Randy Stahl Mookie Everyone ignores me, so I can get away with this: I think this person is a plant. Used to keep things moving on the forum. A pot stirrer that someone behind the scenes knows very well and approves. Admit it. You all enjoy poking a stick at this person or they would evaporate due to being ignored. Takes two to argue - ahem, discuss. I thought I was the "plant" . I can be disruptive too, ask my boss..
Mookie Everyone ignores me, so I can get away with this: I think this person is a plant. Used to keep things moving on the forum. A pot stirrer that someone behind the scenes knows very well and approves. Admit it. You all enjoy poking a stick at this person or they would evaporate due to being ignored. Takes two to argue - ahem, discuss.
Everyone ignores me, so I can get away with this: I think this person is a plant. Used to keep things moving on the forum. A pot stirrer that someone behind the scenes knows very well and approves. Admit it. You all enjoy poking a stick at this person or they would evaporate due to being ignored. Takes two to argue - ahem, discuss.
I thought I was the "plant" . I can be disruptive too, ask my boss..
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
243129 LithoniaOperator I But I find some of the snarky, condescending responses to his/her posts to be infinitely more offensive than anything Euclid has posted. Just sayin’. I personally learn more from instructive posts than from ones whose primary purpose seems to be to throw one‘s weight around and show who the “real railroaders” are. Well said.
LithoniaOperator I But I find some of the snarky, condescending responses to his/her posts to be infinitely more offensive than anything Euclid has posted. Just sayin’. I personally learn more from instructive posts than from ones whose primary purpose seems to be to throw one‘s weight around and show who the “real railroaders” are.
I
But I find some of the snarky, condescending responses to his/her posts to be infinitely more offensive than anything Euclid has posted.
Just sayin’.
I personally learn more from instructive posts than from ones whose primary purpose seems to be to throw one‘s weight around and show who the “real railroaders” are.
Well said.
23 17 46 11
zugmann Euclid As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended. Most liklely not. If it was anything like the software I used, (s)he would have just had a TOL show up on his board.
Euclid As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended.
Most liklely not. If it was anything like the software I used, (s)he would have just had a TOL show up on his board.
Completely correct. And the TOL usually just show a section of track as "red" in the dispatchers track line view of his territory. It doesn't have the resolution of which track circuit is showing occupied - but can involve several.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
https://photos.app.goo.gl/gTeux6Mn4v5GOEA12
An example of occupancy on dispatcher's display. From Carolina to Norcross is 4 miles. It shows as one section on the display despite that there are at least 2 track circuits there. If there were hand throw switches with circuit controllers in that section and any one of them were reversed, the whole section would light up red on the display. The dispatcher would not know why, just that some track circuit in that section is showing occupancy.
oltmannd https://photos.app.goo.gl/gTeux6Mn4v5GOEA12 An example of occupancy on dispatcher's display. From Carolina to Norcross is 4 miles. It shows as one section on the display despite that there are at least 2 track circuits there. If there were hand throw switches with circuit controllers in that section and any one of them were reversed, the whole section would light up red on the display. The dispatcher would not know why, just that some track circuit in that section is showing occupancy.
Don,
Was this type of display operating during the signal suspension, thus indicating that the switch was open as #91 approached?
Euclid, the control machine is tied into the signal system and, even if not attended for the duration of the suspension, may have produced much the same untrustable response as the waysides under test and hence would be ignored
This is an example of why I told you to read up on things before forming conclusions on them. It would appear you are still systematically electing not to do that, or you would have had no need to ask a question like that; indeed, you could have answered it.
There comes a time when wilful repeated ignorance begins to shade over into something else. I advise everyone to avoid that slope.
Euclid oltmannd https://photos.app.goo.gl/gTeux6Mn4v5GOEA12 An example of occupancy on dispatcher's display. From Carolina to Norcross is 4 miles. It shows as one section on the display despite that there are at least 2 track circuits there. If there were hand throw switches with circuit controllers in that section and any one of them were reversed, the whole section would light up red on the display. The dispatcher would not know why, just that some track circuit in that section is showing occupancy. Don, Was this type of display operating during the signal suspension, thus indicating that the switch was open as #91 approached?
When signals are suspended, model board indication in the limits of the signal suspension cannot be used for anything other than a interesting light display. The lights do not indicate track occupancy or a switch being thrown in the limits. They do not contain ANY Dispatcher actionable information.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Overmod Euclid, the control machine is tied into the signal system and, even if not attended for the duration of the suspension, may have produced much the same untrustable response as the waysides under test and hence would be ignored This is an example of why I told you to read up on things before forming conclusions on them. It would appear you are still systematically electing not to do that, or you would have had no need to ask a question like that; indeed, you could have answered it. There comes a time when wilful repeated ignorance begins to shade over into something else. I advise everyone to avoid that slope.
Oh please.
I did not prematurely form conclusions. If it sounded that way to you, I was just stating given factors for the context of my question. I did read that ponderous six page Emergency Order No. 24 that you referenced. It is difficult to assimilate hundreds of sentences where each sentence twists and turns with assertions, supplementary condtions, and exceptions. It seems like a really impractical and pointless excersize to simply get an answer to my yes or no question.
So, okay, I got it. The only control over that switch position was in the reliability of the last person who used it, and any unauthorized use thereafter. I am not ready for a final exam, but I assume that the final position of the switch was manually recorded on a form and entered into a system of records.
It is interesting to take this conclusion back to the point of the original post asking about a sort positive switch verification system.
EuclidI am not ready for a final exam, but I assume that the final position of the switch was manually recorded on a form and entered into a system of records.
You're sure right about the exam (which in this case would really be self-applied before you opined further) but the part of EO 24 that is relevant here has nothing to do with writing stuff on multiple forms, it specifically concerns telling the dispatcher all the signatures are on the form before the dispatcher can give movement authority to any other train between the control points involved. Note that in order to complete the form 'truthfully' the switches must all be lined and locked properly, and requiring confirmation by 'everyone' in the operating train crew is additional assurance, or adequate excuse to spread retrospective blame around, depending on your perspective, that all the switches were set.
Part of what Euclid dismisses as gobbledygook is the discussion of how information on a written form can be conveyed to a remote dispatcher without, say, a fax machine or cell-phone camera. I thought this was pretty clear but then again, I've been used to dealing with Government language abuse for way too long and only object to it now when it is ambiguous.
As this applies to this 91 accident, the audit trail is very short on any branch. The switch was obviously left mislined, for over half an hour. If the CSX crew filled out their SPAF saying they'd all confirmed the switch was lined for the main, either they were 'mistaken' or there was very unlikely tampering. (There is another possibility, but it could be handled with relatively minor embedment of the EO 24 mandated forms and procedures.)
If the dispatcher misunderstood a radio call from the head end reporting 'clear of the switch' as somehow including verbal confirmation of the SPAF as required in some more of that gobbledygook beneath Euclid's tolerance, then the mistake might have been compounded -- some of this depends on a thing I do not remember, the time 91 was given movement authority -- but this would still leave the CSX crew with the necessity of formal SPAF information confirmation with the dispatcher before their tiedown could be deemed complete enough to release authority for 91.
BaltACD When signals are suspended, model board indication in the limits of the signal suspension cannot be used for anything other than a interesting light display. The lights do not indicate track occupancy or a switch being thrown in the limits. They do not contain ANY Dispatcher actionable information.
Makes sense, reminds me of an article on strack speeders noting that the wheels were insulated because they did not reliably shunt the track circuit. If it doesn't work reliably, keep it from working at all.
EuclidSo does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification? If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? For instance, why not impose restricted speed on trains approaching switches?
If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? For instance, why not impose restricted speed on trains approaching switches?
http://ten90solutions.com/as_i_dont_understand_it - see the last 2 paragraphs
As he's an operating supervisor, his opinion has a lot of credibility with me - he understands the procedures to create safety and has been (and still is?) responsible for that.
Of course, having that many qualified people would work only for a signal suspension planned well in advance. For an unanticipated suspension caused by bad weather, etc., it might be hard to round up those people on short notice.
- PDN.
Paul_D_North_Jr Euclid So does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification? If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? For instance, why not impose restricted speed on trains approaching switches? David Schanoes believes that could be accomplished in large part by having signal department employees - not train service or other operating people - be repsonsible for handling the switch and reporting, etc.: http://ten90solutions.com/as_i_dont_understand_it - see the last 2 paragraphs As he's an operating supervisor, his opinion has a lot of credibility with me - he understands the procedures to create safety and has been (and still is?) responsible for that. Of course, having that many qualified people would work only for a signal suspension planned well in advance. For an unanticipated suspension caused by bad weather, etc., it might be hard to round up those people on short notice. - PDN.
Euclid So does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification? If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? For instance, why not impose restricted speed on trains approaching switches?
David Schanoes believes that could be accomplished in large part by having signal department employees - not train service or other operating people - be repsonsible for handling the switch and reporting, etc.:
In 21st Century railroading - it is difficult to get any craft to work on the weekend, let alone at night on weekends - especially when their craft is predicated on a M-F daylight work schedule.
BaltACDIn 21st Century railroading - it is difficult to get any craft to work on the weekend, let alone at night on weekends - especially when their craft is predicated on a M-F daylight work schedule.
"I'm not paying OT! My budget!! My budget!!"
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
zugmann BaltACD In 21st Century railroading - it is difficult to get any craft to work on the weekend, let alone at night on weekends - especially when their craft is predicated on a M-F daylight work schedule. "I'm not paying OT! My budget!! My budget!!"
BaltACD In 21st Century railroading - it is difficult to get any craft to work on the weekend, let alone at night on weekends - especially when their craft is predicated on a M-F daylight work schedule.
That to. Especially in the world of EHH.
Norfolk Southern's answer to verifying switch position within the limits of a signal suspension is to require that "all switches within the limits must be securely spiked or fastened for main track movement" - NS Rule 298(a). This requirement would have brought switching operations at the Dixiana auto facility to a halt, but definitely would have prevented the accident. True safety does not come cheap.
ns145 Norfolk Southern's answer to verifying switch position within the limits of a signal suspension is to require that "all switches within the limits must be securely spiked or fastened for main track movement" - NS Rule 298(a). This requirement would have brought switching operations at the Dixiana auto facility to a halt, but definitely would have prevented the accident. True safety does not come cheap.
ns145Norfolk Southern's answer to verifying switch position within the limits of a signal suspension is to require that "all switches within the limits must be securely spiked or fastened for main track movement" - NS Rule 298(a).
i find it interesting that we have already had other posts indicating that other railroads follow the same procedure (I recall UP being one) -- can someone with more patience and a better device than I check to see what the various other North American railroads of consequence do?
Before the potential issue of a signal department employee came up, I would have said that track-warrant procedures involving just the crews of trains should be a reasonable way to provide safety while still allowing operation on sidings. Whether or not that rumor turns out to have substance, I now see one place that the post-Graniteville procedures need to be changed if 'spiking' is not to be adopted for reasonable safety. This might be as simple as adaptation to lockout/tagout when a supervisor comes along and says the equivalent of 'Hey, Mac, let me take a whack at it'* -- namely that there be explicit transfer of all authority, perhaps in this case as silly as the idea of CSX lining, locking, and documenting the switch position before letting a signal person 'have at it'.
*I apologize in advance if this attempt at humor makes people irritated; it's supposed to try to make the concept behind it memorable...
Now you're reading!
(I trust Balt likes your quoted use of Bando Blue!)
Now is the time for a real education and employment opportunity.
https://www.facebook.com/nscareers/videos/1292281154206873/
Euclid Here is process of granting exceptions to EO #24. I see some roads apparently require trains to approach hand-operated switches prepared to stop. That’s an interesting solution. Hmm...
All railroads have rules that at times will require trains or engines approaching a switch, facing or trailing points, prepared to stop short. Some branch lines of the major carriers may be operated under such a rule. Some short line railroads* may operate their entire line under such rules. The rule is called Yard Limits. GCOR also has Restricted Limits. Within Yard Limits in unsignalled territory (in all territory when within Restricted Limits) all trains and engines must operate at Restricted Speed. Hmm... I'm surprised you didn't know this already.
To remind you what Restricted Speed is, here's the GCOR version.
When a train or engine is required to move at restricted speed, movement must be made at a speed that allows stopping within half the range of vision short of:
The crew must keep a lookout for broken rail and not exceed 20 MPH.
Comply with these requirements until the leading wheels reach a point where movement at restricted speed is no longer required.
Notice it actually says stopping short of a derail or switch lined improperly?
Jeff
Had a signal maintainer handle a dual control in hand operation for my train once. Too bad he forgot about the moveable point frog. Caught it before anything bad happened.
jeffhergertTo remind you what Restricted Speed is, here's the GCOR version.
NORAC is essentially the same.
For a long time, our own rules called for "not to exceed 10 MPH." That's been raised to 20 MPH now.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Euclid ns145 Norfolk Southern's answer to verifying switch position within the limits of a signal suspension is to require that "all switches within the limits must be securely spiked or fastened for main track movement" - NS Rule 298(a). This requirement would have brought switching operations at the Dixiana auto facility to a halt, but definitely would have prevented the accident. True safety does not come cheap. Why don’t they just rely on the switch position awareness form? Wouldn’t that get the job done at less cost?
Although your question feels "troll-y" to me, I'll answer anyway, with a parallel.
Some countries allow right turn on red after stop. Some countries don't. It's a trade off between a small increment of safety against a small increment of time and energy. It depends how you measure and value the trade-offs.
tree68 jeffhergert To remind you what Restricted Speed is, here's the GCOR version. NORAC is essentially the same. For a long time, our own rules called for "not to exceed 10 MPH." That's been raised to 20 MPH now.
jeffhergert To remind you what Restricted Speed is, here's the GCOR version.
Was 15 mph on Conrail for ages.
Does the concept of "switch tenders" functionally apply in these signal suspension situations. I read earlier in the thread that "budget" concerns and fewer personnel would make this difficult.
I understand, as a non railroader, that rules are to be followed (and somehow either the rule was not followed, or validalism occured) but what are possible rule adjustments going forward?
Further, do you believe the Feds will be involved in new rules covering these operations? Ironically, it is the implementation of Federal rules (PTC) which led to this unfortunate incident.
Thanks to all operation folks for your patience in my lack of understanding.
Ed
Keep in mind that 'PTC caused this accident' is only circumstantial, roughly comparable to blaming the firemen for the Lac Megantic wreck. Finding the actual cause, which is almost certainly in how the dispatcher was 'informed' that the switch was lined and authority released, is the important thing to start determining when NTSB releases their next report.
It is very clear to me (as a non-railroader) that the only 'safe' way to run above restricted speed in these situations is either to require spiking of all the switches involved or, as you mentioned, providing employees to tend each switch 'for the duration'. There are a number of interesting concerns with the latter approach, which I'll get to in a moment.
Any approach that does not physically immobilize the switches, not just keep them locked 'under supervision', would require some version of EO 24 SPAF to be kept, and strict reporting conventions with the dispatcher observed. One of the current accident scenarios now being discussed is that a signal-systems employee of some kind did, in fact, 'take over' responsibility of the switch from the crew, but did not successfully communicate that to the dispatcher, perhaps thinking the crew would ensure all other trains were still held. The issues that produced the 'need' for timer switches would still apply to 'switchtenders' who might forget or panic and throw switches ahead of or under trains (as I believe has been documented).
On the other hand, much 'precision scheduled Railroading' would go to Hell in a handbasket if subject to running prepared to stop at each facing switch (for reasons mentioned in at least one thread so far) or even at restricted speed. This before we address the inconvenience and potential loss of revenue from any moves that cannot be made while the route is 'spiked' (or could be made, safely, between the bunched-up traffic in a restricted-speed bottleneck).
So either the Government mandates full safe course, which involves spiking all switches (as anything less than a full Government order would likely be ignored by a management interested in running as much of its normal traffic as normally as possible) or some enhanced procedure, with full audit-trail documentation, needs to be applied.
If that is the case, the two events of signal suspension and failure of switch position awareness are actually unrelated events. They just happened to occur at the same time, like falling from the trapeze on the day you decide to work without a net.
Well, I think that's not quite right; they are necessarily sequential. As a number of posters have said, if there had been no signal suspension this wreck would not, and almost assuredly could not, have occurred.
To digress briefly: you may have read and perhaps commented on some of the threads regarding 'consolidation' of dispatching in a few whiz-bang nerve centers, and the accompanying loss of most physical route familiarity beyond what dispatchers 'closer to their territory' would have. In a signal suspension the dispatcher is essentially blind, dependent on what he or she hears or receives from the people on the spot, and unable to verify the status of any switch, or the position of any train, apart from what is reported. It has been mentioned that people accustomed to CTC may have a hard time getting comfortable with 'paper railroad' conventions and limitations; I can't of course speak for the dispatchers' "tribe" but we have several participants here who can.
Since it is so far undisputed that the dispatcher issued 59mph authority to 91, we can isolate the proximate cause of the 'human error' not to the fact of the mislimed switch, but to the communications with the dispatcher that convinced her the railroad was safe.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.