overallHere is my question; Why can’t the railroads do something similar with track switches? If a brakeman on a train needs to line a switch abnormally, he should call the dispatcher and get permission first, before doing it. If the switch is left lined for a siding, when it should be lined for the main, that situation would be flagged on a mimic board and the dispatcher would know to issue a switching order to get that switch back to normal. If this is a bad idea or won’t work, tell me why.
If this is a bad idea or won’t work, tell me why.
It is done every day. There are procedures in effect to require it. However, in the Cacye case, with the signal system suspended there was no indication to the Dispatcher that the job that backed the auto racks off in the siding had failed to close the siding switch, despite the crew having reported that they had closed the switch.
To use your term - the mimic board was out of service account of the Signal System Suspension.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD overall Here is my question; Why can’t the railroads do something similar with track switches? If a brakeman on a train needs to line a switch abnormally, he should call the dispatcher and get permission first, before doing it. If the switch is left lined for a siding, when it should be lined for the main, that situation would be flagged on a mimic board and the dispatcher would know to issue a switching order to get that switch back to normal. If this is a bad idea or won’t work, tell me why. It is done every day. There are procedures in effect to require it. However, in the Cacye case, with the signal system suspended there was no indication to the Dispatcher that the job that backed the auto racks off in the siding had failed to close the siding switch, despite the crew having reported that they had closed the switch. To use your term - the mimic board was out of service account of the Signal System Suspension.
overall Here is my question; Why can’t the railroads do something similar with track switches? If a brakeman on a train needs to line a switch abnormally, he should call the dispatcher and get permission first, before doing it. If the switch is left lined for a siding, when it should be lined for the main, that situation would be flagged on a mimic board and the dispatcher would know to issue a switching order to get that switch back to normal. If this is a bad idea or won’t work, tell me why.
So does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification?
If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? For instance, why not impose restricted speed on trains approaching switches?
EuclidIf so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? For instance, why not impose restricted speed on trains approaching switches?
Those protections were in place. Speed on the line was reduced to 59 MPH, and I have little doubt that track occupancy was granted by EC1 (track warrant).
Trains in dark territory routinely run without any signals at all.
The suspension had been in effect for what, a full day already. There were no problems up until that point.
A failure in procedure occured.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
EuclidSo does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification?
Yes. The switch had a circuit controller and electric lock. If the switch wasn't hard over against the stock rail in the normal position, the track circuit would knock down and the adjacent block signal would show "stop".
EuclidIf so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification?
With the signal system out, the territory reverted to "dark territory" rules. 59 mph max instead of 79 mph. So, same level of safety as running in dark territory elsewhere. Part of this is that the switch position to be recorded on form - by Federal Rule.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/11/25/05-23303/fra-emergency-order-no-24-notice-no-2-emergency-order-no-24-hand-operated-main-track-switches
Was this done in this case? I don't think anybody has said it has or hasn't been done. Only statement I heard was that the freight released their movement authority and implicit in this was that switch was normal and locked.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Why not shut the railroad down for the duration?
Anything is subject to man failure. PTC when implemented will be subject to man failure.
oltmannd Euclid So does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification? Yes. The switch had a circuit controller and electric lock. If the switch wasn't hard over against the stock rail in the normal position, the track circuit would knock down and the adjacent block signal would show "stop". Euclid If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? With the signal system out, the territory reverted to "dark territory" rules. 59 mph max instead of 79 mph. So, same level of safety as running in dark territory elsewhere. Part of this is that the switch position to be recorded on form - by Federal Rule. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/11/25/05-23303/fra-emergency-order-no-24-notice-no-2-emergency-order-no-24-hand-operated-main-track-switches Was this done in this case? I don't think anybody has said it has or hasn't been done. Only statement I heard was that the freight released their movement authority and implicit in this was that switch was normal and locked.
Euclid So does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification?
Euclid If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification?
Okay, if I understand you, the signal suspension reverted the territory back to the safety level of dark territory, which is less safe than signalized territory. So the signal suspension reduced safety on that track.
So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension?
Otherwise, it seems inherently risky to reduce the safety protection on anything that is in operation with people used to the normal safety; even if the reduce level of safety is in operation elsewhere and considered acceptable.
Euclid oltmannd Euclid So does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification? Yes. The switch had a circuit controller and electric lock. If the switch wasn't hard over against the stock rail in the normal position, the track circuit would knock down and the adjacent block signal would show "stop". Euclid If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? With the signal system out, the territory reverted to "dark territory" rules. 59 mph max instead of 79 mph. So, same level of safety as running in dark territory elsewhere. Part of this is that the switch position to be recorded on form - by Federal Rule. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/11/25/05-23303/fra-emergency-order-no-24-notice-no-2-emergency-order-no-24-hand-operated-main-track-switches Was this done in this case? I don't think anybody has said it has or hasn't been done. Only statement I heard was that the freight released their movement authority and implicit in this was that switch was normal and locked. Okay, if I understand you, the signal suspension reverted the territory back to the safety level of dark territory, which is less safe than signalized territory. So the signal suspension reduced safety on that track. So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension? Otherwise, it seems inherently risky to reduce the safety protection on anything that is in operation with people used to the normal safety; even if the reduce level of safety is in operation elsewhere and considered acceptable.
This has been obvious to most of the posters on this thread and the other threads that are related to the matter since the first report that the signal suspension was in effect at the time of the collision.
Johnny
Deggesty Euclid oltmannd Euclid So does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification? Yes. The switch had a circuit controller and electric lock. If the switch wasn't hard over against the stock rail in the normal position, the track circuit would knock down and the adjacent block signal would show "stop". Euclid If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? With the signal system out, the territory reverted to "dark territory" rules. 59 mph max instead of 79 mph. So, same level of safety as running in dark territory elsewhere. Part of this is that the switch position to be recorded on form - by Federal Rule. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/11/25/05-23303/fra-emergency-order-no-24-notice-no-2-emergency-order-no-24-hand-operated-main-track-switches Was this done in this case? I don't think anybody has said it has or hasn't been done. Only statement I heard was that the freight released their movement authority and implicit in this was that switch was normal and locked. Okay, if I understand you, the signal suspension reverted the territory back to the safety level of dark territory, which is less safe than signalized territory. So the signal suspension reduced safety on that track. So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension? Otherwise, it seems inherently risky to reduce the safety protection on anything that is in operation with people used to the normal safety; even if the reduce level of safety is in operation elsewhere and considered acceptable. As has been stated, such a system was imposed by reverting to the rules in effect in dark territory. This has been obvious to most of the posters on this thread and the other threads that are related to the matter since the first report that the signal suspension was in effect at the time of the collision.
As has been stated, such a system was imposed by reverting to the rules in effect in dark territory.
That does not answer my question which you highlighted in red. Why is dark territory sufficient for a line that has been deemed necessary to signalize?
EuclidThat does not answer my question which you highlighted in red. Why is dark territory sufficient for a line that has been deemed necessary to signalize?
I'm not sure I understand the point of this question. The line WAS signalized, but what do you do if the signals then stop working for some reason? Quit and go home in the van until they light up again? No, you go to the procedures in the CSX rules and the Florence Division employee timetable -- which in this particular case resembles the procedure used for permanently-unsignaled line because, in a suspension, the signals may not be "dark" but you ignore anything about them.
Now, this has no bearing on suspending observation of EO 24, which calls for holograph confirmation of safe switch lining in ANY circumstance (which is a CYA formality) but also explicit confirmation to the manual-rules dispatcher that all the actions and conditions required to be signed off on that CYA form have, in fact, been completely done.
This specific thing, which after discussion was adopted as a Federal Rule specifically to prevent JUST this kind of incident, is the great concern here, and its evident failure the great mystery here, not anything to do with railroaders supposedly being unable to run trains in the absence of pretty colored lights.
EuclidSo why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension?
Because the railroads operate in the real world with real constraints and limitations. I understand to you this is all an academic exercise, but that's you. You're alwasy looking for perfection. It's a noble pursuit, but don't let it consume you.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Why was the line deemed necessary to signalize?
Odds are it was less for safety than it was capacity. Signals allow following trains to work at relatively short headway - long enough to stop without colliding with the train ahead, but not so long as to unduly restrict how many trains could be run on the line.
Safety - protection against broken rails, misaligned switches, etc, was likely a secondary consideration when the signals were installed.
Maintaining this level of capacity without signals would have required a manned block station every few miles, and at all passing sidings.
Even today it would require train crews to be in near constant contact with the dispatcher by radio.
It's rare to hear a dispatcher give a train territory less than 20-30 miles. In many cases I hear the dispatcher here give a train the whole railroad - 60-70 miles - because there is no other traffic. Sometimes it's just a few miles because that's all they need to do their work.
Dark territory rules attempt to do exactly this. That's why the lower speeds. That's why the "belt and suspenders" rules on switch position.
The safest course would be to not run the train.
The next safest course would be to run the whole thing at restricted speed.
Of course, there is a need for railroads to actually function as transportation, so dark territory is allowed and the rules are codified and judged by the Federal regulators as adequate for safety.
zugmann Euclid So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension? Because the railroads operate in the real world with real constraints and limitations. I understand to you this is all an academic exercise, but that's you. You're alwasy looking for perfection. It's a noble pursuit, but don't let it consume you.
Euclid So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension?
+1 ...obviously.
oltmannd Euclid So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension? Dark territory rules attempt to do exactly this. That's why the lower speeds. That's why the "belt and suspenders" rules on switch position. The safest course would be to not run the train. The next safest course would be to run the whole thing at restricted speed. Of course, there is a need for railroads to actually function as transportation, so dark territory is allowed and the rules are codified and judged by the Federal regulators as adequate for safety.
Rather than shut the railroad down, why not impose a restricted speed order on approach to mainline switches? Would that be just too much perfection?
Thank you, Overmod, Larry, Zug, Don, for your responses. I was somewhat flabbergasted at the response to my answer (perhaps I should not have been so).
From the day that an Erie superintendent first issued an order to the oprerating crews of an opposing train on, as rules were developed and put into force, trains have been operated safely, barring natural interventions--when the rules have been observed and common sense prevailed.
When I first went to the Jacksonvile Dispatch Center in 1990, when we had signal FAILURE on a subdivision, Management immediately wanted to have DTC (Direct Train Control) placed into effect on the affected territory - Beside the 2-3 hour or more delay in getting the Signal Suspension messages forulated, transmitted and repeated to ALL trains that were on the railroad at the time - DTC injects one other restriction with trains not having cabooses and flagmen - there can only be a single train in the established block at any point in time. If you have two trains following each other through signalled territory on say 10 minute headway, the first train can enter the block if authorized and proceed at the maximum speed for the block. The 2nd train comes to a stop at the entrance of the block and waits until the preceeding train reports his entire train is clear of the block and he releases his authority to the Dispatcher, who then contacts the following train and issues that train's authority. What happens is that traffic seriously backs up over time with the restricted means of movement. Management's thoughts at the time was freight trains could run 49 MPH through the block, which was correct, however, what it overlooked was the cascade effect of only permitting a single train in a block at a time.
Subsequently, management decided it was more efficient to 'talk trains past the stop signals' and let them operate at Restricted Speed looking out for trains ahead in addition to all the other things a crew is to look out for when operating at Restricted Speed.
Sometimes, the 59 MPH and 49 MPH speeds for Passenger and Freight in Dark Territory is just a illusion in the real world of railroading. Multiple 'inch worms' keep a subdivision relatively fluid, whereas 'speed demon' DTC or TWC dark railroading can tie it in knots.
There are NO PERFECT ANSWERS in the movement of trains by human beings.
Euclid Rather than shut the railroad down, why not impose a restricted speed order on approach to mainline switches? Would that be just too much perfection?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Murphy Siding Euclid Rather than shut the railroad down, why not impose a restricted speed order on approach to mainline switches? Would that be just too much perfection? They did- 59 miles per hour.
They did- 59 miles per hour.
That is not restricted speed.
EuclidObviously a restriction to 59 mph was not slow enough.
It would have been just fine if rules were followed. (unless sabotage was an issue).
The alternative is restricting speed. The heart and soul of restricting speed is "line of sight". If you want solid protection from hand throws and broken rails in dark territory, you're stuck with restricting speed. Better yet, restricting speed with high rail ahead of each train.
Obviously, this is not good enough to provide meaningful transportation. The dark territory rules have been honed over decades and decades. They are good for what they are.
EuclidRather than shut the railroad down, why not impose a restricted speed order on approach to mainline switches?
Are you proposing restricted speed (a method of operation which is specifically spelled out in the rules), or "a restricted speed?" And if you're suggesting "a restricted speed," what would you suggest it be?
Euclid Murphy Siding Euclid Rather than shut the railroad down, why not impose a restricted speed order on approach to mainline switches? Would that be just too much perfection? They did- 59 miles per hour. That is not restricted speed.
Assuming we are all in accord with what 'restricted speed' means with no working signals -- which involves the ability to make a safe stop in half the sight distance -- it might be interesting to take a map of the Florence Division, physically note all the critical restrictions including facing-point switches, and develop a train-speed map that provides restricted-speed protection for all the restrictions. I think that is what Euclid is calling for, and at least theoretically this might extend to running in the equivalent of 'sections' where the following train can be stopped in half the distance to the visible end or EOT of the train ahead, giving you inchworms. Until this is actually laid out and modeled all we have is he-said she-said with cross-accusations of misunderstanding, which I find I'm too tired to watch any more. And I find to my despair that I have a food allergy, possibly one acquired after too long reading here and on RyPN, to popcorn.
Suspect that will indeed be 'too slow to work' as well as nerve-wracking to crews, but I do think it deserves a calculation with 'real numbers' to confirm or deny.
tree68Are you proposing restricted speed (a method of operation which is specifically spelled out in the rules), or "a restricted speed?" And if you're suggesting "a restricted speed," what would you suggest it be?
Restricted speed isn't necessarily necessary. If you're just concerned with switchpoints, you can operate prepared to stop at each facing one.
We had that rule for running opposed in 251 territory for a bit. Never understood it, really.
Would that be a problematic disruption? How many miles of track, how many switches, and for how many days are we talking about?
EuclidAs I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended.
Most liklely not. If it was anything like the software I used, (s)he would have just had a TOL show up on his board.
Euclid It reminds me of the Chester wreck where permission was granted, but expired without proper information exchanges and understandings.
Be careful with using the term "expired". Depends on rule book, but for us, certain permissions never expire. They can be fulfilled, cancelled or voided - but don't expire.
EuclidSo, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong.
An approach speed. Define that. Are we operating the whole block restricting? Or just near the switches? How far in advance? As any day 1 RRer can tell you, "restricted" is not a speed. It's a method of operation. Can't just throw the term around willy-nilly.
zugmann Euclid As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended. Most liklely not. If it was anything like the software I used, (s)he would have just had a TOL show up on his board.
Euclid As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended.
Okay. I thought that is what Balt said earlier here or in another thread. The gist of it was that because the signals had been suspended, there was lack of direct remote knowledge of the switch position. But it was not entirely clear to me.
Euclid I am talking about rule-defined “restricted speed.” If the switch points are visible at 250 feet, you approach no faster than the speed at which you can stop within 125 feet. As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended. Being that they were suspended, the dispatcher had to rely on verbal information conveyed by the freight conductor. Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed. It reminds me of the Chester wreck where permission was granted, but expired without proper information exchanges and understandings. In any case, it sounds like it was mainly or exclusively switch position verification that was compromised in the suspension of signals. So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong. Would that be a problematic disruption? How many miles of track, how many switches, and for how many days are we talking about?
Quoting Euclid: " Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed."
Euclid, apparently you missed all the references to the form in the various posts that referred to the form. Can someone tell me how many times the forms have been mentioned on the threads concerning this wreck?
It is not the signing of the forms that failed. It is either the failure of the person responsible to align the switch for the main to so align it, or else someone with a switch key came along and maliciously lined it back to the siding.
zugmann Euclid So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong. An approach speed. Define that. Are we operating the whole block restricting? Or just near the switches? How far in advance? As any day 1 RRer can tell you, "restricted" is not a speed. It's a method of operation. Can't just throw the term around willy-nilly.
Euclid So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong.
It is whatever speed and location where that speed is stipulated that accomplishes the goal that I defined in this part of my prior post:
"to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong."
Euclid"to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong."
Gald you don't write the rules.
Using the term "approach speed" is odd.
Either make the block restricting, or have a requirment to prepare to stop before each facing point. See? Much simpler. Or have maintainers out to man each switch that needs used. Or did EHH fire all of them, too?
Murphy Siding Euclid I am talking about rule-defined “restricted speed.” If the switch points are visible at 250 feet, you approach no faster than the speed at which you can stop within 125 feet. As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended. Being that they were suspended, the dispatcher had to rely on verbal information conveyed by the freight conductor. Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed. It reminds me of the Chester wreck where permission was granted, but expired without proper information exchanges and understandings. In any case, it sounds like it was mainly or exclusively switch position verification that was compromised in the suspension of signals. So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong. Would that be a problematic disruption? How many miles of track, how many switches, and for how many days are we talking about? At what speed would they be able to stop the train in 125 feet? To keep from having a restricted speed that varied with the visibility available for each switch, you'd probably just end up rolling along at whatever the most restricted speed was.
At what speed would they be able to stop the train in 125 feet? To keep from having a restricted speed that varied with the visibility available for each switch, you'd probably just end up rolling along at whatever the most restricted speed was.
That is up to the judgment of the engineer. As others have said, "restricted speed" it is not a specific speed. It is defined by the objective to stop short of something, and can vary according to train, grades, weather, etc.
So you're calling for restricted speed, which on my railroad carries the caveat "not to exceed 20 MPH."
EuclidThat is up to the judgment of the engineer. As others have said, "restricted speed" it is not a specific speed. It is defined by the objective to stop short of something, and can vary according to train, grades, weather, etc.
Stop short of some things - look our for others.
zugmann Euclid "to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong." Gald you don't write the rules. Using the term "approach speed" is odd. Either make the block restricting, or have a requirment to prepare to stop before each facing point. See? Much simpler. Or have maintainers out to man each switch that needs used. Or did EHH fire all of them, too?
Euclid "to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong."
Well as long as you understand what I mean, you can put it into the right words. I am only concerned with saying what needs to be accomplished.
zugmann Euclid "to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong." Gald you don't write the rules. Using the term "approach speed" is odd. Either make the block restricting, or have a requirment to prepare to stop before each facing point. See? Much simpler.
Either make the block restricting, or have a requirment to prepare to stop before each facing point. See? Much simpler.
Maybe he is a no experience weed weasel trying to hang everybody with his interpertation of how the rules are written and specified 'in his minds rule book', not the one that a railroad has published and teaches for its employees.
Euclid Murphy Siding Euclid I am talking about rule-defined “restricted speed.” If the switch points are visible at 250 feet, you approach no faster than the speed at which you can stop within 125 feet. As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended. Being that they were suspended, the dispatcher had to rely on verbal information conveyed by the freight conductor. Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed. It reminds me of the Chester wreck where permission was granted, but expired without proper information exchanges and understandings. In any case, it sounds like it was mainly or exclusively switch position verification that was compromised in the suspension of signals. So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong. Would that be a problematic disruption? How many miles of track, how many switches, and for how many days are we talking about? At what speed would they be able to stop the train in 125 feet? To keep from having a restricted speed that varied with the visibility available for each switch, you'd probably just end up rolling along at whatever the most restricted speed was. That is up to the judgment of the engineer. As others have said, "restricted speed" it is not a specific speed. It is defined by the objective to stop short of something, and can vary according to train, grades, weather, etc.
EuclidWell as long as you understand what I mean, you can put it into the right words. I am only concerned with saying what needs to be accomplished.
We all know what needs to be accomplished. But getting there IS the battle.
But assuming you know what a rule means is the fatest way to get written up for it. But at least you'll learn what it really means, I guess.
Deggesty Quoting Euclid: " Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed." Euclid, apparently you missed all the references to the form in the various posts that referred to the form. Can someone tell me how many times the forms have been mentioned on the threads concerning this wreck? It is not the signing of the forms that failed. It is either the failure of the person responsible to align the switch for the main to so align it, or else someone with a switch key came along and maliciously lined it back to the siding.
At least a million is how many times forms have been mentioned in the threads about this wreck. I don't know what failed besides the position of the switch. All I recall is that the conductor basically confirmed that they had finished their work involving the switch. And I guess that there is an implication there that the switch had been properly re-lined for the main line. However, as I understand what Balt said, the suspension of signals also suspended the means of the dispatcher confiming that the switch was actually properly lined.
So maybe we should go back to that point and revisit the issue of how the switch was wrong and nobody knew it.
Overmod Euclid That does not answer my question which you highlighted in red. Why is dark territory sufficient for a line that has been deemed necessary to signalize? I'm not sure I understand the point of this question. The line WAS signalized, but what do you do if the signals then stop working for some reason? Quit and go home in the van until they light up again? No, you go to the procedures in the CSX rules and the Florence Division employee timetable -- which in this particular case resembles the procedure used for permanently-unsignaled line because, in a suspension, the signals may not be "dark" but you ignore anything about them. Now, this has no bearing on suspending observation of EO 24, which calls for holograph confirmation of safe switch lining in ANY circumstance (which is a CYA formality) but also explicit confirmation to the manual-rules dispatcher that all the actions and conditions required to be signed off on that CYA form have, in fact, been completely done. This specific thing, which after discussion was adopted as a Federal Rule specifically to prevent JUST this kind of incident, is the great concern here, and its evident failure the great mystery here, not anything to do with railroaders supposedly being unable to run trains in the absence of pretty colored lights.
Euclid That does not answer my question which you highlighted in red. Why is dark territory sufficient for a line that has been deemed necessary to signalize?
23 17 46 11
Euclid oltmannd Euclid So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension? Dark territory rules attempt to do exactly this. That's why the lower speeds. That's why the "belt and suspenders" rules on switch position. The safest course would be to not run the train. The next safest course would be to run the whole thing at restricted speed. Of course, there is a need for railroads to actually function as transportation, so dark territory is allowed and the rules are codified and judged by the Federal regulators as adequate for safety. Why is it that when I suggest a little more safety, people say, “Well we could just stop running trains” ? Is there not a happy medium? Obviously a restriction to 59 mph was not slow enough. The OP here spoke of a system for guaranteed control over power grid switches and wondered why the railroads don’t have something equivalent. He was immediately assured that they do have something equivalent; and yet that was not the case at the time and place of this collision. Rather than shut the railroad down, why not impose a restricted speed order on approach to mainline switches? Would that be just too much perfection?
A little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher.
Euclid: google FRA Emergency Order 24, and be sure you have read and carefully comprehended both the comments filed when it was first proposed (after Graniteville) and the FULL text of the final rule as published in the Federal Register. That will make you enough of an expert on the 'forms' to comment on the details intelligently, particularly as involves notifying dispatchers when operating under some version of track-warrant control.
Rest of you: leave him alone until he has done all that. Then we can reduce it to reading comprehension relative to the actual words in the actual Final Rule that applies anywhere, Florence Division, signal suspension, or whatever.
OvermodA little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher.
DS will have a TOL. Engineer will also know there is something in the block ahead. But unless you have an actual switch signal (Pennsy had those at one time), all you know is that there is something in the block.
tree68 Euclid "to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong." So you're calling for restricted speed, which on my railroad carries the caveat "not to exceed 20 MPH."
...20 mph because that's about as fast as you can go before your are "outdriving your vision".
zugmann Overmod A little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher. DS will have a TOL. Engineer will also know there is something in the block ahead. But unless you have an actual switch signal (Pennsy had those at one time), all you know is that there is something in the block.
Overmod A little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher.
+1
Since when have reality and common sense entered Euclid's world?
Euclidall I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong."
So, you are expecting every engineer running what is normally CTC territory to remember exactly where every single facing point hand throw is on their territory? What do you think the error rate with this procedure would be?
zugmann ... But unless you have an actual switch signal (Pennsy had those at one time), all you know is that there is something in the block.
And the way you know this, say if you're approaching the block at 59mph, is how?
Euclid's argument doesn't care if the engineer knows it's an unlined switch vs. a standing train vs. lightning cycling the relays wrong. The important thing is that he will have a red board, and whatever rules he follows from that point could safely involve Euclid's creeping along at real restricted speed ... to the next clear block. That might not be intolerable.
OvermodAnd the way you know this, say if you're approaching the block at 59mph, is how? Euclid's argument doesn't care if the engineer knows it's an unlined switch vs. a standing train vs. lightning cycling the relays wrong. The important thing is that he will have a red board, and whatever rules he follows from that point could safely involve Euclid's creeping along at real restricted speed ... to the next clear block. That might not be intolerable.
I don't know what you're trying to ask here. Yeah, if you have a signal, then it would be restrictive. If you don't have a signal, you are running paper railroad. If you don't like the idea of paper railroad - then so be it.
WAIT A MINUTE ... nobody move!
I want Euclid to explain in his own words what a TOL is, and how it is generated.
No hints, either.
Overmod WAIT A MINUTE ... nobody move! I want Euclid to explain in his own words what a TOL is, and how it is generated. No hints, either.
Well I am just guessing, but I think it might mean "Track Occupied Light" and it lights up on the dispatcher's board when a switch is opened, and it indicates the block facing the points is occupied. But if I am wrong, I am hoping someone will chime in with the right answer.
EuclidBut if I am wrong...
Bucky wrong? How can that be?
Don't guess; research it. If you are going to speculate about what something does you should research how it works.
This could take a while, cue the jeopardy music!
I'll make some popcorn...
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Murphy Siding zugmann Overmod A little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher. DS will have a TOL. Engineer will also know there is something in the block ahead. But unless you have an actual switch signal (Pennsy had those at one time), all you know is that there is something in the block. TOL?
TOL?
Trolling Out Loud. I'm just guessing, I didn't research that.
Jeff
PS. The terminology I hear is close, but just a bit different. I imagine just like other things, it depends on where you are for the terms in use.
SD70Dude This could take a while, cue the jeopardy music! I'll make some popcorn...
EuclidWell I am just guessing, but I think it might mean "Track Occupied Light" and it lights up on the dispatcher's board when a switch is opened, and it indicates the block facing the points is occupied. But if I am wrong, I am hoping someone will chime in with the right answer.
Yeah. track occupancy light, track light, I'm sure there's other terms as Jeff says. Dirty definition: Just shows when something is shunting/interupting the current in a block of track. Could be open switch, broken rail, shunting device, boxcar that rolled away from a siding, parked train, flooded tracks, broken bond wire, or something else.
TOL--sounds as though it is related to what the DS used to use to keep track of who was where when--and what each operator used to show who went by when. I won't give the old name; must keep it a secret.
Kind of like OSing?
One desk I worked had a clipboard. Used it to keep track of what was in the various sidings/holding spots/ industries.
Old head told me "I don't care what you do - just keep that clipboard updated!"
I don't miss those days.
zugmann Euclid Well I am just guessing, but I think it might mean "Track Occupied Light" and it lights up on the dispatcher's board when a switch is opened, and it indicates the block facing the points is occupied. But if I am wrong, I am hoping someone will chime in with the right answer. Yeah. track occupancy light, track light, I'm sure there's other terms as Jeff says. Dirty definition: Just shows when something is shunting/interupting the current in a block of track. Could be open switch, broken rail, shunting device, boxcar that rolled away from a siding, parked train, flooded tracks, broken bond wire, or something else.
Euclid Well I am just guessing, but I think it might mean "Track Occupied Light" and it lights up on the dispatcher's board when a switch is opened, and it indicates the block facing the points is occupied. But if I am wrong, I am hoping someone will chime in with the right answer.
So was that working at the collsion site during the signal supension? Or was it shut off because of the signal suspension?
EuclidSo was that working at the collsion site during the signal supension? Or was it shut off because of the signal suspension?
that is the signal system.
zugmann Kind of like OSing? One desk I worked had a clipboard. Used it to keep track of what was in the various sidings/holding spots/ industries. Old head told me "I don't care what you do - just keep that clipboard updated!" I don't miss those days.
Deggesty zugmann Kind of like OSing? One desk I worked had a clipboard. Used it to keep track of what was in the various sidings/holding spots/ industries. Old head told me "I don't care what you do - just keep that clipboard updated!" I don't miss those days. Zug, DON'T give it away!
Zug, DON'T give it away!
The ***** ***** that the dispatcher used to maintain in ink, is now maintained by computer. Zug's clip board sounds like a column on the ***** *****s I have from the RI called a yard report. Actually ***** ***** is probably more slang. I have some from the RI, MILW and FTDDM&S and the form name is a bit more formal. On the RI the form was called ************ ****** ** ***** ********. The RI form the operators used to record train arrival/departure/passing was ******* ****** ** ***** ********.
Now we can discuss OS. Is it "On Sheet", "Out of Station" or "Over Switch"? I'm in the On Sheet camp.
OS = On sheet.
My first rules qualification was in the consolidated code of operating rules..
Then it was GCOR, then it was CROR, then NORAC, now again GCOR. And don't forget the CORA book for Chicago. So many rules, so little memory...
I’m new here. More than four decades ago, I spent two years working on a small southern railroad. And I have been a railfan for more than 60 years.
Some of Euclid’s questions and comments strike me as perhaps coming from someone relatively uninformed, unrealistic, naive, or some combination thereof. But they seem like honest, sincere remarks, by and large. (Maybe with an exception or two.)
But I find some of the snarky, condescending responses to his/her posts to be infinitely more offensive than anything Euclid has posted.
Just sayin’.
I personally learn more from instructive posts than from ones whose primary purpose seems to be to throw one‘s weight around and show who the “real railroaders” are.
Still in training.
Randy StahlOS = On sheet. My first rules qualification was in the consolidated code of operating rules.. Then it was GCOR, then it was CROR, then NORAC, now again GCOR. And don't forget the CORA book for Chicago. So many rules, so little memory...
So many rules nearly the same - but not! And the devil is in the differences.
LithoniaOperator I But I find some of the snarky, condescending responses to his/her posts to be infinitely more offensive than anything Euclid has posted. Just sayin’. I personally learn more from instructive posts than from ones whose primary purpose seems to be to throw one‘s weight around and show who the “real railroaders” are.
I
Well said.
BaltACD Randy Stahl OS = On sheet. My first rules qualification was in the consolidated code of operating rules.. Then it was GCOR, then it was CROR, then NORAC, now again GCOR. And don't forget the CORA book for Chicago. So many rules, so little memory... So many rules nearly the same - but not! And the devil is in the differences.
Randy Stahl OS = On sheet. My first rules qualification was in the consolidated code of operating rules.. Then it was GCOR, then it was CROR, then NORAC, now again GCOR. And don't forget the CORA book for Chicago. So many rules, so little memory...
Yes, but I've never released my main track authority with a switch reversed unless I had a clearance or track warrant line item to do so regardless of what rulebook I was using.
243129 LithoniaOperator I But I find some of the snarky, condescending responses to his/her posts to be infinitely more offensive than anything Euclid has posted. Just sayin’. I personally learn more from instructive posts than from ones whose primary purpose seems to be to throw one‘s weight around and show who the “real railroaders” are. Well said.
But still wrong...
An "expensive model collector"
LithoniaOperator I’m new here. More than four decades ago, I spent two years working on a small southern railroad. And I have been a railfan for more than 60 years. Some of Euclid’s questions and comments strike me as perhaps coming from someone relatively uninformed, unrealistic, naive, or some combination thereof. But they seem like honest, sincere remarks, by and large. (Maybe with an exception or two.) But I find some of the snarky, condescending responses to his/her posts to be infinitely more offensive than anything Euclid has posted.
Deal with Euclid, or Bucky, or whatever screen name he or she decides to use today for the last 5 years, and you will find them less naive. It has gotten to the point that I will not even respond to him/her. It just isn't worth the effort. Most of the real railroaders, along with the coach cleaners feel the same, and show it with the "snarky" responses. Stick around for awhile and you will see.
zugmann tree68 Are you proposing restricted speed (a method of operation which is specifically spelled out in the rules), or "a restricted speed?" And if you're suggesting "a restricted speed," what would you suggest it be? Restricted speed isn't necessarily necessary. If you're just concerned with switchpoints, you can operate prepared to stop at each facing one. We had that rule for running opposed in 251 territory for a bit. Never understood it, really.
tree68 Are you proposing restricted speed (a method of operation which is specifically spelled out in the rules), or "a restricted speed?" And if you're suggesting "a restricted speed," what would you suggest it be?
I remember it being a rule where you had double track ABS and running against the current the facing point hand throws weren't wiried into the block signalling. I'm thinking the rule was in place on the ex-Reading and carried into NORAC, but dont' quote me...
Only one I can think you missed would be track circuit out of calibration.
ChuckCobleigh A little off topic vis a vis where the thread is at the moment, but apropos to the subject line on the thread, 93 years ago on February 7, Mopac passenger train 104 from Omaha to Kansas City hit a switch on the main and careened into the engine of a stopped freight on the siding, killing both engineers and firemen and apparently a rod-riding soldier from Ft. Leavenworth. This occurred near Nearman, KS. So, Cayce is not a recent phenomenon.
No, NJT ran a train into a spaghetti factory at speed a couple decades ago, too.
Everyone ignores me, so I can get away with this: I think this person is a plant. Used to keep things moving on the forum. A pot stirrer that someone behind the scenes knows very well and approves. Admit it. You all enjoy poking a stick at this person or they would evaporate due to being ignored. Takes two to argue - ahem, discuss.
She who has no signature! cinscocom-tmw
MookieA pot stirrer that someone behind the scenes knows very well and approves.
You are not alone in that belief.
Yeah, I like that. It takes so little to stir the pot here.
n012944 . . . the real railroaders, along with the coach cleaners . . .
Sigh.
I better make more popcorn, this is getting good!
oltmanndNo, NJT ran a train into a spaghetti factory at speed a couple decades ago, too.
Did the engineer have a meat-ball signal to do that?
ChuckCobleigh oltmannd No, NJT ran a train into a spaghetti factory at speed a couple decades ago, too. Did the engineer have a meat-ball signal to do that?
oltmannd No, NJT ran a train into a spaghetti factory at speed a couple decades ago, too.
And if this caused the sauce to be spread over the lumber scattered by the accident, would you have a bunch of "red boards"?
So far as I can derive from available info. we had a human failure to properly align a hand switch. Most if not all operating rules on the RR are the result of such failures over many years and adjustments to requirements. The rules also require that employees are aware of their actions with respect to safety.
As to the question of whether restricted speed would be most advisable, I suggest not when the limits of operating authority are "known" to be clear. It may be the result of the investigation into this matter requires that within signal suspension limits all facing point switches are required to be spiked before passenger (or all) trains are allowed to enter the limits; or use of hand switches and taking CTC switches off power to hand throw them is prohibited. Apart from this particular event, the signal system may be inoperative owing to weather, wherby locations in a territory cannot be accessed other than by rail, or that movement of traffic is so slowed that crews may expire on their hours of service unless there are means to advance traffic, and restricted speed does not sufficently accomplish this over significant distances. I do not think the rules are ambiguous or unclear so that there should have been any mistake in this event, from what I can ascertain. Moreover, as others have stated, "dark" territory has been operated for more than a century and a half, relying upon the integrity of those associated with the movement of trains. Whether PTC proves to be a fail-safe mode remains to be seen.
I would question whether CSX had any (qualified) supervisory personnel briefing crews about the nature of the signal suspension that required train movements in an unusual circumstance.
In short, I would characterize a suggestion that restricted speed would be safer as akin to requiring that all traffic moving in a highway construction zone move at 20mph - such as ten miles of all traffic using lanes of what is normally highway in one direction. Safer? Perhaps. Practical? Not.
He musta pasta red signal
LithoniaOperator n012944 . . . the real railroaders, along with the coach cleaners . . . Sigh.
Snicker.
Mookie Everyone ignores me, so I can get away with this: I think this person is a plant. Used to keep things moving on the forum. A pot stirrer that someone behind the scenes knows very well and approves. Admit it. You all enjoy poking a stick at this person or they would evaporate due to being ignored. Takes two to argue - ahem, discuss.
I thought I was the "plant" . I can be disruptive too, ask my boss..
Oh, the late night humor! I'm glad I was in bed
Randy Stahl Mookie Everyone ignores me, so I can get away with this: I think this person is a plant. Used to keep things moving on the forum. A pot stirrer that someone behind the scenes knows very well and approves. Admit it. You all enjoy poking a stick at this person or they would evaporate due to being ignored. Takes two to argue - ahem, discuss. I thought I was the "plant" . I can be disruptive too, ask my boss..
Completely correct. And the TOL usually just show a section of track as "red" in the dispatchers track line view of his territory. It doesn't have the resolution of which track circuit is showing occupied - but can involve several.
https://photos.app.goo.gl/gTeux6Mn4v5GOEA12
An example of occupancy on dispatcher's display. From Carolina to Norcross is 4 miles. It shows as one section on the display despite that there are at least 2 track circuits there. If there were hand throw switches with circuit controllers in that section and any one of them were reversed, the whole section would light up red on the display. The dispatcher would not know why, just that some track circuit in that section is showing occupancy.
oltmannd https://photos.app.goo.gl/gTeux6Mn4v5GOEA12 An example of occupancy on dispatcher's display. From Carolina to Norcross is 4 miles. It shows as one section on the display despite that there are at least 2 track circuits there. If there were hand throw switches with circuit controllers in that section and any one of them were reversed, the whole section would light up red on the display. The dispatcher would not know why, just that some track circuit in that section is showing occupancy.
Don,
Was this type of display operating during the signal suspension, thus indicating that the switch was open as #91 approached?
Euclid, the control machine is tied into the signal system and, even if not attended for the duration of the suspension, may have produced much the same untrustable response as the waysides under test and hence would be ignored
This is an example of why I told you to read up on things before forming conclusions on them. It would appear you are still systematically electing not to do that, or you would have had no need to ask a question like that; indeed, you could have answered it.
There comes a time when wilful repeated ignorance begins to shade over into something else. I advise everyone to avoid that slope.
Euclid oltmannd https://photos.app.goo.gl/gTeux6Mn4v5GOEA12 An example of occupancy on dispatcher's display. From Carolina to Norcross is 4 miles. It shows as one section on the display despite that there are at least 2 track circuits there. If there were hand throw switches with circuit controllers in that section and any one of them were reversed, the whole section would light up red on the display. The dispatcher would not know why, just that some track circuit in that section is showing occupancy. Don, Was this type of display operating during the signal suspension, thus indicating that the switch was open as #91 approached?
When signals are suspended, model board indication in the limits of the signal suspension cannot be used for anything other than a interesting light display. The lights do not indicate track occupancy or a switch being thrown in the limits. They do not contain ANY Dispatcher actionable information.
Overmod Euclid, the control machine is tied into the signal system and, even if not attended for the duration of the suspension, may have produced much the same untrustable response as the waysides under test and hence would be ignored This is an example of why I told you to read up on things before forming conclusions on them. It would appear you are still systematically electing not to do that, or you would have had no need to ask a question like that; indeed, you could have answered it. There comes a time when wilful repeated ignorance begins to shade over into something else. I advise everyone to avoid that slope.
Oh please.
I did not prematurely form conclusions. If it sounded that way to you, I was just stating given factors for the context of my question. I did read that ponderous six page Emergency Order No. 24 that you referenced. It is difficult to assimilate hundreds of sentences where each sentence twists and turns with assertions, supplementary condtions, and exceptions. It seems like a really impractical and pointless excersize to simply get an answer to my yes or no question.
So, okay, I got it. The only control over that switch position was in the reliability of the last person who used it, and any unauthorized use thereafter. I am not ready for a final exam, but I assume that the final position of the switch was manually recorded on a form and entered into a system of records.
It is interesting to take this conclusion back to the point of the original post asking about a sort positive switch verification system.
EuclidI am not ready for a final exam, but I assume that the final position of the switch was manually recorded on a form and entered into a system of records.
You're sure right about the exam (which in this case would really be self-applied before you opined further) but the part of EO 24 that is relevant here has nothing to do with writing stuff on multiple forms, it specifically concerns telling the dispatcher all the signatures are on the form before the dispatcher can give movement authority to any other train between the control points involved. Note that in order to complete the form 'truthfully' the switches must all be lined and locked properly, and requiring confirmation by 'everyone' in the operating train crew is additional assurance, or adequate excuse to spread retrospective blame around, depending on your perspective, that all the switches were set.
Part of what Euclid dismisses as gobbledygook is the discussion of how information on a written form can be conveyed to a remote dispatcher without, say, a fax machine or cell-phone camera. I thought this was pretty clear but then again, I've been used to dealing with Government language abuse for way too long and only object to it now when it is ambiguous.
As this applies to this 91 accident, the audit trail is very short on any branch. The switch was obviously left mislined, for over half an hour. If the CSX crew filled out their SPAF saying they'd all confirmed the switch was lined for the main, either they were 'mistaken' or there was very unlikely tampering. (There is another possibility, but it could be handled with relatively minor embedment of the EO 24 mandated forms and procedures.)
If the dispatcher misunderstood a radio call from the head end reporting 'clear of the switch' as somehow including verbal confirmation of the SPAF as required in some more of that gobbledygook beneath Euclid's tolerance, then the mistake might have been compounded -- some of this depends on a thing I do not remember, the time 91 was given movement authority -- but this would still leave the CSX crew with the necessity of formal SPAF information confirmation with the dispatcher before their tiedown could be deemed complete enough to release authority for 91.
BaltACD When signals are suspended, model board indication in the limits of the signal suspension cannot be used for anything other than a interesting light display. The lights do not indicate track occupancy or a switch being thrown in the limits. They do not contain ANY Dispatcher actionable information.
Makes sense, reminds me of an article on strack speeders noting that the wheels were insulated because they did not reliably shunt the track circuit. If it doesn't work reliably, keep it from working at all.
EuclidSo does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification? If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? For instance, why not impose restricted speed on trains approaching switches?
http://ten90solutions.com/as_i_dont_understand_it - see the last 2 paragraphs
As he's an operating supervisor, his opinion has a lot of credibility with me - he understands the procedures to create safety and has been (and still is?) responsible for that.
Of course, having that many qualified people would work only for a signal suspension planned well in advance. For an unanticipated suspension caused by bad weather, etc., it might be hard to round up those people on short notice.
- PDN.
Paul_D_North_Jr Euclid So does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification? If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? For instance, why not impose restricted speed on trains approaching switches? David Schanoes believes that could be accomplished in large part by having signal department employees - not train service or other operating people - be repsonsible for handling the switch and reporting, etc.: http://ten90solutions.com/as_i_dont_understand_it - see the last 2 paragraphs As he's an operating supervisor, his opinion has a lot of credibility with me - he understands the procedures to create safety and has been (and still is?) responsible for that. Of course, having that many qualified people would work only for a signal suspension planned well in advance. For an unanticipated suspension caused by bad weather, etc., it might be hard to round up those people on short notice. - PDN.
Euclid So does that mean that when the signal system was suspended, there was a resulting reduction of safety by the loss of automatic switch postion varification? If so, why wasn't some other temporary procedure or mechanism added to compensate for the temporary loss of switch position varification? For instance, why not impose restricted speed on trains approaching switches?
David Schanoes believes that could be accomplished in large part by having signal department employees - not train service or other operating people - be repsonsible for handling the switch and reporting, etc.:
In 21st Century railroading - it is difficult to get any craft to work on the weekend, let alone at night on weekends - especially when their craft is predicated on a M-F daylight work schedule.
BaltACDIn 21st Century railroading - it is difficult to get any craft to work on the weekend, let alone at night on weekends - especially when their craft is predicated on a M-F daylight work schedule.
"I'm not paying OT! My budget!! My budget!!"
zugmann BaltACD In 21st Century railroading - it is difficult to get any craft to work on the weekend, let alone at night on weekends - especially when their craft is predicated on a M-F daylight work schedule. "I'm not paying OT! My budget!! My budget!!"
BaltACD In 21st Century railroading - it is difficult to get any craft to work on the weekend, let alone at night on weekends - especially when their craft is predicated on a M-F daylight work schedule.
That to. Especially in the world of EHH.
Norfolk Southern's answer to verifying switch position within the limits of a signal suspension is to require that "all switches within the limits must be securely spiked or fastened for main track movement" - NS Rule 298(a). This requirement would have brought switching operations at the Dixiana auto facility to a halt, but definitely would have prevented the accident. True safety does not come cheap.
ns145 Norfolk Southern's answer to verifying switch position within the limits of a signal suspension is to require that "all switches within the limits must be securely spiked or fastened for main track movement" - NS Rule 298(a). This requirement would have brought switching operations at the Dixiana auto facility to a halt, but definitely would have prevented the accident. True safety does not come cheap.
ns145Norfolk Southern's answer to verifying switch position within the limits of a signal suspension is to require that "all switches within the limits must be securely spiked or fastened for main track movement" - NS Rule 298(a).
i find it interesting that we have already had other posts indicating that other railroads follow the same procedure (I recall UP being one) -- can someone with more patience and a better device than I check to see what the various other North American railroads of consequence do?
Before the potential issue of a signal department employee came up, I would have said that track-warrant procedures involving just the crews of trains should be a reasonable way to provide safety while still allowing operation on sidings. Whether or not that rumor turns out to have substance, I now see one place that the post-Graniteville procedures need to be changed if 'spiking' is not to be adopted for reasonable safety. This might be as simple as adaptation to lockout/tagout when a supervisor comes along and says the equivalent of 'Hey, Mac, let me take a whack at it'* -- namely that there be explicit transfer of all authority, perhaps in this case as silly as the idea of CSX lining, locking, and documenting the switch position before letting a signal person 'have at it'.
*I apologize in advance if this attempt at humor makes people irritated; it's supposed to try to make the concept behind it memorable...
Now you're reading!
(I trust Balt likes your quoted use of Bando Blue!)
Now is the time for a real education and employment opportunity.
https://www.facebook.com/nscareers/videos/1292281154206873/
Euclid Here is process of granting exceptions to EO #24. I see some roads apparently require trains to approach hand-operated switches prepared to stop. That’s an interesting solution. Hmm...
All railroads have rules that at times will require trains or engines approaching a switch, facing or trailing points, prepared to stop short. Some branch lines of the major carriers may be operated under such a rule. Some short line railroads* may operate their entire line under such rules. The rule is called Yard Limits. GCOR also has Restricted Limits. Within Yard Limits in unsignalled territory (in all territory when within Restricted Limits) all trains and engines must operate at Restricted Speed. Hmm... I'm surprised you didn't know this already.
To remind you what Restricted Speed is, here's the GCOR version.
When a train or engine is required to move at restricted speed, movement must be made at a speed that allows stopping within half the range of vision short of:
The crew must keep a lookout for broken rail and not exceed 20 MPH.
Comply with these requirements until the leading wheels reach a point where movement at restricted speed is no longer required.
Notice it actually says stopping short of a derail or switch lined improperly?
Had a signal maintainer handle a dual control in hand operation for my train once. Too bad he forgot about the moveable point frog. Caught it before anything bad happened.
jeffhergertTo remind you what Restricted Speed is, here's the GCOR version.
NORAC is essentially the same.
For a long time, our own rules called for "not to exceed 10 MPH." That's been raised to 20 MPH now.
Euclid ns145 Norfolk Southern's answer to verifying switch position within the limits of a signal suspension is to require that "all switches within the limits must be securely spiked or fastened for main track movement" - NS Rule 298(a). This requirement would have brought switching operations at the Dixiana auto facility to a halt, but definitely would have prevented the accident. True safety does not come cheap. Why don’t they just rely on the switch position awareness form? Wouldn’t that get the job done at less cost?
Although your question feels "troll-y" to me, I'll answer anyway, with a parallel.
Some countries allow right turn on red after stop. Some countries don't. It's a trade off between a small increment of safety against a small increment of time and energy. It depends how you measure and value the trade-offs.
tree68 jeffhergert To remind you what Restricted Speed is, here's the GCOR version. NORAC is essentially the same. For a long time, our own rules called for "not to exceed 10 MPH." That's been raised to 20 MPH now.
jeffhergert To remind you what Restricted Speed is, here's the GCOR version.
Was 15 mph on Conrail for ages.
Does the concept of "switch tenders" functionally apply in these signal suspension situations. I read earlier in the thread that "budget" concerns and fewer personnel would make this difficult.
I understand, as a non railroader, that rules are to be followed (and somehow either the rule was not followed, or validalism occured) but what are possible rule adjustments going forward?
Further, do you believe the Feds will be involved in new rules covering these operations? Ironically, it is the implementation of Federal rules (PTC) which led to this unfortunate incident.
Thanks to all operation folks for your patience in my lack of understanding.
Ed
Keep in mind that 'PTC caused this accident' is only circumstantial, roughly comparable to blaming the firemen for the Lac Megantic wreck. Finding the actual cause, which is almost certainly in how the dispatcher was 'informed' that the switch was lined and authority released, is the important thing to start determining when NTSB releases their next report.
It is very clear to me (as a non-railroader) that the only 'safe' way to run above restricted speed in these situations is either to require spiking of all the switches involved or, as you mentioned, providing employees to tend each switch 'for the duration'. There are a number of interesting concerns with the latter approach, which I'll get to in a moment.
Any approach that does not physically immobilize the switches, not just keep them locked 'under supervision', would require some version of EO 24 SPAF to be kept, and strict reporting conventions with the dispatcher observed. One of the current accident scenarios now being discussed is that a signal-systems employee of some kind did, in fact, 'take over' responsibility of the switch from the crew, but did not successfully communicate that to the dispatcher, perhaps thinking the crew would ensure all other trains were still held. The issues that produced the 'need' for timer switches would still apply to 'switchtenders' who might forget or panic and throw switches ahead of or under trains (as I believe has been documented).
On the other hand, much 'precision scheduled Railroading' would go to Hell in a handbasket if subject to running prepared to stop at each facing switch (for reasons mentioned in at least one thread so far) or even at restricted speed. This before we address the inconvenience and potential loss of revenue from any moves that cannot be made while the route is 'spiked' (or could be made, safely, between the bunched-up traffic in a restricted-speed bottleneck).
So either the Government mandates full safe course, which involves spiking all switches (as anything less than a full Government order would likely be ignored by a management interested in running as much of its normal traffic as normally as possible) or some enhanced procedure, with full audit-trail documentation, needs to be applied.
If that is the case, the two events of signal suspension and failure of switch position awareness are actually unrelated events. They just happened to occur at the same time, like falling from the trapeze on the day you decide to work without a net.
Well, I think that's not quite right; they are necessarily sequential. As a number of posters have said, if there had been no signal suspension this wreck would not, and almost assuredly could not, have occurred.
To digress briefly: you may have read and perhaps commented on some of the threads regarding 'consolidation' of dispatching in a few whiz-bang nerve centers, and the accompanying loss of most physical route familiarity beyond what dispatchers 'closer to their territory' would have. In a signal suspension the dispatcher is essentially blind, dependent on what he or she hears or receives from the people on the spot, and unable to verify the status of any switch, or the position of any train, apart from what is reported. It has been mentioned that people accustomed to CTC may have a hard time getting comfortable with 'paper railroad' conventions and limitations; I can't of course speak for the dispatchers' "tribe" but we have several participants here who can.
Since it is so far undisputed that the dispatcher issued 59mph authority to 91, we can isolate the proximate cause of the 'human error' not to the fact of the mislimed switch, but to the communications with the dispatcher that convinced her the railroad was safe.
PTC did not cause this wreck.
There will be times when railroads have to take signals out of service for some reason. Procedures exist to deal with dark territory.
Someone, or someones, did not follow procedure. They may have meant to, they may have thought they did . . . but somehow, the proper actions mandated by the policy were not carried out. Unless vandalism was involved (very unlikely), this accident was a result of someone not doing their job properly.
It's a huge tragedy, but it has nothing to do with PTC.
Blaming it on PTC is like blaming it on America's nuclear deterrance. The US was not under attack; so, since it was a normal day, Amtrak and CSX ran trains as usual. If they had not run trains, the accident would not have occurred.
Euclid like falling from the trapeze on the day you decide to work without a net.
Actually, we have two types of trapeze artists. One type works without a net every day and remembers to clip their safety harness to the trapeze every time. The other type works with a net, so doesn't need or ever bother with a saftey harness.
One day, a net guy works without a net and doesn't remember to use a harness and clip in. ...and falls.
Ok, I am not going to get into a p!$$ing match over words as had occured on this and other threads. I did not blame PTC for the deaths, but indicated that the installation "led" to the incident. If my words were misunderstood, then allow this to be a clarification.
I have never experienced an industrial accident such as this and hopefully never will. I have had a number of "incidents" in which mistakes were made which kept cascading into nearly complete failure of that aspect of a project. No lives were involved, just company integrity and $$$. What I have seen that the layering of mistakes or omissions, when compounded simply become out of control if not checked. There was a movie nearly 20 years ago which was entitled "The Perfect Storm" in which natural events and human error led to disaster. I have always remembered that (another similar theme with better ending was "Apollo 13").
Make this understood...I am in no way minimizing the deaths and injuries of those affected, but there are times when events occur, if not under complete control and understanding can completely fall out of control.
My thoughts are with those affected, including the crew members, dispatchers and other involved.
oltmannd Euclid like falling from the trapeze on the day you decide to work without a net. Actually, we have two types of trapeze artists. One type works without a net every day and remembers to clip their safety harness to the trapeze every time. The other type works with a net, so doesn't need or ever bother with a saftey harness. One day, a net guy works without a net and doesn't remember to use a harness and clip in. ...and falls.
Yes. I see what you mean. I had overlooked the fact that the switch position awareness process is not used when the signals are not suspened.
MP173 Ok, I am not going to get into a p!$$ing match over words as had occured on this and other threads. I did not blame PTC for the deaths, but indicated that the installation "led" to the incident. If my words were misunderstood, then allow this to be a clarification.
I personally was not referring to any post by you. I had merely remembered that elsewhere in the forum there was a post by someone else, of which part was this sentence: "So, if signal suspension to install PTC... this could be a PTC caused collision?"
I have no desire or intention of engaging in one-on-ones with anyone here, ever. I was just stating (in so many words) that in the realm of logic and causality, one cannot fairly state that the wreck was caused by PTC. In my opinion.
Thanks for clarifying...this event was a tragedy and I really do not want to go down the path of minimizing the losses over words.
LithoniaOperator "So, if signal suspension to install PTC... this could be a PTC caused collision?"
...was me. The point of it was the irony (?) of the circumstances needed to install PTC equipment created the circumstances that helped cause the wreck. Clearly there is a lot more than that going on...
I think I remember reading some years ago that when one railroad has trackage rights on another's tracks, the guest road always pays regardless of which road is at fault. I guess you could look at Amtrak as the guest in a trackage rights situation.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Paul, you have reminded me that I also read that more years ago than I can remember. However, it certainly seems unjust if the guest road is following instructions given by the owning road.
Don't know what Amtrak's agreement says, but the standard AAR detour agreement puts all liability - regardless of fault - on the detouring railroad.
The 'poster child' for that is back in the 1960's when a detouring Rock Island passenger train collided with a standing CB&Q passenger (?) train in an interlocking (at Streator, Illinois?), killing the RI crew. The cause was later found to be a botched signal upgrade by the CB&Q (sound familiar), giving the RI train a 'false clear'. RI sued the CB&Q, but the federal judge upheld the AAR indemnity clause. This was referenced in an article Michael W. Blascak (a Chicago attorney) wrote for Trains about trackage rights and detour agreements.
We may feel its unfair, but "a contract is a contract" is the position the railroad takes - kind of an 'all-fault' clause, to coin a phrase. Also, the kind of incident is anticipated by the contract - it's not like something bizarre beyond the contemplation of the parties has happened (like a volcano blowing up).
EuclidI thought this was interesting. Amtrak pays all damages even of the accident is caused by the host railroad. That doesn’t seem right.
It was part of the deal Amtrak and the host roads reached years ago after the original deal from 1971 expired. Both sides were happy with it. The flip side is if Amtrak were to cause a wreck with a massively bad result, say a chlorine car breach in a city, Amtrak would not have to pay.
The article also refers to a kind of intimidation of Amtrak by the host railroad to accept the extra liability burden in exchange for fair treatment in handling Amtrak traffic. That is a little hard to believe possible considering that accepting Amtrak trains by the host railroad is presumably mandated by the government. Why shouldn’t the mandate include fair treatment of Amtrak in traffic handling?
oltmannd The flip side is if Amtrak were to cause a wreck with a massively bad result, say a chlorine car breach in a city, Amtrak would not have to pay.
The flip side is if Amtrak were to cause a wreck with a massively bad result, say a chlorine car breach in a city, Amtrak would not have to pay.
oltmannd, why is that? I am confused.
In this case, how far does Amtrak's liability go? Does it have to pay to repair or replace CSX's locomotives? Repair to track and related structures? What about CSX's costs related to delays and detours due to the main being tied up?
LithoniaOperatoroltmannd, why is that? I am confused.
As I understand it -- Amtrak would have to pay ... for any gassing or death to its passengers, or damage to its own equipment. Anything else caused by the breach, potentially involving the kind of damage a Graniteville event would cause in a heavily-populated area, would be the responsibility of the 'owning' railroad.
In fact, if I understand the situation correctly, even if Amtrak were to cause the problem with a 'one-train' event, like a 188-like overspeed accident that the 'host' railroad did nothing to cause, they would only be liable for their own damages.
And Amtrak's overall liability in any case is 'capped' by the same amount per incident that was mentioned in the 188 overspeed wreck.
Paul_D_North_Jr Don't know what Amtrak's agreement says, but the standard AAR detour agreement puts all liability - regardless of fault - on the detouring railroad. The 'poster child' for that is back in the 1960's when a detouring Rock Island passenger train collided with a standing CB&Q passenger (?) train in an interlocking (at Streator, Illinois?), killing the RI crew. The cause was later found to be a botched signal upgrade by the CB&Q (sound familiar), giving the RI train a 'false clear'. RI sued the CB&Q, but the federal judge upheld the AAR indemnity clause. This was referenced in an article Michael W. Blascak (a Chicago attorney) wrote for Trains about trackage rights and detour agreements. We may feel its unfair, but "a contract is a contract" is the position the railroad takes - kind of an 'all-fault' clause, to coin a phrase. Also, the kind of incident is anticipated by the contract - it's not like something bizarre beyond the contemplation of the parties has happened (like a volcano blowing up). - PDN.
Montgomery, IL 1964. Combined Rocky Mountain Rocket and Golden State detouring over the CB&Q.
http://railfan44.blogspot.com/2014/01/major-passenger-train-wreck-montgomery.html
I think the point is that Amtrak pays for their own liability if they cause a wreck, and they also pay for the host railroad's liability if the host railroad causes a wreck. The point of the article flows from this Amtrak collision in South Carolina. The point made is that even if CSX caused the collision by their own negligence, Amtrak still pays for the damages to Amtrak such as loss of equipment and the death and injury to the passengers and crew.
LithoniaOperator oltmannd The flip side is if Amtrak were to cause a wreck with a massively bad result, say a chlorine car breach in a city, Amtrak would not have to pay. oltmannd, why is that? I am confused.
That's the deal they have. Each road pays for it's own regardless of fault. Sort of like "no-fault" auto insurance.
oltmannd LithoniaOperator oltmannd The flip side is if Amtrak were to cause a wreck with a massively bad result, say a chlorine car breach in a city, Amtrak would not have to pay. oltmannd, why is that? I am confused. That's the deal they have. Each road pays for it's own regardless of fault. Sort of like "no-fault" auto insurance.
But if Amtrak caused it, wouldn't any harm to the general public be Amtrak's responsibility. I think you are saying that the host railroad would have to pay for damage to its own equipment, physical plant, and foreign-road freight cars and cargo in its care at the time.
But if trackside non-railroad property and non-railroad individuals were harmed, wouldn't that be Amtrak's problem?
Not challenging you. I am just clueless about this subject.
LithoniaOperator oltmannd LithoniaOperator oltmannd The flip side is if Amtrak were to cause a wreck with a massively bad result, say a chlorine car breach in a city, Amtrak would not have to pay. oltmannd, why is that? I am confused. That's the deal they have. Each road pays for it's own regardless of fault. Sort of like "no-fault" auto insurance. But if Amtrak caused it, wouldn't any harm to the general public be Amtrak's responsibility. I think you are saying that the host railroad would have to pay for damage to its own equipment, physical plant, and foreign-road freight cars and cargo in its care at the time. But if trackside non-railroad property and non-railroad individuals were harmed, wouldn't that be Amtrak's problem? Not challenging you. I am just clueless about this subject.
Good questions. I don't really know. I imagine if the damage was from the host road's equipment, the host road would be on the hook. If they are the one hauling the chlorine car, then it's on them.
I do wonder how all this would hold up in a civil suit, though. Would the "no fault" deal hold up?
oltmanndThat's the deal they have. Each road pays for it's own regardless of fault. Sort of like "no-fault" auto insurance.
Now I'm confused. I thought we had established that the "guest" road always paid.
Paul of Covington oltmannd That's the deal they have. Each road pays for it's own regardless of fault. Sort of like "no-fault" auto insurance. Now I'm confused. I thought we had established that the "guest" road always paid.
oltmannd That's the deal they have. Each road pays for it's own regardless of fault. Sort of like "no-fault" auto insurance.
Railroad liability and indemnity clauses have kept generations of lawyers fully employed - a internet forum will not bring clarity.
Lawyers will argue that if CSX knew that they had to pay for damages in an Amtrak wreck that CSX caused, they would be more careful in the operations surrounding and governing the Amtrak train. In the case of No. 91, maybe CSX would have spiked the switches or imposed restricted speed if they thought that was cheaper than taking the financial risk for damages if the train were wrecked because of a CSX mistake.
The Cayce wreck was cause by two CSX employees.
Everyone takes care of their own. An Amtrak train hits a CSX train on CSX territiory and Amtrak pays for the their people and equipment. CSX pays for their people, equipment and plant.
NS derails on the corridor and an Amtrak train hit it, NS pays for their people and equipment, Amtrak pays for their people equipment and plant.
That's my understanding, anyway.
It's also why most mainline steam excursions operate as Amtrak specials on the host road.
Thanks, Jeff - all sounds correct (it came back to me that the CB&Q train was the Ak-Sar-Ben). There was also an article in Trains shortly afterward in the mid-1960's titled "The Accident that Couldn't Happen" by Robert B. Shaw, as I recall.
Randy Stahl The Cayce wreck was cause by two CSX employees.
What roles did they play?
EuclidWhat roles did they play?
I think that's been pretty well established.
tree68 I think that's been pretty well established.
This is starting to feel like Firehouse eh, Tree?
This space reserved for SpaceMouse's future presidential candidacy advertisements
GraniteRailroaderThis is starting to feel like Firehouse eh, Tree?
Yep.
It seems as if it’s possible that three CSX employees are involved: two on the train crew, plus the dispatcher. We don’t know yet what happened. It will likely be a long time before we do.
Paul of CovingtonNow I'm confused. I thought we had established that the "guest" road always paid.
Look at the dates. The 'guest road always paid' was in common usage half a century ago, between relative railroad 'equals'.
The Amtrak 'secret agreement' considerably postdates (Don Oltmann can give you precise date and circumstances) the original agreement established when the 'quasi-public' NRPC was formed in 1971. It has the no-fault characteristics described.
As also noted, if other specific roads have established their own written agreements, those would be binding over the AAR principle. And it's unlikely we are going to know the details in those.
tree68 Euclid What roles did they play? I think that's been pretty well established.
Euclid What roles did they play?
I did not know that anything had been established as to who caused the disaster. I recall that speculation has narrowed it down to one of two people.
My question you quoted above was regarding Randy's comment. Notice that he includes two people as being the cause, rather than the cause being one of two people. He said this:
"The Cayce wreck was cause by two CSX employees."
Euclid"The Cayce wreck was cause by two CSX employees."
And another poster suggested it was three.
Outside parties such as vandals and signal department employees notwithstanding, all three have been mentioned during the discussion.
Only two people had the ability to handle that switch. Both crew members are responsible for making sure switches are normal before releasing thier authority.
I'd like to see thier names published because I don't want either of them working around me.
tree68 Euclid "The Cayce wreck was cause by two CSX employees." And another poster suggested it was three. Outside parties such as vandals and signal department employees notwithstanding, all three have been mentioned during the discussion.
Euclid "The Cayce wreck was cause by two CSX employees."
The quote you attibute to me above was not stated by me. It was stated by Randy. It sounds like a statement of fact, so I asked Randy what role those two people played.
I was not sure which two people Randy was referring to and he did not say. So I thought I would start by asking what role the two people played.
I think we are only left with the conclusion that the switch was locked and lined into the siding.
EuclidThe quote you attibute to me above was not stated by me. {snip} I think we are only left with the conclusion that the switch was locked and lined into the siding.
I usually don't screw up quotes like that - you're right. It was Randy.
As I recall, that the switch was lined and locked for the siding has been established as fact.
As you note, the question is by whom. That has also been discussed, and the conclusion of that discussion narrows it down to two people, barring "outside interference."
As also noted, the dispatcher may or may not hold a piece of this.
Euclid I think the point of the article is to open the door to the public interest of forcing an Amtrak host railroad to pay the damages sustained in an Amtrak wreck if the wreck is caused by the host railroad. This could be driven by lawyers who want to take on this cause. The time may be right for the proposal because this Cayce wreck appears likely to have been caused by CSX. The most convincing argument to persuade the public to support the cause is the safety of the traveling public. Lawyers will argue that if CSX knew that they had to pay for damages in an Amtrak wreck that CSX caused, they would be more careful in the operations surrounding and governing the Amtrak train. In the case of No. 91, maybe CSX would have spiked the switches or imposed restricted speed if they thought that was cheaper than taking the financial risk for damages if the train were wrecked because of a CSX mistake.
I think this sums up the point I have been making as I said above:
http://cs.trains.com/trn/b/observation-tower/archive/2018/02/14/is-justice-served-by-no-fault-contracts.aspx
tree68As also noted, the dispatcher may or may not hold a piece of this.
Everything I have heard through 'back channels' say that the Dispatcher performed all the required functions to the letter of the Rule Book and common sense.
BaltACD tree68 As also noted, the dispatcher may or may not hold a piece of this. Everything I have heard through 'back channels' say that the Dispatcher performed all the required functions to the letter of the Rule Book and common sense.
tree68 As also noted, the dispatcher may or may not hold a piece of this.
I hope this turns out to be true. I have always held dispatchers in very high regard. This is an awful situation however it happened, but it would comfort me some to know there was no mistake by the dispatcher.
BaltACD tree68 As also noted, the dispatcher may or may not hold a piece of this.
Euclid Euclid I think the point of the article is to open the door to the public interest of forcing an Amtrak host railroad to pay the damages sustained in an Amtrak wreck if the wreck is caused by the host railroad. This could be driven by lawyers who want to take on this cause. The time may be right for the proposal because this Cayce wreck appears likely to have been caused by CSX. The most convincing argument to persuade the public to support the cause is the safety of the traveling public. Lawyers will argue that if CSX knew that they had to pay for damages in an Amtrak wreck that CSX caused, they would be more careful in the operations surrounding and governing the Amtrak train. In the case of No. 91, maybe CSX would have spiked the switches or imposed restricted speed if they thought that was cheaper than taking the financial risk for damages if the train were wrecked because of a CSX mistake. I think this sums up the point I have been making as I said above: http://cs.trains.com/trn/b/observation-tower/archive/2018/02/14/is-justice-served-by-no-fault-contracts.aspx
Yes, the photo is backwards.
I heard that the CSX dispatcher got the 'switch is normal and locked" from someone in the yard office, not the conductor. The person quoted a news article in the Jax paper. I haven't been able to find that. Not good if true...
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