Now excuse me, through this whole thread I have failed to recall exactly what the MMA's train tie-down rules were. Additionally, as you read the following, I am only examining the engineer's actions and culpability, not the remainder of the case against the other railroaders, the railroad, and the crude oil companies themselves, who are all also liable in part for this disaster - no disaster ever has a single cause.
The long and short of it is this: if the engineer did NOT follow the printed rules for tying down his train, then he is at least partially at-fault for this disaster. It's ethics 101, and it's printed in every railroad rulebook I've ever read: these rules supercede anything anybody tells you, and when in doubt, the safe course must be taken. There is room for good-faith challenging, at least in the US, but I'm not sure if Canada has a similar rule. Perhaps somebody can fill us in on that count.
Given that, here is a small sampling of these safety clauses from active or slightly-out-of-date rulebooks. They're all literally the first rules in the book - that is how important safety is! The breaking these rules is inexcusable!
From CN's US Operating Rules, 8th Edition (currently in use)
Rule A: Safety. Safety and a commitment to obey the rules are the most important elements in performing duties. If in doubt, the safe course must be taken.
Rule 100: Employees must be familiar with and obey all rules, regulations, and instructions. [...bunch of stuff about training...] ...They must properly report any violations to the proper supervisor. Employees must ask their supervisor for an explaination of any rule, regulation or instruction of which they are unsure.
Or, from CSX's Operating Rules & Signal Aspects and Indications, Jan 2010 (since superceded but unlikely to have amended these sections!)
Rule A: Empolyees must know and obey rules and special instructions that relate to their duties. When in doubt as to the meaning and application of any rule or instruction, employees must ask their supervising officer for clarification
Also from GCOR 7th Edition (currently in use AFAIK)
Rule 1.1 Safety: Safety is the most important element in performing duties. Obeying the rules is essential to job safety and continued employment.
Rule 1.1.1 Maintaining a Safe Course: In case of doubt or uncertainty, take the safe course
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So, I'm not sure what rulebook was in use on the MMA at the time (decent chance that it was GCOR), but these ideas are universal to the railroad industry - if these sorts of clauses were not present in the rulebook, I'd think it'd be a good case for negligence by the company, as it would be so contrary to standard industry practice, and obviously deficient from a safety perspective.
So at any rate, if the engineer did not follow the printed rules (rulebook, timetable, special instruction, or dispatcher message), then he is culpable by breaking the rules, period. There's some small wiggle room if his superiors explained the tie-down rules incorrectly, but it is hard to argue that your supervisor could overrule the idea that you've gotta set "x" number of handbrakes, which I imagine was part of the MMA rulebook, and almost certainly not weakend by special instruction, bulletin or dispatcher message. If it was, that'd be a huge count against the railroad.
Even still, if the engineer had reason to suspect that the train might not be fully secure, and it was a risk to public safety, then generally ethics code and the rulebook would hold him at least partially liable.
Whether or not the jury comes to this conclusion is another matter. But from a rulebook perspective, he is guilty if he did not follow the printed rules, and is not guilty if he followed them.
Again I don't recall specifically what rules were followed or broken - you'll have to take the above case and apply those facts.
And these hold true for any railroad incident, minor or catastrophic. I know there is a lot of discussion about "trainmasters in the bushes" and other similar tactics to get 100% compliance, but getting on and off moving equipment or not walking the full distance out and around the end of a car is minor compared to tie-down rules, which have to be right up there with following signal rules and mandatory directives, in terms of thou must follow or else, because that's how you create corn-field meets and level urban cores.
This, in blue, is from the fifth conversation in the link I posted above. This is after the discussion between Harding and his supervisors about the fire on the engine and consequent shutdown of the engine due to the fire, and leaving it shut down after the fire was put out. Here, RJ asks the engineer how many handbrakes he applied, and he answered that question:
TH: How the [blank] did that thing start to roll down, RJ?
RJ: I don’t know. How many brakes did you put on?
TH: The units, the V.B., and the first car, seven brakes.
RJ: I don’t know what will happen. The best I can tell you is that Daniel Aubé is on his way there
TH: Okay, well what’s, what you want to do with me, RJ? Don’t leave me out in the cold here.
Here the conversation continues and Harding is assured that the train was secure when it was left after the fire was put out. Also, at this point, Harding has been informed from earlier conversation that the engine had been shut down. Yet even knowing that fact, it does not appear at this point that he has considered that the loss of air pumping might have led to the loss of securement:
TH: That the [blank] fuel train rolled down, it was a question of, anyways. …Were there any railway people that went up there to put the fire out?
RJ: Jean-Noël Busque.
TH: And everything was secure when he was there? Everything was fine? Everything was …
RJ: Everything was fine, yeah.
TH: And then it rolled down, what, two hours later? Three hours later?
RJ: Fire was up at midnight, and I got a call at 1:30 that there was a fire in downtown.
However if we look further at the TSB rules and procedures at the time shall we. The TSB had no RULES or Regulations and the CP and CN also had no hard and fast rules in place on how many handbrakes to secure a train on a grade peroid. They had guidelines but nothing that stated failure to follow this rule will result in discipline or a fine in the case from the TSB. Your basing what he should have done off of the USA rules and regulations NOT Canadian which are a whole different hill of beans to swallow. What is required here in the States will get you laughed out in court in Canada. Yes we all know that everyone involved at the MMA screwed the pooch when it came to this accident however what we think he did wrong is not going to matter in a Canadian court of law one freaking bit. Just a word of advice from someone that is right now pulling her hair our dealing with a Canadian company that tore the hood off one of my bosses trucks in a truck stop and is refusing to pay for it. Our insurance carrier is having fits dealing with their insurer also Canadian and get this the same company but the Canadian side of the company.
Euclid Norm48327 He [Engineer Harding] was under an obligation to follow the proper rules and procedures of securing a train that was parked on a grade and it appears he failed to follow them. I will not, in view of what his dispatchers and superiors told him to do condemn him. He obeyed his orders from above, and right or wrong he followed them. I appears to me too that Harding failed to follow the rules and procedures. He did not set enough handbrakes and he relied on the independent brake. But why do you blame his superiors for that? They did not tell him to do what he did to secure the train. Harding made those decisions and carried out the procedure, so why don't you blame him rather than his superiors? I did not intend my use of the word "feelings" to mean just emotion. You can change the word to "reasoning" if you like. That would be a better word for what I meant. In any case, I am not trying to blame the engineer. I have no agenda as you keep insisting. Not only did Harding's immdeiate supervisors give him various orders than may have affected the outcome; but Harding's improper method of securing the train may have been dictated by a higher authority within the company. The only way to get to that is to ask Harding a lot of questions about his reasons and beliefs about the way he securred the train.
Norm48327 He [Engineer Harding] was under an obligation to follow the proper rules and procedures of securing a train that was parked on a grade and it appears he failed to follow them. I will not, in view of what his dispatchers and superiors told him to do condemn him. He obeyed his orders from above, and right or wrong he followed them.
I appears to me too that Harding failed to follow the rules and procedures. He did not set enough handbrakes and he relied on the independent brake. But why do you blame his superiors for that? They did not tell him to do what he did to secure the train. Harding made those decisions and carried out the procedure, so why don't you blame him rather than his superiors?
I did not intend my use of the word "feelings" to mean just emotion. You can change the word to "reasoning" if you like. That would be a better word for what I meant.
In any case, I am not trying to blame the engineer. I have no agenda as you keep insisting. Not only did Harding's immdeiate supervisors give him various orders than may have affected the outcome; but Harding's improper method of securing the train may have been dictated by a higher authority within the company. The only way to get to that is to ask Harding a lot of questions about his reasons and beliefs about the way he securred the train.
I am suspecting you must have been the trainer on MM&A on the procedures for securing trains.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Norm48327He [Engineer Harding] was under an obligation to follow the proper rules and procedures of securing a train that was parked on a grade and it appears he failed to follow them. I will not, in view of what his dispatchers and superiors told him to do condemn him. He obeyed his orders from above, and right or wrong he followed them.
Euclid Norm48327 Overmod, Then I would suspect the fault to lie higher up the chain of command. Norm, That is the reason why I said I would like to hear the engineer's response to this line of questioning about his feelings about shutting down the engine and stopping the pumping of air that would maintain the securement that he had made dependent upon the engine air brakes. My point was not to try to convict the engineer. It was to explore whether Harding even realized that relying on air for securment was illegal, and whether he even realized the danger of stopping air pumping upon which this illegal securement depended. I ask this because something is missing in the engineer's intention of securement and his willingness to allow the air pumping to stop until morning. Therefore, I have a feeling that some of what appears to be missing might be explained by policies or verbal instructions from MM&A management. It may be, as some have said, that MM&A management failed to adequately train employees on train securement. But it also may be that management improperly trained its employees to take improper shortcuts in securement. Without this missing piece in the explanation of Engineer Harding's lack of concern for the stopping of air pumping, it appears that he was absolutely clueless about the process of securing trains. And that seems unlikely.
Norm48327 Overmod, Then I would suspect the fault to lie higher up the chain of command.
Overmod,
Then I would suspect the fault to lie higher up the chain of command.
Norm,
That is the reason why I said I would like to hear the engineer's response to this line of questioning about his feelings about shutting down the engine and stopping the pumping of air that would maintain the securement that he had made dependent upon the engine air brakes.
My point was not to try to convict the engineer. It was to explore whether Harding even realized that relying on air for securment was illegal, and whether he even realized the danger of stopping air pumping upon which this illegal securement depended. I ask this because something is missing in the engineer's intention of securement and his willingness to allow the air pumping to stop until morning.
Therefore, I have a feeling that some of what appears to be missing might be explained by policies or verbal instructions from MM&A management. It may be, as some have said, that MM&A management failed to adequately train employees on train securement. But it also may be that management improperly trained its employees to take improper shortcuts in securement.
Without this missing piece in the explanation of Engineer Harding's lack of concern for the stopping of air pumping, it appears that he was absolutely clueless about the process of securing trains. And that seems unlikely.
Bucky,
Who gives a rat's what his feeings (emotions don't count; actions do) were at the time? He was under an obligation to follow the proper rules and procedures of securing a train that was parked on a grade and it appears he failed to follow them. I will not, in view of what his dispatchers and superiors told him to do condemn him. He obeyed his orders from above, and right or wrong he followed them. IMO that places the blame a level or so above Harding. He was simply a peon doing what he was told to do, and now he is being prosecuted because he followed orders.
Keep on twisting things to fit your agenda just as you have done to condmen any trains that have derailed and caused problems.
Norm
Agreed. And you might check my prevous comment as to a conjecture, an hypothesis, not a fact, as to why.
BaltACDThe ultimate responsibility rests with the Engineer that did not SECURE the train. His limited training may have led him to believe it was secured, however, results indicate that it wasn't.
I would opine that the reason the RTC didn't tell the engineer to go back and start an engine (and perhaps why no one else did) was because he (mistakenly) believed that the train was properly secured. If it were, then starting another locomotive would have had limited value - chiefly keeping the train on air to avoid the four hour rule.
OTOH, I don't recall if the two ever discussed how many brakes had actually been applied.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Unfortunately, both Up and Down the chain of command.
The ultimate responsibility rests with the Engineer that did not SECURE the train. His limited training may have led him to believe it was secured, however, results indicate that it wasn't. The limited training is the responsibility of the MM&A operating organization who SHOULD have been teaching proper securement methods to ALL Train and Engine personnel as well as 1st level Operating Management. The statements that have been made by the Engineer indicate that he personally was not trained on the proper methods of securing his train.
Even if he were on the Hours of Service (and he wasn't), properly securing a train is a allowed 'violation' as the securement is a matter of PUBLIC SAFETY. This incident highlights why this violation of HOS is allowed.
Norm48327If I may be so bold as to ask, Are you discussing the trial or simply rehashing things that were accounted for in the original Lac Megantic thread?
He’s actually doing EXACTLY what I asked him to do: recover the transcript of conversation between TH and RJ regarding the critical detail of starting one of the units. I did misremember some of the detail, and I am thankful to him for providing the exact reference.
The ‘bone of contention’ here is a point that may or may not be specifically elicited here (and a ‘partial’ version may not bring up the specific point that Euclid and I would like to see clearly made in the trial testimony.
Some combination of rule making and expediency gave the people involved the idea that a train secured by locomotive plus seven ‘handbrakes’ (and on tank cars that’s half the securement of a car with full foundation rigging) plus independent, on a 2% grade, with a single known-defective engine running, was ‘secure’. The immediate question Euclid has is whether Harding or RJ recognized the problem with the EOT bleeding down the independent with all the prime movers off. It seems relatively clear that Harding was concerned enough to ask to go start another (and was overruled) BUT not enough to insist that an engine be started before ‘the American’ arrived at 7 to take the next leg. Which argues to me that he did not truly realize the immediacy of the danger...
and yes, this ought to be elicited as part of Harding’s trial testimony, as yes, it is (at least in my opinion) highly relevant to Harding’s share of responsibility for the accident.
Norm48327If I may be so bold as to ask, Are you discussing the trial or simply rehashing things that were accounted for in the original Lac Megantic thread? What was said back then is history and no longer count because at the time it was mostly speculation. The fate of the accused now lies in the hands of the court and jury, but you insist on bringing things that fit your agenda back into the conversation.
I have no agenda in this. I do not care who wins or loses in this trial. I am also unable to decide who is guilty of causing the Lac Megantic disaster. I have commented on this in ways that probe into the culpability of both management and labor. I think it is a very interesting case. What was explored in previous threads is now pertinent to this trial, and we are discussing the trial here.
Euclid Here is a transcript of conversations between Harding and his supervisor(s) including audio: https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/dispatches-from-a-disaster/article20148699/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&cmpid=rss1 Here is the part where the engineer is told that the locomotive he left running had caught fire and been shut down. He is also informed that the locomotive will not be re-started until morning. Neither person expresses any concern about the air leaking off and releasing the independent brakes. I have emphasized some of it in bold: Third conversation 11:59 p.m. RJ calling Harding at the Auberge hotel RJ: Sorry to bother you. TH: No problem. RJ: Hey, euh, did you kill the units before leaving? TH: Yes, four of them. RJ: Which one did you keep running? TH: 5017. RJ: The leader? TH: Yes. RJ: Ok, apparently it’s – it went on fire TH: It went on fire? RJ: Yeah. TH: Oh, really? RJ: Yeah. TH: Okay [laughs]. I had problems with that. I reported it to Dave. Have you talked to Dave? RJ: No. TH: Okay. I told Dave that I worked it hard coming up there and she was smoking pretty good when I left her. RJ: Okay. TH: Now you’re telling me she caught on fire? RJ: Yeah, she caught on fire. TH: Ok, somebody up there to take care of it or? RJ: Yeah, well, the firemen were there. TH: Yes? RJ: And apparently it’s dead now … TH: Oh. RJ: And the the fire is, is all gone. It’s extinguished. TH: Okay. RJ: … and that’s all I know about it. TH: Do I need to go up there, start … RJ: No, no, no, no, Jean Noel Busque is. He went there to check if there’s any damage and he’s gonna call me back. TH: Okay, call me back, RJ. RJ: No, go to bed. TH: There’s nothing to do, hey? RJ: There’s nothing to do, we won’t start up an engine now. For tomorrow morning. He’s gonna start them up, the American is gonna start them up. TH: Okay. So she caught on fire, then. RJ: It might be a minor fire, mind you. TH: Yeah, yeah. RJ: It could be something in one of the traction motors, something like that. TH: Ah. RJ: But you killed the 4 units, you kept only 5017 running? TH: That was the only one that was running, 5017. RJ: Yeah, and it caught on fire. Okay. TH: And she caught on fire … RJ: Alright. TH: Okay, RJ. RJ: Okay, bye. TH: Bye.
Here is a transcript of conversations between Harding and his supervisor(s) including audio:
https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/dispatches-from-a-disaster/article20148699/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&cmpid=rss1
Here is the part where the engineer is told that the locomotive he left running had caught fire and been shut down. He is also informed that the locomotive will not be re-started until morning. Neither person expresses any concern about the air leaking off and releasing the independent brakes. I have emphasized some of it in bold:
Third conversation
11:59 p.m.
RJ calling Harding at the Auberge hotel
RJ: Sorry to bother you.
TH: No problem.
RJ: Hey, euh, did you kill the units before leaving?
TH: Yes, four of them.
RJ: Which one did you keep running?
TH: 5017.
RJ: The leader?
TH: Yes.
RJ: Ok, apparently it’s – it went on fire
TH: It went on fire?
RJ: Yeah.
TH: Oh, really?
TH: Okay [laughs]. I had problems with that. I reported it to Dave. Have you talked to Dave?
RJ: No.
TH: Okay. I told Dave that I worked it hard coming up there and she was smoking pretty good when I left her.
RJ: Okay.
TH: Now you’re telling me she caught on fire?
RJ: Yeah, she caught on fire.
TH: Ok, somebody up there to take care of it or?
RJ: Yeah, well, the firemen were there.
TH: Yes?
RJ: And apparently it’s dead now …
TH: Oh.
RJ: And the the fire is, is all gone. It’s extinguished.
TH: Okay.
RJ: … and that’s all I know about it.
TH: Do I need to go up there, start …
RJ: No, no, no, no, Jean Noel Busque is. He went there to check if there’s any damage and he’s gonna call me back.
TH: Okay, call me back, RJ.
RJ: No, go to bed.
TH: There’s nothing to do, hey?
RJ: There’s nothing to do, we won’t start up an engine now. For tomorrow morning. He’s gonna start them up, the American is gonna start them up.
TH: Okay. So she caught on fire, then.
RJ: It might be a minor fire, mind you.
TH: Yeah, yeah.
RJ: It could be something in one of the traction motors, something like that.
TH: Ah.
RJ: But you killed the 4 units, you kept only 5017 running?
TH: That was the only one that was running, 5017.
RJ: Yeah, and it caught on fire. Okay.
TH: And she caught on fire …
RJ: Alright.
TH: Okay, RJ.
RJ: Okay, bye.
TH: Bye.
If I may be so bold as to ask, Are you discussing the trial or simply rehashing things that were accounted for in the original Lac Megantic thread? What was said back then is history and no longer count because at the time it was mostly speculation. The fate of the accused now lies in the hands of the court and jury, but you insist on bringing things that fit your agenda back into the conversation.
EuclidAs you can see in the FULL CONTEXT of what I said, I was referring to learning Harding’s reaction after he was told that the engine had been shut down by the fire department.
Now you have me going back and having to look over the testimony carefully again, because I don't remember him being told explicitly that the single engine had caught fire and been shut down without another one being started. If you'll do that too I think we can arrive at the direct references in the previous reporting more quickly.
It does raise the hair on the back of my neck to think that between the three of them they might have thought that it would be OK to leave that train with no running power or operating air compressors until 7am for the 'next engineer' to solve. I am not sure 'totally dismissive' is a fair term to use, though; if I remember correctly Harding was aware of the fact that he had left his train partly 'hanging' on the independent brake, and was concerned about ensuring an engine stayed 'pumping' when he thought the damaged lead engine's prime mover might 'quit without notice'. I would find it difficult to believe that had he been told just a few minutes later that the engine had not only quit but caught fire he would be more ignorant of the consequences; perhaps it is more likely that he was "reassured" that the situation would be taken care of without his on-the-clock attention (and I do remember what I think was some language from Farnham RTC to that effect -- see if you can find the exact language in the transcripts).
The concern I have is that Harding will receive 'hostile witness' treatment and selective questioning when he is placed on the stand, and made to look 'guilty' following very much the same kind of logic and phrasing you used. The 'blaming/hating' was not directed at you specifically. Of course I can't do anything about how the lawyers proceed, and I am just as interested as you are in hearing exactly what he says about his thoughts and actions in those critical few minutes. I just think we should not prejudge him for things that I don't remember the transcripts indicating he did and by extension thought.
(And yes, it's somewhat hypocritical of me to say this about Harding and still think poorly of those other folks in the RTC, but it is harder to justify some of their actions and thinking in this matter.)
Overmod Euclid I would expect him to make a very strong effort to rectify that situation by either getting the company to go and check the train or to get in a taxi and go there himself. Yet he did not do either of those things. He apparenly simply dismissed the issue. I want to know why he did nothing when the news of the shut down engine should have propelled him into emergency action. Jesus H Christ, don't you remember this being covered in the preliminary reports? He WAS concerned, he EXPLICITLY asked those two morons in the RFC if he should stay to watch the deflicted engine; they told him to get off the clock and stay off the clock, and then chose not to call him either for the ensuing fire or its pathetic fire-department aftermath. I think it was the fire department that asked the elderly French-Canadian trackwalker about the finer points of shutting down a burning locomotive, another step in the calamity -- sure hope the lawyers don't try to scapegoat that poor man. Tom Harding has much to answer for, but something he does not need is misguided judgmental blaming/hating for something that was explicitly put out of his control by order of his superiors.
Euclid I would expect him to make a very strong effort to rectify that situation by either getting the company to go and check the train or to get in a taxi and go there himself. Yet he did not do either of those things. He apparenly simply dismissed the issue. I want to know why he did nothing when the news of the shut down engine should have propelled him into emergency action.
Jesus H Christ, don't you remember this being covered in the preliminary reports? He WAS concerned, he EXPLICITLY asked those two morons in the RFC if he should stay to watch the deflicted engine; they told him to get off the clock and stay off the clock, and then chose not to call him either for the ensuing fire or its pathetic fire-department aftermath. I think it was the fire department that asked the elderly French-Canadian trackwalker about the finer points of shutting down a burning locomotive, another step in the calamity -- sure hope the lawyers don't try to scapegoat that poor man.
Tom Harding has much to answer for, but something he does not need is misguided judgmental blaming/hating for something that was explicitly put out of his control by order of his superiors.
In the full context from which you extracted the quote by me above, I said this:
It was reported that the engineer told his supervisor(s) about the problem, and at least implied that he advised his supervisor(s) that he wanted to shut down the engine before leaving it. It was reported that the supervisor(s) told him to leave the engine running.
In court, I would like to hear the engineer explain whether after shutting down the engine, he would have started another engine to pump air, if he had been permitted to shut it down the engine with the problem.
If he answered yes to that question, I would like to hear him state whether he was told that the faulty engine had been shut down by the fire department, as I understand that he had conversations about the fire with his supervisor(s)
********************************************
Yes I do remember the reported details. Harding was concerned explicitly (as you say) about leaving the engine running. After leaving it running, he told the cab driver he did not want to leave it running, but that he was ordered to leave it running. This expression by Harding occurred before the fire and before the engine was shut down by the fire department.
As you can see in the FULL CONTEXT of what I said, I was referring to learning Harding’s reaction after he was told that the engine had been shut down by the fire department.
Also, in the full context of what I said, I was expressing my wish that Harding would be asked about this in court in order to explore his thinking about losing the air pumping of the shut down engine. I believe I recall that he was told by his supervisor after the fire that the engine had been shut down. As I recall, he and his informing supervisor seemed totally dismissive of this fact as though there was no thought about the loss of air pumping resulting from shutting down the engine.
Also, your last comment about blaming and hating Harding has nothing to do with my desire to hear him questioned about this matter I have explained above.
This is where a real safety culture comes into play. Now granted, I am familiar with what may be the ultimate safety culture, which is the nuclear generation field. Aviation and medicine would be close behind. In nuclear generation records of training, actual job performance , and qualifications are kept. If I was told to do something that was contrary to proper safety or quality procedures it would be easy to demonstrate that I knew the proper ( and sometimes legal) way to do my job. I would have NO excuse for following instructions that varied from established procedures. I am encouraged to question my instructions. If i am ordered to do something that is wrong and dangerous I can have an NRC inspector there 24 hours a day. To put this in perspective this incident killed 16 times as many people as have been killed by nuclear energy in the generation industry. 3 men killed on an experimental army reactor, SL-1 in 1961 is the total. When you put dollars before lives, you will have Lac Megantics.
EuclidI would expect him to make a very strong effort to rectify that situation by either getting the company to go and check the train or to get in a taxi and go there himself. Yet he did not do either of those things. He apparenly simply dismissed the issue. I want to know why he did nothing when the news of the shut down engine should have propelled him into emergency action.
blue streak 1A two day later train was not securred properly ? Wonder what commodities ? That is a really daming fact to any jury.
If presented as such, it would demonstrate the Company's lack of training of their crews on how to properly secure a train. Depending upon what actual charges are being tried in the trial it would be very damning.
A two day later train was not securred properly ? Wonder what commodities ? That is a really daming fact to any jury.
You are assuming that he 1. Knew how to properly secure a train and 2. knew that his "securement" was inadequate. Was he even competent to know those things? Ignorance is his best defense. If he can convince the jury that his employer trained him improperly then he probably walks. BUT since as I recall the end of his trip was in the U.S. he would have had to be FRA licenced and I presume hold a Canadian equivalent then he can only play a limited amount of dumb.
Euclid dehusman Euclid If he answered yes to that question, I would like to hear him state whether he was told that the faulty engine had been shut down by the fire department, as I understand that he had conversations about the fire with his supervisor(s) What difference does it make? Repeating for the umpteenth time, whether or not the engines were running would make NO difference if the train were properly secured. If the train were properly secured you could have shut down the engines or even turned the angle cock and disconnected the engines and it would not have made a difference. The train would have stayed put IF it was properly secured. The questions about the engines are a waste of time and electrons. Dave, I realize that it makes no difference whether the engine was shut down in the terms you are describing. I am fully aware of the fact that air brake must not play any part in the securement. But I asked the question for a different reason, which I think is pertinent to the overall question of negligence, intent, etc. The reason I ask whether the engineer was told that the engine had been shut down is that he knew that the running engine was needed to maintain the set inedpenent brakes which he was relying on the hold the train. So even though it was wrong to secure the train that way, that is the way the engineer securred it. I assume he believed that it was okay to secure relying on the independent brakes. So given that background, I cannot believe that the news that the one running engine was shut down would not ring a very loud bell in the mind of the engineer. And if engineer experienced that realization that the train was no longer securred, I would expect him to make a very strong effort to rectify that situation by either getting the company to go and check the train or to get in a taxi and go there himself. Yet he did not do either of those things. He apparenly simply dismissed the issue. I want to know why he did nothing when the news of the shut down engine should have propelled him into emergency action. His answer to that question would be highly relevant to what he knew about securing trains. That is why I would like to hear the engineer state in court whether he was told that the faulty engine had been shut down by the fire department.
dehusman Euclid If he answered yes to that question, I would like to hear him state whether he was told that the faulty engine had been shut down by the fire department, as I understand that he had conversations about the fire with his supervisor(s) What difference does it make? Repeating for the umpteenth time, whether or not the engines were running would make NO difference if the train were properly secured. If the train were properly secured you could have shut down the engines or even turned the angle cock and disconnected the engines and it would not have made a difference. The train would have stayed put IF it was properly secured. The questions about the engines are a waste of time and electrons.
Euclid If he answered yes to that question, I would like to hear him state whether he was told that the faulty engine had been shut down by the fire department, as I understand that he had conversations about the fire with his supervisor(s)
What difference does it make?
Repeating for the umpteenth time, whether or not the engines were running would make NO difference if the train were properly secured. If the train were properly secured you could have shut down the engines or even turned the angle cock and disconnected the engines and it would not have made a difference. The train would have stayed put IF it was properly secured. The questions about the engines are a waste of time and electrons.
Dave,
I realize that it makes no difference whether the engine was shut down in the terms you are describing. I am fully aware of the fact that air brake must not play any part in the securement. But I asked the question for a different reason, which I think is pertinent to the overall question of negligence, intent, etc.
The reason I ask whether the engineer was told that the engine had been shut down is that he knew that the running engine was needed to maintain the set inedpenent brakes which he was relying on the hold the train. So even though it was wrong to secure the train that way, that is the way the engineer securred it. I assume he believed that it was okay to secure relying on the independent brakes.
So given that background, I cannot believe that the news that the one running engine was shut down would not ring a very loud bell in the mind of the engineer. And if engineer experienced that realization that the train was no longer securred, I would expect him to make a very strong effort to rectify that situation by either getting the company to go and check the train or to get in a taxi and go there himself. Yet he did not do either of those things. He apparenly simply dismissed the issue. I want to know why he did nothing when the news of the shut down engine should have propelled him into emergency action.
His answer to that question would be highly relevant to what he knew about securing trains. That is why I would like to hear the engineer state in court whether he was told that the faulty engine had been shut down by the fire department.
US crews will leave an engine running on a train that has been secured. It is left running for one reason ONLY. To keep air on the trainline so as not to require a full Class 1 Brake Test for a train (or cut of cars) that after having been air tested is left OFF AIR for 4 or more hours. The engine running has no bearing on the securement of the train. Hand Brakes on the train's CARS are used to secure the TRAIN - with or without engines.
EuclidIf he answered yes to that question, I would like to hear him state whether he was told that the faulty engine had been shut down by the fire department, as I understand that he had conversations about the fire with his supervisor(s)
EuclidDid the engineer know the proper procedure for securing the train? If he did, why didn't he follow it? Was he given any instructions by his supervisors about how to secure the train?
Those are the more relevant questions.
How many handbrakes were required by calculation? How many handbrakes were required by rule How many handbrakes did he think he needed to apply? How many did he apply? If there is a discrepancy between any of those numbers, why?
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Electroliner 1935 SD70M-2Dude I also realize that I have given a very simplistic explanation of the air brake system, and have left out the emergency reservoir and other portions like quick service, quick charge, retainers, load/empty features, and pressure maintaining etc. Just trying to keep this from getting out of hand. Yes you are "Articulate" and so is Jeff. I thank both of you for enlightening me and I suspect many others. The 3/8' orifice was new to me and your explanation very good. Thanks to both you and Jeff. PS Jeff. I presume you can see the DP units pressures from the front unit on a monitor. It gives you all the data? IE, you (or your conductor) didn't have to walk the train>
SD70M-2Dude I also realize that I have given a very simplistic explanation of the air brake system, and have left out the emergency reservoir and other portions like quick service, quick charge, retainers, load/empty features, and pressure maintaining etc. Just trying to keep this from getting out of hand.
Yes you are "Articulate" and so is Jeff. I thank both of you for enlightening me and I suspect many others. The 3/8' orifice was new to me and your explanation very good. Thanks to both you and Jeff.
PS Jeff. I presume you can see the DP units pressures from the front unit on a monitor. It gives you all the data? IE, you (or your conductor) didn't have to walk the train>
Don't know UP Rules. On CSX - train in emergency - with HAZMAT - even if air restores immediately must be walked to verify that the HAZMAT is still on the rail.
If the air doen't immediatly restore on ANY train, it must be walked.
Conductors frequently reported finding 'stuck vent valves' in situations where the air didn't restore and they cut the brakes out on the offending car.
SD70M-2DudeI also realize that I have given a very simplistic explanation of the air brake system, and have left out the emergency reservoir and other portions like quick service, quick charge, retainers, load/empty features, and pressure maintaining etc. Just trying to keep this from getting out of hand.
Main reservoir on locomotive feeds brake pipe and locomotive brake cylinder. Engine shuts down. Compressor stops pumping air. Main reservoir pressure starts to drop. As it drops, so does the brake pipe and independent brake pressure.
I was treated to this last trip when the DP shut down and wouldn't restart. I watched, as we waited for a mech. dept guy to come out, the DP's main reservoir, equalizing reservoir (which "controls" the brake pipe) and independent brake pressure leak away. All three stayed within one to two psi as the air leaked off. In this case, it didn't affect the brake pipe because the DP had cut it's brake valve out automatically.
Jeff
So, as I understand this, the slow leakage that reduced the pressure in the locomotive independent brake cylinders would have, at the same time, reduced the pressure in the main reservoir, the trainline, and all of the car reservoirs. As this leakage continued, it would have exhausted all the air pressure in all four of these elements. And because the leakage was so slow, there was no valve movement on each car that would have diverted air from the car reservoirs into the car brake cylinders, so they remained fully released. Then when the falling pressure was low enough, the locomotive independent brake cylinders released, and the train rolled away.
Wonderful explanation.
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