EuclidSo blaming the firemen for shutting down the engine is misguided. In my opinion, even if they had not notified the railroad; the runaway would have been the fault of MM&A for not properly securing the train. MM&A claiming they were not notified would have been beside the point. And most certainly, there is absolutely no case that can be made saying that the firemen did not notify the proper people at MM&A, as has been suggested above by Overmod saying that the MM&A offices being closed would have prevented notification of MM&A by the firemen.
You are still not getting the point. It is not "the fault of MM&A" that the train was not secured, it was the Stooges, acting contrary to at least some important details officially provided by MM&A. It is not the firemen's "fault" that the train ran away, but it is a direct and proximate result of their shutting that unit down. I no longer really blame them for taking the easiest step to extinguish the fire by hitting the UES; there isn't any way they could have known the train was basically unsecured and was hanging on a system their shutdown crippled. To my knowledge they were not on trial in this proceeding or, if they were, I don't expect them to be charged with actionable contributory liability. On the other hand, their notification of anyone at MM&A was limited to a Stooge and someone with acknowledged lack of knowledge in proper power-consist shutdown. This is largely moot in the Lac Megantic circumstances because there was little reason for anyone in actual authority at MM&A to suspect the train was so appallingly unsecured, or to be able to get responsible personnel to the train within the window that turned out to represent independent leakdown.
Personally, I think the right people are on trial, for at least some of the right reasons. It is the continued conflation of those foons with "MM&A" that keeps bothering me.
daveklepper Narrowing down the exact last cause, not modifying anything statted earlier about responsibiloity: Could the supervisor forgot the train was on a grade?
Narrowing down the exact last cause, not modifying anything statted earlier about responsibiloity:
Could the supervisor forgot the train was on a grade?
I suppose he could have, but the supervisor had no way of knowing that the shutting down of the lead engine and the consequential loss of air pumping would endanger the train. The supervisor informed Harding of the fire event. He told Harding that the lead engine had caught fire and had been shut down. Harding acknowleged both points. Then they reviewed several times, the point that the engine had caught fire as if that was the one critical point to bear in mind.
Neither Harding or the supervisor said anything in regard to any specific significance of the information that the running engine had been shut down. That suggests that Harding did not consider the possibility that the loss of air pumping might defeat his securement of the train.
Had this been considered by either man, re-starting another engine on the train to pump air should have been of the most urgent priority. But one point to consider is that Harding had no way of knowing that the loss of air pumping leading to the release of the independent brake would cause the train to roll away. Because he tested with independent brakes and handbrakes set, he had no way of knowing how much each braking system contributed to holding the train on the grade.
Harding did ask the supervisor if he should go back to the site and re-start the engine. The supervisor told him not to, and that it would be dealt with in the morning.
Overmod#2: Informing Stooge #2 is not the same thing as informing "MM&A" in the sense sone posters seem to think applies.
I assume you are referring to my claim that MM&A had been adequately notified that the firemen had shut down the one locomotive that had been needed to pump air to maintain the independent brakes set for securement by as established by Harding.
What you have the firemen do? Should they have checked the train for proper securement and set handbrakes if necessary? Should they have been trained for that procedure? Should they have then sent a certified notice to the headquarters of MM&A informing them of what happened?
The train engineer's supervisor had been notified by the fire department and by the MM&A employee who had been sent to oversee the emergency at Nantes. That supervisor, in turn, notified Engineer Harding that the locomotive had been shut down. This was prior to the runaway. Harding knew that he had checked the securement with the independent brade set, and that he had left it set during the securement. He may have been the only person who knew those facts, but clearly, he knew them.
In the transcript of the coversations between Harding and his supervisor, Harding told the supervisor that he had securred the train. The supervisor asked Harding how many handbrakes he had set, and Harding accurately provided that information including which handbrakes they were.
BaltACD Euclid Overmod Euclid They were notified by the fire department that the engine had been shut down. It was up to MM&A to respond to that notice. OK, let's yes-but this one: WHAT 'they'? Who was it the fire department notified? Not 'the MM&A' - that's a railroad with its main offices closed at the time. Not the shop staff - if I remember correctly, Randy Stahl didn't hear anything for nearly 2 hours about 5017 catching fire, and why should he think a secured train would cause trouble. Tell me EXACTLY who the fire department contacted, what their knowledge of locomotives and train handling was, and who made the subsequent decisions to leave things as they were. Earlier in this thread, I posted transcripts and audio recordings of conversations that Harding had with his supervisor. I don’t recall his name but I believe he is one of the three people on trial. He is the guy who was first to inform Harding that the lead engine on the oil train caught fire after Harding had left it for the night. He also told Harding that the fire department had responded and put the fire out. He also told Harding that the engine had been shut down. He told Harding that that other MM&A guy from track maintenance went to the scene and was there when the fire department responded and shut down the engine. As I recall, Harding ask this supervisor who was telling him what happened if he (Harding) should go the site and check, or something like that. His supervisor told him no, and told him they would deal with it in the morning. So the supervisor had been told that the locomotive had caught fire, the fire department had shut down the locomotive, and that they put the fire out. And the supervisor conveyed the information to Harding that they would not do anything at the site until the next morning. Either the fire department, the track guy, or both must have given Harding’s supervisor this information. I would say that amounts to notifying the MM&A, as I said in my previous post. I do not know if Harding’s supervisor conveyed the information to anyone else, or if he made the decision to leave it all until morning on his own. From the Supervisors point of view - Harding as the Engineer/Crew was expected to have SECURED his train properly before leaving the train and going onto the lodging facility - it is his JOB to perform the task of SECURING THE TRAIN before leaving it unattended. Any instructions the Supervisor may have given to Harding were given with the understanding that the train HAD BEEN PROPERLY SECURED. If the train had been secured as necessary by the only person charged with the responsibility to do it - nothing that later happened to the locomotive would have caused the train to run away - IF THE TRAIN HAD BEEN PROPERLY SECURED! HARDING DID NOT PROPERLY SECURE THE TRAIN! End of the primary story. Harding is the primary and proximate cause, the MM&A safety culture or the lack thereof is a secondary cause, however, it will be very difficult to assign criminality to a poor safety culture. The Supervisors involved in this case are not 'policy making' supervisors - they manage their areas of responsibility in accordance with the POLICY that has been established by officials that are higher up the chain of command. The Engineer could be considered a Private were he in the Army. The Supervisors charged would be of the approximate rank of Sargent. Enlisted personnel don't make policy in the Army and the individuals charged don't make policy on the MM&A.
Euclid Overmod Euclid They were notified by the fire department that the engine had been shut down. It was up to MM&A to respond to that notice. OK, let's yes-but this one: WHAT 'they'? Who was it the fire department notified? Not 'the MM&A' - that's a railroad with its main offices closed at the time. Not the shop staff - if I remember correctly, Randy Stahl didn't hear anything for nearly 2 hours about 5017 catching fire, and why should he think a secured train would cause trouble. Tell me EXACTLY who the fire department contacted, what their knowledge of locomotives and train handling was, and who made the subsequent decisions to leave things as they were. Earlier in this thread, I posted transcripts and audio recordings of conversations that Harding had with his supervisor. I don’t recall his name but I believe he is one of the three people on trial. He is the guy who was first to inform Harding that the lead engine on the oil train caught fire after Harding had left it for the night. He also told Harding that the fire department had responded and put the fire out. He also told Harding that the engine had been shut down. He told Harding that that other MM&A guy from track maintenance went to the scene and was there when the fire department responded and shut down the engine. As I recall, Harding ask this supervisor who was telling him what happened if he (Harding) should go the site and check, or something like that. His supervisor told him no, and told him they would deal with it in the morning. So the supervisor had been told that the locomotive had caught fire, the fire department had shut down the locomotive, and that they put the fire out. And the supervisor conveyed the information to Harding that they would not do anything at the site until the next morning. Either the fire department, the track guy, or both must have given Harding’s supervisor this information. I would say that amounts to notifying the MM&A, as I said in my previous post. I do not know if Harding’s supervisor conveyed the information to anyone else, or if he made the decision to leave it all until morning on his own.
Overmod Euclid They were notified by the fire department that the engine had been shut down. It was up to MM&A to respond to that notice. OK, let's yes-but this one: WHAT 'they'? Who was it the fire department notified? Not 'the MM&A' - that's a railroad with its main offices closed at the time. Not the shop staff - if I remember correctly, Randy Stahl didn't hear anything for nearly 2 hours about 5017 catching fire, and why should he think a secured train would cause trouble. Tell me EXACTLY who the fire department contacted, what their knowledge of locomotives and train handling was, and who made the subsequent decisions to leave things as they were.
Euclid They were notified by the fire department that the engine had been shut down. It was up to MM&A to respond to that notice.
OK, let's yes-but this one: WHAT 'they'? Who was it the fire department notified? Not 'the MM&A' - that's a railroad with its main offices closed at the time. Not the shop staff - if I remember correctly, Randy Stahl didn't hear anything for nearly 2 hours about 5017 catching fire, and why should he think a secured train would cause trouble. Tell me EXACTLY who the fire department contacted, what their knowledge of locomotives and train handling was, and who made the subsequent decisions to leave things as they were.
Earlier in this thread, I posted transcripts and audio recordings of conversations that Harding had with his supervisor. I don’t recall his name but I believe he is one of the three people on trial. He is the guy who was first to inform Harding that the lead engine on the oil train caught fire after Harding had left it for the night.
He also told Harding that the fire department had responded and put the fire out. He also told Harding that the engine had been shut down. He told Harding that that other MM&A guy from track maintenance went to the scene and was there when the fire department responded and shut down the engine.
As I recall, Harding ask this supervisor who was telling him what happened if he (Harding) should go the site and check, or something like that. His supervisor told him no, and told him they would deal with it in the morning. So the supervisor had been told that the locomotive had caught fire, the fire department had shut down the locomotive, and that they put the fire out. And the supervisor conveyed the information to Harding that they would not do anything at the site until the next morning.
Either the fire department, the track guy, or both must have given Harding’s supervisor this information. I would say that amounts to notifying the MM&A, as I said in my previous post. I do not know if Harding’s supervisor conveyed the information to anyone else, or if he made the decision to leave it all until morning on his own.
From the Supervisors point of view - Harding as the Engineer/Crew was expected to have SECURED his train properly before leaving the train and going onto the lodging facility - it is his JOB to perform the task of SECURING THE TRAIN before leaving it unattended. Any instructions the Supervisor may have given to Harding were given with the understanding that the train HAD BEEN PROPERLY SECURED.
If the train had been secured as necessary by the only person charged with the responsibility to do it - nothing that later happened to the locomotive would have caused the train to run away - IF THE TRAIN HAD BEEN PROPERLY SECURED!
HARDING DID NOT PROPERLY SECURE THE TRAIN! End of the primary story. Harding is the primary and proximate cause, the MM&A safety culture or the lack thereof is a secondary cause, however, it will be very difficult to assign criminality to a poor safety culture. The Supervisors involved in this case are not 'policy making' supervisors - they manage their areas of responsibility in accordance with the POLICY that has been established by officials that are higher up the chain of command. The Engineer could be considered a Private were he in the Army. The Supervisors charged would be of the approximate rank of Sargent. Enlisted personnel don't make policy in the Army and the individuals charged don't make policy on the MM&A.
I think the point is particulary important, because over and over, I have seen posts here and elsewhere that insist the whole thing was caused by the firemen for shutting down the one engine pumping air. You will recall that even Ed Burkhart made the same accusation only days after the disaster. The fire department had to come out and publicly refute that false charge by the MM&A President.
So blaming the firemen for shutting down the engine is misguided. In my opinion, even if they had not notified the railroad; the runaway would have been the fault of MM&A for not properly securing the train. MM&A claiming they were not notified would have been beside the point. And most certainly, there is absolutely no case that can be made saying that the firemen did not notify the proper people at MM&A, as has been suggested above by Overmod saying that the MM&A offices being closed would have prevented notification of MM&A by the firemen.
duplicate posting removed.
I have a track record and some credentials:
1. The "not wishing to interfere in local practice" trap led me to have to buy or borrow a soldering iron and rewire a complex sound ssytem with a night without sleep so an opening "show could go on."
2. In testing an air-to-ground via parachute droppable loudspeaker system with the drop zone at Camp McCall, an offshoot of Fort Bragg, NC, the device fell squarely on the adjacent main line of the SAL, just south of Southern Pines (single track CTC). I did not ask for instructions, talk to any superiors, but used my walkie-talkie to contact the Fort Bragg Emergency Communications HQ and told them precisely what happened and that they MUST immediately contact the SAL Dispatcher in Hamlet and relay my message to them directly without waiting one second. They did. After I and my four enlised men (I was a 2nd Lt.) used our winch and 3/4-ton truck to horse the torpedo-shaped device off the track, I called back to announce the all-clear. We left before any train passed by. (After the Army I rode over that stretch of track many times, but mostly asleep at night.)
3. Once got an order from the Major who was my immediate Army boss, that was off-the-wall rediculous and would have interfered with an important project with a deadline that was also our responsibility. But the time this rediculous repositioning of a lot of heavy equipment had to completed was by evening the next day. I did not stop the guys from the major project, but decided that if necessary one or two of the men and I would implement the order during the night, hoping that a countermanding order would come before we would start. And it did, with a runner colming to me while I was on-line at the officers' mess hall. (Can I say that the story of Abraham's binding of Isaac was in my mind the whole time of this episode?)
daveklepperBut what about the people he hired to run the railroad? They too presumably had had responsible positions with CN and CP. Why did not they insure those railroads' safety culture, procedures, rules, and policies were also applied to MM&A
This bothers me too. I could make 'Yalie' jokes but Ed is smart enough to understand both management under uncertainty and where to prioritize effort in scarce-resource situations (not always a euphemism for shoestring operations).
The problem is that if you hire people based in part on the experience in their resumes, you may tacitly assume they were actually good at doing what they claimed they had done. This is not quite the same thing as CDL drivers who might need the equivalent of 'continuing education' as laws and contradictory policies get more and more strangling -- or doing periodic knowledge checks on drivers to ensure they know everything management expects them to. The railroaders on trial now had extensive local experience, including presumably good knowledge of that particular route, and I at least suspect this was part of why MM&A hired them on. What could MM&A management teach them better about what they already knew?
The thing I find missing -- not having worked for one of Ed's companies I don't know whether or not this is systemic -- is a reasonable rapid-response system for emergencies. We know, somewhat ironically, that such a system wouldn't have helped much at Lac Megantic because the folks on the spot made cross-assumptions about what had and hadn't been done, but I feel deeply for people like Randy who might have done something even there had they received early enough notice of the emerging situation. But can you blame a management for not going well above and beyond what Canadian law and rules said was required?
These are all good points and within the boundaries of what I posted. I note primarily, not totally. If you or I had been in Harding's position, we would not have asked for permission to shut down the locomotive belching black oil-drop smoke. We would have started up a second unit and shut down the lead unit. Before notifying the supervisor. Because we are safety-first minded. And our previous experience would have made us absolutely sure the train would not roll with handbrakes alone, even if we intended to keep the air-brakes on all night. And we would have questioned parking any train at all at the top of a grade on a main line without derail protection. Regardless of any lack of policy or rules on these matters.
And regarding Berkhardt, his role seems much like that of Warren Buffet in the operations of BNSF. But I think I might have a clue as to why he restricted himslf to that kind of role, avoiding becoming an HH.
But what about the people he hired to run the railroad? They too presumably had had resonsible positions with CN and CP. Why did not they insure those railroads' safety culture, proceedures, rules, and policies were also applied to MM&A?
Is not that the most imortant question? And if answered, an answer that can guide us to prevent other tragedies?
Your point #1: How many years experience did Harding have before he worked for MM&A? And where did he have it?
No claim that MM&A didn't adequately teach him proper train securement has any credibility. It is very clear, however, what MM&A's published rule on securement testing requires.
#2: Informing Stooge #2 is not the same thing as informing "MM&A" in the sense sone posters seem to think applies. In a world of perfect information that might be different; in a Russian-like culture where 'requesting orders from Moscow' on pain of, er, termination were required before proceeding with any actions to solve anomalous situations the blame would more clearly be on the responsible upper MM&A people. But this is more a confederacy of dunces making dumb decisions and then working the 'I was only following orders' angle with a different wrinkle. You could as equally blame United States military policy or United States officer training for the My Lai massacre ... perhaps it is true, but there are likelier reasons for the situation, and more meaningful places to apply the appropriate justice.
Regarding point #3: are you really suggesting that railroads have policies that cover all possibilities of employee bad judgment and stupidity? I would like to think such a thing is possible, but I have never seen it done in practical business; in fact, far more often I have seen policy have to be adjusted to suit a least common denominator for 'the employees you can get'.
The better case I think you could make here is whether Burkhardt et al. had a culture of fear going in Quebec, with clearly understood consequences if penny-pinching objectives were not quickly and expediently met. If it were a disciplinary offense at RTC Farnham to incur a HOS violation in having a qualified employee check out his now-burning locomotive, I could see the culpability of MM&A management a little better. But to my knowledge that was not taken up back in the days Ed was 'the most hated CEO in Canada' and may not be a focus now.
What this is beginning to remind me of is the accident in Bhopal, where the government interfered with Carbide's very ability to run the facility safely and incompetent locals ran the plant improperly and then ran away when their bungling took effect. There, too, we had eager government folks trying to arrest the American CEO for being 'responsible' and the whole deep-pockets evil-American-capitalist trope being evoked.
A previous posting of mine speculates, a good working hypothesis, as why Burkhart MAY not have made abolutely certain such rules and policies were ini efffect on the railroad.
Speaking from experience, I once found it hard to impose my supervision on people with a different culture and language and even fell into the trip of letting them "do it their way." Fortunately, the situation did not result in any physical injury or pain to anyone.
I agree with the above analysis and wish to take it further:
!. Harding did not secure the train properly. The question is was he trained or had instructions as to what proper security?
2. The supervisor made an error in assuming a track-walker, a person resonsible for maintainging track and, unless he was an exceptional Jack-of-all-trades railroaders, without sufficient knowledge to cover all points associated with shuting down and leaving a locomotive that had a fire, could and should asume that responsibility.
3. Unless the railroad had clear policies in both these matters, policies and rules that both Harding and the Supervisor violated --- and Class Ones definitely do have such rules and policies, then the blame is PRIMARILY on the railroad and only secondarily on the two people who failed to perform properly.
That is my opinion, for whatever it is worth.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
EuclidIt is not shutting down that lead engine that is an issue. The issue is the MM&A relying on that engine to run and maintain the securement of the train.
I'm beginning to think you actually believe that MM&A issued double secret probationary orders to park trains on grades with minimum securement, conduct pull tests with the independent applied, and leave a consist dead on the main without securement. Despite the actual MM&A meterial having now been provided.
You also seem to think by extension that an engineer with years of experience on mountain grades is suddenly going to forget his prior-employer's grade tables just because the MM&A only provided flatland guidelines before conducting a mandatory securement test?
They were notified by the fire department that the engine had been shut down. It was up to MM&A to respond to that notice.
In my opinion: it was cute to try to engineer this to be an American company's fault. That wouldn't objectively hold up originally, and it seems less and less likely with each new witness. (Except for Irving lying about effective packing group, which didn't matter to any aspect of the accident related to MM&A or its crews.)
Comments about the previous trip of the locomotive are being used to muddy the water and prevent those who sit in judgment from seeing the facts clearly.
The repair to the engine block had nothing to do with the failure. If the repair was that bad the engine certainly would have shut down due to low oil pressure much sooner. If the 5017 was really that bad the train could not have made the hard pull from Scottstown to Nantes. He'd be stalled East of Scottstown.
The TSB findings really are theory, I have a different theory based on many years of experience with these engines.
My co workers and I will own a part of this forever, it will never be possible to assuage the overwhelming regret we all feel.
OvermodSo it is important to determine where the responsibility lies for shutting down that critical engine, and here Callahan is saying in essence that the MM&A shop people who worked on 5017, more specifically the folks using the J-B Weld equivalent for buildup, have no blame in this accident
I don't know what Callaghan is saying. He starts to say things that he never completes. As for the engine shut down responsiblity, the fire department clearly took responsibility for shutting down the lead engine, which was their right and duty to do. That is the first step in responding to a locomotive fire.
It is not shutting down that lead engine that is an issue. The issue is the MM&A relying on that engine to run and maintain the securement of the train. They were notified by the fire department that the engine had been shut down. It was up to MM&A to respond to that notice.
I will have to look again at the section of the TSB report involving the cam seal repair. What Callahan appears to be saying is that no aspect of that actually contributed to the fire, and by implication the severe 'emissions' that were lighted off to start it. That is new, and I would want to see some more specific explanation from Callahan on what he meant.
The PROXIMATE cause of the Lac Megantic accident was the release of the straight air following termination of air compressor operation when the only running locomotive was shut down, complicated materially only by continued air-turbine operation of the EOTD (which was required to keep running anyway). While there were a great many aggravating circumstances which could have prevented the runaway, that's the reason it ran away.
So it is important to determine where the responsibility lies for shutting down that critical engine, and here Callahan is saying in essence that the MM&A shop people who worked on 5017, more specifically the folks using the J-B Weld equivalent for buildup, have no blame in this accident - which should, I hope, make some of Randy Stahl's friends and associates feel less upset about the accident.
Deggesty Euclid tree68 The plot thickens. No hand brakes at all? Click on the previous line - it's a hot link. Two quotes from the expert witness: Callaghan told the court the mechanical breakdown didn't cause the fire on the locomotive, but he said, "If the locomotive has a mechanical problem even before the fire, you minimize your potential problems by placing it in a position where it will not be the lead locomotive." When asked by the Crown what that meant, Callaghan answered, "There were no brakes, hand or automatic, applied to the train." In the first quote, I have no idea what point he is making. Maybe Murphy Siding can provide one of his public service announcements to clear it up. That sentence by Callaghan seems to start up and go six different directions like a fireworks rocket. And then it ends. The second quote refers to only the tank cars having no handbrakes being applied, which has been established. Callaghan is the first one I have heard that defines “train” as only the rolling stock. I always thought the term includes the locomotive (s) as well. Therefore, I consider Callaghan's assertion that no handbrakes were applie to the train to be incredibly misleading. As such, it comes off as a bombshell, which of course it isn't. As I recall, only the locomotive straight air brake was applied. Am I correct? If so, Mr. Callahan's statement that there were no handbrakes applied on the train is true. It does follow that a known defective engine should not have been the lead engine.
Euclid tree68 The plot thickens. No hand brakes at all? Click on the previous line - it's a hot link. Two quotes from the expert witness: Callaghan told the court the mechanical breakdown didn't cause the fire on the locomotive, but he said, "If the locomotive has a mechanical problem even before the fire, you minimize your potential problems by placing it in a position where it will not be the lead locomotive." When asked by the Crown what that meant, Callaghan answered, "There were no brakes, hand or automatic, applied to the train." In the first quote, I have no idea what point he is making. Maybe Murphy Siding can provide one of his public service announcements to clear it up. That sentence by Callaghan seems to start up and go six different directions like a fireworks rocket. And then it ends. The second quote refers to only the tank cars having no handbrakes being applied, which has been established. Callaghan is the first one I have heard that defines “train” as only the rolling stock. I always thought the term includes the locomotive (s) as well. Therefore, I consider Callaghan's assertion that no handbrakes were applie to the train to be incredibly misleading. As such, it comes off as a bombshell, which of course it isn't.
tree68 The plot thickens. No hand brakes at all? Click on the previous line - it's a hot link.
The plot thickens.
No hand brakes at all?
Click on the previous line - it's a hot link.
Two quotes from the expert witness:
Callaghan told the court the mechanical breakdown didn't cause the fire on the locomotive, but he said, "If the locomotive has a mechanical problem even before the fire, you minimize your potential problems by placing it in a position where it will not be the lead locomotive."
When asked by the Crown what that meant, Callaghan answered, "There were no brakes, hand or automatic, applied to the train."
In the first quote, I have no idea what point he is making. Maybe Murphy Siding can provide one of his public service announcements to clear it up. That sentence by Callaghan seems to start up and go six different directions like a fireworks rocket. And then it ends.
The second quote refers to only the tank cars having no handbrakes being applied, which has been established. Callaghan is the first one I have heard that defines “train” as only the rolling stock. I always thought the term includes the locomotive (s) as well.
Therefore, I consider Callaghan's assertion that no handbrakes were applie to the train to be incredibly misleading. As such, it comes off as a bombshell, which of course it isn't.
As I recall, only the locomotive straight air brake was applied. Am I correct? If so, Mr. Callahan's statement that there were no handbrakes applied on the train is true.
It does follow that a known defective engine should not have been the lead engine.
In the first comment above by Callaghan, my concern is that he says the mechanical breakdown did not cause the fire on the locomotive. Then in the following part of his comment, he apparently tries to justify his first sentence about the mechanical breakdown not causing the fire. That part is torturous because neither the fire nor the extingusing of the fire, not that loss of air pumping actually caused the runaway. So the entire comment is pointless gobbledegook.
You are right that the only air applied was the independent brakes, but Harding also set seven hanbrakes, which has been found to be insufficient according to the rules. But I would say that seven handbrakes were applied on the train. Callaghan's comment that none were applied is very misleading if not incorrect, depending on the meaning of terms.
Better go back and fact-check just who it was, not 'the company', that told him to leave that locomotive running in that condition. If I recall correctly it was the same Stooge that would later tell Harding not to bother going back when the engine caught fire. Or recognize that another engine needed to be started with the lead engine shut off via the UES.
OvermodRemember that to Harding a locomotive actively blowing oil at idle was not a particularly anomalous thing - he thought it was because 'he'd been working it pretty hard' (or words to that effect).
The cab driver commented to Harding about the engine smoking and blowing oil which was landing on the cab windshield. He seemed surprised to learn that Harding intended to leave the engine running in that condition. Harding responded by saying that he did not want to leave the locomotive running in that condition, but that he was ordered by the company to leave it running.
Harding also commented in that conversation or another, about the excessive smoke, that he had run the locomotive pretty hard coming into Nantes. I have seen nothing to indicate that he meant that he believed that the excessive smoke was a normal consequence of working the locomotive hard. I took it to mean that he felt that hard working had accelerated the progressing symptoms of the mechanical failure, making it quite obvious.
tree68 BaltACD All that is previously disclosed information. The link may be hot, the information presented isn't. News story dated today...
BaltACD All that is previously disclosed information. The link may be hot, the information presented isn't.
All that is previously disclosed information. The link may be hot, the information presented isn't.
News story dated today...
That information was in the TSB report, which was released in 2014:
"At around 2250, the train arrived at Nantes, was brought to a stop using the automatic brakes, and was parked for the night on a descending grade on the main track. The LE applied the independent brakes to the locomotive consist. He then began to apply the hand brakes on the locomotive consist and the buffer car (7 cars in total), and shut down the 4 trailing locomotives. Subsequently, the LE released the automatic brakes and conducted a hand brake effectiveness test without releasing the locomotive independent brakes. The LE then contacted the rail traffic controller (RTC) responsible for train movements between Farnham and Megantic Station (Megantic), who was located in MMA’s yard office in Farnham, to indicate that the train was secured."
The news seems to have forgotten about the official report and its contents, in favour of sensationalizing every word spoken at the trial.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Johnny
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
In the first instance he is only saying what we've said before: you don't put a known defective locomotive in the lead, you put it back in the power consist (where it could be isolated easily if its condition deteriorated).
I wish the Crown counsel had then asked "if a locomotive is known defective is it the only locomotive you leave running just because it is leading" ... getting perhaps at why the Stooges arranged for that to happen. Remember that to Harding a locomotive actively blowing oil at idle was not a particularly anomalous thing - he thought it was because 'he'd been working it pretty hard' (or words to that effect).
The second item is unfortunate because it leaves the same impression as 'we did not apply any brakes' in the Midnight Rider case. But I had not realized that the 'seven brakes' only went back as far as the two non-tank cars at the front of the train!
It's a Canadian thing that no discrimination was made between handbrake application on locomotives, on cars that only apply on one end, and cars with full foundation in determining the Transport Canada rule (but that has, I think, now been changed - in my opinion, not well enough) on the 'legal' number of "handbrakes" to set before a securement test. This is something different - no tank-car brakes were even applied.
I do think the language is a bit sensationalized so that 'no brakes on the tank cars' gets morphed into 'no brakes on the train'. But it's still appalling to me that no tank cars were secured ... and that the locomotive event recorder shows no evidence of a pull test.
tree68The plot thickens. No hand brakes at all? Click on the previous line - it's a hot link.
That does not bode well for Harding.
Norm
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.