Oui, quand en Quebec, parle comme une Quebeçois parle.
On VIA trains, announcements made in Quebec are made first in French and then in English. In the other provinces, English is used first and then French.
My high school French did avail me 20 years ago; even though I had a different accent I was understood by le Quebeçois who helped me when I had missed a turn on my way to le gare. Pardonnez moi, s'il vous plait; il a plus de soixante ans since I studied la plus belle des langues (which my wife despised).
Johnny
You are 100% wrong on that point. As part of the deal into Confederation Quebec was granted its own rule of law with the Napoleonic Code seperate and totally independent of Federal Law.
The legislature is called OFFICIALLY, "The National Assembly" not the provincial legislature as elsewhere. Quebec has never signed into any Constitutonal Accord. They have their own language laws and Immigation Laws as well, in addition to many others. It is too much of a hot potato to bring all that back up since the failed Meech Lake Accord under the Mulroney government which further gave Quebec far more seperate and special rights.
Not sure how it works in Louisiana but I doubt if it supercedes US Federal Law, but in Quebec it does.
Just do not get a speeding ticket in Quebec with your Alberta plates on your car and not being able to speak French!
Miningman Also...Does everyone understand that the legal system in Quebec is not like anywhere else whatsoever in Canada and pretty sure Louisiana as well, alone in the States. . It is based on the Napoleonic Code or Law, sometimes referred to as Civil Law. That is a big consideration. Basically you are quilty until proven innocent, not the other way around as applies to most of us residing elsewhere.
Also...Does everyone understand that the legal system in Quebec is not like anywhere else whatsoever in Canada and pretty sure Louisiana as well, alone in the States. . It is based on the Napoleonic Code or Law, sometimes referred to as Civil Law. That is a big consideration. Basically you are quilty until proven innocent, not the other way around as applies to most of us residing elsewhere.
Not gonna go too far (politics) but Quebec always has been unique, for better or worse. However, I am pretty sure our Federal criminal code (based of the English system) supersedes any provincial law, which would imply that innocent until proven guilty is the law in all 13 provinces and territories.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Miningman The Canadian media has skewered the MM&A and it's management in a most biased and relentless way and the emphasis is always on the American ownership and not only their "ineptness" but portrayed as uncaring screw 'em all rotten capitalists. This has been going on a long while to the point of being a derangement syndrome and it is not fair in the least. The vox populi and the great unwashed have been whipped up into pitchforks and burning torches. It has been unbearable.
The Canadian media has skewered the MM&A and it's management in a most biased and relentless way and the emphasis is always on the American ownership and not only their "ineptness" but portrayed as uncaring screw 'em all rotten capitalists. This has been going on a long while to the point of being a derangement syndrome and it is not fair in the least. The vox populi and the great unwashed have been whipped up into pitchforks and burning torches. It has been unbearable.
The "rotten capitalists" at MMA were doing everything possible to fit that description, by cutting corners at every turn and implementing negligent or unsafe practices to save every bit of money they could. Normally I am not in favour of whipping up the unwashed but if Ed Burkhardt et al showed up in my neighborhood I would be out the door in seconds, pitchfork in hand.
For a time I worked with an an ex-Algoma Central employee who was there when Burkhardt was managing the WC/AC system. He described him as "the Hunter Harrison of shortlines", and said that a similar incident to Lac Megantic had happened on Burkhardt's watch at WC. He did not specify, but I believe he was referring to this incident, which appears to have been caused by shoddy track maintenance:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weyauwega,_Wisconsin,_derailment
Scanned short NTSB report. Note that it flags improper training of employees as a major factor in the incident:
https://web.archive.org/web/20070928140002/http://www.postcrescent.com/specials/assets/APCweyauweatrain/63953.pdf
I do not believe that the management of MMA should be condemned for being American, I believe they should be condemned for their part in creating the situation that led to the Lac-Megantic runaway.
Overmod BaltACD My understanding is that whenever locomotives are shut down, the Main Battery Switch is to be manipulated to the Off position so the auxilliary's and other parasitic power uses do not drain the battery so the locomotive can be restarted when necessary. I got the impression the OSV energization involved little more power than the hardwired RSC installation would. But this raises a further concern about just how Harding shut the other units down, especially if there was a potential about freezing temperatures during the shutdown interval. It also makes me wonder whether the isolated OSV valves reported on two of the units represented an intentional practice of MM&A personnel precisely to preclude setting the air when units were shut down to conserve fuel or minimize pollution -- and whether the potential concern extends to other units in places where no-idle policies are in effect for locomotives.
BaltACD My understanding is that whenever locomotives are shut down, the Main Battery Switch is to be manipulated to the Off position so the auxilliary's and other parasitic power uses do not drain the battery so the locomotive can be restarted when necessary.
I got the impression the OSV energization involved little more power than the hardwired RSC installation would. But this raises a further concern about just how Harding shut the other units down, especially if there was a potential about freezing temperatures during the shutdown interval. It also makes me wonder whether the isolated OSV valves reported on two of the units represented an intentional practice of MM&A personnel precisely to preclude setting the air when units were shut down to conserve fuel or minimize pollution -- and whether the potential concern extends to other units in places where no-idle policies are in effect for locomotives.
It being July 5 - even in Canada, I don't think there was much of freezing potential.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Overmod replies-
"What I really find I object to is the (apparently largely Canadian) propensity to try excusing the Canadians responsible while casting as much blame on 'Americans' at various levels as possible, often for irrelevant 'safety' violations or assertions of inadequate training of experienced railroaders and the like."
First off I am reluctant to join in this thread So I will keep it pithy.
Overmods point is politely understated.
BaltACDMy understanding is that whenever locomotives are shut down, the Main Battery Switch is to be manipulated to the Off position so the auxilliary's and other parasitic power uses do not drain the battery so the locomotive can be restarted when necessary.
OvermodIf I read this correctly, ironically if the firemen had cut power on at least one of the other locomotives (5023) via main breaker, the corresponding valve might have dropped and probably prevented the accident. Of such little details is disaster sometimes crafted.
My understanding is that whenever locomotives are shut down, the Main Battery Switch is to be manipulated to the Off position so the auxilliary's and other parasitic power uses do not drain the battery so the locomotive can be restarted when necessary.
Overmod If I read this correctly, ironically if the firemen had cut power on at least one of the other locomotives (5023) via main breaker, the corresponding valve might have dropped and probably prevented the accident. Of such little details is disaster sometimes crafted.
If I read this correctly, ironically if the firemen had cut power on at least one of the other locomotives (5023) via main breaker, the corresponding valve might have dropped and probably prevented the accident. Of such little details is disaster sometimes crafted.
Harding manually shut down all the trailing units prior to leaving the train, as per MMA's fuel conservation policy. In doing so he would have opened the battery switches on all of them.
SD70M-2DudeIs it the report/source you were referencing? http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/lab/rail/2013/lp2332013/LP2332013.pdf
http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/lab/rail/2013/lp2332013/LP2332013.pdf
Actually I hadn't seen that report; I think I may have been going off posted information that may have referred to it. Thank you very much for providing the source material.
You were correct in presuming all three locomotives were built with deadman-pedal control setup, and retrofitted with RSC apparatus.
I'm not entirely clear that the OSV is the exact valve that was supposed to drop when electrical power to the unit was cut (that component was supposedly removed prior to the time the inspection was done). The report hints, but does not say explicitly, that the OSV would drop if electrical power was cut to its solenoid, which was not energized from the same 'hot connection' made to keep the RSC alive (see the peripheral comment about how the audible indicator for RSC activation would itself be cut off with the main electrical switch even though the RSC itself was not).
Technically the concern is moot since the OSV was isolated on 5017 'as found' (which I think is likely the condition it was in during the accident, since I think there was tight security around the locomotives after they were last used by Harding to move cars during the fire) so even if the solenoid had dropped the valve out with the locomotive power cut off, the brakes would not have been applied.
After posting I did a quick google search and found this. Is it the report/source you were referencing?
Overmod The detail I remember seeing go by was that all the ex-BN C30-7s were built with a special relay that applied the brakes if the unit power was interrupted -- it's the precise details that escape me, but I think some of the discussion involved whether this should produce a full-service or 'emergency' application rate as it was not a "penalty" brake. This is the device that was subsequently removed from the unit, and it would have set the brakes appropriately when 5017 was shut down.
The detail I remember seeing go by was that all the ex-BN C30-7s were built with a special relay that applied the brakes if the unit power was interrupted -- it's the precise details that escape me, but I think some of the discussion involved whether this should produce a full-service or 'emergency' application rate as it was not a "penalty" brake. This is the device that was subsequently removed from the unit, and it would have set the brakes appropriately when 5017 was shut down.
That's news to me, but I am unfamiliar with BN power or early alerter setups. If that is true then wiring the alerter the way 5017's was doesn't seem so negligent.
But it does make whoever removed that additional relay look even worse. Do you know if it was removed after MMA aquired/leased 5017, or before that point?
SD70M-2DudeI would consider it negligent to wire an alerter/RSC the way that 5017's was.
I would completely agree. On the other hand, a case could be made for keeping 'critical' safety equipment powered even in cases of main electrical shutdown; is it not appropriate to keep the event recorder powered separately from voluntary power cutoff? (Of course, if I were doing it now, I'd have separate batteries and charging for the alerter and LER systems, but 5017 was built much earlier)
Overmod ... perhaps more of MMA's former management should be there as well, to provide clarification on why they were running such a falling apart, two-bit operation. I think that efforts to do that, and perhaps a little more, have already been tried, and somewhat carefully spun in both some of the testimony and the daily news reports of the proceedings. I continue to be somewhat appalled at what was being used to transport very heavy trains of by-then-known-explosive crude over a havily-graded and curved route with older locomotives, but I am not altogether sure that the one-man equipment or operating protocols are directly to be blamed as nickel-and-dime, rather than the local operating culture that helpfully leaves the reverser on the seat of a recognizably ailing (for whatever reason) locomotive left running in preference to better-running ones shut down, with the consist itself not even secured.
... perhaps more of MMA's former management should be there as well, to provide clarification on why they were running such a falling apart, two-bit operation.
I think that efforts to do that, and perhaps a little more, have already been tried, and somewhat carefully spun in both some of the testimony and the daily news reports of the proceedings. I continue to be somewhat appalled at what was being used to transport very heavy trains of by-then-known-explosive crude over a havily-graded and curved route with older locomotives, but I am not altogether sure that the one-man equipment or operating protocols are directly to be blamed as nickel-and-dime, rather than the local operating culture that helpfully leaves the reverser on the seat of a recognizably ailing (for whatever reason) locomotive left running in preference to better-running ones shut down, with the consist itself not even secured.
I've always thought the bit about the reverser and the locomotives being left unlocked is somewhat of a red herring in the Lac Megantic case, in that they did not directly contribute to the runaway. They do provide evidence of wider ignorace of operating rules and a poor safety culture at MMA.
Overmod Something I have not seen, in fact, is the training information for one-man operation, which I fully expect to contain details on how to get the most useful hours out of permitted HOS without a conductor to help things like ... securement. I would also like my memory jogged on why the switch originally provided on 5017 when built, that applied the train air if the unit power was cut, had been disconnected -- someone covered this in detail but I can't search out the information.
Something I have not seen, in fact, is the training information for one-man operation, which I fully expect to contain details on how to get the most useful hours out of permitted HOS without a conductor to help things like ... securement. I would also like my memory jogged on why the switch originally provided on 5017 when built, that applied the train air if the unit power was cut, had been disconnected -- someone covered this in detail but I can't search out the information.
I am not exactly sure, but based on its age 5017 would likely have been built with a dead-man pedal, instead of a more modern alerter/RSC device. I have some limited expericence with a couple dead-man equipped locomotives, a EMD F3A and a GE 44-tonner. On both of them pulling the battery switch has no effect on the dead-man system or the automatic brake. On the F3 there is a second breaker for the speedometer, and when that breaker is turned off a penalty brake application is triggered. The 44-tonner has no such breaker, and does not even have a speedometer.
At some point in its life 5017 was modified, and an aftermarket alerter/RSC device was installed. This was wired directly to the batteries, so when the battery switch was pulled (either by the firefighters or the MMA employee who met them, either way proper practice when shutting down a locomotive) a penalty application was not triggered.
Every alerter/RSC-equipped locomotive I have ever shut down (all CN units) is wired in such a way that a penalty application is triggered when the battery switch is pulled. Pre-Lac Megantic there was no requirement for the alerter/RSC to be wired in this manner, and I am not sure if such a requirement exists today.
I would consider it negligent to wire an alerter/RSC the way that 5017's was.
Overmod SD70M-2Dude I would also find the management of MMA guilty of negligent operating practices, due to their rule which required leaving the automatic brake released on unattended trains, and their normal practice of leaving trains unattended at the top of a long, steep grade. Please provide me with a definitive answer, as there have been assertions several different ways, as to whether Canadian law precludes leaving a standing train with the automatic brake applied? I think you have said that the Westinghouse can be left applied if there was a proper securement test made first, but I also seem to remember, perhaps from the TSB report and some of the discussion thereof, that there was a Transport Canada rule that said it could not be left applied (in their minds probably lest railroaders, those slippery folks, get sloppy and use air application instead of securement to hold a train).
SD70M-2Dude I would also find the management of MMA guilty of negligent operating practices, due to their rule which required leaving the automatic brake released on unattended trains, and their normal practice of leaving trains unattended at the top of a long, steep grade.
Please provide me with a definitive answer, as there have been assertions several different ways, as to whether Canadian law precludes leaving a standing train with the automatic brake applied? I think you have said that the Westinghouse can be left applied if there was a proper securement test made first, but I also seem to remember, perhaps from the TSB report and some of the discussion thereof, that there was a Transport Canada rule that said it could not be left applied (in their minds probably lest railroaders, those slippery folks, get sloppy and use air application instead of securement to hold a train).
Pre-Lac Megantic, there was no such Transport Canada rule, one way or the other, regarding the application or release of the automatic brake on unattended trains. As I posted earlier in this thread, CN and CP had very different unattended train securement practices.
CN: Full service application of the automatic brake, full application of the independent, one handbrake applied on the lead locomotive (but no handbrakes on cars). Our policies also stated that "every effort must be made" to avoid leaving trains on grades greater than 0.7%, and if for any reason a train was to be left on such a grade then handbrakes were required on the cars, sufficient to hold the train.
CP: Automatic brake released, full application of the independent, sufficient handbrakes on the cars to hold the train. I am not sure what their policy was regarding unattended trains on grades. MMA seems to have been using rules similar to CP's, if not the same.
Whenever handbrakes were applied they were to be tested with a push/pull test, which by default required releasing the independent brake at least enough to allow the locomotive consist to move itself.
In my 7 years of railroading there has never been a Transport Canada rule or law prohibiting the application of the automatic brake on unattended trains. I am unsure if there was one at any point before that.
SD70M-2DudeI would also find the management of MMA guilty of negligent operating practices, due to their rule which required leaving the automatic brake released on unattended trains, and their normal practice of leaving trains unattended at the top of a long, steep grade.
Please provide me with a definitive answer, as there have been assertions several different ways, as to whether Canadian law precludes leaving a standing train with the automatic brake applied? I think you have said that the Westinghouse can be left applied if there was a proper securement test made first, but I also seem to remember, perhaps from the TSB report and some of the discussion thereof, that there was a Transport Canada rule that said it could not be left applied (in their minds probably lest railroaders, those slippery folks, get sloppy and use air application instead of securement to hold a train). I don't think we can blame MM&A or its personnel if there were a Canadian rule restricting the use of the automatic on an unattended train. (I believe this issue was fixed reasonably quickly after the accident, but I may well be remembering some other change in applicable law or regulations)
I am waiting to find out just who authorized the stop location on the grade, particularly since I think the severe curve at the foot, just outside Lac Megantic town, was well recognized as a hazard. It's almost enough to make me cry reading Labrie's horrified reaction to fire on a FUEL TRAIN and then his relief to find out it was "only" the locomotive... never mind the hazard of inadequate securement in a known dangerous location.
This knowledge may come hand in hand with the aforementioned recognition of who, if not Harding, came up with the bright idea of the pull test with the independent applied. That's really where the 'smoking gun' is, in my opinion, net of all the tragedy of errors that occurred otherwise.
I also find it negligent that a employee who was not familiar with train operations was sent to meet the firefighters, instead of one who was, especially when there was an opportunity to do so (Tom Harding was called in his hotel room, and then told he was not required).
I can see how this might happen in a comparatively remote area with few employees nearby, in the middle of the night, in the absence of specific knowledge about the equipment situation. I might not have thought to ask whether the train was fully tied down with no engines running, either ... even now, it still astounds me that it was not.
I think that efforts to do that, and perhaps a little more, have already been tried, and somewhat carefully spun in both some of the testimony and the daily news reports of the proceedings. I continue to be somewhat appalled at what was being used to transport very heavy trains of by-then-known-explosive crude over a havily-graded and curved route with older locomotives, but I am not altogether sure that the one-man equipment or operating protocols are directly to be blamed as nickel-and-dime, rather than the local operating culture that helpfully leaves the reverser on the seat of a recognizably ailing (for whatever reason) locomotive left running in preference to better-running ones shut down, with the consist itself not even secured. Something I have not seen, in fact, is the training information for one-man operation, which I fully expect to contain details on how to get the most useful hours out of permitted HOS without a conductor to help things like ... securement. I would also like my memory jogged on why the switch originally provided on 5017 when built, that applied the train air if the unit power was cut, had been disconnected -- someone covered this in detail but I can't search out the information.
BaltACD SD70M-2Dude Deggesty I have seen portable derails advertised in Trains. What they weigh, I do not know. Around 40 lbs. I can lift one without hardship. The major problem with them is that they simply do not work very well, and are more likely to be shoved out of the way by a locomotive instead of actually derailing it. In addition, a derail of any kind is only as good as the ties it is mounted on, and most of MMA's track was in very poor condition, with many defective ties. 40 pounds doesn't sound like much - UNTIL you have to lug is several hundred feet to put it in a proper position. Can you spell I - N - J - U - R - Y in trying to lug it on a Main Track track structure with ballast and ties to trip over.
SD70M-2Dude Deggesty I have seen portable derails advertised in Trains. What they weigh, I do not know. Around 40 lbs. I can lift one without hardship. The major problem with them is that they simply do not work very well, and are more likely to be shoved out of the way by a locomotive instead of actually derailing it. In addition, a derail of any kind is only as good as the ties it is mounted on, and most of MMA's track was in very poor condition, with many defective ties.
Deggesty I have seen portable derails advertised in Trains. What they weigh, I do not know.
I have seen portable derails advertised in Trains. What they weigh, I do not know.
Around 40 lbs. I can lift one without hardship. The major problem with them is that they simply do not work very well, and are more likely to be shoved out of the way by a locomotive instead of actually derailing it.
In addition, a derail of any kind is only as good as the ties it is mounted on, and most of MMA's track was in very poor condition, with many defective ties.
40 pounds doesn't sound like much - UNTIL you have to lug is several hundred feet to put it in a proper position. Can you spell I - N - J - U - R - Y in trying to lug it on a Main Track track structure with ballast and ties to trip over.
I've done it on several occasions, and I am still unhurt. Just take your time.
Knuckles are far heavier and harder to deal with.
Overmod I won't take up the issue of what might be 'sufficient' notice to "MM&A" in part because the individuals on trial are effectively the whole of MM&A that was involved or, in fact, able to respond to the situation in any timely manner. What I really find I object to is the (apparently largely Canadian) propensity to try excusing the Canadians responsible while casting as much blame on 'Americans' at various levels as possible, often for irrelevant 'safety' violations or assertions of inadequate training of experienced railroaders and the like. When I see any blanket condemnation of "MM&A" I confess that is the first thing that springs to mind, and I apologize to all the rational Canadian majority that does not engage in the practice.
I won't take up the issue of what might be 'sufficient' notice to "MM&A" in part because the individuals on trial are effectively the whole of MM&A that was involved or, in fact, able to respond to the situation in any timely manner. What I really find I object to is the (apparently largely Canadian) propensity to try excusing the Canadians responsible while casting as much blame on 'Americans' at various levels as possible, often for irrelevant 'safety' violations or assertions of inadequate training of experienced railroaders and the like. When I see any blanket condemnation of "MM&A" I confess that is the first thing that springs to mind, and I apologize to all the rational Canadian majority that does not engage in the practice.
As a Canadian (at risk of going too political here), I could say the same thing about the American propensity to blame various societal and economic problems on non-Americans, of course I also apologize to the rational American majority that does not engage in that practice...
But seriously though, everyone blames everyone else, expecially when there is political hay to make. Those publicly blaming the "American" upper management of MMA also stand to gain personally from grandstanding like that.
As an operating railroader, I would find Tom Harding guilty of negligence for not performing a proper handbrake test, as the independent brake was left applied.
I would also find the management of MMA guilty of negligent operating practices, due to their rule which required leaving the automatic brake released on unattended trains, and their normal practice of leaving trains unattended at the top of a long, steep grade. I do not know enough about MMA's internal personnel structure to decide who should be charged over this though.
So I agree that the right people are in the courtroom, but perhaps more of MMA's former management should be there as well, to provide claification on why they were running such a falling apart, two-bit operation.
Incidentally, this past September, as I was going into Denver by way of the detour across Wyoming, I noticed split rail derails on some of the tracks that were connected to the main, and flopover derails on other tracks that were connected to the main. Around here, almost all that I have seen are split rail.
Overmod daveklepper I am still suspicious of management because of the parking of the train on a grade on a main line without derail protection unmanned. There was actually something in the report about this. If I recall correctly it was the only place near crew lodging that would not result in blocked crossings, and there was apparently no effective way to put the train in a siding and derail-protect that siding to the outside -- we discussed that there is no good safe way to implement a derail on a working main, for other reasons, let alone have a single-man crew slog back to set it and then either leave it set 'for the crew next coming the other way to release it' (a recipe for pending disaster) or have the relief engineer waste part of his shift slogging back to unlock it.
daveklepper I am still suspicious of management because of the parking of the train on a grade on a main line without derail protection unmanned.
There was actually something in the report about this. If I recall correctly it was the only place near crew lodging that would not result in blocked crossings, and there was apparently no effective way to put the train in a siding and derail-protect that siding to the outside -- we discussed that there is no good safe way to implement a derail on a working main, for other reasons, let alone have a single-man crew slog back to set it and then either leave it set 'for the crew next coming the other way to release it' (a recipe for pending disaster) or have the relief engineer waste part of his shift slogging back to unlock it.
That is not correct, there is a solution to this which the Canadian rules (CROR) have always allowed for, the Special Derail:
"104.5(d) The location of SPECIAL DERAILS will be indicated in the time table or special instructions, will be switch stand operated and identified in the field with a reflective red letter “D” on a reflective yellow target, or a sign indicating “Special Derail” which will be visible when in the derailing position.
The following requirements govern their use:
They are normally found on sidings, but I know of a couple which have been installed on main tracks post Lac-Megantic, and the rule never prohibited installation on a main track.
Note that a Special Derail is only required to be left in the derailing position when equipment is left behind it, otherwise it must be left in the non-derailing position.
OvermodWhat I really find I object to is the (apparently largely Canadian) propensity to try excusing the Canadians responsible while casting as much blame on 'Americans' at various levels as possible, often for irrelevant 'safety' violations or assertions of inadequate training of experienced railroaders and the like.
Where do you see this? Can you give an example?
Please stop taking me to mean what I don't mean and don't say. You are not very good at it and it is starting to be aggravating as a practice.
As noted, I am waiting to see how many, if any, aspects of the events leading to the disaster were actual expedient American policy rather than 'local option'. I have still not seen the trial-record answer to Harding being asked why he did not do a securement test as the applicable rules required, with the independent fully released, after setting his little allotment of brakes on what he knew to be a severe grade.
Overmod Euclid So blaming the firemen for shutting down the engine is misguided. In my opinion, even if they had not notified the railroad; the runaway would have been the fault of MM&A for not properly securing the train. MM&A claiming they were not notified would have been beside the point. And most certainly, there is absolutely no case that can be made saying that the firemen did not notify the proper people at MM&A, as has been suggested above by Overmod saying that the MM&A offices being closed would have prevented notification of MM&A by the firemen. You are still not getting the point. It is not "the fault of MM&A" that the train was not secured, it was the Stooges, acting contrary to at least some important details officially provided by MM&A. It is not the firemen's "fault" that the train ran away, but it is a direct and proximate result of their shutting that unit down. I no longer really blame them for taking the easiest step to extinguish the fire by hitting the UES; there isn't any way they could have known the train was basically unsecured and was hanging on a system their shutdown crippled. To my knowledge they were not on trial in this proceeding or, if they were, I don't expect them to be charged with actionable contributory liability. On the other hand, their notification of anyone at MM&A was limited to a Stooge and someone with acknowledged lack of knowledge in proper power-consist shutdown. This is largely moot in the Lac Megantic circumstances because there was little reason for anyone in actual authority at MM&A to suspect the train was so appallingly unsecured, or to be able to get responsible personnel to the train within the window that turned out to represent independent leakdown. Personally, I think the right people are on trial, for at least some of the right reasons. It is the continued conflation of those foons with "MM&A" that keeps bothering me.
Euclid So blaming the firemen for shutting down the engine is misguided. In my opinion, even if they had not notified the railroad; the runaway would have been the fault of MM&A for not properly securing the train. MM&A claiming they were not notified would have been beside the point. And most certainly, there is absolutely no case that can be made saying that the firemen did not notify the proper people at MM&A, as has been suggested above by Overmod saying that the MM&A offices being closed would have prevented notification of MM&A by the firemen.
You are still not getting the point. It is not "the fault of MM&A" that the train was not secured, it was the Stooges, acting contrary to at least some important details officially provided by MM&A. It is not the firemen's "fault" that the train ran away, but it is a direct and proximate result of their shutting that unit down. I no longer really blame them for taking the easiest step to extinguish the fire by hitting the UES; there isn't any way they could have known the train was basically unsecured and was hanging on a system their shutdown crippled. To my knowledge they were not on trial in this proceeding or, if they were, I don't expect them to be charged with actionable contributory liability. On the other hand, their notification of anyone at MM&A was limited to a Stooge and someone with acknowledged lack of knowledge in proper power-consist shutdown. This is largely moot in the Lac Megantic circumstances because there was little reason for anyone in actual authority at MM&A to suspect the train was so appallingly unsecured, or to be able to get responsible personnel to the train within the window that turned out to represent independent leakdown.
Personally, I think the right people are on trial, for at least some of the right reasons. It is the continued conflation of those foons with "MM&A" that keeps bothering me.
I am getting the point just fine.
Consider the part of my quote above that I have highlighted in red.
“In my opinion, even if they had not notified the railroad; the runaway would have been the fault of MM&A for not properly securing the train.”
It does sound like I am blaming MM&A exclusively, but I had not intended that to mean blaming MM&A upper management as opposed to lower level employees such as Harding; which I believe is what you are objecting to. By saying “MM&A is as fault”, I mean the organization as a whole only to distinguish from blaming an outsider cause such as the firemen.
Also, when I refer to the firemen notifying MM&A, I do not restrict that to just notifying the top of the organization. I mean notifying the MM&A at any level that can be expected to be able and willing to carry the notification to individuals within the organization for obtaining a proper response to the notice.
In any case, my response in full context was to your comment indicating that the firemen did not notify high enough in the MM&A organization.
I do understand that there is also a narrower division of the issue regarding who within MM&A is to blame. In that regard, there is a large divide of public opinion, that chooses between blaming the engineer who broke the securement rule versus blaming the MM&A management for not having a sufficient safety culture. I can see both sides of that argument having merit.
But you did clearly blame the firemen for not notifying MM&A that they had shut down the engine. You implied that if they only notified Harding’s supervisor, that did not amount to notifying MM&A, as I had said they did. I took you to mean that notifying only as high as Harding’s supervisor left higher management in the dark, so they should remain blameless.
In any case, you leave this supposed deficiency in notification as being a direct cause by the firemen. That seems to me to place some, if not all blame for the disaster on the firemen. You imply that if the MM&A management were notified earlier, the supposed benefit would have been that they would have done more to verify that the train was secured after the fire emergency. Otherwise, the point of notifying MM&A management would be moot.
daveklepperI am still suspicious of management because of the parking of the train on a grade on a main line without derail protection unmanned.
I agree that it seems an act of insanity to tie a fuel train down on falling 2% unattended without derail protection engaged on the downhill side, given what seems to be the additional detail of inadequate guides for initial securement. What I am looking to see discussed at trial is a bit different: if there is a demonstrable company policy to use the independent as a necessary adjunct to 'securement minimum number of brakes' in part to maximize crew running hours by minimizing time spent by the leaving and arriving single men. If that were established, THEN we will have better grounds to cry company insanity.
Then the jury should be agle to come to a verdict. He should give testemony concerning the relevant instructions on hand brakes, on smoking locomotives, the whole bit.
I am still suspicious of management because of the parking of the train on a grade on a main line wihtout derail protection unmanned.
I feel certain he will be called to testify.
Yes, MMA had a safety director.
All Class Is have an officer, part of managment, specifically resonsible for safety. In some cases he or she might have other duties, but there is person with safety in his or her portfolio. So do most regionsals and short lines. What about MM&A?
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