According to Harding’s lawyer, Thomas Walsh, the essential ingredients of this case involve a departure from a proven norm of conduct which is so great that it constitutes criminal negligence. On the MM&A, according to the TSB report, the failure to properly secure parked trains was common. Would that make it a proven norm of conduct? If so, is what Harding did a departure from that norm of conduct or a part of it?
Isn't this the perpetual problem with rules? You either set general rules: "Safety is rule #1". Or you set very specific rules: "stand 20 feet from a switch". The outsider focuses on the specific rule as it is easy to understand. The experienced railroader understands the intent of the specific rule and uses a general rule to modify their behavior. As the rule book expands it finds more and more of these two dimensioned rules. Management finds it easy to write the specific rule and increase the complexity of the rule system.
Is there a solution? Can the general rule overrule the specific? Are some rules made so hard and fast that the general rule cannot be applied? As an example, is the Hours of Service rule such a rule that the crew can walk away from an unsafe train? Are some specific rules so complex that they cannot be followed in every case? For example, CSX's rule to inform the dispatcher if potential tresspassers are near the tracks.
If the railroads believe in Safety First, that should dominate all the other rules and allow the crew to take safe action regardless of the specifics.
My own belief is that the rulke here is adequate and need not be modified or iterpreted. With the push-pull tedt, done correctly, the number of handbrakes applied is assured.
petitnjIsn't this the perpetual problem with rules? You either set general rules: "Safety is rule #1". Or you set very specific rules: "stand 20 feet from a switch".
Rules build on each other. "When in doubt, take the safe course."
I would submit that the example you cite simply specifies what is the appropriate safe course. You should stand away from the switch to be safe - twenty feet is an appropriate distance. If standing twenty feet from the switch will also be unsafe, then there is no rule against standing further away.
I can't say as I've ever seen one rule countermand another. But if it does happen, refer back to rule #1.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
The TSB has publicaly stated in the past that the push/pull test is unreliable on high [steep] grades.
I was unaware of that, Euclid. How steep? And why is it unreliable?
And what do they propose as an alternative?
daveklepper I was unaware of that, Euclid. How steep? And why is it unreliable? And what do they propose as an alternative?
As I recall, this was in their accident report for a runaway train on QNSL. I will look for it.
EuclidThe TSB has publicaly stated in the past that the push/pull test is unreliable on high [steep] grades.
What is the TSB's defination of 'high [steep]' grades? The reality of railroad rights of way is that there are relatively few places that don't have some grade in their physical characteristics.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Here is the information from the TSB covering several aspects of the uncertainty of train securement rules and practice. I have added emphasis in red:
http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf
Train Securement between Bybee and Tika
When a train stops in the slope between Bybee and Tika following emergency braking, it must be secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112 and related special instructions. Rule 112 special instructions specify the minimum number of hand brakes needed in general operating conditions, but do not give the number when specific conditions apply. It is up to the locomotive engineer to determine the number of hand brakes required. In this incident, for LIM-55, the locomotive engineer, taking into consideration conditions such as track grade and train specifications, determined that 35 hand brakes were sufficient. However, given the torque applied and the condition of the brakes, that number proved insufficient to prevent the train from running away.
Employees rely on their personal experience gained in situations where cars have either not moved or ran away to determine the sufficient number of hand brakes to be applied. Standard operating practices do not take into account that hand brakes can be applied in varying degrees, depending on the wheel torque. Yet, the amount of torque that employees can physically apply to the wheel varies from one to the other. Torque variability is affected by the design, condition and maintenance of hand brakes as well as differences in physical capabilities among locomotive engineers.
The car weight and type, track gradient where the cars are left and actual and possible wind speed and direction must also be considered when deciding the sufficient number of hand brakes needed to secure a train. Determining what constitutes a sufficient number of hand brakes requires more information than locomotive engineers may have available to them and a better comprehension of the relevant variables and their relationship. This means that each locomotive engineer is left with the decision to determine how many brakes should be applied and to what degree. - 12 -
Locomotive engineers who apply hand brakes do not receive any definitive feedback to confirm that sufficient brake shoe force was attained. Furthermore, because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management’s expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112. Other railway companies in Canada have enhanced CROR Rule 112, on high-grade sections of track, by putting into place procedures detailing the application and the number of hand brakes required. Without specific instructions that take into consideration local conditions, there is a risk of underestimating the number of hand brakes required to secure a train on a steep grade such as between Bybee and Tika and consequently other trains could run away.
What is the grade between Bybee and Tika?
The grade is 1.34%: http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/images/r11q0056-figure-2.pngRegards, Volker
Note also that Rule 112 was extensively rewritten after the Lac Megantic accident and I would be surprised if the 'lessons learned' from the 2011 QNS&L accident were not incorporated. I do not have the time or the tools to look for the discussion section of the Rule 112 revision but we have discussed it in at least one thread here.
Euclid, you might post the texts of the pre- and post-Megantic versions of Rule 112 and associated rules and highlight the specific changes that were made.
And 1.34 is not particularly steep, rather more typical.
With the TSB statements it appears they gained all their 'field' experience in the classroom and never tied down a single hand brake or performed a push-pull test on a secured train.
Unfortunately, new rules are always the answer to someone who clearly violates an existing rule. The new rule is a more specific rule that often makes following previous general rules more difficult. It is not safe to put a flagman out on the street where cars don't stop for the stop sign on the grade crossing. (Actually, they do stop in the middle of the track to look both ways!) Should the flagman stay aboard the railcar and signal the locomotive when traffic is stopped? Here a safe course would be up to the flagman.
BaltACD With the TSB statements it appears they gained all their 'field' experience in the classroom and never tied down a single hand brake or performed a push-pull test on a secured train.
Balt,
Somehow that statement stands out. When I first met him the track supervisor for our area he was a new hire fresh from college and didn't know diddly. The track foreman knew more than he did. Rather than throwing in the towel the supervisor, with the blessing of his boss, went to work in the field to get some hands on experience. Under the track foreman's tutelage he became a good supervisor.
A college education is good but does not beat practical experience.
I still occasionaly see the man and am greatful he listened to the voice of experience. I'm sure you've seen the same in your trade.
Norm
The part I quoted from the TSB report is highly relevant to the Lac Megantic trial. In the case of MM&A, not only is there information that there was a culture of inadequate train securement such as not doing push/pull tests or doing them with air set; but even if MM&A rules were followed, there is a case to be made that those rules were not the most current and effective practice known to the industry. The official rules of the MM&A were certainly not 100% effective as is widely believed.
In the statements by the TSB, they clearly detail the shortcomings of Rule 112, and then stated that other railway companies have gone beyond rule 112 by enhancing it with additional procedures that make it more reliable.
Consider this quote from the TSB:
Other railway companies in Canada have enhanced CROR Rule 112, on high-grade sections of track, by putting into place procedures detailing the application and the number of hand brakes required. Without specific instructions that take into consideration local conditions, there is a risk of underestimating the number of hand brakes required to secure a train on a steep grade such as between Bybee and Tika and consequently other trains could run away.
I assume that the new rules that were put in place after the Lac Megantic reflect these enhancements to rule 112 that were voluntarily developed and implemented as detailed in the above report of the QNS&L Ry. runaway.
Here is CROR Rule 112 as it stood on 9/13:
(a) When equipment is left at any point a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied to prevent it from moving. Special instructions will indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for all locations where equipment is left. If equipment is left on a siding, it must be coupled to other equipment if any on such track unless it is necessary to provide separation at a public crossing at grade or elsewhere. (b) Before relying on the retarding force of the hand brake(s), whether leaving equipment or riding equipment to rest, the effectiveness of the hand brake(s) must be tested by fully applying the hand brake(s) and moving the cut of cars slightly to ensure sufficient retarding force is present to prevent the equipment from moving. When leaving a cut of cars secured, and after completion of this test, the cut should be observed while pulling away to ensure slack action has settled and that the cars remain in place. (c) Application of hand brakes must not be made while equipment is being pulled or shoved.
(b) Before relying on the retarding force of the hand brake(s), whether leaving equipment or riding equipment to rest, the effectiveness of the hand brake(s) must be tested by fully applying the hand brake(s) and moving the cut of cars slightly to ensure sufficient retarding force is present to prevent the equipment from moving. When leaving a cut of cars secured, and after completion of this test, the cut should be observed while pulling away to ensure slack action has settled and that the cars remain in place.
(c) Application of hand brakes must not be made while equipment is being pulled or shoved.
Taken from this letter: http://danielstraining.com/transport-canada-issues-rail-safety-advisory-letter-0913-the-securement-of-equipment-and-trains-left-unattended/ Here is the current CROR 112: In the application of this rule: (i) Equipment is considered unattended when an employee is not in close enough proximity to take effective action to stop the unintentional moving of equipment. (ii) Physical securement or mechanical devices are: hand brakes; air brakes; derails; mechanical emergency devices; locomotive equipped with a reset safety control (RSC) with roll-away protection where air pressure is maintained by continuous operation or auto start is provided; bowled terrain; and if in a yard: retarder, stop-block, wheel chocks and skates. (iii) High risk locations, as determined by a risk assessment, must be identified in company instructions. (a) When equipment, including a locomotive without an air source, is left unattended on a main track, subdivision track, siding or high risk location, at least the minimum number of hand brakes as indicated in the hand brake chart in (k) must be applied and determined to be sufficient through an effectiveness test described in (e), and at least one additional physical securement or mechanical device must be used. When air brakes are used as an additional means of physical securement: (i) the air brake system must be charged to ensure proper brake application; and (ii) the brake pipe must be fully vented at a service rate or have an emergency application and, on freight equipment, the angle cock left open. (iii) the equipment may only be left unattended for up to a maximum of two hours. If required to be left longer, an employee must conduct a visual verification to confirm that the equipment remains secure. The verification must confirm the air brake pistons are fully extended and the hand brakes remain applied. This verification must be carried out at consecutive intervals of two hours or less. If any motion is detected during the verification, additional hand brakes must be applied. The results of that verification must be communicated to another employee. (b) When unattended equipment is left coupled to a locomotive with an air source on a main track, subdivision track, siding or high risk location, at least the minimum number of hand brakes as indicated in the hand brake chart in (k) must be applied and determined to be sufficient through an effectiveness test described in (e), and at least one additional physical securement or mechanical device must be used. When air brakes are used as an additional means of physical securement: (i) the locomotive controlling the air brake system must maintain pressure; (ii) the air brake system must be charged to ensure proper brake application and the equipment must be left with air brakes applied; and (iii) the independent brake must be fully applied. (c) When equipment is left unattended in a yard, at least one physical securement or mechanical device must be utilized. (d) When equipment is left unattended on non-main track, at other than a yard, siding, subdivision track, or high risk location, a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied and determined sufficient through an effectiveness test described in (e). Special instructions must indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for these locations where equipment is left unattended. (e) When hand brakes are used, an effectiveness test must be performed as follows: release all air brakes and, (i) allow or cause the slack to adjust. It must be apparent when slack runs in or out, that the hand brakes are sufficient to prevent the equipment from moving; or (ii) apply sufficient tractive effort to determine that the hand brakes provide sufficient force to prevent the equipment from moving when tractive effort is terminated. (f) Hand brakes must be applied on all locomotives in the lead consist of an unattended movement. (g) Application of hand brakes must not be done while equipment is being pulled or shoved. (h) Before leaving equipment at any location, the employee securing such equipment must confirm with another employee the manner in which the equipment has been secured. (i) Exceptional weather situations, such as high winds or other unusual conditions, must be considered and factored into securement decisions. When exceptional weather situations emerge, previously secured equipment may require additional means of securement. Special instructions may contain location specific instructions where extreme weather events are prevalent. (j) When advised that trespasser(s) or emergency responder(s) have been in contact with unattended equipment, the person responsible for the territory must make arrangements to have an employee verify the equipment remains secured without delay. (k) In the application of this chart, the number of hand brakes on locomotives in the lead consist shall not to be included in the number of hand brakes required by the chart.
Here is the current CROR 112:
In the application of this rule: (i) Equipment is considered unattended when an employee is not in close enough proximity to take effective action to stop the unintentional moving of equipment. (ii) Physical securement or mechanical devices are: hand brakes; air brakes; derails; mechanical emergency devices; locomotive equipped with a reset safety control (RSC) with roll-away protection where air pressure is maintained by continuous operation or auto start is provided; bowled terrain; and if in a yard: retarder, stop-block, wheel chocks and skates. (iii) High risk locations, as determined by a risk assessment, must be identified in company instructions. (a) When equipment, including a locomotive without an air source, is left unattended on a main track, subdivision track, siding or high risk location, at least the minimum number of hand brakes as indicated in the hand brake chart in (k) must be applied and determined to be sufficient through an effectiveness test described in (e), and at least one additional physical securement or mechanical device must be used. When air brakes are used as an additional means of physical securement: (i) the air brake system must be charged to ensure proper brake application; and (ii) the brake pipe must be fully vented at a service rate or have an emergency application and, on freight equipment, the angle cock left open. (iii) the equipment may only be left unattended for up to a maximum of two hours. If required to be left longer, an employee must conduct a visual verification to confirm that the equipment remains secure. The verification must confirm the air brake pistons are fully extended and the hand brakes remain applied. This verification must be carried out at consecutive intervals of two hours or less. If any motion is detected during the verification, additional hand brakes must be applied. The results of that verification must be communicated to another employee. (b) When unattended equipment is left coupled to a locomotive with an air source on a main track, subdivision track, siding or high risk location, at least the minimum number of hand brakes as indicated in the hand brake chart in (k) must be applied and determined to be sufficient through an effectiveness test described in (e), and at least one additional physical securement or mechanical device must be used. When air brakes are used as an additional means of physical securement: (i) the locomotive controlling the air brake system must maintain pressure; (ii) the air brake system must be charged to ensure proper brake application and the equipment must be left with air brakes applied; and (iii) the independent brake must be fully applied. (c) When equipment is left unattended in a yard, at least one physical securement or mechanical device must be utilized. (d) When equipment is left unattended on non-main track, at other than a yard, siding, subdivision track, or high risk location, a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied and determined sufficient through an effectiveness test described in (e). Special instructions must indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for these locations where equipment is left unattended. (e) When hand brakes are used, an effectiveness test must be performed as follows: release all air brakes and, (i) allow or cause the slack to adjust. It must be apparent when slack runs in or out, that the hand brakes are sufficient to prevent the equipment from moving; or (ii) apply sufficient tractive effort to determine that the hand brakes provide sufficient force to prevent the equipment from moving when tractive effort is terminated. (f) Hand brakes must be applied on all locomotives in the lead consist of an unattended movement. (g) Application of hand brakes must not be done while equipment is being pulled or shoved. (h) Before leaving equipment at any location, the employee securing such equipment must confirm with another employee the manner in which the equipment has been secured. (i) Exceptional weather situations, such as high winds or other unusual conditions, must be considered and factored into securement decisions. When exceptional weather situations emerge, previously secured equipment may require additional means of securement. Special instructions may contain location specific instructions where extreme weather events are prevalent. (j) When advised that trespasser(s) or emergency responder(s) have been in contact with unattended equipment, the person responsible for the territory must make arrangements to have an employee verify the equipment remains secured without delay. (k) In the application of this chart, the number of hand brakes on locomotives in the lead consist shall not to be included in the number of hand brakes required by the chart.
(i) Equipment is considered unattended when an employee is not in close enough proximity to take effective action to stop the unintentional moving of equipment.
(ii) Physical securement or mechanical devices are:
hand brakes;
air brakes;
derails;
mechanical emergency devices;
locomotive equipped with a reset safety control (RSC) with roll-away protection where air pressure is maintained by continuous operation or auto start is provided;
bowled terrain; and
if in a yard: retarder, stop-block, wheel chocks and skates.
(iii) High risk locations, as determined by a risk assessment, must be identified in company instructions.
(a) When equipment, including a locomotive without an air source, is left unattended on a main track, subdivision track, siding or high risk location, at least the minimum number of hand brakes as indicated in the hand brake chart in (k) must be applied and determined to be sufficient through an effectiveness test described in (e), and at least one additional physical securement or mechanical device must be used. When air brakes are used as an additional means of physical securement:
(i) the air brake system must be charged to ensure proper brake application; and
(ii) the brake pipe must be fully vented at a service rate or have an emergency application and, on freight equipment, the angle cock left open.
(iii) the equipment may only be left unattended for up to a maximum of two hours.
If required to be left longer, an employee must conduct a visual verification to confirm that the equipment remains secure. The verification must confirm the air brake pistons are fully extended and the hand brakes remain applied. This verification must be carried out at consecutive intervals of two hours or less. If any motion is detected during the verification, additional hand brakes must be applied. The results of that verification must be communicated to another employee.
(b) When unattended equipment is left coupled to a locomotive with an air source on a main track, subdivision track, siding or high risk location, at least the minimum number of hand brakes as indicated in the hand brake chart in (k) must be applied and determined to be sufficient through an effectiveness test described in (e), and at least one additional physical securement or mechanical device must be used. When air brakes are used as an additional means of physical securement:
(i) the locomotive controlling the air brake system must maintain pressure;
(ii) the air brake system must be charged to ensure proper brake application and the equipment must be left with air brakes applied; and
(iii) the independent brake must be fully applied.
(c) When equipment is left unattended in a yard, at least one physical securement or mechanical device must be utilized.
(d) When equipment is left unattended on non-main track, at other than a yard, siding, subdivision track, or high risk location, a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied and determined sufficient through an effectiveness test described in (e). Special instructions must indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for these locations where equipment is left unattended.
(e) When hand brakes are used, an effectiveness test must be performed as follows: release all air brakes and,
(i) allow or cause the slack to adjust. It must be apparent when slack runs in or out, that the hand brakes are sufficient to prevent the equipment from moving; or
(ii) apply sufficient tractive effort to determine that the hand brakes provide sufficient force to prevent the equipment from moving when tractive effort is terminated.
(f) Hand brakes must be applied on all locomotives in the lead consist of an unattended movement.
(g) Application of hand brakes must not be done while equipment is being pulled or shoved.
(h) Before leaving equipment at any location, the employee securing such equipment must confirm with another employee the manner in which the equipment has been secured.
(i) Exceptional weather situations, such as high winds or other unusual conditions, must be considered and factored into securement decisions. When exceptional weather situations emerge, previously secured equipment may require additional means of securement. Special instructions may contain location specific instructions where extreme weather events are prevalent.
(j) When advised that trespasser(s) or emergency responder(s) have been in contact with unattended equipment, the person responsible for the territory must make arrangements to have an employee verify the equipment remains secured without delay.
(k) In the application of this chart, the number of hand brakes on locomotives in the lead consist shall not to be included in the number of hand brakes required by the chart.
Still, there is the first line of the old rule:
When equipment is left at any point a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied to prevent it from moving.
It's a shame that it now takes several paragraphs to cover what was easily summed up in one sentence.
1.` Is thewre any reecord of a run-away AFTER the correct push-pull test was pereformed?
2. Should not the testamony that seven handbrakes were applied but in the opinion of tghe witness fourtenn would have required, indicate overall weight is NOT a problem provided a SUFFICIRNT number of handbrakes are applied?
Questions:
Would not the expert testamony that 14 handbrakes, double the number set, indicate the overload alone was not the problem, that any total train weight can be handled, provided a sufficient number of handbrakes are applied?
Are there known cases of the push-pul test havingbeen applied properly, but still a runaway happened?
Thr Jury is not supposed to consder the TSI reports, but what actual evidence was presented to the Jury concverning the Securing-the-train procedure in the rule-book Tom Harding wass supposed to observe?
In the case of leaving trains unattended at Nantes, I believe that normal foresight would have shown that the location was high risk enough to be unacceptable. Any of the largest trains that MM&A was running at the time would have been certain to derail and pile up in the heart of downtown Lac Megantic if the train happened to run away. There was adequate distance for a runaway train to reach a speed far in excess of the rollover speed of the track curve entering the town.
When working around cranes, there is a universal rule saying that personnel must not go beneath raised loads. A train tied up with handbrakes atop the grade at Nantes was like a raised load with all the citizens of Lac Megantic beneath it. Relying on handbrakes to keep the train stationary would be like relying on crane cables to never break.
EuclidIn the case of leaving trains unattended at Nantes, I believe that normal foresight would have shown that the location was high risk enough to be unacceptable.
I have tried, since the accident, to figure out exactly how Nantes came to be 'acceptable' for parking heavy fuel trains. I understand it's 'as close' to the border as convenient road access permits while remaining in Canada, and blocking local crossings all night is going to produce some trouble, but I, personally, wouldn't think that practical handbrake securement of a train that size on a grade that steep, with known limiting curves into a populated area, with a one-man crew, would be particularly practical. Simple physical analysis would reveal the operating problems, even before invoking dysfunctional local practices in train securement.
That is a powerful metaphor, and if made at one of the civil trials might have powerful effect. My first thought is that it isn't quite accurate because handbrakes apply in parallel whereas crane cables fail completely when any one of them fails, so the analogy isn't as dramatic, and while a single coupler failure behind the 'set', given the combination of failures that caused the accident, would have produced a nominally shorter but still lethal runaway, almost anything done right in the 'combination of failures' would have averted the catastrophe entirely if such a failure had occurred either accidentally or intentionally.
The equivalent to the problem at Nantes was not that a crane cable might break; it's that the drum was left improperly braked, the load was not blocked, people shut off the crane engine without informing the operators properly, a mandatory safety device discharged power to the drum brake, and no one was there to see the drum start unwinding. The moral lesson you're teaching, that it was foolish to leave the load elevated in the first place, remains strong, and the argument that it was less expensive to leave it up than to spend all the manpower, expense, and time to lower and secure it and then lift it up again in the morning is certainly arguable too.
However, it is also very likely that most normal securement, properly executed, particularly with the additional measures that have been added to rule 112, really addresses the danger beyond a reasonable operational doubt. And that is what would be at the heart of a negligence claim against the actual railroad officers and policy-makers here. I might add that I'm reluctant to say that MM&A shoulda-woulda-coulda have hired many more weed weasels to curtail any tendency for the local folkles to be securing their trains without releasing the independent, to go along with their apparent censure of crews setting the independent on standing trains. I have to wonder if there were local cultural 'tendencies' that would lead to underreporting of that practice to responsible American management; I doubt it was something MM&A company policy either enabled or would tolerate had they known it was widespread, and I have yet to see objective evidence that their policy would.
One thing I have never seen or heard mentioned in all the discussions since the incident happened - What is the record of MM&A Efficiency Tests done to secured trains, in general and specifically at Nantes. If parking trains at Nantes was a routine operational reality, there should have been routine Efficiency Tests done to test the securement of those trains.
I can't speak for MM&A, however, my former carrier keeps the records of all Efficiency Tests that the company's officials perform. Company officials are required to perform a set number of Efficiency Tests every month, those tests and their results are reported up the chain of command. Depending upon the test, failure can result in application of the formal discipline procedure.
Overmod Euclid In the case of leaving trains unattended at Nantes, I believe that normal foresight would have shown that the location was high risk enough to be unacceptable. \ I have tried, since the accident, to figure out exactly how Nantes came to be 'acceptable' for parking heavy fuel trains. I understand it's 'as close' to the border as convenient road access permits while remaining in Canada, and blocking local crossings all night is going to produce some trouble, but I, personally, wouldn't think that practical handbrake securement of a train that size on a grade that steep, with known limiting curves into a populated area, with a one-man crew, would be particularly practical. Simple physical analysis would reveal the operating problems, even before invoking dysfunctional local practices in train securement. When working around cranes, there is a universal rule saying that personnel must not go beneath raised loads. A train tied up with handbrakes atop the grade at Nantes was like a raised load with all the citizens of Lac Megantic beneath it. Relying on handbrakes to keep the train stationary would be like relying on crane cables to never break. That is a powerful metaphor, and if made at one of the civil trials might have powerful effect. My first thought is that it isn't quite accurate because handbrakes apply in parallel whereas crane cables fail completely when any one of them fails, so the analogy isn't as dramatic, and while a single coupler failure behind the 'set', given the combination of failures that caused the accident, would have produced a nominally shorter but still lethal runaway, almost anything done right in the 'combination of failures' would have averted the catastrophe entirely if such a failure had occurred either accidentally or intentionally. The equivalent to the problem at Nantes was not that a crane cable might break; it's that the drum was left improperly braked, the load was not blocked, people shut off the crane engine without informing the operators properly, a mandatory safety device discharged power to the drum brake, and no one was there to see the drum start unwinding. The moral lesson you're teaching, that it was foolish to leave the load elevated in the first place, remains strong, and the argument that it was less expensive to leave it up than to spend all the manpower, expense, and time to lower and secure it and then lift it up again in the morning is certainly arguable too. However, it is also very likely that most normal securement, properly executed, particularly with the additional measures that have been added to rule 112, really addresses the danger beyond a reasonable operational doubt. And that is what would be at the heart of a negligence claim against the actual railroad officers and policy-makers here. I might add that I'm reluctant to say that MM&A shoulda-woulda-coulda have hired many more weed weasels to curtail any tendency for the local folkles to be securing their trains without releasing the independent, to go along with their apparent censure of crews setting the independent on standing trains. I have to wonder if there were local cultural 'tendencies' that would lead to underreporting of that practice to responsible American management; I doubt it was something MM&A company policy either enabled or would tolerate had they known it was widespread, and I have yet to see objective evidence that their policy would.
Euclid In the case of leaving trains unattended at Nantes, I believe that normal foresight would have shown that the location was high risk enough to be unacceptable.
\
I understand your points about my metaphor. I had considered some of them too. The key point is not so much the abrupt and total failure, but rather the certainty and extensiveness of the lethal consequences; and this especially with a trainload of highly volatile crude oil. Not only is the high speed derailment inevitable, but so is the pileup, due to the curve allowing the derailed train to leave the track alignment in a strongly diverging tangent. Also inevitable is the massive and instantly fully involved fire as so many tank cars are breached in such a short time.
One can say that if the rules were followed, this would not have happened. Well sure, of course, but failures to follow rules are inevitable too. If the rules are followed, crane cables don’t break.
There is no doubt in my mind that if I were working as an engineer for MM&A at the time, I would have recognized this incredible danger and made a stand against it. If more people were willing to do that, rules would not have to be written in blood.
EuclidThere is no doubt in my mind that if I were working as an engineer for MM&A at the time, I would have recognized this incredible danger and made a stand against it. If more people were willing to do that, rules would not have to be written in blood.
Meanwhile, in the real world...
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Euclid Overmod Euclid In the case of leaving trains unattended at Nantes, I believe that normal foresight would have shown that the location was high risk enough to be unacceptable. \ I have tried, since the accident, to figure out exactly how Nantes came to be 'acceptable' for parking heavy fuel trains. I understand it's 'as close' to the border as convenient road access permits while remaining in Canada, and blocking local crossings all night is going to produce some trouble, but I, personally, wouldn't think that practical handbrake securement of a train that size on a grade that steep, with known limiting curves into a populated area, with a one-man crew, would be particularly practical. Simple physical analysis would reveal the operating problems, even before invoking dysfunctional local practices in train securement. When working around cranes, there is a universal rule saying that personnel must not go beneath raised loads. A train tied up with handbrakes atop the grade at Nantes was like a raised load with all the citizens of Lac Megantic beneath it. Relying on handbrakes to keep the train stationary would be like relying on crane cables to never break. That is a powerful metaphor, and if made at one of the civil trials might have powerful effect. My first thought is that it isn't quite accurate because handbrakes apply in parallel whereas crane cables fail completely when any one of them fails, so the analogy isn't as dramatic, and while a single coupler failure behind the 'set', given the combination of failures that caused the accident, would have produced a nominally shorter but still lethal runaway, almost anything done right in the 'combination of failures' would have averted the catastrophe entirely if such a failure had occurred either accidentally or intentionally. The equivalent to the problem at Nantes was not that a crane cable might break; it's that the drum was left improperly braked, the load was not blocked, people shut off the crane engine without informing the operators properly, a mandatory safety device discharged power to the drum brake, and no one was there to see the drum start unwinding. The moral lesson you're teaching, that it was foolish to leave the load elevated in the first place, remains strong, and the argument that it was less expensive to leave it up than to spend all the manpower, expense, and time to lower and secure it and then lift it up again in the morning is certainly arguable too. However, it is also very likely that most normal securement, properly executed, particularly with the additional measures that have been added to rule 112, really addresses the danger beyond a reasonable operational doubt. And that is what would be at the heart of a negligence claim against the actual railroad officers and policy-makers here. I might add that I'm reluctant to say that MM&A shoulda-woulda-coulda have hired many more weed weasels to curtail any tendency for the local folkles to be securing their trains without releasing the independent, to go along with their apparent censure of crews setting the independent on standing trains. I have to wonder if there were local cultural 'tendencies' that would lead to underreporting of that practice to responsible American management; I doubt it was something MM&A company policy either enabled or would tolerate had they known it was widespread, and I have yet to see objective evidence that their policy would. I understand your points about my metaphor. I had considered some of them too. The key point is not so much the abrupt and total failure, but rather the certainty and extensiveness of the lethal consequences; and this especially with a trainload of highly volatile crude oil. Not only is the high speed derailment inevitable, but so is the pileup, due to the curve allowing the derailed train to leave the track alignment in a strongly diverging tangent. Also inevitable is the massive and instantly fully involved fire as so many tank cars are breached in such a short time. One can say that if the rules were followed, this would not have happened. Well sure, of course, but failures to follow rules are inevitable too. If the rules are followed, crane cables don’t break. There is no doubt in my mind that if I were working as an engineer for MM&A at the time, I would have recognized this incredible danger and made a stand against it. If more people were willing to do that, rules would not have to be written in blood.
Johnny
Deggesty Euclid Overmod Euclid In the case of leaving trains unattended at Nantes, I believe that normal foresight would have shown that the location was high risk enough to be unacceptable. \ I have tried, since the accident, to figure out exactly how Nantes came to be 'acceptable' for parking heavy fuel trains. I understand it's 'as close' to the border as convenient road access permits while remaining in Canada, and blocking local crossings all night is going to produce some trouble, but I, personally, wouldn't think that practical handbrake securement of a train that size on a grade that steep, with known limiting curves into a populated area, with a one-man crew, would be particularly practical. Simple physical analysis would reveal the operating problems, even before invoking dysfunctional local practices in train securement. When working around cranes, there is a universal rule saying that personnel must not go beneath raised loads. A train tied up with handbrakes atop the grade at Nantes was like a raised load with all the citizens of Lac Megantic beneath it. Relying on handbrakes to keep the train stationary would be like relying on crane cables to never break. That is a powerful metaphor, and if made at one of the civil trials might have powerful effect. My first thought is that it isn't quite accurate because handbrakes apply in parallel whereas crane cables fail completely when any one of them fails, so the analogy isn't as dramatic, and while a single coupler failure behind the 'set', given the combination of failures that caused the accident, would have produced a nominally shorter but still lethal runaway, almost anything done right in the 'combination of failures' would have averted the catastrophe entirely if such a failure had occurred either accidentally or intentionally. The equivalent to the problem at Nantes was not that a crane cable might break; it's that the drum was left improperly braked, the load was not blocked, people shut off the crane engine without informing the operators properly, a mandatory safety device discharged power to the drum brake, and no one was there to see the drum start unwinding. The moral lesson you're teaching, that it was foolish to leave the load elevated in the first place, remains strong, and the argument that it was less expensive to leave it up than to spend all the manpower, expense, and time to lower and secure it and then lift it up again in the morning is certainly arguable too. However, it is also very likely that most normal securement, properly executed, particularly with the additional measures that have been added to rule 112, really addresses the danger beyond a reasonable operational doubt. And that is what would be at the heart of a negligence claim against the actual railroad officers and policy-makers here. I might add that I'm reluctant to say that MM&A shoulda-woulda-coulda have hired many more weed weasels to curtail any tendency for the local folkles to be securing their trains without releasing the independent, to go along with their apparent censure of crews setting the independent on standing trains. I have to wonder if there were local cultural 'tendencies' that would lead to underreporting of that practice to responsible American management; I doubt it was something MM&A company policy either enabled or would tolerate had they known it was widespread, and I have yet to see objective evidence that their policy would. I understand your points about my metaphor. I had considered some of them too. The key point is not so much the abrupt and total failure, but rather the certainty and extensiveness of the lethal consequences; and this especially with a trainload of highly volatile crude oil. Not only is the high speed derailment inevitable, but so is the pileup, due to the curve allowing the derailed train to leave the track alignment in a strongly diverging tangent. Also inevitable is the massive and instantly fully involved fire as so many tank cars are breached in such a short time. One can say that if the rules were followed, this would not have happened. Well sure, of course, but failures to follow rules are inevitable too. If the rules are followed, crane cables don’t break. There is no doubt in my mind that if I were working as an engineer for MM&A at the time, I would have recognized this incredible danger and made a stand against it. If more people were willing to do that, rules would not have to be written in blood. Yes, especially now that all of the mistakes have been pointed out.
Yes, especially now that all of the mistakes have been pointed out.
No, I am not talking about recognizing the danger in hindsight. It was obvious before it happened. It is not surprising that anyone would see it coming. What is surprising is that so many were willing to look the other way.
BaltACD Company officials are required to perform a set number of Efficiency Tests every month, ...
Conversely, our conductors and engineers are required to have at least one efficiency test each year. No getting lucky and not getting "caught." The challenge for us is that our volunteers are not scheduled, as such - arranging for a test when any given crew member is on duty can be a challenge.
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