OK. But would you not agree thst in the USA, since the interests of Harding are opposed to those of the other two defendents, that their trials would have been separated? And do you agree about the purpose of a trial in all ethical democracies? Thanks for the clarification.
And if I am correct about the USA possibility, why is it different in Quebec that the three are being charged together in one trial?
With regarding Harding vs, the lack of Safey First MM&A culture, I thought of an analogy. A stretch of highway is posted at 55mph. There is a seldom-used pedestrian crossing with a pedestrian-activated stop light, set to yellow before red with the assumption that nobody drives faster than 65mph. But lots of drivers don't obey the speed limit, and reinforcement by police is very spotty. So the almost invitable occurs, an elderly pedestrian activated the light, a speeder doing 85 brakes too late, the pedestrian freezes in terror instead of quickening his pace....etc. In a court of law, would the driver be able to use the excuse: "Well, almoist everybody speeds on that stretch of highway"?
How does that work as an analogy? Unless, again, Harding was COMMANDED to do what he did. Like, "secure the train as quickly as you possibly can."
Don't know enough about criminal law to make any kind of comment. Just wanted to point out your mistake, the same one that I made. Outside of that I really do not want to comment or speculate on this thread.
I'm still trying to fiqure out how we gave ten million bucks to a terrorist who killed an American military medic in Afghanistan and pleaded quilty, because ne was sleep deprived at Gitmo.
Incredible! Please email the story to me at daveklepper@yahoo.com
Overmod Euclid said: I find it strange that Callaghan’s testimony about one-man crews would be allowed in the trial. Overmod said: Nothing strange about it, if the Crown (or the defense) wanted to reinforce some kind of contributory negligence on MM&A for having done 'nothing except add mirrors' or whatever Callaghan said. Goes hand in hand with MM&A 'disabling' or 'miswiring' a 'safety valve'. The thng is, here it is Saturday and some posters still seem blissfully unaware that there HAS been testimony regarding far more preparation for one-man operation, and about the purpose and safety of the OSVs, and I have the impression the jury understands what the correct picture on both points, much more favorable to MM&A, actually was.
Euclid said:
I find it strange that Callaghan’s testimony about one-man crews would be allowed in the trial.
Overmod said:
Nothing strange about it, if the Crown (or the defense) wanted to reinforce some kind of contributory negligence on MM&A for having done 'nothing except add mirrors' or whatever Callaghan said. Goes hand in hand with MM&A 'disabling' or 'miswiring' a 'safety valve'. The thng is, here it is Saturday and some posters still seem blissfully unaware that there HAS been testimony regarding far more preparation for one-man operation, and about the purpose and safety of the OSVs, and I have the impression the jury understands what the correct picture on both points, much more favorable to MM&A, actually was.
Can you please provide a reference to MM&A's extensive preparation for one-man operation that was detailed in testimony during the trial, as you mention above? Who said it and what did they say?
MM: I find nothing substantiating your post concerning a former prisoner of the USA. I did find that the current Canadian government did do somehing similar.
We can discuss this further in private email correspondence off this website. And yes, I do see a remote conection to this tragedy. But that has to be discussed off this website.
Will private email you Dave
Euclid Overmod Euclid said: I find it strange that Callaghan’s testimony about one-man crews would be allowed in the trial. Overmod said: Nothing strange about it, if the Crown (or the defense) wanted to reinforce some kind of contributory negligence on MM&A for having done 'nothing except add mirrors' or whatever Callaghan said. Goes hand in hand with MM&A 'disabling' or 'miswiring' a 'safety valve'. The thng is, here it is Saturday and some posters still seem blissfully unaware that there HAS been testimony regarding far more preparation for one-man operation, and about the purpose and safety of the OSVs, and I have the impression the jury understands what the correct picture on both points, much more favorable to MM&A, actually was. Can you please provide a reference to MM&A's extensive preparation for one-man operation that was detailed in testimony during the trial, as you mention above? Who said it and what did they say?
I testified that I was against installing the mirrors. I thought it better to get up from the engineer seat and look out the opposite side window.
I also stated that one man crews were 2 plus years in the making in Canada. There are alot of changes and effort that an engineer is not going to see or know. It began with a risk analysis beginning with the protocals of June 26 2006 updated March 9 2009 and December 11 2011.
We had meetings in Canada with the village of Nantes Oct. 28 2009. Meeting with Frontenac on Oct 29 and Megantic on Oct 29 2009.
It was MUCH more than some mirrors.
EuclidCan you please provide a reference to MM&A's extensive preparation for one-man operation that was detailed in testimony during the trial, as you mention above? Who said it and what did they say?
As you're fond of saying, why should I have to document the truth of a statement I make? Tell you what: you tell us what your experience kicking cars was, and I'll tell you the source and provenance of my information on MM&A's one-man-crew operation.
On the other hand, since it's already a matter of public record, you could just wait for the official transcripts, as many of us are doing, or perhaps the source himself would care to comment directly, as I personally would prefer.
Correction. Thanks! He was a prisoner in the USA but then also in Canada, and it was Trudau Canadian govenment that bestowed this fortune on him.
In the cross examining of technical expert Stephen Callaghan by Harding’s lawyer, Callaghan said he has worked for QNSL RR, and helped develop their preparations for one-man crews. As I recall, he said that MM&A had only installed a mirror in locomotive cabs to prepare for one-man crew operation.
When asked what preparations were made by QNSL, he said that they had instituted 65 new rules and procedures that were implemented before one-man operation began. He also said that four additional ones had to be done within 12 months of the start of one-man operation. He said that QNSL put all employees through 10 days of specialized training related to single-person operations. He also said that anti-collision devices were installed on QNSL trains. He also said that provisions were created to provide first responders to provide rescue of an engineer stranded in the wilderness.
MM&A safety director, Michael Horan also testified that the only thing MM&A had done to prepare for one-man operation was to install the mirrors on locomotives.
Wnat exactly is an anti collision device ? PTC ?
EuclidHe also said that anti-collision devices were installed on QNSL trains.
If I remember correctly, and someone correct me if I do not, the 'anticollision devices' on the QNS&L were radio proximity transponders, which gave progressive alerts as locomotives grew closer to each other. I do not remember precisely how that technology worked, but it was very effective for the 'purpose intended'.
Euclid In the cross examining of technical expert Stephen Callaghan by Harding’s lawyer, Callaghan said he has worked for QNSL RR, and helped develop their preparations for one-man crews. As I recall, he said that MM&A had only installed a mirror in locomotive cabs to prepare for one-man crew operation. When asked what preparations were made by QNSL, he said that they had instituted 65 new rules and procedures that were implemented before one-man operation began. He also said that four additional ones had to be done within 12 months of the start of one-man operation. He said that QNSL put all employees through 10 days of specialized training related to single-person operations. He also said that anti-collision devices were installed on QNSL trains. He also said that provisions were created to provide first responders to provide rescue of an engineer stranded in the wilderness. MM&A safety director, Michael Horan also testified that the only thing MM&A had done to prepare for one-man operation was to install the mirrors on locomotives.
Did the QNSL 1 man training include how to properly secure a train? If not then that training had no bearing on the Lac Megantic incident.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD Euclid In the cross examining of technical expert Stephen Callaghan by Harding’s lawyer, Callaghan said he has worked for QNSL RR, and helped develop their preparations for one-man crews. As I recall, he said that MM&A had only installed a mirror in locomotive cabs to prepare for one-man crew operation. When asked what preparations were made by QNSL, he said that they had instituted 65 new rules and procedures that were implemented before one-man operation began. He also said that four additional ones had to be done within 12 months of the start of one-man operation. He said that QNSL put all employees through 10 days of specialized training related to single-person operations. He also said that anti-collision devices were installed on QNSL trains. He also said that provisions were created to provide first responders to provide rescue of an engineer stranded in the wilderness. MM&A safety director, Michael Horan also testified that the only thing MM&A had done to prepare for one-man operation was to install the mirrors on locomotives. Did the QNSL 1 man training include how to properly secure a train? If not then that training had no bearing on the Lac Megantic incident.
Well just to clarify, I had no intention of implying that anything to do with the one-man crew issue (including MM&A's suggested lack of preparation for one-man crews) has anything whatsoever to do with Harding not securing the train.
MY POINT is that blame is being placed on the MM&A during the trial, and that has the effect of excusing Harding's actions. That theme is all over the written news and commentary about the Lac Megantic disaster. And apparently it has also made its way into the trial.
One such narrative is that there is a little book of regulations that puts federal limits on train weight. The runaway oil train was 100% overloaded past the federal limit. So of course Harding was unable to secure the train. It was just too dang heavy for handbrakes to hold.
Now bear in mind that I am not asserting that to be true. I am only telling you about somebody else asserting it to be true.
For all of you that know how the train should have been secured and see Harding to be the only one reponsible for the disaster, I have a feeling that you are going to agast at what this trial produces. Once again, this is not what I am hoping for, but I am beginning to expect it.
Euclid The runaway oil train was 100% overloaded past the federal limit.
Is there documentation to support that? If I may ask, what is the load per train limit in Canada?
Given the land barges some US railroads are running there does not appear to be any regulatory limit on either tonnage or train length, nor would I suspect there to be any similar regulation in Canada. Perhaps horsepower per ton of train would be a consideration but what would a railroad trying to save a buck be obligated to do under the rules? If the train is capable of making the journey regardless of speed it is likely allowed. If it can't, the hosting railroad should have provisions to repower it when necessary.
As regards engineer Harding it should be obvious to the deaf and blind he should be found guilty of not properly securing his train regardless of what he was ordered to do, but should he alone be held responsible? He reported to his dispatccher and commented to the taxi driver that the engine was spitting oil dropletts out the exhaust stack. Was he not aware a cylinder had gone west? IMO, I would think the loss of power should have given him an indication of something wrong.
His failure to properly secure the train doesn't mean others are not culpable but should offer Harding a degree of protection in court were he ordered to leave the train as it was.
I'm not familiar with Canadian criminal law but the comments in this discussion lead me to believe there is sufficient blame to spread around. The others may be spared simply because Harding is the scapegoat. Granted he failed to do his job properly, and he should not be forgiven for that but if it was common practice on the MM&A should he alone be held accountable?
I'm not trying to be contentious, just seeking factual information rather than speculation. The trial, whether fair or not will determine the outcome for Harding and others. The best outcome we can hope for is fairness and I don't think any of those on trial wanted to see 47 people die and downtown Lac Megantic destroyed in the resulting fire.
Norm
Randy,If the piston on the lead unit had a hole in it, why didn't the "Crankcase Overpressure" shut the unit down?
.
BigJim Randy,If the piston on the lead unit had a hole in it, why didn't the "Crankcase Overpressure" shut the unit down?
Thats exactly why I think the failure happened at Nantes siding. I do not think the piston holed in notch 8 on the hard climb from Scotstown to Nantes. I think it went through the piston at Nantes, eventually it would have shut down on CCOP if it didn't run out of lube oil first. It may not build enough CCOP in idle in a short enough time.
I think you ask a great question and its one that I considered.
Norm48327 Euclid The runaway oil train was 100% overloaded past the federal limit. Is there documentation to support that? If I may ask, what is the load per train limit in Canada? Given the land barges some US railroads are running there does not appear to be any regulatory limit on either tonnage or train length, nor would I suspect there to be any similar regulation in Canada. Perhaps horsepower per ton of train would be a consideration but what would a railroad trying to save a buck be obligated to do under the rules? If the train is capable of making the journey regardless of speed it is likely allowed. If it can't, the hosting railroad should have provisions to repower it when necessary. As regards engineer Harding it should be obvious to the deaf and blind he should be found guilty of not properly securing his train regardless of what he was ordered to do, but should he alone be held responsible? He reported to his dispatccher and commented to the taxi driver that the engine was spitting oil dropletts out the exhaust stack. Was he not aware a cylinder had gone west? IMO, I would think the loss of power should have given him an indication of something wrong. His failure to properly secure the train doesn't mean others are not culpable but should offer Harding a degree of protection in court were he ordered to leave the train as it was. I'm not familiar with Canadian criminal law but the comments in this discussion lead me to believe there is sufficient blame to spread around. The others may be spared simply because Harding is the scapegoat. Granted he failed to do his job properly, and he should not be forgiven for that but if it was common practice on the MM&A should he alone be held accountable? I'm not trying to be contentious, just seeking factual information rather than speculation. The trial, whether fair or not will determine the outcome for Harding and others. The best outcome we can hope for is fairness and I don't think any of those on trial wanted to see 47 people die and downtown Lac Megantic destroyed in the resulting fire.
Actually, it was not 100% overloaded. I got my numbers mixed up. It was 9100 tons when the maximum allowed according to a regulation was 6300 tons. I have seen it reported many times that the train was overloaded. It is always stated as being against a regulation, but never does it say what regulation that is. So, a couple weeks ago, I asked here what regulation is involved in limiting the train weight, and nobody provided the answer.
Then today, I found a news report that refers to the regulation as being in a regulation manual, which was in the possession of Engineer Daigle during his testimony as to the oil train being overweight. I have linked to the article below. This is as close to clarity that I have seen any report come, but still it does not say who is imposing this regulation. I think it is strange to have focused so much coverage on this overweight detail while leaving out so many things that any person interested in the story would naturally like to know.
When I google “Lac Megantic disaster trial,” I get several of those activism pieces that are intended to shift blame off of Harding and onto MM&A management. The rest of the search turns up news articles which also seem focused on blaming MM&A. It was one of those activism pieces that suggested Harding could not secure the train with handbrakes because it was too heavy. Those are propaganda pieces and some characterize the disaster as being a corporate crime committed by the management of MM&A. They come across as labor disputes against railroad management.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/mma-trial-train-overweight-1.4367611
“Rules dictated maximum weight
Daigle, one of three MMA engineers who operated trains along the Farnham–to–Mégantic route, told the court it was common practice for the company's top management to play loose with established railway regulations.
Referring to a regulation manual and documents which listed the contents and weight of the 73-tanker-car train that derailed on July 6, 2013, Daigle confirmed the maximum weight allowed for an MMA train during the period from April 1, 2013 to Nov. 30 was 6300 tonnes — not counting locomotives.
The train involved in the tragedy weighed 9100 tonnes.”
EuclidOne such narrative is that there is a little book of regulations that puts federal limits on train weight. The runaway oil train was 100% overloaded past the federal limit. So of course Harding was unable to secure the train. It was just too dang heavy for handbrakes to hold.
Am I the only one who appreciated this as sarcasm?
As of 6/24/2017 there was no visible stricture on train weight applicable to hazardous materials transport by rail. (See http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2017/2017-06-24/html/reg3-eng.html ) This discussion includes by reference the original act of 1992 and its 2009 revision. Note in particular the discussion of the Lac Megantic accident in this document.
Meanwhile, the Canadian 'Rules Respecting Track Safety' (TSR) as late as 2012 has no reference to maximum safe train length either, at least that I can see.
And, in the interests of avoiding any further stupidity regarding quotation of GCOR, etc. in reference to Canadian law and practice, here is a link to the PDF copy of the December 14th, 2016 CROR. (This is the version that was revised in the wake of the Lac Megantic accident; I invite one of our Canadians to provide a counterpart link to the version of the CROR that was in force then). Nowhere in here do I see reference to maximum train weights, although I was expecting to see something about tons per operative brake or permissible axles of power -- I think those are specific railroad rules, not TC/TSA 'federal' regulations.
So I would appreciate a hard link to the relevant document that MM&A 'should' have read specifying that its oil train was unsafely overweight by federal regulation. Either PDF or screenshots of the relevant pages would be fine if the document is not available in html.
Overmod Euclid One such narrative is that there is a little book of regulations that puts federal limits on train weight. The runaway oil train was 100% overloaded past the federal limit. So of course Harding was unable to secure the train. It was just too dang heavy for handbrakes to hold. Am I the only one who appreciated this as sarcasm? As of 6/24/2017 there was no visible stricture on train weight applicable to hazardous materials transport by rail. (See http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2017/2017-06-24/html/reg3-eng.html ) This discussion includes by reference the original act of 1992 and its 2009 revision. Note in particular the discussion of the Lac Megantic accident in this document. Meanwhile, the Canadian 'Rules Respecting Track Safety' (TSR) as late as 2012 has no reference to maximum safe train length either, at least that I can see. And, in the interests of avoiding any further stupidity regarding quotation of GCOR, etc. in reference to Canadian law and practice, [url=https://www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/railsafety/CANADIAN_RAIL_OPERATING_RULES_2016.pdf]here is a link to the PDF copy of the December 14th, 2016 CROR. (This is the version that was revised in the wake of the Lac Megantic accident; I invite one of our Canadians to provide a counterpart link to the version of the CROR that was in force then). Nowhere in here do I see reference to maximum train weights, although I was expecting to see something about tons per operative brake or permissible axles of power -- I think those are specific railroad rules, not TC/TSA 'federal' regulations. So I would appreciate a hard link to the relevant document that MM&A 'should' have read specifying that its oil train was unsafely overweight by federal regulation. Either PDF or screenshots of the relevant pages would be fine if the document is not available in html.
Euclid One such narrative is that there is a little book of regulations that puts federal limits on train weight. The runaway oil train was 100% overloaded past the federal limit. So of course Harding was unable to secure the train. It was just too dang heavy for handbrakes to hold.
And, in the interests of avoiding any further stupidity regarding quotation of GCOR, etc. in reference to Canadian law and practice, [url=https://www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/railsafety/CANADIAN_RAIL_OPERATING_RULES_2016.pdf]here is a link to the PDF copy of the December 14th, 2016 CROR. (This is the version that was revised in the wake of the Lac Megantic accident; I invite one of our Canadians to provide a counterpart link to the version of the CROR that was in force then). Nowhere in here do I see reference to maximum train weights, although I was expecting to see something about tons per operative brake or permissible axles of power -- I think those are specific railroad rules, not TC/TSA 'federal' regulations.
Johnny
DeggestyOh, me, Overmod; I clicked on the link you gave ...
I left out the close-URL tag and had to go back and edit it to work properly. Both hot links do work; the first goes to the appropriate Web page, and the second proceeds directly to a download (1.67MB) of the CROR. (If anyone can't get their download to work, PM me with an outside e-mail address and I'll send it as an attachment.)
Overmod Euclid One such narrative is that there is a little book of regulations that puts federal limits on train weight. The runaway oil train was 100% overloaded past the federal limit. So of course Harding was unable to secure the train. It was just too dang heavy for handbrakes to hold. Am I the only one who appreciated this as sarcasm? As of 6/24/2017 there was no visible stricture on train weight applicable to hazardous materials transport by rail. (See http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2017/2017-06-24/html/reg3-eng.html ) This discussion includes by reference the original act of 1992 and its 2009 revision. Note in particular the discussion of the Lac Megantic accident in this document. Meanwhile, the Canadian 'Rules Respecting Track Safety' (TSR) as late as 2012 has no reference to maximum safe train length either, at least that I can see. And, in the interests of avoiding any further stupidity regarding quotation of GCOR, etc. in reference to Canadian law and practice, here is a link to the PDF copy of the December 14th, 2016 CROR. (This is the version that was revised in the wake of the Lac Megantic accident; I invite one of our Canadians to provide a counterpart link to the version of the CROR that was in force then). Nowhere in here do I see reference to maximum train weights, although I was expecting to see something about tons per operative brake or permissible axles of power -- I think those are specific railroad rules, not TC/TSA 'federal' regulations. So I would appreciate a hard link to the relevant document that MM&A 'should' have read specifying that its oil train was unsafely overweight by federal regulation. Either PDF or screenshots of the relevant pages would be fine if the document is not available in html.
You're looking at the operating rule book. They usually contain general instructions (such as "unattended engines" in the linked 12/14/16 CROR) but more specific instructions like you're expecting would most likely be in Air Brake and Train Handling Rules and/or Special Instructions. Our AB&TH rules conform to US CFR (where applicable, and our book cites which CFR pertains to the rule) and I would expect Canadian rules would too. Still, I'm sure there are some items that aren't covered by government regulation and those would be up to the railroad's discretion.
Jeff
General Special instructions (GSI) 2-245 dated May 18 2012 cancelled the old CP tonnage limit.
Myself and other RFE's operated some of the first oil trains to first get an idea if the trains were manageable on the railroad. We also then got feedback from experienced engineers concerning the operation of the trains and the feedback and our results were all positive. They were good handling trains.
Francois must have forgotten about the bulletin GSI.
According to the accident report total train length were 4,700 ft and total weight 10,290 tons, the locomotive consist was 1,004 tons.
If there were any violations of train size limits (length or weight) wouldn't it be mentioned in the TSB report? I haven't found anything like this but.Regards, Volker
Again , the TSB report was not allowed as evidence. The jury will never see it. No reference to the report was allowed.
I know, but here in this discussion it might help.
It is the same in the USA but that doesn't make it easier to understand. Regards, Volker
Randy StahlGeneral Special instructions (GSI) 2-245 dated May 18 2012 cancelled the old CP tonnage limit.
Has the jury heard that information in court, or are they only left with the testimony of Daigle stating that the train was overloaded past the prescribed limit, and that this was an expample of how the company's top management played fast and loose with established railway regulations?
Euclid Randy Stahl General Special instructions (GSI) 2-245 dated May 18 2012 cancelled the old CP tonnage limit. Has the jury heard that information in court, or are they only left with the testimony of Daigle stating that the train was overloaded past the prescribed limit, and that this was an expample of how the company's top management played fast and loose with established railway regulations?
Randy Stahl General Special instructions (GSI) 2-245 dated May 18 2012 cancelled the old CP tonnage limit.
I did not testify to this. I do not know if anyone else did.
Did not an expert witness testify as to correct Securing a train procedure? If so, the Jury should know there is no weight limitation, the greater weight, the greater number of handbrakes applied. At least several jurors should understand that and inform others.
I am waiting for the trial transcript to see exactly what the jury was told about brakes. Of course it is a particularly egregious red herring to bring the issue up at all; a 35-year railroader doesn't need a cheat sheet to know how many brakes to apply to keep the train from moving when doing the rules-mandated pull test.
What the jury SHOULD have been told by the expert witless is the same thing my wife tells the clients: any estimate provided is only an initial figure, and the ACTUAL price is determined by the necessary service. The 'number of handbrakes' is just a guide for the initial set, not some magic legal proof that the train is safe.
And yes, I hope that was communicated to the jury, although I suspect it was 'spun' to make it look as though the MM&A number-of-brakes table was negligently inadequate for 2%-grade railroading with "grossly overweight" consists, etc. etc. etc.
Likely in hindsight Ed's team should just have copied over the substance of the CP train-handling rules as likely applicable to that line before MM&A started running over it. I believe we have discussed this in sufficient detail; it would have indicated a set of something like 40% of the brakes on the train ... for idiots unwilling or unable to conduct the NECESSARY PULL TEST assuring securement afterwards.
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