Saturnalia Randy Stahl The only way to prove either theory would have been to change the bad power assembly, put oil in it and run it. This was not done. Would you consider it inmaterial that they didn't test this, or do you think that testing it would have potentially changed anything with regards to the investigation and these crminal proceedings? Sounds like you suggest that the run-away was inevitable that night if the low oil pressure concolusion is true, so I suppose probably not. Thanks for your contributions here in this thread - it's the sort of insight generally lacking in these speculative threads, and I know many of us really appreciate it.
Randy Stahl The only way to prove either theory would have been to change the bad power assembly, put oil in it and run it. This was not done.
The only way to prove either theory would have been to change the bad power assembly, put oil in it and run it. This was not done.
Would you consider it inmaterial that they didn't test this, or do you think that testing it would have potentially changed anything with regards to the investigation and these crminal proceedings? Sounds like you suggest that the run-away was inevitable that night if the low oil pressure concolusion is true, so I suppose probably not.
Thanks for your contributions here in this thread - it's the sort of insight generally lacking in these speculative threads, and I know many of us really appreciate it.
I don't think that the locomotive failure is important. Locomotives fail , there are alot of things other than a failed piston that can cause a failure with the same result as Megantic.
1) fuel pump failure- blown fuel line or gasket.
2) water pressure failure- radiator leak, blown water hose etc.
3) electrical control failure,
4) oil leak- blown hose or gasket
5) engine bearing failure, seized main bearing, spun rod bearing.
6) crankcase overpressure- broken rings, piston crown failure.
7) engine overheat
8) battery charge failure- aux gen brushes, aux gen faillure, voltage regulator failure.
9) locomotive out of fuel, empty tank.
All of these failures at Nantes would have have the same result.
SD70M-2Dude Euclid BaltACD Any engineer that thinks performing a push-pull test with the independent brake applied should have his engineers certification invalidated the instant he tried that stunt. Securing a train is not rocket science or brain surgery in it's mental requirements. Right. But my point is not that Harding was wrong in the way he securred the train. I think he could have been lax and just rationalized that what he did was sufficient. But I don't see how he could have thought it was sufficient if he were to lose the independent brakes, and I don't see how he could fail to see that, in all likelihood, he would lose the independent brake. To miss that leads me to believe he did not have sufficient knowledge for the job. So, I would have to conclude that Harding does not have prior experience securing trains on steep grades on either MM&A or on another railroad. If he did have such experience, he would have realized the peril that shutting down the engine created. Upon that realization, he would have gone back to the site and either set more handbrakes or started another engine. He would have convinced RJ that it was absolutely necessary for him to go back the site and secure the train because a runaway was inevitable if he did not. He would have gone back even if he was not paid by his employer. A couple other things to keep in mind: Harding would have been fatigued after a long day's work when the RTC called him at the hotel. He would likely not have been in a 100% clear state of mind due to that fatigue, and I can tell you from personal experience that one's #1 goal is sleep when you are in that state of mind, no matter how dedicated an employee you are. And before Lac-Megantic it was not common knowledge that a train's air brakes could behave the way they did there. Most people (myself included) thought that the brake pipe leaking off would automatically set the air brakes on the cars, no matter how slow the leak was. If this thought entered Harding mind, combined with his fatigue it would likely have been enough to reassure him that the train would still be waiting there the next day, and he would have then refocused on his primary goal of the moment (sleep). The RTC telling him that the locomotive problems would be dealt with the next morning would only have reinforced this train of thought.
Euclid BaltACD Any engineer that thinks performing a push-pull test with the independent brake applied should have his engineers certification invalidated the instant he tried that stunt. Securing a train is not rocket science or brain surgery in it's mental requirements. Right. But my point is not that Harding was wrong in the way he securred the train. I think he could have been lax and just rationalized that what he did was sufficient. But I don't see how he could have thought it was sufficient if he were to lose the independent brakes, and I don't see how he could fail to see that, in all likelihood, he would lose the independent brake. To miss that leads me to believe he did not have sufficient knowledge for the job. So, I would have to conclude that Harding does not have prior experience securing trains on steep grades on either MM&A or on another railroad. If he did have such experience, he would have realized the peril that shutting down the engine created. Upon that realization, he would have gone back to the site and either set more handbrakes or started another engine. He would have convinced RJ that it was absolutely necessary for him to go back the site and secure the train because a runaway was inevitable if he did not. He would have gone back even if he was not paid by his employer.
BaltACD Any engineer that thinks performing a push-pull test with the independent brake applied should have his engineers certification invalidated the instant he tried that stunt. Securing a train is not rocket science or brain surgery in it's mental requirements.
Right. But my point is not that Harding was wrong in the way he securred the train. I think he could have been lax and just rationalized that what he did was sufficient. But I don't see how he could have thought it was sufficient if he were to lose the independent brakes, and I don't see how he could fail to see that, in all likelihood, he would lose the independent brake. To miss that leads me to believe he did not have sufficient knowledge for the job.
So, I would have to conclude that Harding does not have prior experience securing trains on steep grades on either MM&A or on another railroad. If he did have such experience, he would have realized the peril that shutting down the engine created. Upon that realization, he would have gone back to the site and either set more handbrakes or started another engine. He would have convinced RJ that it was absolutely necessary for him to go back the site and secure the train because a runaway was inevitable if he did not. He would have gone back even if he was not paid by his employer.
A couple other things to keep in mind:
Harding would have been fatigued after a long day's work when the RTC called him at the hotel. He would likely not have been in a 100% clear state of mind due to that fatigue, and I can tell you from personal experience that one's #1 goal is sleep when you are in that state of mind, no matter how dedicated an employee you are.
And before Lac-Megantic it was not common knowledge that a train's air brakes could behave the way they did there. Most people (myself included) thought that the brake pipe leaking off would automatically set the air brakes on the cars, no matter how slow the leak was. If this thought entered Harding mind, combined with his fatigue it would likely have been enough to reassure him that the train would still be waiting there the next day, and he would have then refocused on his primary goal of the moment (sleep). The RTC telling him that the locomotive problems would be dealt with the next morning would only have reinforced this train of thought.
Those are all good points. I was basically responding to the idea raised earlier in this thread that Harding would not be influenced by management to cut corners and take chances because Harding had knowledge of the seriousness of the responsibility which he had gained from previous experience of mountain railroading on other railroads. Yet what we see is extensive chance taking and corner cutting. So obviously, he was not imune to such an attitude, making it plausible that he was able to be influenced by management to cut corners.
In the conversation between Harding and RJ, I can almost see the wheels turning in Harding’s mind as he is informed about the fire on his engine, the fire department being called to put it out, and the engine being shut down. It is as if Harding is receiving the information in small pieces, but thinking far deeper about what it all means about his role in it. At one point, he starts a sentence in response to those issues, but stops himself as though he did not want to go further as he realized where his thoughts were taking the sentence. About the runaway, he says “it was a question of--.”
He said this:
“TH: That the [blank] fuel train rolled down, it was a question of, anyways. …Were there any railway people that went up there to put the fire out?”
SD70M-2Dude And before Lac-Megantic it was not common knowledge that a train's air brakes could behave the way they did there. Most people (myself included) thought that the brake pipe leaking off would automatically set the air brakes on the cars, no matter how slow the leak was.
And before Lac-Megantic it was not common knowledge that a train's air brakes could behave the way they did there. Most people (myself included) thought that the brake pipe leaking off would automatically set the air brakes on the cars, no matter how slow the leak was.
Another great point, which I wouldn't have first-hand experience at but definitely re-enforces that the unknown can be dangerous.
Still, I still wholeheartedly believe that not setting the handbrakes correctly is the ultimate cause here. Even though this may not have been well-understood, or the engine failure not foreseen, properly setting the handbrakes is the end-all solution here. And it just wasn't done.
Saturnalia SD70M-2Dude And before Lac-Megantic it was not common knowledge that a train's air brakes could behave the way they did there. Most people (myself included) thought that the brake pipe leaking off would automatically set the air brakes on the cars, no matter how slow the leak was. Another great point, which I wouldn't have first-hand experience at but definitely re-enforces that the unknown can be dangerous. Still, I still wholeheartedly believe that not setting the handbrakes correctly is the ultimate cause here. Even though this may not have been well-understood, or the engine failure not foreseen, properly setting the handbrakes is the end-all solution here. And it just wasn't done.
I can't believe any PROFESSIONAL railroader that has worked on the ground hasn't had at least a afternoons training on the operation of air brakes - what they can do and what can happen under various circumstance. For a working railroader to claim that they didn't understand that air could leak off a trainline at such a rate as to not apply the brakes is a basic lack of understanding on what actions it take for a brake valve on a car to do its job.
Not setting the car hand brakes in sufficient quantity is the ONLY CAUSE of this incident. All the rest is just so much noise.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Saturnalia Still, I still wholeheartedly believe that not setting the handbrakes correctly is the ultimate cause here. Even though this may not have been well-understood, or the engine failure not foreseen, properly setting the handbrakes is the end-all solution here. And it just wasn't done.
You are correct there. I was only speaking to what may have entered Harding's state of mind during the phone conversation with the RTC in his hotel room.
What is most egregious is not that too few handbrakes were set, it is that they were not tested properly.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
BaltACD I can't believe any PROFESSIONAL railroader that has worked on the ground hasn't had at least a afternoons training on the operation of air brakes - what they can do and what can happen under various circumstance. For a working railroader to claim that they didn't understand that air could leak off a trainline at such a rate as to not apply the brakes is a basic lack of understanding on what actions it take for a brake valve on a car to do its job.
The internal workings of the brake valve were not a big part of Conductor or Locomotive Engineer training courses for years before Lac-Megantic, and still are not today (I am speaking for CN of course).
But enough people have read the TSB report and other associated materials that the knowledge has been spread around, and it is common now.
For some comparison, CN Engineer training is now 3 weeks in class at the Winnipeg training centre, followed by several months of training trips. The internal workings of a car control valve are skimmed over, and are not covered in depth. The hazard of the air leaking off slowly when the brakes are released is not specifically mentioned.
Training has deteriorated from what it used to be, back when the famous Gimli, MB training centre was still in operation the class was 7 weeks, and at least one entire week was spent solely on air brakes. I'm told that new engineer trainees had to take apart and then reassemble a 24RL locomotive brake stand, and do extensive work with a car control valve too. None of that happens anymore.
I agree that training standards have become far too lax over the past 20 years, but the specific changes vary from railroad to railroad (recall the lack of retainer knowledge/use at CSX bits from the "Fire and Derailment in Southern Pennsylvania" thread).
Yes, lots of what superficially seem minutiae that can be glossed over in training can result in disastrous consequences. Twenty years ago when the AC-4400s were starting to replace the SD40s on CPR a train had air trouble on the Field Hill for a second time. The crew should have tied down enough handbrakes to hold the heavy 112 car grain train on the 2.2% grade while they brought the train line back up to full pressure. On the other hand they knew the dynamic brakes on the three AC4400s would be powerful enough to control the train while the air was restored to full pressure and so took a shortcut.
The trifling error was that they left the controller set for dynamic braking. This was standard for the older power; where the handle was set was what the locomotive did. Unfortunately the more advanced electronics on the new GEs had suspended the dynamic brake when the air brakes had applied, and had to be reset by getting out of d/b briefly when releasing the air brakes. This became widely known and added to the curriculum only afterwards.
To make a long story short, the head end made it safely to the bottom of the grade after a wild ride and there were no injuries. But the rest of the train, except for the drawbar of the first hopper, was scattered at various points over the previous seven miles. The cars wedged in the lower Spiral Tunnel were a particular challenge to remove.
TSB report on 1997 Field hill runaway:
http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/1997/r97c0147/r97c0147.asp
In reference to the air brakes leaking off at a leakage rate not sufficient to initiate a brake application.
I indicated to the TSB that it was possible however I could not quantify my theory since I had little experiance with the rate of leakage with a turbine driven EOT marker.
7-25-2013:
To confirm my theory we used a test train. Another loaded oil train was being stored at Benson Siding about 13 miles West of Brownville jct. The test locomotive was the 5016. We (myself and the TSB) duplicated the locomotive consist with the same types and number of locomotives and included a VB car. The Benson oil train was a bit bigger than the train at Nantes by three cars. We used a turbine EOT.
The test results nearly duplicated the Nantes train from information on the 5017 event recorder.
Any theory that the 5017 airbrake condition in any way caused the leakage is untrue.
This test was entirely my idea.
Is it appropriate to mention the names of the TSB investigators?
It is difficult to gain my trust and respect however the two TSB investigators I worked with were real pro's. They gained my respect and admiration even though the circumstances were very traumatic.
BaltACD For a working railroader to claim that they didn't understand that air could leak off a trainline at such a rate as to not apply the brakes is a basic lack of understanding on what actions it take for a brake valve on a car to do its job.
.
SD70M-2DudeWhat is most egregious is not that too few handbrakes were set, it is that they were not tested properly.
I hope everyone is listening.
SD70M-2DudeAnd before Lac-Megantic it was not common knowledge that a train's air brakes could behave the way they did there. Most people (myself included) thought that the brake pipe leaking off would automatically set the air brakes on the cars, no matter how slow the leak was.
Wasn't common knowledge to whom?
In my 37 years working for a railroad, every rules test I took or gave (that involved air brakes) included the warning that the air brakes could not be counted on to hold a train, that the brakes can leak off.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
It wasn't common knowledge to the TSB and certainly not something I knew. I did know that the charging choke will let air back into the brake pipe without setting the brakes but I did not know the effect of a turbine EOT.
Big Jim. Things could have turned out much worse, I'm glad you were on your game!
dehusmanIn my 37 years working for a railroad, every rules test I took or gave (that involved air brakes) included the warning that the air brakes could not be counted on to hold a train, that the brakes can leak off.
Not what he meant. The issue is knowing that a mandatory 'safety device' not only can but WILL produce the paradoxical effect -- albeit by coincidence -- in its normal operation. That is the very specific concern here, although I am not sure how it can be translated into 'fault' or 'negligence' for MM&A not mentioning specifically why you never, ever leave a dead train on independent securement with the FRED running. (They made it clear in their rules that the train should be secured with a proper push/pull test before being left under any circumstances)
As a firearms analogy: it's a bit different to know 'never let your gun pointed be at anyone' vs. recognizing that a particular weapon has an excessively light trigger pull or sensitive auto sear. The former is obvious, but the latter is wise to know about in practice.
dehusman SD70M-2Dude And before Lac-Megantic it was not common knowledge that a train's air brakes could behave the way they did there. Most people (myself included) thought that the brake pipe leaking off would automatically set the air brakes on the cars, no matter how slow the leak was. Wasn't common knowledge to whom? In my 37 years working for a railroad, every rules test I took or gave (that involved air brakes) included the warning that the air brakes could not be counted on to hold a train, that the brakes can leak off.
I have heard that many times, but I had never associated that statement with the fact that the trainline can leak down while brakes are released, and yet never cause the brakes to set during the leakdown of the trainline.
In one of the earlier Lac Megantic threads, I had raised this question asking why the automatic brake never set on the runaway when the air leaked down. It was only then, that I first heard of the explanation we are hearing now.
The general statement that air brakes can leak off is widely understood to mean that set brakes can leak off as individual cylinders leak at varying rates and evenually release the brake rigging. That would enter into the scencario of leaving cars with the trainline open to atomosphere and all airbrake cylinders fully applied and holding pressure.
It is entirely different than the trainline leaking down with released brakes while failing to set those released brakes.
SD70M-2Dude And before Lac-Megantic it was not common knowledge that a train's air brakes could behave the way they did there. Most people (myself included) thought that the brake pipe leaking off would automatically set the air brakes on the cars, no matter how slow the leak was. Wasn't common knowledge to whom? In my 37 years working for a railroad, every rules test I took or gave (that involved air brakes) included the warning that the air brakes could not be counted on to hold a train, that the brakes can leak off.
I should rephrase and be more specific, it was not common knowledge to the running trades employees (engineers and conductors) I work with that a fully charged train's brake pipe pressure can be reduced a slow rate without the brakes applying. From other comments it looks like we were not the only ones.
Euclid The general statement that air brakes can leak off is widely understood to mean that set brakes can leak off as individual cylinders leak at varying rates and evenually release the brake rigging. That would enter into the scencario of leaving cars with the trainline open to atomosphere and all airbrake cylinders fully applied and holding pressure. It is entirely different than the trainline leaking down with released brakes while failing to set those released brakes.
Exactly. This is what I understood that rule to mean, as did my co-workers. No one ever thought of leaving cars unattended and off air for long periods of time for that reason.
BigJimI found out about it one night as I happened to notice the air presure on the rear, as shown by the EOT, had leaked down to a point that should have stopped the train dead in its tracks. I talked it over with the conductor after I made a small brake application and release without seeing any movement on the EOT's rear air pressure gauge. I notified the dispatcher that we had air problems and were stopping to check out the problem. The conductor dropped off and I pulled by slowly as he looked for a crossed anglecock. He found one crossed about half way back (luckily it was on his side the first roll-by). He opened it up and the pressure on the rear began to restore. We then continued on without any more trouble. I have no idea how the anglecock got crossed as we never stopped blocking a road crossing where someone could have done it.
The same thing happened to me once, but we were able to figure out why the angle cock closed itself.
We were on a (fortunately empty) train composed mainly of hoppers with air-operated bottom doors ("rapid discharge" brand). These cars have a second set of air hoses dedicated to operation of the doors, and they are on the opposite side of the car from the brake pipe hose and angle cock.
Just like the brake pipe hoses they normally hang down towards the rail, but on this day one had been twisted around and up into a position where it was reaching over and contacting the angle cock on the next car, which it then bumped closed through vibration.
We intially thought our EOT was giving a faulty reading, as we too thought that the brakes should have applied with the tail end pressure reading so low (it had dropped by 20 pounds by the time I found and fixed the problem). I knew right away it was not vandalism as we'd had a good run that day, with no stops since the brakes had last been set and released.
This was after Lac-Megantic had happened, but before the TSB report was released. The behaviour of the air brakes did trouble me at the time, but as we had fixed the problem and were able to continue normally I didn't give it much further thought. Only when I read the TSB report (specificially the tests we now know Randy arranged) did something click, and I realized what had truly happened that day at work.
The Federal - January 15, 1953 - closed anglecock
http://dotlibrary.specialcollection.net/Document?db=DOT-RAILROAD&query=(select+3525)
A friend investigated an accident on the South African railways, where something like a hanging chain or hose between units had gradually knocked the angle cock closed. It can happen.
A rather curious case that caused unexpected problems in train handling occurred when a rail train was lifting the rail from an abandoned line. The shrubbery had started to encroach, enough to set the retainers on many of the cars. A relatively harmless problem, but it puzzled the engineer. Old heads were running the train, so after stopping they soon identified the problem. It continued to be a nuisance, with stops occasionally required to take the retainers off.
We've had instances of brush turning retainer valves. Usually not enough to cause train handling problems, but enough to have a hot-box detector find the hot wheels.
I had a manifest once where we had a blockage that turned out be about 18 cars back on a 102 car manifest. Went over the Summit at Omaha, started easing into dynamics and made a minimum reduction once about half the train was over. The EOT didn't change, which isn't unusual do to comm loss in that area. I pushed the comm test button and it passed, with no change in pressure. I squeezed off another 2 or 3 pounds, still no change. The EOT (air turbine type) finally dropped 1 pound and I knew we had a problem. I increased dynamics and made a full service reduction, watching the accelerometer. After seeing us gain about 1/2 mph, it started showing us slowing. Since we had clear signals and were definitely slowing, I decided to ride it out. Once stopped, I called the dispatcher who notified the car department to send out a car man. Meanwhile, the conductor started walking. He soon called to ask if the brake pistons should be out or in. I said out, and he went back a couple of cars and found the problem. A box car with a long travel drawbar had pinched an air hose when the slack came in. The carman who fixed it said the extension hose between the brake pipe and the anglecock fitting was the wrong size. It was too long, allowing it to be pinched between the draft gear and car body when the slack came in. No, he didn't replace it, he just wired it up so it wouldn't do it again. I guess it worked, we never had problems with it again.
Jeff
Occasionally someone makes the point here that the only blame for this disaster was Engineer Harding not properly securing the train. And by extension, there is a presumption that this thread should not be discussing any of the other elements that contributed to the wreck. However, even the scope of the trial extends beyond the actions of Harding and includes two of his supervisors. And the scope of the trial is also not locked into just the actions of those three. The expert witness who detailed the failures of Harding has also testified about the issue of the MM&A converting to one-man crews.
There has also been a large amount of advocacy written and published that presents this disaster as a result of the interests of management prevailing over the interests of organized labor. Among many other factors, the issue of one-man crews is the centerpiece of this presentation. Clearly, the expert witness characterized the switch to one-man crews on the MM&A as being inadequately prepared for by management, and thus contributing to the failure of Harding to secure the train. So, as I understand it, this complaint against MM&A management is now part of the trial.
EuclidOccasionally someone makes the point here that the only blame for this disaster was Engineer Harding not properly securing the train. And by extension, there is a presumption that this thread should not be discussing any of the other elements that contributed to the wreck. However, even the scope of the trial extends beyond the actions of Harding and includes two of his supervisors. And the scope of the trial is also not locked into just the actions of those three. The expert witness who detailed the failures of Harding has also testified about the issue of the MM&A converting to one-man crews. There has also been a large amount of advocacy written and published that presents this disaster as a result of the interests of management prevailing over the interests of organized labor. Among many other factors, the issue of one-man crews is the centerpiece of this presentation. Clearly, the expert witness characterized the switch to one-man crews on the MM&A as being inadequately prepared for by management, and thus contributing to the failure of Harding to secure the train. So, as I understand it, this complaint against MM&A management is now part of the trial.
Harding DID NOT SECURE THE TRAIN!
Any and all other points of contentions can be true, however, their occurence did not cause the train to become a runaway.
Harding DID NOT SECURE THE TRAIN - all the rest is various communities trying to muddy the water.
Had Harding properly secured the train at Nantes it would still be there today unless actually moved by another crew.
EuclidClearly, the expert witness characterized the switch to one-man crews on the MM&A as being inadequately prepared for by management
Equally clearly, an actually expert witness is expected to demolish this claim as bovine excrement in upcoming testimony, so I wouldn't 'conclude' anything about inadequate preparation until you know the applicable facts better. I do not find it surprising that strong efforts to make MM&A the focus of this trial in some way are being made, and I suppose it is the responsibility of the accuseds' counsel to make or attempt to enhance or embellish whatever claims or innuendos they can.
Just wait for the trial to be over. Then we will see what is, and isn't, applicable.
EuclidSo, as I understand it, this complaint against MM&A management is now part of the trial.
Unless the Canadians have a way to insert a new charge into a trial proceeding, any complaint against MM&A will be by inference. The trial is about the three individuals, nothing more, nothing less.
Many trials bring forth other factors that (usually) seek to reduce the defendents responsibility in a case. This one is no different.
As Balt says - there may be other factors, but the bottom line is that Harding did not adequately secure the train.
That's not to say that Canadian authorities may not seek charges against the company and other individuals, or that civil trials might not use some of those factors when seeking damages. But there are just three individuals on trial. Period. They'll either be found guilty or not.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 Euclid So, as I understand it, this complaint against MM&A management is now part of the trial. Unless the Canadians have a way to insert a new charge into a trial proceeding, any complaint against MM&A will be by inference. The trial is about the three individuals, nothing more, nothing less. Many trials bring forth other factors that (usually) seek to reduce the defendents responsibility in a case. This one is no different. As Balt says - there may be other factors, but the bottom line is that Harding did not adequately secure the train. That's not to say that Canadian authorities may not seek charges against the company and other individuals, or that civil trials might not use some of those factors when seeking damages. But there are just three individuals on trial. Period. They'll either be found guilty or not.
Euclid So, as I understand it, this complaint against MM&A management is now part of the trial.
I did not say that MM&A management is now being charged. By my saying they are now part of the trial, I mean that the expert witness had introduced the idea that the lack of preparedness for one-man crew operation on the part of management is being put forth as an excuse on behalf of Harding. My larger point is that all of these secondary factors relating to the question of Harding's guilt or innnocense are a legitimate part of this thread discussion.
Overmod Euclid Clearly, the expert witness characterized the switch to one-man crews on the MM&A as being inadequately prepared for by management Equally clearly, an actually expert witness is expected to demolish this claim as bovine excrement in upcoming testimony, so I wouldn't 'conclude' anything about inadequate preparation until you know the applicable facts better. I do not find it surprising that strong efforts to make MM&A the focus of this trial in some way are being made, and I suppose it is the responsibility of the accuseds' counsel to make or attempt to enhance or embellish whatever claims or innuendos they can. Just wait for the trial to be over. Then we will see what is, and isn't, applicable.
Euclid Clearly, the expert witness characterized the switch to one-man crews on the MM&A as being inadequately prepared for by management
You say I should not conclude anything about inadequate preparation until I know the facts better. Where have I concluded anything? I have not concluded anything. Read my post above again. I have not predicted anything.
All I have said above is that the topic includes all of these other dimensions, so they are a legitimate part of the discussion. I never said that I Harding acted properly or that any of the excuses being made for him are valid. I only characterized what the expert witness said in testimony. We are free to discuss all dimensions of this case and trial, and are under no obligation to limit comments to just the assumption that Harding is guilty.
Let me ask you a question: You say above that an “expert witness is expected to demolish this claim (of witness Stephen Callaghan) as bovine excrement in upcoming testimony.” Who exactly is “expecting” that, and what is the expectation based on?
There are 3 on trial and ONLY ONE of them HAD THE ABILITY to have prevented the incident. Telephone conversations don't apply hand brakes.
BaltACDThere are 3 on trial and ONLY ONE of them HAD THE ABILITY to have prevented the incident. Telephone conversations don't apply hand brakes.
Exactly.
The only reason the others are potentially liable is if it's felt they should have recognized that the train was not properly secured based on what Harding told them on the phone. If that's the case, then one might conclude that one of them should have told Harding to set more handbrakes. Just my take on it.
We'll see how the jury feels.
Then why are three on trial?
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