daveklepper But a new thought: Did not one inspector state: "There is no evidence of ANY of the car handbrakes having been applied?" Moving a handbraked car in a yard operation inveriably results in wheel flat-spots. Harding said he set handbrakes on seven cars. I trust Harding's statement. It is inconceivable to me that, with his prior experience, he would have left the train with air only. It should be possible to see if any of the seven forward cars have the flat spots that indicate they had handbrakes set during the runaway. Others may believe it not possible that someone released the handbrakes. But a person with a certain mischeivous or destructive mind, passing by on a nearby highway, may have had a sudden thourght to engage in what such a perverted mind might consider "fun."
But a new thought:
Did not one inspector state: "There is no evidence of ANY of the car handbrakes having been applied?"
Moving a handbraked car in a yard operation inveriably results in wheel flat-spots. Harding said he set handbrakes on seven cars. I trust Harding's statement. It is inconceivable to me that, with his prior experience, he would have left the train with air only. It should be possible to see if any of the seven forward cars have the flat spots that indicate they had handbrakes set during the runaway.
Others may believe it not possible that someone released the handbrakes. But a person with a certain mischeivous or destructive mind, passing by on a nearby highway, may have had a sudden thourght to engage in what such a perverted mind might consider "fun."
The "inspector" you mention was an expert witness. He testified that there were no handbrakes applied to the train. Apparently his reference to "train" means only the tank cars. So we have one more piece of ambiguity inserted into this technical puzzle that is being presented to the jury.
The fact is that Harding set handbrakes on the locomotives, that special car made from a caboose, and the first tank car. He stated this to RJ, just after they became aware of the runaway, in response to RJ asking Harding how many brakes he set: "TH: The units, the V.B., and the first car, seven brakes."
It would have been possible for someone to have released any of those handbrakes. As far as I know, there is nothing in the rules that would prevent that sort of tampering. However, I believe the investigation found sufficent evidence that the locomotive handbrakes had been applied, although they did not result in any wheel sliding.
I think we can agree to believe the expert witness. If Harding said he set handbrakes on seven brakes, INCLUDING THE FIRST CAR, either he is lieing or there was tampering.
I tend to favor the latter.
daveklepperI think we can agree to believe the expert witness. If Harding said he set handbrakes on seven brakes, INCLUDING THE FIRST CAR, either he is lieing or there was tampering. I tend to favor the latter.
The 'car' that Harding set the brake on was the buffer car that is between the locomotives and the revenue train (the oil). The 'expert' was referring to the brakes not being appiled to the oil cars.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
daveklepper I think we can agree to believe the expert witness. If Harding said he set handbrakes on seven brakes, INCLUDING THE FIRST CAR, either he is lieing or there was tampering. I tend to favor the latter.
The expert witness confirmed that handbrakes brakes had been set on the locomotives as Harding had claimed. Apparently the expert witness disagrees with Harding about Harding's claim of setting the handbrake on the first tank car.
Then the expert witness said that no handbrakes had been set on the "train," giving the impression that from one end to the other, the entire assembly of cars and locomotives had no handbrakes set. Obviously what the expert witness means is that no handbrakes were set on the tank car consist. Why an expert witness would make a statement containing such a glaring verbal loophole that so muddies the water is beyond me.
But if the locomotive handbrakes had been fully applied during the runaway, would not there have been flat-spots on the locomotive wheels? Why not? So isn't it possible that while the other brakes were fully released, the locomotive handbrakes were partially released or released and applied lightly?
It would be wise to stick with the TSB report which is VERY different than the "expert" hired by the police.
I will say that the TSB people that I met and worked with, really are experts.
Handbrakes on a locomotive usually only apply on one truck, or even one axle. As I recall, the roll test was made with the independent applied, so if the handbrake on the locomotive wasn't set as solidly as would have been desired, it would not have become obvious at the time anyhow.
As I've discussed before, some people pull handbrakes just until they get some resistance, not until they can't pull the brake any more. I have no idea if that was the case here.
Even a well set handbrake may roll - the wheels may not lock up until things heat up enough (and thus expand) to keep the wheel from rolling, at which point there will be flat spots. The locomotive hand brake is basically intended to hold the locomotive.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
daveklepper But if the locomotive handbrakes had been fully applied during the runaway, would not there have been flat-spots on the locomotive wheels? Why not? So isn't it possible that while the other brakes were fully released, the locomotive handbrakes were partially released or released and applied lightly?
Again, refer to the TSB report that shows evidence of the locomotive wheels being discolored from high temperatures proving that the handbrakes were applied. Locomotives like the C30-7 usually don't slide however the SD40s in the consist did have some flow on the treads.
There is no requirement for handbrakes to be set tight enough to lock the wheels.
Sounds like they're starting to look at the MMA's changes when they transitioned to one-man crew operations, specifically that the only change made was to add a mirror to the conductor's side so the engineer could look back. They're comparing it to the QNSL, which made tons of changes, most of which sound related to their remoteness, and not necessarily applicable to the much more civilized route of the MMA, or most other railroads.
But surely, this will bring into focus a more critical analysis of single-man crew operational practices, particularly training. I'd be interested to know if the STB or FRA has ever compiled such a report, detailing the steps generally taken and their results across the industry.
However, there is still no solid evidence that two crewmembers is safer than one.
And it still doesn't excuse the engineer's failure to follow the rules. Train tie-down rules don't change when you reduce your crew size. That was his responsibility and he failed to do his job.
I agree Harding did not do his job. Neither did the supervisor, neither did the safety director, neither did the motive power director or superintendent of motive power, neither did the dispatcher. Probably some othe higher-ups too. And we know the shipper did not do his job and has already been fined or something. The track-walker probably did his job to the best of his ability. So did the cab driver for that matter.
But I still believe there is the POSSIBILITY of tampering.
Furthermore, if others had done their jobs, not only a possibility but a probability that Harding would have done his job.
Saturnalia Sounds like they're starting to look at the MMA's changes when they transitioned to one-man crew operations, specifically that the only change made was to add a mirror to the conductor's side so the engineer could look back. They're comparing it to the QNSL, which made tons of changes, most of which sound related to their remoteness, and not necessarily applicable to the much more civilized route of the MMA, or most other railroads. But surely, this will bring into focus a more critical analysis of single-man crew operational practices, particularly training. I'd be interested to know if the STB or FRA has ever compiled such a report, detailing the steps generally taken and their results across the industry. However, there is still no solid evidence that two crewmembers is safer than one. And it still doesn't excuse the engineer's failure to follow the rules. Train tie-down rules don't change when you reduce your crew size. That was his responsibility and he failed to do his job.
Here are some other changes that were made at MMA for single man crews:
1) contracted with a helocopter service in case of a crewman injury.
2) met with local emergence persons and provided maps to various locations along the railroad for rescue purposes.
3) required constant contact between the RTC and the single man crew, every 30 minutes. There was a plan to locate the train and crew in the event there was no contact using choppers and highway vehicles.
4)Passing and meeting trains was modified so that one train MUST be stopped before another train can pass.
5) A single man crew cannot operate long hood forward in any circumstance.
These items are just from memory, If I took the time I could add much more.
I was actually opposed to installing mirrors, I thought it would be better to get out of the engineers seat and look at the train from the conductors side from time to time.
daveklepper I agree Harding did not do his job. Neither did the supervisor, neither did the safety director, neither did the motive power director or superintendent of motive power, neither did the dispatcher. Probably some othe higher-ups too. And we know the shipper did not do his job and has already been fined or something. The track-walker probably did his job to the best of his ability. So did the cab driver for that matter. But I still believe there is the POSSIBILITY of tampering. Furthermore, if others had done their jobs, not only a possibility but a probability that Harding would have done his job.
You know of course that I was the manager of motive power ?
Randy, I did not know that. So how in the world could Harding have run such a decrepit locomotive? And not shut it down and start up one that wasn't belching oil drops in smoke?
You seem like a bright and reasonable guy. But obviously you must have been under very great restraints and penny-pinching to let such power out on the line. Did Harding talk to you during his operation of the train? I'd have to know what the conversation consisted of to know whether you were doing your job or not. If indeed there were conversations.
But again, I think that tampering was definitely a possibility. I do not believe Harding was lieing or forgetful regarding the brakes set.
We can discuss that issue personally off the website via my
daveklepper@yahoo.com
And I admire your courage in participating on this thread in any case. You are a very fine and honest person to do so.
On the day of the wreck I kept checking my phone to see if I missed any calls. I didn't. I did not know there was an issue with the 5017 until the train was already piled up in Megantic.
I did not speak with Tom for some time before the accident and I did not speak with him after the accident.
Every railroad I worked for, including the CN had some penny pinching going on.
If we thought the 5017 was decrepit we would have left it parked. Fact is, it (5017) loadtested fine when it was in the shop. We had no indications that there was an impending failure.
At the scene of the wreck the first angle I looked at was tampering or terrorism, I found zero evidence that anyone tampered with the train.
I didn't know how many handbrakes were on the train until I actually walked into the pile of burning cars and looked. I counted seven, five locomotives, one remote car and the buffer car.
So if a Judge in the Commonwealth of PA/USA can drop charges against Brandon Bostian the Engineer of the Amtrak Crash in Philly in which the DA refused to file charges because he saw the accedent as a "Force Majeure" (We have a forum subject on "Force Majeure" aka act of God but the Commonwealth of PA allowed for private citizens to bypass the States Attorneys office and file direct charges. Then why is this Canada case diffrent if both Canada and Pennsylvania rely on anciant English common law. --From what I understand is that there was huge temperture diffrence from Day to Night which causes the Air Brakes and shoes to expand and or contract and that could not have been forseeable and if it was it would be civil and not rise to criminal behavoir.
Why would there be any evidence? Cannot one release handbrakes without leaving a clue as to whether they were set or not?
If you contact me about my real thoughts of this issue, I'll be glad to simply discuss this off the thread.
But if you say you saw the evidence of seven handbrakes APPLIED, then there is no real conflict with Harding's testimony, and the case against tampering is proven. End of that discussion.
And shouldn't you have been contacted in the case of first the belching-oil locomotive and second the locomotive fire? You cannot do your job if you are not given the opporunity.
Thats neither here nor there, I wasn't contacted.
Nantes siding was adjacent to a main road, tampering evidence would have been rumours that a suspicious vehicle was parked along the roadway.
In order to walk from the roadway to the track it is possible that footprints may have been left in the mud in the ditch. Our crews knew about a secret spot in the weeds that had a nice pallet to walk on without getting your feet wet.
Two possibilities I looked for.
Randy StahlIf we thought the 5017 was decrepit we would have left it parked. Fact is, it (5017) loadtested fine when it was in the shop. We had no indications that there was an impending failure.
Randy,
Can you tell us about the mechanical failure on the locomotive that developed the fire, and the details of how it developed, the time span of development, etc.?
There has been reporting that the failure was caused by a repair of an engine casting, and the repair amounted to bonding or buildup with some type of epoxy or similar compound. It is my understanding that this repair was made weeks or months before the failure that caused the fire, but that the repair was a compromise in strength and not able to hold up like new parts would. Can you shed some light on that ealier repair, and did that lead to the ultimate failure that caused the engine fire?
Neither here nor there? You should have been contacted. Someone else was not doing his job, and this actively prevented you from doing yours. (For thsi argument, I am defining a error of ommision as active. May be a wrong definition, but it seems applicablel here,)
The engine block had a chip adjacent to the number 5 cam bearing. I didn't think we needed to do anything to it as the engine had good oil pressure and the top end appeared to lubricating fine. I agreed to add some JB weld to the block because we thought that it would be some added material around the bearing. I was curious too see how it would stand up inside a crankcase also.
The failure was caused by number 5R exhaust valve dropping into the cylinder. The valve was driven into the piston holing it and opened the top valve train to combustion gasses. Crank case oil was pumped from the crankcase into the exhaust causing a stack fire.
I have experienced this before and the cause appeared to be a bad valve seat that failed rapidly with the advent of ultra low sulfer fuel. The valve lash became un adjustable and the top of the exhaust valve and the rocker arm broke off.
Here's a revalation, When I checked the lube oil level after the wreck there was only about 60 gallons left. The 5017 was about to shut down with low oil pressure even had it not caught fire.
Randy Stahl The engine block had a chip adjacent to the number 5 cam bearing. I didn't think we needed to do anything to it as the engine had good oil pressure and the top end appeared to lubricating fine. I agreed to add some JB weld to the block because we thought that it would be some added material around the bearing. I was curious too see how it would stand up inside a crankcase also. The failure was caused by number 5R exhaust valve dropping into the cylinder. The valve was driven into the piston holing it and opened the top valve train to combustion gasses. Crank case oil was pumped from the crankcase into the exhaust causing a stack fire. I have experienced this before and the cause appeared to be a bad valve seat that failed rapidly with the advent of ultra low sulfer fuel. The valve lash became un adjustable and the top of the exhaust valve and the rocker arm broke off. Here's a revalation, When I checked the lube oil level after the wreck there was only about 60 gallons left. The 5017 was about to shut down with low oil pressure even had it not caught fire.
Okay, thanks for that clarification. So the JB weld repair had nothing to do with causing the mechanical breakdown that was actually cased by the exhaust valve poking a hole through a piston. I do recall seeing that piston hole being reported as the cause of the mechanical breakdown that lead to the fire. But I also recall the JB weld repair being blamed.
Your point about the low oil pressure shut down is interesting. It seems that even if nobody called the fire department, the train would have still run away
Euclid Randy Stahl The engine block had a chip adjacent to the number 5 cam bearing. I didn't think we needed to do anything to it as the engine had good oil pressure and the top end appeared to lubricating fine. I agreed to add some JB weld to the block because we thought that it would be some added material around the bearing. I was curious too see how it would stand up inside a crankcase also. The failure was caused by number 5R exhaust valve dropping into the cylinder. The valve was driven into the piston holing it and opened the top valve train to combustion gasses. Crank case oil was pumped from the crankcase into the exhaust causing a stack fire. I have experienced this before and the cause appeared to be a bad valve seat that failed rapidly with the advent of ultra low sulfer fuel. The valve lash became un adjustable and the top of the exhaust valve and the rocker arm broke off. Here's a revalation, When I checked the lube oil level after the wreck there was only about 60 gallons left. The 5017 was about to shut down with low oil pressure even had it not caught fire. Okay, thanks for that clarification. So the JB weld repair had nothing to do with causing the mechanical breakdown that was actually cased by the exhaust valve poking a hole through a piston. I do recall seeing that piston hole being reported as the cause of the mechanical breakdown that lead to the fire. But I also recall the JB weld repair being blamed. Your point about the low oil pressure shut down is interesting. It seems that even if nobody called the fire department, the train would have still run away
The TSB stated in their report that the cam bearing failure led to a lack of sufficient valve train lubrication, which then caused the exhaust valve to fail and led to the cylinder damage.
I am not a diesel mechanic Randy, but you are. Does the TSB's conclusion sound reasonable to you?
Interesting point about the low oil level, I had not heard that bit of information before.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
The cam bearing never failed. before the engine left for service we made sure it was lubricating properly. Also if there was an oil pressure problem the engine would have shut down. While the TSB conclusion is plausible there are some errors in logic which lead me to a different conclusion.
This is my only point of contention with the TSB theory. My theory however is based on years of experience with this exact type of failure.
The TSB theory suggests that since the top deck of the valve train was "coked" that it was starving for oil, they forgot the fact that there was a large hole from the combustion chamber directly into the top deck. There were VERY hot combustion gasses cooking the upper valve train.
The only way to prove either theory would have been to change the bad power assembly, put oil in it and run it. This was not done.
With all the mountain railroad experience that Harding is said to have, one thing puzzles me. Even if he believed he had the train adequately secured with the combination of handbrakes and independent brakes, he would have naturally doubted that securement when he learned that the engine he left pumping air had been shut down. Yet, when he was informed of this by RJ, he never said anything about the issue of losing the indendent brake due to leakage. How could he possibly miss that point if he has knowledge and experience?
EuclidWith all the mountain railroad experience that Harding is said to have, one thing puzzles me. Even if he believed he had the train adequately secured with the combination of handbrakes and independent brakes, he would have naturally doubted that securement when he learned that the engine he left pumping air had been shut down. Yet, when he was informed of this by RJ, he never said anything about the issue of losing the indendent brake due to leakage. How could he possibly miss that point if he has knowledge and experience?
Harding is not operating in mountain railroading conditions. So called flat land railroading does not mean there are no grades to contend with, both from the power required to move trains as well as the braking power that is necessary to control and secure the trains.
My personal view of Mr. Harding is that AFTER THE FACT he is trying to make up as many excuses as he can think of and can try to hide behind. No matter any conversation that Mr. Harding had with the Rail Traffic Controller - the RTC could not apply any hand brakes over the telephone. A RTC in conversation with field personnel about the securement of a train must rely on the fact that field personnel have secured the train as required by the rules - not that X number of hand brakes have been applied, but that WHEN TESTED the train stayed in place. Any engineer that thinks performing a push-pull test with the independent brake applied should have his engineers certification invalidated the instant he tried that stunt. Securing a train is not rocket science or brain surgery in it's mental requirements.
BaltACDAny engineer that thinks performing a push-pull test with the independent brake applied should have his engineers certification invalidated the instant he tried that stunt. Securing a train is not rocket science or brain surgery in it's mental requirements.
Right. But my point is not that Harding was wrong in the way he securred the train. I think he could have been lax and just rationalized that what he did was sufficient. But I don't see how he could have thought it was sufficient if he were to lose the independent brakes, and I don't see how he could fail to see that, in all likelihood, he would lose the independent brake. To miss that leads me to believe he did not have sufficient knowledge for the job.
So, I would have to conclude that Harding does not have prior experience securing trains on steep grades on either MM&A or on another railroad. If he did have such experience, he would have realized the peril that shutting down the engine created. Upon that realization, he would have gone back to the site and either set more handbrakes or started another engine. He would have convinced RJ that it was absolutely necessary for him to go back the site and secure the train because a runaway was inevitable if he did not. He would have gone back even if he was not paid by his employer.
Randy Stahl The only way to prove either theory would have been to change the bad power assembly, put oil in it and run it. This was not done.
Would you consider it inmaterial that they didn't test this, or do you think that testing it would have potentially changed anything with regards to the investigation and these crminal proceedings? Sounds like you suggest that the run-away was inevitable that night if the low oil pressure concolusion is true, so I suppose probably not.
Thanks for your contributions here in this thread - it's the sort of insight generally lacking in these speculative threads, and I know many of us really appreciate it.
Saturnalia Thanks for your contributions here in this thread - it's the sort of insight generally lacking in these speculative threads, and I know many of us really appreciate it.
I second that, it is always best to get information from someone with first-hand, inside knowledge of what happened. Some of that information (like the low oil level in 5017) didn't make it into the TSB report either.
Euclid BaltACD Any engineer that thinks performing a push-pull test with the independent brake applied should have his engineers certification invalidated the instant he tried that stunt. Securing a train is not rocket science or brain surgery in it's mental requirements. Right. But my point is not that Harding was wrong in the way he securred the train. I think he could have been lax and just rationalized that what he did was sufficient. But I don't see how he could have thought it was sufficient if he were to lose the independent brakes, and I don't see how he could fail to see that, in all likelihood, he would lose the independent brake. To miss that leads me to believe he did not have sufficient knowledge for the job. So, I would have to conclude that Harding does not have prior experience securing trains on steep grades on either MM&A or on another railroad. If he did have such experience, he would have realized the peril that shutting down the engine created. Upon that realization, he would have gone back to the site and either set more handbrakes or started another engine. He would have convinced RJ that it was absolutely necessary for him to go back the site and secure the train because a runaway was inevitable if he did not. He would have gone back even if he was not paid by his employer.
BaltACD Any engineer that thinks performing a push-pull test with the independent brake applied should have his engineers certification invalidated the instant he tried that stunt. Securing a train is not rocket science or brain surgery in it's mental requirements.
A couple other things to keep in mind:
Harding would have been fatigued after a long day's work when the RTC called him at the hotel. He would likely not have been in a 100% clear state of mind due to that fatigue, and I can tell you from personal experience that one's #1 goal is sleep when you are in that state of mind, no matter how dedicated an employee you are.
And before Lac-Megantic it was not common knowledge that a train's air brakes could behave the way they did there. Most people (myself included) thought that the brake pipe leaking off would automatically set the air brakes on the cars, no matter how slow the leak was. If this thought entered Harding mind, combined with his fatigue it would likely have been enough to reassure him that the train would still be waiting there the next day, and he would have then refocused on his primary goal of the moment (sleep). The RTC telling him that the locomotive problems would be dealt with the next morning would only have reinforced this train of thought.
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