73 MPH comes out to about 110 FPS - or around one and a half IM cars per second. Add in the other factors already mentioned and the crew had little time to react.
If the ballast is profiled like usual, the crew may have been walking away from their train (ie, not right next to the cars), thus away from the inclined shoulder of the ballast on their line, but closer to the Amtrak line. Given poor footing and the distance to their train, apart from dropping to the ground immediately, they were sitting ducks.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
BaltACD Euclid Quote from the Newswire piece: “The report states that at 11:18 p.m., the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The two lines run in parallel for about 1 mile in the Ivy City section of northeast Washington.” If they were walking in this space wouldn’t there be room for them to clear any passing trains on both lines? Aerodynamic effects in a confined space of one train passing a stopped train at 73 MPH. Trains push a signifigant amount of air ahead of them. Ever tried to walk a straight course when outside with winds in the 25-40 MPH range? There is physical space, IF speeds are controled while passing.
Euclid Quote from the Newswire piece: “The report states that at 11:18 p.m., the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The two lines run in parallel for about 1 mile in the Ivy City section of northeast Washington.” If they were walking in this space wouldn’t there be room for them to clear any passing trains on both lines?
“The report states that at 11:18 p.m., the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The two lines run in parallel for about 1 mile in the Ivy City section of northeast Washington.”
If they were walking in this space wouldn’t there be room for them to clear any passing trains on both lines?
Aerodynamic effects in a confined space of one train passing a stopped train at 73 MPH. Trains push a signifigant amount of air ahead of them. Ever tried to walk a straight course when outside with winds in the 25-40 MPH range? There is physical space, IF speeds are controled while passing.
I understand the air movement effect. But do the rules allow employees in this area where they may be overpowered by the wind of a passing train, and struck by the train as a consequence? It does not seem like the company would just leave that possiblity to happenstance.
BaltACDAerodynamic effects in a confined space of one train passing a stopped train at 73 MPH. Trains push a signifigant amount of air ahead of them. Ever tried to walk a straight course when outside with winds in the 25-40 MPH range? There is physical space, IF speeds are controled while passing.
Many years ago I was told by an SP brakeman to "hit the gound" if in doubt, after remarking that railroading was a very dangerious occupation. I'm guessing that bit of advice was related among others to situations like the tragedy in this discussion. There's a lot more to being safe on that job of which I am unaware, having neither training nor experience in "the biz" to help me out. In any event, I am exceedingly cautious (read that paranoid) anywhere near a railroad.
EuclidQuote from the Newswire piece: “The report states that at 11:18 p.m., the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The two lines run in parallel for about 1 mile in the Ivy City section of northeast Washington.” If they were walking in this space wouldn’t there be room for them to clear any passing trains on both lines?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Quote from the Newswire piece:
The NTSB report interjects an aspect of this incident that I had not been aware of. The crew was in the act of setting off a bad order that had been identified by the CSX Mechanical Depts. 'early warning system' that goes above and beyond the normal defect reports that the detectors radio the crew themselves. Additionally there was a 'outbound' Amtrak train that was in the area at the same time as the inbound train struck the CSX employees.
The early reports that I saw said the train had activated the Laurel DD which is located at mile post BAA 21.7. The incident happened in the interlocking limits of control point F Tower mile post BAA 37.0 - over 15 miles beyond Laurel.
The Mechanical Department in Jacksonville recieves additional data from Defect Detectors over and above the data that gets communicated to crews by the DD's own radios. The Mechanical Dept. will contact Chief Dispatcher and territory Dispatcher via a CADS message that must be acknowledged by each party so they can regain their ability to use the CADS System. With the distance between the DD that caused the warning and where the train stopped to inspect the defect; it is obvious to me that the DD's message to the train took no exceptions to the cars. The Mechanical Dept. with its 'back channel' data did take exception. Truthfully, this was not a uncommon happening when I was working - frustrating, but not uncommon.
F Tower, where the incident happened, is not the location one wants to be making switching movements - there is Amtrak's Mains on one side and the Ivy City yard tracks on the other. On the ground it is considered a high crime area, despite having a high level of background lighting, both from the street and Ivy City yard.
Trains can be surprisingly quiet. Electric powered trains are even quieter. With the high level of background lighting in the area, a passing trains headlight does not create the impact it would in a 'dark' area. Additionally the employee's proximity to their own train's power would have the noise of those idling engines overriding the other noises in their hearing range.
Sadly a 'perfect storm' of issues from the aspects of trains, speeds, sight lines, lighting, noise and track proximity ends in the deaths of two young employees - the Conductor was 25 and the Conductor Trainee was 20.
WASHINGTON – Two CSX Transportation employees that were struck and killed by an Amtrak train on June 27 had completed an inspection and were walking back to the head end of their train. That information comes from a preliminary report published...
http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2017/07/12-ntsb-csx-crew-setting-out-car-at-time-of-fatal-strike
Brian Schmidt, Editor, Classic Trains magazine
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