WASHINGTON – Two CSX Transportation employees that were struck and killed by an Amtrak train on June 27 had completed an inspection and were walking back to the head end of their train. That information comes from a preliminary report published...
http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2017/07/12-ntsb-csx-crew-setting-out-car-at-time-of-fatal-strike
Brian Schmidt, Editor, Classic Trains magazine
The NTSB report interjects an aspect of this incident that I had not been aware of. The crew was in the act of setting off a bad order that had been identified by the CSX Mechanical Depts. 'early warning system' that goes above and beyond the normal defect reports that the detectors radio the crew themselves. Additionally there was a 'outbound' Amtrak train that was in the area at the same time as the inbound train struck the CSX employees.
The early reports that I saw said the train had activated the Laurel DD which is located at mile post BAA 21.7. The incident happened in the interlocking limits of control point F Tower mile post BAA 37.0 - over 15 miles beyond Laurel.
The Mechanical Department in Jacksonville recieves additional data from Defect Detectors over and above the data that gets communicated to crews by the DD's own radios. The Mechanical Dept. will contact Chief Dispatcher and territory Dispatcher via a CADS message that must be acknowledged by each party so they can regain their ability to use the CADS System. With the distance between the DD that caused the warning and where the train stopped to inspect the defect; it is obvious to me that the DD's message to the train took no exceptions to the cars. The Mechanical Dept. with its 'back channel' data did take exception. Truthfully, this was not a uncommon happening when I was working - frustrating, but not uncommon.
F Tower, where the incident happened, is not the location one wants to be making switching movements - there is Amtrak's Mains on one side and the Ivy City yard tracks on the other. On the ground it is considered a high crime area, despite having a high level of background lighting, both from the street and Ivy City yard.
Trains can be surprisingly quiet. Electric powered trains are even quieter. With the high level of background lighting in the area, a passing trains headlight does not create the impact it would in a 'dark' area. Additionally the employee's proximity to their own train's power would have the noise of those idling engines overriding the other noises in their hearing range.
Sadly a 'perfect storm' of issues from the aspects of trains, speeds, sight lines, lighting, noise and track proximity ends in the deaths of two young employees - the Conductor was 25 and the Conductor Trainee was 20.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Quote from the Newswire piece:
“The report states that at 11:18 p.m., the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The two lines run in parallel for about 1 mile in the Ivy City section of northeast Washington.”
If they were walking in this space wouldn’t there be room for them to clear any passing trains on both lines?
EuclidQuote from the Newswire piece: “The report states that at 11:18 p.m., the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The two lines run in parallel for about 1 mile in the Ivy City section of northeast Washington.” If they were walking in this space wouldn’t there be room for them to clear any passing trains on both lines?
Aerodynamic effects in a confined space of one train passing a stopped train at 73 MPH. Trains push a signifigant amount of air ahead of them. Ever tried to walk a straight course when outside with winds in the 25-40 MPH range? There is physical space, IF speeds are controled while passing.
BaltACDAerodynamic effects in a confined space of one train passing a stopped train at 73 MPH. Trains push a signifigant amount of air ahead of them. Ever tried to walk a straight course when outside with winds in the 25-40 MPH range? There is physical space, IF speeds are controled while passing.
Many years ago I was told by an SP brakeman to "hit the gound" if in doubt, after remarking that railroading was a very dangerious occupation. I'm guessing that bit of advice was related among others to situations like the tragedy in this discussion. There's a lot more to being safe on that job of which I am unaware, having neither training nor experience in "the biz" to help me out. In any event, I am exceedingly cautious (read that paranoid) anywhere near a railroad.
BaltACD Euclid Quote from the Newswire piece: “The report states that at 11:18 p.m., the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The two lines run in parallel for about 1 mile in the Ivy City section of northeast Washington.” If they were walking in this space wouldn’t there be room for them to clear any passing trains on both lines? Aerodynamic effects in a confined space of one train passing a stopped train at 73 MPH. Trains push a signifigant amount of air ahead of them. Ever tried to walk a straight course when outside with winds in the 25-40 MPH range? There is physical space, IF speeds are controled while passing.
Euclid Quote from the Newswire piece: “The report states that at 11:18 p.m., the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The two lines run in parallel for about 1 mile in the Ivy City section of northeast Washington.” If they were walking in this space wouldn’t there be room for them to clear any passing trains on both lines?
I understand the air movement effect. But do the rules allow employees in this area where they may be overpowered by the wind of a passing train, and struck by the train as a consequence? It does not seem like the company would just leave that possiblity to happenstance.
73 MPH comes out to about 110 FPS - or around one and a half IM cars per second. Add in the other factors already mentioned and the crew had little time to react.
If the ballast is profiled like usual, the crew may have been walking away from their train (ie, not right next to the cars), thus away from the inclined shoulder of the ballast on their line, but closer to the Amtrak line. Given poor footing and the distance to their train, apart from dropping to the ground immediately, they were sitting ducks.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 73 MPH comes out to about 110 FPS - or around one and a half IM cars per second. Add in the other factors already mentioned and the crew had little time to react. Given poor footing and the distance to their train, apart from dropping to the ground immediately, they were sitting ducks.
Given poor footing and the distance to their train, apart from dropping to the ground immediately, they were sitting ducks.
The two ROWs are parallel and very close. They may have been on the Amtrak property without realizing it. Given the much greater frequency of high speed Amtrak trains, shouldn't they be instructed to walk on the other side of their train on the CSX track?
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimmThe two ROWs are parallel and very close. They may have been on the Amtrak property without realizing it. Given the much greater frequency of high speed Amtrak trains, shouldn't they be instructed to walk on the other side of their train on the CSX track?
Defect Detector initiated inspections require inspections on both sides of the cars. My understanding is they inspected from the engines back as far as necessary on the side of the train away from Amtrak. Their return to the engines was accomplished on the side adjacent to Amtrak. Train they were inspecting had been operating on CSX #1 track, furthest from Amtrak, the CSX engines and 'maybe' two cars were stopped within the limits of the F Tower control point interlocking on CSX #2 track, the track closest to Amtrak as they had operated through the crossovers at F Tower. Crew did most of their inspection walking on or about CSX #2 track which the head end of their train had blocked.
The great unknown is why their heads weren't on a step by step swivel when they got to the location where they had to walk between the CSX & Amtrak Mains.
I have seen reports of train strike fatalities of people occupying one track of a double track. The person’s attention is drawn to a train approaching them from the front on the same track they are walking on. So they step over to the other track to get out of the path of the approaching train. But there is also a train approaching from behind them on that second track. They step in front of that train and get hit because they never thought to look back with the distraction of getting out of the path of the train to their front. Both trains are making plenty of noise, but the person assumes it is all coming from the train approaching them.
In the case of this accident, we are told that two opposing trains simultaneously converged on the location of the two trainmen. Both trains sounded their horns. It sounds like the perfect setup for the scenario I refer to above.
EuclidIt sounds like the perfect setup for the scenario I refer to above.
Except that it's almost the perfect opposite: they were most certainly not walking on the far Amtrak main facing that train, and they did not walk into the gauge of the near Amtrak main while overconcentrating on the oncoming train. We've already commented on the issue with both Amtrak trains simultaneously sounding their horns, probably continually in panic and horror, and the ambient noise and sound reflections from the adjacent train and its power. The issues that I think need to be resolved is how far over toward the Amtrak side of the ballast 'valley' they were walking when the following train overtook them, and how they were brought in contact with the train; personally I think they were caught off-guard,stiffened in surprise or staggered and were then pulled in by the initial 'suction' behind the bow wave of displaced air, rather than being 'hit' by some part of the front of the train.
I do strongly suspect they were being careful not to walk on an adjacent main, or even in the clearance 'gauge' area, as your analogy's wording would appear to suggest. They might have been fully observant of where to go and what to do in normal four-track clearances. I think it was more an unlucky 'perfect storm' of bad circumstances that killed them, more than any obvious lack of safe procedure even for a brief time.
RME I think it was more an unlucky 'perfect storm' of bad circumstances that killed them, more than any obvious lack of safe procedure even for a brief time.
I would say that for a perfect storm to be possible there has to be a lack of safe procedure, or a rules violation.
BaltACDCrew did most of their inspection walking on or about CSX #2 track which the head end of their train had blocked. The great unknown is why their heads weren't on a step by step swivel when they got to the location where they had to walk between the CSX & Amtrak Mains.
Perhaps one should have tried walking backwards (difficult and dangerous) so as to see an oncoming Amtrak train? Even if they heard or saw the approaching train, escape in time would be ddifficult. Perhaps the inspection should have been halted/postponed at the point where the engine and those cars were on the track adjoining Amtrak?
EuclidI would say that for a perfect storm to be possible there has to be a lack of safe procedure, or a rules violation.
You would, wouldn't you? And perhaps there was; I don't know there wasn't.
The issue here is that most of the elements of the 'perfect storm' were circumstantial, if decidedly very, very unlucky. Had the two men walked the 'active' side of the cut first, they would have been facing the right way in traffic the whole way down to the crossover, and come back up the other side of the cut to the power on a thoroughly unoccupied track. But to my knowledge there is no "rule" or even "safety procedure" that mandates always facing the expected direction of movement when walking adjacent to a track. Perhaps there should be; essentially there is for pedestrians walking next to road traffic. But I do not think it is fair or just to judge there was a rules violation, in this extraordinary circumstance, just because the two have died.
But we have BaltACD still commenting in this thread, who knows the relevant CSX rules and safety procedures better than you or I ever will. Perhaps he can provide you with details of how this was their fault through wilful ignorance or inattention to particular rules. I doubt he can convince you out of having a prejudicial opinion, though, no matter what the rules actually say.
RMEBut I do not think it is fair or just to judge there was a rules violation, in this extraordinary circumstance, just because the two have died. I doubt he can convince you out of having a prejudicial opinion, though, no matter what the rules actually say.
I doubt he can convince you out of having a prejudicial opinion, though, no matter what the rules actually say.
Oh please. I suggest you go back and carefully read what I said before you jump to wild conclusions about me unfairly judging or having prejudicial opinions. Nowhere have I judged that there was a rules violation. And I have no opinion at all about this, let alone a prejudicial one.
I am just trying to puzzle out how this accident happened. The idea of a “perfect storm” being the cause strikes me as weird in this case of a specific work procedure with no intervening “act of god” type factors. There is a rule requiring one to expect trains any time and any direction on any track. I don’t know if there is any requirement to walk in certain directions on a track. I don’t see the analogy of that to walking on roads because there you can anticipate the traffic direction. On a railroad track, you cannot anticipate traffic direction. Reasonable safety would require looking back very frequently. Even that is imperfect where the potential for relatively quiet, high speed trains run. It seems the best protection would be to not walk on the track at all.
I do not know the track layout in this area. Is it impossible to perform the work they were doing without fouling a live track?
How soon they forget.
Until such time as NTSB or Amtrak release video from Amtrak Train #175 there can be no answers to the questions of what the CSX crew was actually doing. All we are doing is speculating on speculation only knowing the final outcome.
tree68 Euclid I would say that for a perfect storm to be possible there has to be a lack of safe procedure, or a rules violation. How soon they forget.
Euclid I would say that for a perfect storm to be possible there has to be a lack of safe procedure, or a rules violation.
I have not forgotten that. Offering a rules violation as one possiblity is hardly the same thing as judging that a rules violation did ocurr, as RME accused me of doing.
RMEthey were most certainly not walking on the far Amtrak main facing that train, and they did not walk into the gauge of the near Amtrak main while overconcentrating on the oncoming train.
The direction they were headed while walking was the same direction as the Amtrak train was traveling. So it is likely that they were walking with their backs toward the approaching Amtrak train. But how can you be so confident in knowing where they were walking?
It seems to me that it was possible that they were walking on the track where the Amtrak train was approaching; or stepped onto that track to clear the other track where a train was approaching them from the front. Why do you rule out those two possibilities?
RME they were most certainly not walking on the far Amtrak main facing that train, and they did not walk into the gauge of the near Amtrak main while overconcentrating on the oncoming train.
While the former seems likely, the latter is unknown. If anything, it is likely they did stray into the gauge of the near Amtrak main. However, as BALT says, we should wait for the forward-facing Amtrak locomotive video.
schlimm RME they were most certainly not walking on the far Amtrak main facing that train, and they did not walk into the gauge of the near Amtrak main while overconcentrating on the oncoming train. While the former seems likely, the latter is unknown. If anything, it is likely they did stray into the gauge of the near Amtrak main. However, as BALT says, we should wait for the forward-facing Amtrak locomotive video.
Pending the video, I would opine that it is possible that they were close enough (but not on, or within the "kill zone") to the Amtrak rails to be thrown off balance on the unsure surface of the ballast - ie, they fell into the train. As has been noted, there is a bit of a pressure wave involved with a train doing near 80 MPH. And there's not a lot of room between the tracks.
What is the source of this information in the Newswire story, and why are the two statements in apparent conflict with each other?
…the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor.
Both engineers stated they started blowing their horns when they saw the CSX employees on the track, the report says.
EuclidWhat is the source of this information in the Newswire story, and why are the two statements in apparent conflict with each other? …the conductor and conductor trainee of CSX intermodal train Q137 were walking in the space between the CSX two-track main line and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. Both engineers stated they started blowing their horns when they saw the CSX employees on the track, the report says.
Poor writing!
Any conflict is purely in your mind. "On the track" will include on the ballast section, which likely extends across the full width of all the tracks. And that puts them in a dangerous zone, as sadly was shown in this case.
Others have mentioned the wind blast and possible suction. The other factor will be the disorientation caused by a fast moving train right beside you. I haven't heard if they were hit by the front of the train, or staggered into the side.
So then there is no location within this grouping of four tracks that a person could occupy while being considered safe from the nearest passing train. That sounds like a death trap that would require positive protection.
The " hit the dirt " appears to be good advice even if raining.
Possibly this freight crew had never become accustomed to anything like the close track spacing that is particular to this location (and others in the NEC and commuter railroads in the New York area). They assumed that walking in the center of space between the two tracks was safe, which it was not, since there was insufficient clearance. And yes, if they had "hit the dirt" the overhang of the trains would probably have passed over them.
quote user="daveklepper"]Possibly this freight crew had never become accustomed to anything like the close track spacing that is particular to this location (and others in the NEC and commuter railroads in the New York area). They assumed that walking in the center of space between the two tracks was safe, which it was not, since there was insufficient clearance. And yes, if they had "hit the dirt" the overhang of the trains would probably have passed over them.[/quote]
The Conductor had been qualified for about 2.5 years and had worked the Cumberland/Baltimore Pool for most of that time. There is no way to tell how many times (if ever) he was on the ground at F Tower. However, he had been through F Tower on hundreds of trips.
Even with a train approaching fast and close, getting into the clear would not have required more than a split second, and would have been intuitive to experienced railroaders. I doubt that air movement created by the train played a role. The fact that they did not get into the clear is evidence that they never saw the train that hit them.
One good possible reason for that is that, with both trains blowing horn warnings, the warnings were heard together and not as two individual warnings from two different trains.
It is reported that they were walking with their backs to the train that hit them. So they could have seen the other train approaching them, and attributed both train warnings only to the train they saw coming toward them.
This type of ironic outcome from horn or whistle warnings causing the opposite of the intended effect has happened before, and I suspect quite often. If so, it actually does seem worthy of being labeled as a “perfect storm” in that it requires two trains approaching simultaneously and each giving warnings that obscure the warning of the other.
Here is an historical example of this type of accident:
June 1890
23rd, on New York, New Haven & Hartford, at South Lyme, Conn., butting collision between two gravel trains. The engine of one of the trains was pushing the caboose. One laborer was killed and three injured. It appears that the conductors of these trains made meeting points verbally upon their own responsibility, which a coroner’s verdict says was “without the knowledge of the railroad company.” The coroner’s verdict also says that each engineer on approaching the curve where the collision occurred blew a long blast of the whistle, and that very likely these signals were simultaneous, so that neither heard the whistle of the other.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.