flmiller Moderators, Please, the horse is dead - now stop the beating.
Moderators,
Please, the horse is dead - now stop the beating.
Many children are like that. lol
Rich
If you ever fall over in public, pick yourself up and say “sorry it’s been a while since I inhabited a body.” And just walk away.
A meta-comment. There are several issues that have been confounded into a mess: ECPs, ECTs, causes of derailments and economics (the bottom-line variety). This is compounded by a paucity of relevant statistics and an abundance of opinions posing as facts.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Euclid Wizlish Euclid You have to look at it in that context. Well, rather than debate whether you should consider my point in its proper context, let me ask you a question.
Wizlish Euclid You have to look at it in that context.
Euclid You have to look at it in that context.
Let’ say that somebody said this to you: “There is no safety benefit that ECP can add to oil trains. This is proven by the fact that none of the oil train derailments so far have had causes that ECP could prevent.” How would you reply to that statement?
This reason not to apply ECP to oil trains has been given more than once here in this thread, and it is also the position of the AAR.
Wizlish Euclid You say that NONE of the recent oil train derailments were caused by slack action. Then you say that those slack action problems are not found in oil trains. He said two things, both of which are objectively true: None of the oil-train incidents were caused by slack action; Slack action is unlikely to be an accident cause in 'unit-train' like consists, including those of existing forms of HHFT.
Euclid You say that NONE of the recent oil train derailments were caused by slack action. Then you say that those slack action problems are not found in oil trains.
He said two things, both of which are objectively true:
None of the oil-train incidents were caused by slack action;
Slack action is unlikely to be an accident cause in 'unit-train' like consists, including those of existing forms of HHFT.
EuclidYou say that NONE of the recent oil train derailments were caused by slack action. Then you say that those slack action problems are not found in oil trains.
And this is supposed to be a problem ... how?
You seem to have confused what Dave is saying with what Don Oltmann said a few posts back (the latter being what has your bee in a bonnet regarding 'no benefit from ECP' to oil trains). You're doing neither your case nor your credibility much good by barking up that wrong tree.
I confess I'm still looking to Don to qualify the statement he made. Until he does that, the "discussion" about ECP is likely going to continue to be another song that doesn't end. I say we wait for it.
BaltACDSlack run in and out, is not normally associated with braking - it is associated with the engineer not properly handling the application and removal of power to the train.
The 'slack run-in' that is important to the present discussion is not 'associated with braking' in the sense the "AAR statistics" would consider it. Again, it's the slack run-in that occurs after the derailment has technically occurred ... the derailment being the only thing that causes part of the train to decelerate more quickly than brakes can apply or, once applied, retard the trailing portion of the consist. To my knowledge there are no FRA statistics that describe this as a contributing factor to accident severity, or that discriminate it from a derailment consequence of any other kind.I am not altogether sure that there could be meaningful data from which such statistics could be derived (in the absence of pervasive monitoring of train condition, for instance).
The points about UDEs and 'poor train handling' are better taken. There can be little question that eliminating the former on HHFTs is desirable ... but isn't it better addressed by proper maintenance and adjustment of the relatively 'captive' HHFT consists? And as noted (repeatedly, in multiple contexts) the pneumatic brake system per se plays a very small role in practical train handling. It is true (also as noted repeatedly) that the use of an ECP system in train handling would allow many more options safely ... but we are not concerned with what could be done better, right now, only what shouldn't be done worse.
dehusman Let’ say that somebody said this to you: “There is no safety benefit that ECP can add to oil trains. This is proven by the fact that none of the oil train derailments so far have had causes that ECP could prevent.” How would you reply to that statement? My reply would be its a red herring and a misrepresentation of the argument. Nobody has said there is "no" benefit. There are just there are options that more effectively deter releases.
My reply would be its a red herring and a misrepresentation of the argument. Nobody has said there is "no" benefit. There are just there are options that more effectively deter releases.
Euclid schlimm tdmidget Yes. But the study I cited concerns causes of derailments only, not all accidents regardless of definition. At best, the AAR statement is disingenuous in understating (I believe deliberately) with its <0.99% figure. That said, brakes are not a major factor in derailments. Poor track is. However, ECP has many benefit not limited to safety. ECP also has benefits to safety that the AAR is ignoring in their statistic on derailments related to braking, and its relationship to the benefits of ECP. For example, when the AAR refers to the number of derailments caused by braking problems, they are NOT counting the derailments that are due to slack run-in, which could be prevented by ECP brakes. They are also not counting derailments caused by UDEs, which could be prevented by ECP brakes. They are also not counting derailments caused by poor train handling, which might have been prevented by ECP brakes. And the AAR is also not acknowledging the ECP benefit in quicker stopping that can mitigate the damage and spill by reducing the number cars in the pileup.
schlimm tdmidget Yes. But the study I cited concerns causes of derailments only, not all accidents regardless of definition. At best, the AAR statement is disingenuous in understating (I believe deliberately) with its <0.99% figure. That said, brakes are not a major factor in derailments. Poor track is. However, ECP has many benefit not limited to safety.
tdmidget
Yes. But the study I cited concerns causes of derailments only, not all accidents regardless of definition. At best, the AAR statement is disingenuous in understating (I believe deliberately) with its <0.99% figure. That said, brakes are not a major factor in derailments. Poor track is.
However, ECP has many benefit not limited to safety.
Slack run in and out, is not normally associated with braking - it is associated with the engineer not properly handling the application and removal of power to the train.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
schlimm tdmidget dmidget wrote the following post 9 hours ago: " However, the AAR claim is quite false, which discredits them as an accurate source of opinion." Has it occurred to you that the AAr and FRA might have different difinitions of accident? Yes. But the study I cited concerns causes of derailments only, not all accidents regardless of definition. At best, the AAR statement is disingenuous in understating (I believe deliberately) with its <0.99% figure. That said, brakes are not a major factor in derailments. Poor track is. However, ECP has many benefit not limited to safety.
tdmidget dmidget wrote the following post 9 hours ago: " However, the AAR claim is quite false, which discredits them as an accurate source of opinion." Has it occurred to you that the AAr and FRA might have different difinitions of accident?
What I have said is that the benefit is not cost effective, that other technology has already accomplished much of the benefit, and that ECP would not have prevented any of the derailments so far. Regarding derailments, ECP is not about preventing a pile, its about making the pile smaller. Whether or not the train piles up depends on factors unrelated to the braking system. It is dependent on what caused the derailment, the train dynamics and the track/roadbed conditions.
The majority of the benefits of ECP are about normal train handling, brake wear, speed of release, keeping the train line charged, etc.
If you want to spend a billion dollars on tank car safety, require insulating jackets and head shields on the tank cars. That way the cars are less likely to explode or catch fire in ANY derailment in ANY train in ANY pile. Insulation actually prevents releases of material. That addresses an actual CAUSE of failure that ECP does not. And its proven, existing technology that can be applied now and is compatible with any train on any railroad.
The new regulations do not require the car owners to upgrade the cars. What it does is put restrictions on how the cars can be moved if they are not upgraded. That shifts the penalty/cost for operating unimproved cars from the tank car owners to the railroads. Nothing prevents the shippers from tendering trains of 69 un-improved cars The regs might even incent the car owners to defer upgrades. They don't have to upgrade the cars and with the slower transit speeds the shippers will need bigger fleets of cars. If you are in the tank car owning/leasing business that's a double bonus, you don't have to sink capital into the fleet and you get more leases. Then the railroad has to operate them at speeds which will increase their operating costs and negatively impact the other customers. In turn that shifts the enforcement from the government to the railroads, where they have to establish "penalties" in the form of higher rates for the un-improved cars to force the car companies to improve/upgrade/replace the cars (that is happening now). What the railroads want is the regulations to require the cars to be upgraded so the financial burden is bourne by the car owners and operators, and the enforcement burden is bourne by government, the not by the railroads.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
tdmidgetdmidget wrote the following post 9 hours ago: " However, the AAR claim is quite false, which discredits them as an accurate source of opinion." Has it occurred to you that the AAr and FRA might have different difinitions of accident?
WizlishAs noted earlier, the only real 'safe' thing to do is keep the cars from leaving the clearance envelope of the track they are on ... either by not deraiiing in the first place, or by staying reasonably upright and in line, off adjacent tracks, and away from lineside things to run into and puncture.
Curiously, a former DOT official seems to agree with you:
What can railroads do to prevent accidents? Brigham McCown, a former head of the federal agency that regulates rail transport of hazardous materials, said an array of new technologies patented within the last decade can warn of defects and identify trouble spots before accidents happen. For example, sensors can be put on the lead locomotive to measure rail thickness, detect deformities and alert engineers, he said. Sensors can also be placed under track or next to rail ties to detect movement in track beds, or on cars to detect a broken wheel, he said. "Given the sheer volume of hazardous materials and crude oil, we simply can't afford to have these rail cars come off the track," McCown said. Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-so-many-oil-trains-have-derailed-this-year-2015-3#ixzz3h5t78TQ4
Brigham McCown, a former head of the federal agency that regulates rail transport of hazardous materials, said an array of new technologies patented within the last decade can warn of defects and identify trouble spots before accidents happen.
For example, sensors can be put on the lead locomotive to measure rail thickness, detect deformities and alert engineers, he said. Sensors can also be placed under track or next to rail ties to detect movement in track beds, or on cars to detect a broken wheel, he said.
"Given the sheer volume of hazardous materials and crude oil, we simply can't afford to have these rail cars come off the track," McCown said.
Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-so-many-oil-trains-have-derailed-this-year-2015-3#ixzz3h5t78TQ4
Not a single word about braking...
Mr. McKown gets around in the press. Here's another statement he made to the LA times about possible causes of recent incidents:
[quote]Brigham McCown, former chief of the federal agency that sets tank car rules, said he believed the string of recent accidents had resulted from extreme weather this winter. The introduction of continuous welded track has made rails more vulnerable to expansion and contraction during temperature swings, experts say.[/unquote]
Brakes! Where are the brakes?
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
EuclidYou have to look at it in that context.
I don't, and I won't. You have no basis in fact to be specifying numbers as if they were data. Please do not do that again.
It's a valid point that ECP can relieve some problems that cause derailments. It's possible to discuss these with respect to HHFT operation, even to determine some idea on how safety going forward might be enhanced by mandating ECP on HHFTs. But specifying fabricated numbers, and then rationalizing them by saying 'I just threw them out there as an example', is not a valid way to go about establishing that. We seem to be having a hard enough time just deciding on the kinds of brake-related causes of derailment that might legitimately apply to running HHFTs, let alone whether ECP might actually reduce derailment danger in a way that justifies its cost (again in the strict context of HHFTs).
If you want to start a discussion about the point you say you were making, which I understand as being something like 'the accidents to HHFTs so far are not an indication that future accidents involving HHFTs might not be of the kind that might be preventable through use of ECP' then by all means do so. My opinion is that many, perhaps most of the statistical brake-related-derailment causes will not apply to blocks of HHFT equipment whose condition is carefully monitored and documented. I note for example that one poster seems to be lumping handbrake-related derailments in there as if they would be contributors to derailments that ECP would prevent -- perhaps this is valid, if the ECP system used is configured to report that a handbrake has not been properly released or its linkage has been caught and dragged into engagement accidentally, but that's a stretch at best to justify an $8000+ investment per car.
If I might refine the discussion 'rules of engagement' slightly: in my opinion, the most likely way that ECP will be applied under the proposed mandate is via one of the conversion-manifold systems, for example the one described in this patent, 20140049037, from one of the manufacturers of S4200 compliant ECP systems. We might gainfully consider framing the discussion of potential benefits ... and conversion cost and time ... using this technical approach to define how the "ECP system" that will best fulfil mandate requirements would be built and provided.
Something interesting to me about that patent: one of the principal objections to ECP so far is that it is not easily (or supposedly safely) compatible with single-pipe "Westinghouse". I would think that the 'manifold conversion' patent would make much more of its claim that compatibility with triple-valve operation is possible; instead they seem to be bending over backwards to establish they have priority on the idea without describing how their system would be configured to achieve it safely.
'
" However, the AAR claim is quite false, which discredits them as an accurate source of opinion."
Has it occurred to you that the AAr and FRA might have different difinitions of accident?
AAR:
Wizlish Euclid Let’s say that ECP prevents one derailment out of 20 on average.
Euclid Let’s say that ECP prevents one derailment out of 20 on average.
EuclidLet’s say that ECP prevents one derailment out of 20 on average.
No. Let me nip that crap in the bud. Let's NOT say ECP 'prevents 5% of derailments' at all, until you have actually substantiated that range of numbers. Out of curiosity, where did you get that specific number?
Let's start by specifying the type and severity of derailments that ECP 'prevents', with an indication of how likely each one is for an oil train in service.
I'm not trying to be hard on you. Remember that I am sympathetic to the positive effects of ECP (or a system like it) on train handling, and I do think there are ways that ECP systems can be designed to reduce likelihood of derailments under certain conditions.
There's a certain logical fallacy here, which schlimm might be able to reify and define more correctly. It's possible that by the time there have been 20 godawful fireball explosions, at least one of the wrecks will have some kind of brake-related involvement. As noted elsewhere, if ECP is installed on a train that explodes, does that indicate that it helped reduce the likelihood of an explosion, just not quite enough?
schlimm Track and rail problems are the main cause.
Didn't someone very early in this thread (I'm not going back to look for it.) suggest that the money spent on ECP would be more effectively spent on track inspection and maintenance?
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Some relevant data: As has been posted before, this study (by UIUC for NEXTRANS) analyzed derailments on Class I main lines 2001-2010.
Of a total of 4352 derailments reported to the FRA, 95 were brake operations, 41 were from handbrake operations, 37 other car brake defects, 27 brake rigging defect, 19 airhose defect, 8 UDEs, 4 other brake operations and 1 handbrake defect (car). Total 232, ~5%. Track and rail problems are the main cause. However, the AAR claim is quite false, which discredits them as an accurate source of opinion.
Of course this is all derailments, not just oil trains. But it provides a large data base and shows that brakes really are not the problem.
http://www.purdue.edu/discoverypark/nextrans/assets/pdfs/Integrating%20Hazardous%20Materials%20Transportation%20Safety%20Risk%20Management%20Framework.pdf
tree68 We've wandered away from the basic premise of the thread - oil train derailments. The ongoing discussion about ECP is not really relevant. To this point, no oil train incidents have been laid to any cause that would have been mitigated by any of the stated benefits of ECP.
schlimmBut emergency applications are not the only cause for derailments by braking. Indeed, the shorter distances for ECP service applications may permit avoidance of the use of emergency braking and thus all its users' problems.
See the AAR propaganda about 'less than .99% of accidents were related to braking' (it is now, helpfully, a featured ad from aar.com whenever I google something ECP-related!)
This discussion isn't about brake-induced derailments per se, although it is certainly trying to creep around to be there. It is about what happens when a train derails for some reason, any reason, and its crew does something with the brake to stop it under that circumstance.
Dave Husman and some others are of the decided opinion that the only good response to a confirmed derailment is to brake as hard as you can, with as many cars as have the ability to brake, and get the 'way' off as much of the train as you can, as quickly as you can. I suspect that the lawyers, and groups concerned with the way lawyers are likely to think, will concur that this policy is the least potentially 'negligent' action to take in such an emergent situation. It's unclear as yet how much of FRA and DOT subscribe to the same idea.
In many cases, emergency braking will destabilize the 'accident' part of the train, one very well defined way being for the trailing consist to slam into the derailed cars in a way that more frequently than not causes them to rotate into accordioning. Regretfully I must also observe that service braking that is not modulated to keep derailed cars 'tensioned' (in other words that can keep the trailing cars from decelerating any faster than the derailed ones do) may in fact protract the risk that the derailed car(s) will fall out of line, foul adjacent tracks, etc. And it is that motion that produces the fireball oil-train disasters.
Reminds me a bit of the koan of the Destroyer -- no matter what you do with the brake, you risk upsetting things, and if you do nothing, you still risk upsetting things. As noted earlier, the only real 'safe' thing to do is keep the cars from leaving the clearance envelope of the track they are on ... either by not deraiiing in the first place, or by staying reasonably upright and in line, off adjacent tracks, and away from lineside things to run into and puncture.
Wizlish As we have discussed -- and I notice you didn't ask the NYAB or WABTEC people this specific question, to which the answer in detail will be highly enlightening -- much of the modulation ECP brakes provide in service positions is not active during emergency. That is likely why there is only the nominal 3% or so 'performance improvement' (measured in stopping time or stopping distance, whichever is better for ya) between "big-holing the Westinghouse" and full commanded emergency on AAR-standard ECP.
schlimmIndeed, the shorter distances for ECP service applications may permit avoidance of the use of emergency braking and thus all its uses' problems.
Emergency applications are usually "right now" incidents - odds are pretty good that no kind of service braking is going to do that job. I doubt you'll find any engineers who consider emergency braking a part of their service braking repetoire.
We've wandered away from the basic premise of the thread - oil train derailments. The ongoing discussion about ECP is not really relevant. To this point, no oil train incidents have been laid to any cause that would have been mitigated by any of the stated benefits of ECP.
Which is why so many folks are dismissing the suggested ECP mandate as unnecessary. It's trying to cure a problem that doesn't exist.
That's not to say that ECP doesn't have it's benefits - and those have already been well discussed. I would opine that given the fact that a perfectly servicable method of braking already exists, that ECP will find it's way into railroading big-time when the economic benefit becomes obvious to the railroads.
Unlike the introduction of air brakes in the first place, where the railroads had to be dragged kicking and screaming into their implementation (workers were expendable and cheaper than the new invention?), ECP, somewhat tried, but still not entirely tested, offers only a variation on the theme.
Wait for it.....
The heartache the RRs have with ECP isn't how it works when it works, it's the lack of relibility of the state of the art. Even in captive service with trained and equipped personnel, there are too many incidents where it takes too long to get trains out on the road.
You think the roads have problems with congestion at oil terminals now....
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
It has been discussed elsewhere that the greatest reduction in stopping distance for ECP is in service applications. The reduction of distance is a lesser percentage in emergency applications. But emergency applications are not the only cause for derailments by braking. Indeed, the shorter distances for ECP service applications may permit avoidance of the use of emergency braking and thus all its uses' problems.
EuclidECP may benefit some trains more than others, but the issue at hand is how much it benefits oil trains, and whether the benefit is worth the cost. I think this point is important because some here have indeed claimed that none of the slack control benefits of ECP apply to unit trains. I think that is an absurd position being advanced in a desperate attempt to support the AAR rejection of ECP brakes. Of course the cost/benefit of ECP is moot if there is zero benefit, but that proposition has zero credibility.
Why does the basis of this discussion keep changing every few posts?
Most of the benefits mentioned refer to SERVICE braking, not the 'emergency' scenarios involved in current derailment stops. Even if ECP application occurred "immediately" the full length of the train, there is still a time lag before the shoes contact the wheels, and another period of time before, even at ideal NBR on every car, the brakes apply firmly enough to start taking substantial 'way' off the train. Meanwhile a derailed car may have dug in, swung sideways, or otherwise encountered deceleration well beyond that which any braked steel wheels can produce -- at which point you will get a run-in, and probably some accordioning, until the momentum comes off the part of the train to the rear of the 'incident'.
As we have discussed -- and I notice you didn't ask the NYAB or WABTEC people this specific question, to which the answer in detail will be highly enlightening -- much of the modulation ECP brakes provide in service positions is not active during emergency. That is likely why there is only the nominal 3% or so 'performance improvement' (measured in stopping time or stopping distance, whichever is better for ya) between "big-holing the Westinghouse" and full commanded emergency on AAR-standard ECP.
And what the argument about the "cost/benefit" from ECP is about, in the present context, is the effective subpercentage of that 3% that an ECP system on a HHFT would achieve over its conventionally-braked counterpart. As we have discussed, the relative time lag involved in actuation of the conventional brakes is only a fraction of the effective setup time to full-emergency actuation, and after that point no considerations of graduated release apply.
Now, I think a case could be made that in cases of prompt 'dig-in' following derailment, every moment that can be saved in applying those brakes in the trailing segment may result in lower impact attenuation. It is possible in fact to calculate just how much effect this would have. It is by no means enough to reduce most of the cumulative impact force (either via progressive slack run-in or treating the trailing segment as fully bunched as its momentum comes to bear on a derailment-decelerated car or cars) that you claim causes car deformation.
And it is only this -- so far -- that the multibillion-dollar, multiyear retrofit program for ECP would provide as safety benefits for HHFTs in accident conditions. That is why AAR, with some justification, takes the position that an ECP mandate does not provide benefits commensurate with its cost.
I happen to agree that there are a number of places that ECP provides very real advantages in train handling. I further agree that setting up an ECP system so that it responds quickly and positively to derailment detection in a sensible way -- for example, via differential braking -- might well provide distinctive advantage that would make the cost of a mandate worthwhile. However, such a system would have to be designed and programmed, and then effective hardware built and tested, and then some effective way to implement it at the scope and in the time required would have to be provided for, before I would expect the AAR to change its position.
I also expect the FRA would have to 'come clean' on whether the HHFT mandate will be cleverly extended to trains carrying PIH and other 'hazmat' cars, and thence to general interchange moves in general. I myself wonder why there is no TIGER or other 'stimulus' money going into design of intelligent ECP systems, or to subsidize some or all of the capital cost of a mandated conversion ... for those cars and equipment for which ECP is supposed to be a significant public-safety improvement.
I thought you were answering the question that I had asked about what Don was referring to.
No, because I am not a clairvoyant or mentalist to tell you what Don was thinking when he said what he did. (Or consider it is my place to create a paraphrase of his expressed opinion.) I am sure, though, that he will answer at greater length, in due time, and tell you what his opinion is, and why he used the words he did.
Wizlish Euclid So then why does Don say that many of the benefits claimed above by Leith Al-Nazer do not apply to unit trains? I of course can't answer that question as asked. But I can point to some areas that indicate where benefits stated would not apply directly to typical unit-train operations, or be of more value to loose-car railroading:
Euclid So then why does Don say that many of the benefits claimed above by Leith Al-Nazer do not apply to unit trains?
I of course can't answer that question as asked. But I can point to some areas that indicate where benefits stated would not apply directly to typical unit-train operations, or be of more value to loose-car railroading:
EuclidSo then why does Don say that many of the benefits claimed above by Leith Al-Nazer do not apply to unit trains?
... Under ECP operation, the simultaneous brake application results in uniform braking and minimal run-in forces, resulting in no additional sliding propensity of the braked wheels. These reduced run-in forces between cars may result in less wear-and-tear on the cars over time and may reduce the potential of a derailment, especially in the case where the train is poorly assembled (for example, if too many empty cars are placed adjacent to each other).
Additionally, ECP brake systems allow for all cars in the train to brake at the same braking (or deceleration) rate even if they had varying physical brake configurations; which is something that cannot be achieved on conventional pneumatic systems.
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