Deggesty Does what was posted today extend the speed reduction to all urban areas?
Does what was posted today extend the speed reduction to all urban areas?
No - only those defined by the FRA.
And in many cases, track speed in these areas are already below 40 MPH for all trains because of the lines having been laid out in the 19th Century and then they got hemmed in by urban development.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
tree68 Let's face if folks - Bucky's solutions are going to save the day, and it's the railroads' fault if they don't immediately embrace and implement those solutions.
Let's face if folks - Bucky's solutions are going to save the day, and it's the railroads' fault if they don't immediately embrace and implement those solutions.
The world should be beating a path to his door. He will be rich and famous.
Norm
cacole A news item published Monday, April 20th, indicates that the Transportation Department has issued a series of emergency orders, including a 40-mph speed limit for hazardous materials moving through uban areas.
A news item published Monday, April 20th, indicates that the Transportation Department has issued a series of emergency orders, including a 40-mph speed limit for hazardous materials moving through uban areas.
"High Thread Urban" should have been written "High Threat Urban."
Johnny
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Euclid In the Lynchburg wreck, the pulling was only against the resistance of the eight derailed cars because no brakes were applied to the cars behind the derailment during the dragging of the eight derailed cars.
And how do you know that to be fact?
Euclid Dave, You say that only empties have a chance of being dragged as an alternative to jackknifing, and therefore my idea won’t work because the oil trains are loaded. Yet, in the Virginia wreck, eight LOADED cars were derailed and dragged, with the first car in the string being dragged 1,200 feet. They lost their trucks and tore up the track, and yet they stayed in line, and mostly upright; and none of those eight cars breached. Then you suggest that none of this matters because cars behind the eight dragged cars did jackknife and breach, as if that discredits the idea of differential braking and related features. All the Virginia wreck did was inadvertently demonstrate the beneficial effect of differential braking. Had this train been equipped with my four features, the braking response would have begun the instant the first car derailed, rather than after it dragged for 1,200 feet. And also the braking response would have set maximum braking behind the derailed car, and due to the empty/loaded sensors of my concept, that braking would have been much greater braking force than what was available in the Virginia train wreck. At the same time, the differential braking would have created the same type of tension ahead of the derailed cars that was demonstrated inadvertently in the actual wreck. So rather than just dragging eight cars clear of the pileup; with my system, the much heavier braking behind the derailment, plus the fact that it would have begun 1,200 feet earlier—these factors may have prevented all of the jackknifing that did occur in the wreck, and also prevented all of the breaching and fire that did occur.
1) The derailed cars part as they move over damaged tracks, and the derailed cars behind the parting are being shoved ahead by the cars still on the rails behind the derailment. The derailed cars behind the parting jackknife, and the ones ahead of the derailment pull away without jackknifing.
2) The derailed cars do not part as they move over damaged track, and the slack is bunched because they are being shoved ahead by the cars still on the rails behind the derailment. The derailed cars jackknife as they are shoved.
3) The derailed cars do not part as they move over damaged track, and the slack is stretched as they are being pulled ahead by the cars still on the rails ahead of the derailment. The derailed cars do not jackknife.
It might bear mentioning here, before we get some 'expert' solving the problem by making the valve more sensitive, that a properly adjusted triple valve has to be relatively insensitive to the rate of changes in the line pressure. When it is sensitive, you have one kind of 'dynamiter', and that is a bad thing; how you'd get a train reliably over the road with a whole consist of them is a nightmare even to non-railroaders.
I have little doubt that if you went back and looked at the specs or design process of the EOT device, you'd find that the little air turbine was specifically designed so that it wouldn't use enough air to provoke an emergency release on cars with triples within spec. That turned out to be a tragic 'optimization' at Lac Megantic, but I don't blame the EOT's engineering team -- who among them would imagine that a train would be left with all the engines shut down, hanging on the independent and a grossly inadequate number of handbrakes, on a 2% grade?
Euclid Zugmann, I did state that wrongly above. The brake pipe and the independents leaked down, but the tank car automatic brakes remained released with reservoirs fully pressurized because the leak down of the brake pipe was too slow to cause an application of the tank car brakes.
My understanding is that the auxilary reservoirs would have leaked down at the same rate as the train line. That's why the brakes didn't set up. Had the control valve sensed higher pressure in the auxilary reservoir then the train line, it would have moved to the application position. That's how air brakes work. (When the control valve senses pressure equalization between the TL and AXR, it goes to lap. When it senses higher pressure in the TL, it goes to release. Those three basic functions are why the control valve used to be, and the term still is used in the field, called a "triple valve.")
When in the release/running position, there is a charging port that is open between the train line and reservoir. Air can flow into or out of the reservoir. As long as the rate is light enough, it won't trigger a brake application. (The link Zug has says the train line leaked off at 1psi/minute. It wasn't enough to trigger an application.)
That port closes when the control valve goes the application position, and then to the lap position after pressure between the train line and auxilary reservoir equalizes. Before leaving the train unattendend, had the engineer made a brake application, instead of leaving the brake in the release position, the car brakes would have set up harder as the train line leaked off.
I've heard of some railroads (I think the few times I've heard of it, they were all Canadian railroads.) allowing to leave a train unattendend, with the air brakes released after tying a sufficient number of hand brakes. Most, however have rules to leave unattendend trains with the automatic brake applied.
http://www.railway-technical.com/air-brakes.shtml
Scroll down to "operation on each vehicle" and you can see the connection, called a "feed groove" if you enlarge the diagrams.
Jeff
After I wrote my response I realized that the whole arguement was moot. The train would not have gone in emergency when "the air bled off", because the train would have already been in emergency and the air would have never had a chance to bleed off the train line.
As soon as the last engine was shut down, the train line ECP control signal would have gone dead. That should have signaled the cars to go in emergency, because they don't know whether that signal loss was caused by an engine shutdown or the train parting. I wil agree that with ECP the train would have been placed in emergency. The question remains, for how long? A pessimist would say that since nothing else went right that night it would have bled off, an optimist would say it would have held long enough for the relief crew to get there and restart the engines.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Euclid As I understand it, the engineer of the MM&A oil train left the automatic brake released and held the train with just the indenpendent brake and some hand brakes. So apparently the leak-down only involved the independents. The train line and the car reservoirs remained pressurized, and the automatic brake remained released as the train ran away once the independents leaked down. This is why so many people could not understand how the car reservoirs all leaked down and released the car brakes in only a few hours. The car reservoirs did not have to leak down in order to release the car brakes. The car brakes were already released while the reservoirs and train line were fully charged.
As I understand it, the engineer of the MM&A oil train left the automatic brake released and held the train with just the indenpendent brake and some hand brakes. So apparently the leak-down only involved the independents. The train line and the car reservoirs remained pressurized, and the automatic brake remained released as the train ran away once the independents leaked down.
This is why so many people could not understand how the car reservoirs all leaked down and released the car brakes in only a few hours. The car reservoirs did not have to leak down in order to release the car brakes. The car brakes were already released while the reservoirs and train line were fully charged.
Take another look at the report. http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.asp
There's a chart (table 1) on that page with the data downloaded from the engine. The brakepipe did bleed off before the train ran off.
Even with ECP, you set handbrakes when parking a train. Period. End of story. Railroading 101. Never rely on the air to hold an unattended train.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
dehusmanDon't know that that would happen. Is that functionality on each individual car (if a car senses an air drop it sets the brakes on itself) or is it part of the locomotive control valve functionality (the locomotive senses the drop and sets the brakes on the train)? Since there was no system and there is no ECP system currently in use on the US freight network, I couldn't swear how one would work.
I'm going by the systems that have been developed (some of which have been tested in service) for ECP on freight trains. You will know more of these than I do. My present opinion is that ECP systems as generally designed and applied to passenger trains aren't comparable to what is required for a 'good' freight system, either for unit-train service or as prospectively designed for loose-car or loose-block railroading. But I would think any ECP system designed by a competent engineer would have some limit valve that would set the air if trainline pressure dropped below a reasonable limit, no matter how slowly pressure bled off to reach that limit.
I would think having an individual car set the brakes on just itself would be a bad thing.
I can think of very few things as asinine as that would be; it's bad with conventional brakes when one car 'decides' to set itself in emergency ('dynamiting') and takes the rest of the train with it eventually...
If its part of the locomotive control valve, then what happens when all the engines are shut down before the air pressure drops? After all, before the engine caught fire, the train line was pressurized. The only running engine caught fire. That engine was shut down. Subsequent to that the train line pressure dropped. With all the engines shut down, which engine is going to be the one that tells the train to set its brakes?
I leave aside the discussion of what a bonehead Pepsi move it was to leave all the locomotives of a consist 'dead' with only the independent and a wholly insufficient number of handbrakes set. The Canadians involved will have to live with that, and I leave it to them to do that, but shoulda-woulda-coulda is not really appropriate in this discussion, and it brings up the very important point of whether the 'safety' valve in a given locomotive unit will function with that unit isolated or shut down.
As noted in the accident report, many locomotives in fact have a specific valve in the trainline that is meant to detect falling pressure, and at some absolute setpoint this valve opens and dumps the air. I don't remember exactly, but I think that at least one engine in the MMA consist involved at Lac Megantic was set up to have this valve but it was either disconnected or removed. If this is an important issue to document I'll look up the specific references. Randy Stahl is likely to know all about this and I hope he will comment (assuming he hasn't already gotten terminal MEGO syndrome from this thread and has stopped following it...)
In answer to your question: EVERY locomotive in a consist ought to have one of these valves, and 'which one is the one that tells the train to set its brakes' is the first one whose valve triggers. If a given engine doesn't trip, the next one would, and so on. (If I remember correctly, this valve was supplied with battery power even with the locomotive isolated and the prime mover shut down, so even 'dead' units would have the safety feature; IIRC you would have to pull the master battery shutoff, a separate thing on both EMD and GE locomotives, to deactivate it. (Perhaps ironically, wasn't this what those firemen did?) The valve should certainly stay shut when an equipped locomotive is being handled dead-in-train, and it shouldn't contribute enough parasitic drain when 'live' to run a parked locomotive battery down and present proper start/restart, but if this were a concern I'd expect the battery shutoff would have been used.
Even if the air bled off and the train brakes set, there is nothing to say that they wouldn't have bled off and let the train roll free. That's why the rules require handbrakes because the train brakes can't be relied upon to hold a train.
Thing is, the brakes were tested, and I believe it was demonstrated that the train would have held easily for at least 2 to 3 days. The only length of time involved at Lac Megantic would have been up until dawn, when the 'American' engineer showed up to take the train (and discovered what a mess awaited him! The point is that even if the train brakes had started bleeding off to the point the train started to move, it would still have shoes applied to all the cars, plus of course the 'seven brakes' less the axle left out by the defective QRB valve. I think you will agree that it would be unlikely that in the relatively short distance down to Lac Megantic the train would have reached the speed corresponding to the 'boiling point' where outgassing from the shoes destroys effective braking effort at about 22-23 mph.
It might have delayed the runaway for a couple more hours, which might have reduced the fatalities, but there is no guarantee that it would have held the train all night.
Of course there is no 'guarantee' that the train involved in the Lac Megantic accident wouldn't have rolled down and exploded, but I don't recall anyone with experience claiming that if the train air had in fact been set, even with the reduced reservoir pressures corresponding to the point the 'safety' valve triggered at about 40 psi or so, the train would have rolled down that night. I still am uncomfortable with the fact that part of a safety device -- the air turbine in the EOT device -- was the proximate cause both of the significant fall in trainline pressure and the slow-enough fall of pressure that kept the brake system from normally going into emergency by sensing differential between reservoir and trainline pressures. (I would tongue-in-cheek note that if Euclid put a little turbine on every car, the aggregate drop WOULD have put the 'legacy air' in a compatible ECP/standard hybrid system into emergency, right quick, under the conditions that prevailed for the Lac Megantic accident...)
Don't know that that would happen. Is that functionality on each individual car (if a car senses an air drop it sets the brakes on itself) or is it part of the locomotive control valve functionality (the locomotive senses the drop and sets the brakes on the train)? Since there was no system and there is no ECP system currently in use on the US freight network, I couldn't swear how one would work.
Even if the air bled off and the train brakes set, there is nothing to say that they wouldn't have bled off and let the train roll free. That's why the rules require handbrakes because the train brakes can't be relied upon to hold a train. It might have delayed the runaway for a couple more hours, which might have reduced the fatalities, but there is no guarantee that it would have held the train all night.
It seems Euclid is on the same page as me. Perhaps I should have used Lynchburg as an example or some other wreck.
That said, wizlist I'm not sure Dave is wrong about ecp not stopping the wreck. In my understanding, once the air is gone even ecp wouldn't have held the train. OTOH would PTC have been a benefit? Probably not. Even great trackwork wouldn't have helped. But runaway trains is such an anomaly, why even think about it.
How many derailment happen every day? And not just the ones that make the news...
I believe everyone here is taking things a bit too literally. I'm trying to discuss concepts of things that may make improvements, not saying this is how it has to be and its the only way. I see Euclid doing the same, trying to develop a concept but everyone doesn't seem to be even attempting to follow the idea, rather they would rather argue over finedetails. Sure the details will be important, but at this time the idea or concept is more important.
Modeling the Cleveland and Pittsburgh during the PennCentral era starting on the Cleveland lakefront and ending in Mingo junction
dehusmanECP would not have prevented Lac Megantic. Not a single penny of the money spent on ECP would have yielded a benefit for Lac Megantic.
Don't be dumber than you have to be.* Any sensible ECP system would have responded to falling trainline pressure by applying the train brakes. I think we are all agreed: brakes on = no Lac Megantic accident. Admittedly this is a fringe benefit of having the ECP system, and not just some additional valves and wiring to actuate release quicker... but the additional features are part of the "money spent on ECP" (and in the case of Lac Megantic even you can't deny it would have been money well, well spent.)
*(Yes, that was a little strong, but Dave has been a bit arrogant in his claims that many contributors to this thread are ignorant of real-world train systems, and he should have known better than to miss this so badly...)
ruderunner And how do those costs compare to added safety improvements? Upgraded right of way and keeping it in better condition costs how much per year? Not including repairs from derailments (if the derailment didn't happen, the repairs woudn't be needed) Is adding things like ECP really that expensive compared to one major derailment (LacMegantic for example)?
And how do those costs compare to added safety improvements? Upgraded right of way and keeping it in better condition costs how much per year? Not including repairs from derailments (if the derailment didn't happen, the repairs woudn't be needed) Is adding things like ECP really that expensive compared to one major derailment (LacMegantic for example)?
Here is a perfect example of why I keep bringing up using DATA, addressing the CAUSE and not firing shotguns in the dark.
ECP would not have prevented Lac Megantic. Not a single penny of the money spent on ECP would have yielded a benefit for Lac Megantic.
Load/empty sensors would not have prevented Lac Megantic. Not a single penny of the money spent on load/empty sensors would have yielded a benefit for Lac Megantic.
Euclid's differential braking would not have prevented Lac Megantic. Not a single penny of the money spent on differential braking would have yielded a benefit for Lac Megantic.
For a cost benefit basis all of those schemes, if you are trying to prevent Lac Megantic, would have been 100% waste. All expense, zero benefit.
That's why railroads take a broader approach and look at more than the cause du jour that everybody is in a tizzy about. When you look at the big picture, what you do and how you do it is different than just reacting to last thing the evening news covered.
A question of perspective: how much does the industry spend each year on derailment cleanups? Not just hazzardous loads but all derailments? Including lost time to rerail a couple cars that picked a switch and lost revenue from having to shut the line down for days to clean up a more major accident? Damaged and lost lading? litigation and settlements/judgements? Those are just a few of the costs involved in any derailment. How much does that add up to?
Not an easy question to answer. Someone woud really have to be "in the know" to provide real answers but I suppose educated guesses could work here.
And how do those costs compare to added safety improvements? Upgraded right of way and keeping it in better condition costs how much per year? Not including repairs from derailments (if the derailment didn't happen, the repairs woudn't be needed) Is adding things like ECP really that expensive compared to one major derailment (LacMegantic for example)? How many derailments would cost more than ECP? Most are knocking my derailment sensor idea as cost prohibitive but none of us even have any idea how much such a system would cost, not even me. But I feel that the cost would be much less than others think.
Without actual number to put things into perspective though, it's really an argument about nothing. That's not to say that keeping the costs minimal isn't beneficial, actually the cheaper the better in order to gain acceptance. And by way of mass production the more production the cheaper it could become.
EXample: the Lincoln show car that eventually became the original Batmobile, cost FoMoCo somehwere near 5 million dolllars (in the late 50's), was sold to Barris for less than $2000 and now is stil worth less than a fraction of what it cost to build (I believe current value is about $500k). But the production versions of that Lincoln sold for well under $5000 and enough were sold to justify it's production expenses.
Point being, prototype costs are always much higher than production costs.
And to be clear, I agree that derailment prevention is the best way to handle things. If derailments didn't happen how much could be saved in car costs? Tanks coud be built, maybe, with only 1/4" steel for example. What about lower insurance premiums? Higher track speeds? No drailment cleanups? Other savings? Could those saving offset the expense of making trackwork derailment proof?
For that matter can track be made derailment proof? No, not even with an unlimited budget.
So given that derailments can still happen, why not explore avenues of crash control/mitigation? By limiting the severity of those derailments, many of the costs associated with one can certainly be reduced. Enough to offset the cost? Maybe, we don't know yet.
And now that the government is noticing and taking some action, time is growing short for the industry to sort out its own problem. Best to get a handle on it before the government decides whats best. FWIW I don't believe the latest news from on high is bad, it actually seems rather prudent. I'm not sure how patient they will be though before handing down something not practical.
Wizlish I suspect there is the usual war between the operating and MOW department over where the thresholds for a given railroad's detectors will be set -- remains to be seen if there is too much false-positive action and the thresholds have to be 'adjusted' quietly and behind the scenes after the publicity has died down...
What war?
The engineering department doesn't really care where the thresholds are set. Its ithe operating and mechanical departments that have the dog in the hunt. They will determine the threshold based on data and set them accordingly.
always a 3-way war: operating (engineer and conductor zombies), mechanical (car dep't) and engineering (track goblins). I believe the newer detectors can tag a car if a journal or wheel is running hotter than usual, but not as hot as to cause a need for immediate set-out. Pretty hi-tech stuff anymore.
BaltACD would know better than me.
dehusmanY'all have got the detector thing exactly backwards.
How so?
The detector will have a vibration or shock threshold -- a better 'temperature' analogy would have been your thermostat, not a fever. When the setpoint is exceeded, the device issues an alert. Lower threshold = less vibration or whatever needed to trigger the alert.
And the more likelihood that a given train will have at least one car that triggers at the lower threshold, and the affected car will have to be set out at some (possibly inconvenient) point. I suspect there is the usual war between the operating and MOW department over where the thresholds for a given railroad's detectors will be set -- remains to be seen if there is too much false-positive action and the thresholds have to be 'adjusted' quietly and behind the scenes after the publicity has died down...
Euclid I did not miss the part about the 40 mph speed limit applying only in High Threat Urban Areas. Although I did wonder where those areas were, and why they are “high threat.”
Generally I concluded that the report is symbolism over substance intended to convince the public that it is doing its job to address this safety issue. It leaves me to conclude that the main thing that is protecting residents of communities along rail lines is the odds of derailments happening elsewhere.
I realize that there will be less destructive energy as the speed is lowered, but I don’t see how 40 mph is going to help much. Either 40 mph or 50 mph has more than enough energy to breach many tank cars in a pileup.
Considering the wrecks in Casselton, Alabama, Virginia, W. Virginia, Illinois, and the two in Ontario; how fast were these trains running when they derailed?
Considering the first sentence, could it possibly be more indecisive? “Preliminary investigation” of one recent derailment “indicates” that a mechanical defect “involving” a broken tank car wheel “may” have “caused” or “contributed” to the incident.
I see this report as intended to convey a sense of ramping up concern in order to set the stage for new tank car rules that are going to surprise the stakeholders.
We'll have to disagree on this -- except I do think there are forces in government that are setting up to do more or less what you say. Many in Congress would be delighted to exercise power in dictating to railroads what is 'necessary' to achieve 'safety' whether or not the solution is cost-effective, practicable, or even safe (let alone safer than better alternatives). All you need to do is compare the history of mandated PTC to see how this happens.
I thought the NPRM bent over backward NOT to make it look as if more extreme "solutions" were coming, or that a camel's nose was being thrust into anyone's particular tent at present. If the speed restriction were to 20 mph, or applied to all track mileage irrespective of popultion, I'd have been more inclined to agree, but this does look more like an attempt at common sense and practical measures to me. But as usual with these NPRMs, YMMV.
To be honest, the only way a system like yours will ever be built is if the United States Government mandates it, tests it, and subsidizes some or all of the detail design via grants. So I am not quite sure why you're attacking a tendency by that government to take grander or more sweeping action to fix the perceived dangers from volatile-crude trains...
The reaction to the DOT release is amusing. Its like watching people who have never filled out a form 1040 try and redesign the tax code.
The HTUA's have been around since just after 9-11. They are the standardway that the regulations identify major urban areas. There are dozens of regulations that refer to them.
Y'all have got the detector thing exactly backwards. If you kid has a fever they tell you to take them to the doctor if its above 102 or 103 degrees. If they LOWER the threshold, then you take the child to the doctor when the fever is 100 or 99 degrees. You lowered the threshold but response became more restrictive. If they lowerthe threshold then if the detector used to fault at 100 mm then the fault will now hit at 95 mm or whatever. The threshold is lower, but its more restrictive.
Euclid always thinks every announcment is a signal they are going to spring some secret new thing and suprise everybody. That's not how it works.
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