Oil Train

[n012944]

Buslist

 

 

 

 

 

Here's some actual quotes from the AAR. The folks that use this day to day rather than desk jockey.

 

 

That would be information that Bucky/Euclid would not be interested in....

[Euclid]

From this link:  http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/us-dot-announces-comprehensive-proposed-rulemaking-safe-transportation-crude-oil

 

It sounds like ECP brakes are one of three options under consideration for inclusion in the new tank car rules.  The DOT released this July 2014:

 

·         Proposes new standards for tank cars constructed after October 1, 2015 (and that are used to transport flammable liquids as part of a HHFT) (e.g., thermal, top fittings, and bottom outlet protection; tank head and shell puncture resistance). PHMSA is requesting comment on three options for enhanced tank car standard requirements:

 

1.    Tank car option 1 would have 9/16 inch steel, would be outfitted with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes and would be equipped with rollover protection.

 

2.    Tank car option 2 would also have 9/16 inch steel but would not require ECP brakes or rollover protection.

 

3.    Tank car option 3 is based on a 2011 industry standard and has 7/16 inch steel, and does not require ECP brakes or rollover protection

 

 

I also called them today and learned that the new rules will be released to the public soon, and they may or may not include a requirement for ECP brakes on oil trains.  The three options listed above are still on the table in the decision making process. 

[Buslist]

Euclid

I did not realize that ECP brakes are a part of the new oil train rules currently under review by the Obama Administration. My understanding was that Secretary of Transportation, Anthony Foxx had written a letter to the AAR and asked the industry to add ECP brakes to tank cars, but never actually included a requirement for ECP brakes in the proposed new tank car rules. 

 

This report implies that ECP brakes are part of the new rules.  However, the implication is not entirely clear because the article variously refers to ECP brakes and “advanced braking.”  Apparently, the call for ECP is simply an option that is under consideration and described as follows: 

 

“Option 1 would have 9/16 inch steel, would be outfitted with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes and would be equipped with rollover protection.”

 

As I understand it, the new rules are supposed to be released May 12, but it is not easy to find any confirmation of this, even at this late date.  I would not be surprised if this deadline slips further out.    

 

http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL1N0WC1Z520150310?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0

 

Quotes (in blue) from the link:

 

“WASHINGTON, March 10 (Reuters) - The U.S. rail industry is pushing the White House to drop a requirement that oil trains adopt an advanced braking system, a cornerstone of a national safety plan that will soon govern shipments of crude across the country.”

 

 

“Reuters reported last month that the national oil train safety plan now under review at the White House Office of Management and Budget would require the advanced braking system.”

 

 

“"Given the safety challenge we have right now, shame on us if we fail to embrace new technologies,"” said Joe Szabo, former chief of the Federal Railroad Administration.”

 

***********************************

 

The one benefit of ECP brakes that seems to be always cited in relation to oil trains is that ECP brakes will stop a train faster.  If the train is stopped faster, fewer cars will derail in any given derailment incident.  Here, from the link, is the industry’s basis for rejecting that advantage:   

 

“The industry claims fitting rail [rolling] stock with ECP brakes would not prevent accidents, but merely limit the number of cars that derail in an accident.”

 

 

Here's some actual quotes from the AAR. The folks that use this day to day rather than desk jockey.

 

Train braking. As of April 1, 2014, trains operating on main line tracks carrying at least 20 carloads of crude oil have been equipped either with distributed power locomotives (i.e., locomotives placed in locations other than the front of the train) or with two-way telemetry end-of-train devices. These technologies allow train crews to apply emergency brakes simultaneously from both the head end and locations further back in the train in order to stop the train faster.

 

(The new regulations should) Refrain from requiring electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes on tank cars used to move flammable liquids, as they are very costly systems not justified in terms of improved safety benefits, and could result in negative operational impacts on the network.  AAR also noted that under its voluntary agreement with DOT, railroads already have addressed braking systems for trains moving crude oil, using either distributed power or two-way-telemetry end-of-train devices on trains carrying crude oil. 

 

... the federal government is considering new regulations to require electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes for trains moving flammable liquids, including crude oil and ethanol. ECP brakes will not result in fewer accidents, and will not provide significant safety benefits. In fact, ECP brakes are costly and have issues with reliability that could erode network efficiency.

[Euclid]

I did not realize that ECP brakes are a part of the new oil train rules currently under review by the Obama Administration. My understanding was that Secretary of Transportation, Anthony Foxx had written a letter to the AAR and asked the industry to add ECP brakes to tank cars, but never actually included a requirement for ECP brakes in the proposed new tank car rules. 

 

This report implies that ECP brakes are part of the new rules.  However, the implication is not entirely clear because the article variously refers to ECP brakes and “advanced braking.”  Apparently, the call for ECP is simply an option that is under consideration and described as follows: 

 

“Option 1 would have 9/16 inch steel, would be outfitted with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes and would be equipped with rollover protection.”

 

As I understand it, the new rules are supposed to be released May 12, but it is not easy to find any confirmation of this, even at this late date.  I would not be surprised if this deadline slips further out.    

 

http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL1N0WC1Z520150310?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0

 

Quotes (in blue) from the link:

 

“WASHINGTON, March 10 (Reuters) - The U.S. rail industry is pushing the White House to drop a requirement that oil trains adopt an advanced braking system, a cornerstone of a national safety plan that will soon govern shipments of crude across the country.”

 

 

“Reuters reported last month that the national oil train safety plan now under review at the White House Office of Management and Budget would require the advanced braking system.”

 

 

“"Given the safety challenge we have right now, shame on us if we fail to embrace new technologies,"” said Joe Szabo, former chief of the Federal Railroad Administration.”

 

***********************************

 

The one benefit of ECP brakes that seems to be always cited in relation to oil trains is that ECP brakes will stop a train faster.  If the train is stopped faster, fewer cars will derail in any given derailment incident.  Here, from the link, is the industry’s basis for rejecting that advantage:   

 

“The industry claims fitting rail [rolling] stock with ECP brakes would not prevent accidents, but merely limit the number of cars that derail in an accident.”

[cx500]

While many of the members of the forum are indeed railfans rather than "professionals", I am aware that several of those who have regularly provided their critiques are working railroaders with experience in fields such as train operations, civil engineering and accident investigation.  They have been attempting to provide advice and corrections to some of Euclid's assumptions but it seems to be mostly falling on deaf ears. 

Any "engineering or other professional organization" would first require the scientific research and analysis to back up his proposals before even bothering to consider them.  We have been kinder here.  Imagination is praiseworthy and does occasionally lead to valuable innovation.  But that is highly improbable in this case for all the reasons the professionals have, with incredible patience, repeatedly tried to explain.

John

[Norm48327]

CSSHEGEWISCH

After following this particular thread for an incredible length of time, I have come to the conclusion that Bucky/Euclid is making his presentation to the wrong people.  Very few of the members of this forum are professionals who could make a valid critique of his proposals.  He would better serve himself and others by presenting his proposals to various engineering and other professional organizations where they could be critiqued and developed as appropriate.

 

AMEN!

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

After following this particular thread for an incredible length of time, I have come to the conclusion that Bucky/Euclid is making his presentation to the wrong people.  Very few of the members of this forum are professionals who could make a valid critique of his proposals.  He would better serve himself and others by presenting his proposals to various engineering and other professional organizations where they could be critiqued and developed as appropriate.

[Euclid]

Dave,

 

Thanks for your comments.  They are indeed legitimate observations and questions, as you say.  I did look at that 741720 car and see what you mean about the pulled drawbar, and you raise some good points about what it indicates about adding draft force when the draft force is already high enough to part the train. 

 

I understand your point about the problem of increasing the pulling force to keep the train from jackknifing, and then defeating the purpose by pulling the train in two as a result of that increase in pulling. I agree that it poses somewhat of a problem.  It has to thread a needle between too little braking difference and too much braking difference.  So I think the solution has be to have differential braking force simply limited to what the drawbars and couplers can generally withstand, and be able to achieve benefit within that force limitation.

 

In any case, differential braking would become less able to keep the cars in line as the number of derailed cars increased.  The dragging cars would eventually pull apart as their number increased.  That does appear to be what happened in the Lynchburg wreck when car #8 separated from #9.  And then it happened again as the eight dragging cars separated in a couple places.  So I conclude that separation is always quite likely and will defeat the benefit of differential braking when the separation occurs.  So I agree that the added pull of differential braking has to be limited so as to not make separation likely.

 

You are right to conclude that if the natural draft force of the derailment is nearly high enough to part the train, then any further increase from differential braking will likely cause a parting.  However, the natural draft force is not constantly nearly high enough to separate the train.  Generally, if there is draft force in a derailment, it starts low and then rises as the number of derailed-dragging cars increases. 

 

But more important is the fact that many derailments will produce no draft force.  And those are the derailments that can most benefit from differential braking.  The derailments that do not produce draft force will instead produce buff force.  It is buff force that is the problem that jackknifes cars, so the differential braking will introduce draft force to offset the natural buff force.

 

Therefore, the main point of differential braking is limited to only providing positive opposition to any random run-in or introduction of buff force.  Those are the forces that can cause dragging cars to jackknife and begin a pileup when they derail.  The longer the cars are prevented from piling up, the less damage (and thus breach potential) there will be when they do finally begin a pileup.  So the differential braking draft force will be just enough to prevent or delay a pileup by offsetting the natural buff force.  That way the system will not apply heavy differential force that is likely pull the train in two. 

 

However, even if the train does part and pile up during differential braking, that does not mean it is a complete failure.  Just delaying that pileup as the speed drops would be a measure of success of the system.  For instance, I would not expect the system to stretch out the entire derailment and keep it all in line until the train stops, although that would be possible.  Say a derailment involved 15 cars at 50 mph.  It seems like it would be unlikely to stretch that out and keep it together until all 15 cars were on the ground and dragging.  It might be stretched at first at the highest speed, and even stay stretched for some time as the speed drops.   

 

But 15 cars would most likely pull apart if they were being dragged at the lower speeds.  However by that time, the dragging cars would have lost their impetus to jackknife due to all the decelerating friction working against them.  They would tend to stop like a speedboat in the water when you close the throttle.  So, for the dragging cars alone, the jackknifing potential disappears at some level of reduced speed.

 

But then if there are cars still on the rails behind those derailed-dragging, stretched out cars, the trailing cars on the rails would shove the in-line, derailed cars ahead and cause them to accordion, despite the friction holding those cars back.     

 

That is where ECP brakes would help because they could set up faster on those trailing cars still on the rails, and get as much energy out of those cars as possible during the time that the derailed cars are being dragged. But in order for that to happen, it would require derailment sensors.  And all of that is required to support the differential braking.  So ECP is the first basic foundation; and derailment sensors and differential braking are two add-ons.  Then the three components work together and provide essential support to each other.        

 

The very best result that this system could be expected to achieve is to prevent a fire.  I would expect the average result would be to lengthen the time between the start of the derailment and the start of the pileup.  During that time interval, the train will slow down and lose kinetic energy before going into the destructive pileup that causes the cars to breach from the high-speed, high-pressure impacts.  Dissipating energy before a pileup begins will reduce the size of the potential pileup, reduce the potential damage-breaching in the pileup, and possibly even prevent a pileup.  That is what I can see this system doing.  That is the intended result and benefit.

 

Here is one interesting detail that I noticed: 

 

Consider a train with conventional air brakes and slack bunched.  It begins to derail and the derailing cars will accumulate resistance that will act like braking force on them.  Since the train slack is bunched, there is no forward pull on the derailed cars unless or until that forward slack is stretched out by the resistance of the derailing cars.

 

So because the derailed cars are not being pulled, they have the opportunity to exercise their natural braking power (i.e. the resistance from being on the ground) in a way that impedes the trailing cars; and that force of resistance could cause the derailed cars to jackknife. 

 

This is all before any actual air braking takes place. Derailing during this bunched slack condition allows this natural window of opportunity for the pileup to begin before any braking begins.  The process of piling up would begin very quickly, say after two or three cars are on the ground.  Those cars will be shoved along with nothing pulling on them, and they will buckle due to their natural derailed resistance. 

 

However, with derailment sensors, the ECP brakes would immediately begin applying to those cars ahead. So while derailing cars would be trying to pull the slack out of the cars on the rails ahead, those leading cars would resist the slack pullout because their brakes are setting up.  The effect would be to pull on the derailed cars and overcome their resistance resulting from being derailed.  As that resistance is overcome, the derailed cars are pulled ahead, making them less able to impede the cars on the rails pushing from behind.  Therefore, the cars behind the derailed cars are less able to exert force on the derailed cars and jackknife them.

 

Also, at the same time, the brakes will be setting up on those cars behind the derailment, and thus limiting their ability to shove into the derailed cars.  So, in these ways, the system will affect the cars ahead of, and behind the derailment in a way that prevents the derailed and dragging cars from forming a destructive, high-speed pileup.      

[Buslist]

Euclid

Here is an FRA proposal for an overload detection device that would be a part of draft gear and record impacts in road and switching operations.  It mentions that TSB of Canada is considering that switching impact exceeding 7.5 mph would be illegal, and if it occurs, a structural integrity test of the tank car must be performed.  The concern is impact great enough to cause undetected damage that might lead to a structural failure later. 

However the FRA is considering the installation of a device that will actually measure impact force rather than just basing the assessment of damage on impact speed.  The Tank Car Committee is considering the use of accelerometers and/or strain gauges for the same purpose. 

https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L02906#p1_z10_gD_s23_y2002_y2001_y2010_y2012_lPO

Quote from the link:

“Rather than using speed as a measure for determining the severity of a dynamic event, FRA is considering research to help develop an “overload detection device” as an integral part of a draft gear. The device would detect dynamic loads near or exceeding the design limits for a tank car.

 

Much like a “telltale” indicator, an overload detection device would provide objective evidence that a condition exists that requires an investigation into the structural integrity of the tank car. In addition to FRA’s research, the AAR Operating Environment Task Force, operating under the auspices of the Tank Car Committee is exploring the feasibility of instrumenting and continuously monitoring tank cars for the same purpose using accelerometers and/or strain gauges.

 

Due to the increased number of 286,000-pounds GRL rail cars in service and longer trains, the magnitude of in-train and yard impact loads is likely to increase. With increasing loads, there are two issues of concern: (1) high-magnitude loads, discussed above, that may result in sudden crack nucleation, rapid crack propagation, or even failure of structurally significant items, such as a high- speed yard impact that results in sill separation; and (2) low-magnitude loads that are associated with crack growth by fatigue. To address these two issues, applicants must select an optimal cushioning system effective in minimizing the detrimental effects of both types of loads.”

 

What I'm surprised at is that no one has commented that the White Paper was written in 1999, and primarily address the topic of allowing 286K GRL tank cars for HazMat service. The upgrading of rolling stock was a big issue at the time. FRA had jurisdiction over HazMat tanks, the AAR over other types. I guess the sensors that FRA suggested were not very successful given their lack of use some 15 years later. Why this is catalogued in FRA's library under 2012 is anyone's guess.

[dehusman]

I do not expect everybody to agree with my ideas, but I do want to find out exactly why they disagree.

Since you want to understand, here are some observations on the Lynchburg derailment.

At various points in the converstaion you have described the first 7 or 8 derailed cars as some form of "upright and in line".  Upright and in line implies that the cars are on their trucks, merely derailed and are roughly parallel to rails of the track they are supposed to be on.  If a cut of cars is derailed "upright and in line" you should be able to use a set of frogs to rerail them.  Not a big deal in the grander scheme of things.

The first 7 or 8 derailed cars are NOT "upright and in line" by any stretch of the imagination.  The are derailed and on their sides.  They are completely off their trucks, the trucks are disassembled and the track they should be on is completely gutted.  The only reason they are not in a pile is that they fell over on flat ground, an adjacent track.  If there had been the river embankment in that area instead of a track, they would be down the embankment, in the river.  These cars cannot be frogged on.  It will take multiple side-booms or cranes to rerail those cars after track is built to them.

Something caught my eye as I watched the video that I would have to assume you did not see.  As I understand it, the differential braking concept is that the braking effort is reduced on the portion of the train ahead of the derailed cars to increase the draft forces on the cars ahead of the derailed cars, in order to keep the head end and the derailed cars stretched. The increased darft forces would prevent the cars from going out of line. Hold the thought about increasing the draft forces in the head end.

Between about 2:00 and 2:10 in the video the drone flies over and around the end of the first car in the pile, CBTX 741720.  Something is missing.  Its the drawbar.  The first car in the pile appears to have no drawbar in the end of the car away from the river, the end closest to the head end.  This train did not have differential braking.  If the video is clear and the drawbar is in fact missing, the "natural" forces in the train were sufficiently high to cause the drawbar to be ripped out of the car.  The intent of the differential braking is to increase the pull, the draft forces, in the head end.  If the forces are already high enough that it can tear apart the cars, what advantage would there be to INCREASING the draft forces using differential braking?

Maybe that car was further back in the train and the drawbar was ripped out sideways when it jacknifed.  I doubt anybody on this list knows for sure.  In any case, the missing drawbar is evidence that someplace in the derailment there were forces that exceeded the strength of the metal itself.  Before arbitrairily deciding to increase the draft forces in the train, it might be useful to know if the draft forces in the train were already near, at or exceeded the recommended draft forces for the structure of the cars.  Obviously at some point, on this car, in this derailment, some combination of forces were sufficiently high  to cause a structural failure.  Do the draft forces really need to be increased?  If they don't, why do you need differential braking?

These aren't personal attacks, these are what I feel are legitimate observations and questions about "physical evidence" that you are using to support your proposal.  About the only speculation is whether the drawbar is actually there or not and, if not, what caused it to be torn off.  If I can see this and ask these questions, then any professional railroader that sees this video can see it and may come up with the same observations and questions. 

[BaltACD]

A voice in the wilderness

http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/dot-suggests%E2%80%9D-and-fra-recommends%E2%80%9D.html?channel=

[Euclid]

After reading these last comments about all the objections to this thread, I had to go back and review the whole thread to see if it was the same one that I remember.  In pages 1-16, I don’t see any problems.  It covered a lot of ground in an organized fashion, and in great detail about technical issues of oil trains, safety ideas, derailments, etc.  Most of everyone’s comments were stated with great clarity, and the thread stayed right on topic.  There was some disagreement and debate, but it was entirely civil with no sense of personal attacks. There was some apparent misinterpretation from time to time, but this was cleared up without problems.

But this is just my description of the thread.  It is just my narrative about the content and tone.  Others have a different narrative.  But the thread does not need my description or anybody else’s description for that matter.  The thread is right here and it speaks for itself.  It is the perfect transcript of the content and tone.  So rather than listen to narratives of what happened in the thread, I suggest just looking at the actual thread.  Here is a general list of content by page number.  This is highly abbreviated and only for the purpose of generally making reference benchmarks:

 

Page 1:  The failure of the 1232 tank car to survive high speed derailments as expected.

Page 2:  The “smoke screen” of public safety as a pretext for addressing oil train dangers.   Eliminating slack action.

Page 3:  Pros and cons of slack action; it causes derailments, but is needed to start trains.

Page 4:  Oil train safety improvements.  Focus on credentials to verify claims.

Page 5:  My list of oil train enhancements.  Rejection of ECP brake advantages.  Derailment dynamics.

Page 6:  References to derailment causes.  Empty/loaded sensors.  Train stopping distances and effect on number of cars derailed in a derailment.

Page 7:  Empty/loaded sensors; mechanical versus electrical.  Clarifying purpose of empty/loaded sensors; quicker stopping versus preventing wheel slide.

Page 8:  Clarifying purpose of empty/loaded sensors to shorten stopping distance.  Comparison of ECP brakes to conventional air brakes.

Page 9:  Derailment sensors.  Using the ECP wire to transmit signals from electronic derailment sensors.  Mechanical-pneumatic derailment sensors commercially available.  Videos of prolonged dragging of derailed cars that would have been prevented by empty/loaded sensors.

Page 10:  Pros and cons of ECP braking.  Details of ECP braking.  My four stages of oil train safety system and how they interact.  Conventional braking response to example of 100-car train parting 25 cars from head end.

Page 11: Derailment sensors preventing slack run-in from UDEs near the head end of a train.  Dual purpose brake system to mix ECP cars with conventional cars in trains.  Analysis of Lynchburg, VA oil train derailment.

Page 12:  Applying ECP to entire rolling stock fleet versus applied only to oil cars.  NTSB proposal for “tanks in a blanket.” Analysis of Lynchburg, VA oil train derailment with sequence of events listed. Analysis of Lynchburg, VA oil train derailment and its relationship to ECP differential braking.  Ruderunner enters discussion with lots of ideas, including derailment sensors detecting truck swivel.

Page 13:  FRA proposes an impact detector integrated into drawbars of oil cars to record impacts that will require a structural inspection for hidden damage.  Derailment detectors sensing truck swivel.  Commercially available mechanical-pneumatic derailment detector available from New York Air Brake Co.  Derailment detectors being applied to Indian Railways. 

Page 14: Simple and successful mechanical derailment detector developed and used in Spain.  Controlling derailments to mitigate damage versus preventing derailments.

Page 15:  DOT press release about oil trains, including 40 mph speed restriction in “High Threat Urban Areas” and a recommendation to lower the threshold of defect detectors.  Consequences of lowering or raising the detector threshold.  The intended objective of the 1232 tank car, and whether it has been met.  Preventing the Lac Megantic runaway with ECP brakes. 

Page 16:  The role of air brakes in the Lac Megantic runaway.  My detailed response to some of the points made earlier by Dave Husman.  Fifteen snide comments by various people.

Page 17:  Continuation.

 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Overall, I am pleased with conversation and think it was very constructive.  I particularly welcomed the information provided on empty/loaded sensors and derailment detectors.  I made an effort to read every comment in the thread and understand the points they made.  Typically, as I write my responses to the most detailed and longest comments, I have the comment pasted into WORD, and write my response below it.  That way, I can look at the other person’s comment as I write my response, and I can be more certain that I understand what the other person has said.   

I do not expect everybody to agree with my ideas, but I do want to find out exactly why they disagree.  That is really my whole point. I want to pull my ideas together in a comprehensive presentation that can explain them in a way that the average person can understand, and release it in a self-published booklet.  I have come to realize what a challenge it is to understand and explain derailment dynamics and related in-train forces.  Step-by-step illustrations would be essential.  If this were presented in an e-book, I could include animations. To pull this together, it helps to get a review and reaction here.

[schlimm]

Wizlish

 

 

Murray

 

Euclid

So, why don’t you guys go and start your own thread about everything that is wrong with me instead of hijacking this one

 

No one is hijacking your thread.

 

 

And I suppose all these recent critical posts and comments concern oil trains?

I have a little Youtube clip of my own to add.

 

If y'all think this is a dead horse thread, ignore it.  If you think Euclid isn't taking the criticism or comments as wholly as you'd like, either just don't post, or if you just can't stand it, keep criticizing or educating ... but stop insulting.  In case you hadn't noticed, this was his thread from the start, and nobody appointed any of us as thread police to shut it up, whether we like all the 'yes but' action and obtuse justification or not. 

There are fairly firm Forum policies about ad hominem attacks and ridicule.  I for one would greatly prefer it if we all respected them, and moved on. 

 

+1 "Atreous" indeed!!!

[Wizlish]

Buslist

Of course that's true but it doesn't address the "half baked" comment.

He addressed that to me, and I wasn't questioning the standards, onlly the operational result that has been built and tested in the United States so far.  It's the result, not the planning and engineering, that I was commenting on, and only in the sense that the instantiations aren't quite seen as ready 'enough' to be valuable in current railroad service (at least, not cost-effectively).

What I'd like to see is an architecture that provides 'legacy' one-pipe compatibility with simple (or even automatic) adaptation to two-pipe where that can be provided in blocks or unit consists, and have that adopted as the 'mandated' standard the Government winds up using for its safety ECP.  If that can be done within the framework of the 42xx standards, so much the better.

I certainly did not mean to belittle the AAR or its standards!

[Buslist]

BaltACD

 

 

Buslist

Why exactly are AAR Standards S-4200, 4210, 4220 and 4230 "half baked"?

There are trains running in North America, Oz, and South Africa using those specs. In fact the entire Fortiscue Metals Group ore car fleet is so equipped. 

 

 

 

 

Fortiscue is not a network of loose cars operating on multiple privately owned and operated railroads.  Test enviornmnets and day in day out railroading in the US are two different worlds. 

 

Of course that's true but it doesn't address the "half baked" comment. The network of loose cars and the lack of backward compatibility issue are the reasons ECP has not been adapted here, not a "half baked" spec issue. The lack of a migration path is the primary reason for lack of implementation. And I wouldn't call the Southern Companies PRB coal service a "test" enviorement.

[BaltACD]

Buslist

Why exactly are AAR Standards S-4200, 4210, 4220 and 4230 "half baked"?

There are trains running in North America, Oz, and South Africa using those specs. In fact the entire Fortiscue Metals Group ore car fleet is so equipped. 

 

Fortiscue is not a network of loose cars operating on multiple privately owned and operated railroads.  Test enviornmnets and day in day out railroading in the US are two different worlds. 

[Buslist]

Wizlish

 

 

dehusman

I don't see any of that happening. The Government has not given any grants for PTC, all of the equipment, all of the installation and all of the maintenance is paid for by the railroads themselves, not the government.

 

 

Not to say "yes, but..." in the wrong way -- but a great deal of the 'hard' part of PTC design and enablement was Government-underwritten, or at least assisted.  The Meteorcomm SBRs are one example... would that technology have been developed if it had to be commercialized and standardized and marketed to railroads?   This is the level I thought Government 'contribution' would be appropriate for oil-train 'safety systems'.

Meanwhile, I am tempted to say 'the government got what was coming to it' by mandating PTC without a corresponding Polaris/PERT-level technology organization and coordination effort -- which it could easily have engaged in.  Pity.

 

 

 

I see even less of an incentive for the government to get involved with oil train enhancements like ECP etc from a financial standpoint since its an even stickier wicket than PTC (more players).

 

 

I think you are right, but it might be possible for a properly-designed system, presented 'right' to the right people in the right timeframe, to become adopted.  So far, I haven't seen a train-control system or advanced brake system that wasn't designed by the kind of engineering effort that produced the SPV-2000.  That's not to say either one can't be developed for the 'sandbox' environment that Bakken/Eagle Ford crude trains offers.  Personally, I am hoping that the Government does mandate "ECP" for oil trains, because I'd like to see if anyone who steps up to the plate will 'get it'.  Even if the result doesn't make sense to roll out across the full range of interchange cars, it can't be bad to have defined standards for 'national ECP' rather than just a continuation of the half-baked adaptations we seem to have had so far.

 

 

Why exactly are AAR Standards S-4200, 4210, 4220 and 4230 "half baked"?

There are trains running in North America, Oz, and South Africa using those specs. In fact the entire Fortiscue Metals Group ore car fleet is so equipped. 

[Wizlish]

blue streak 1

Any idea if the required replacement of the tank car valves noted in today's newswire has anything to do with explosions ?

Summarize what the story said (I don't get the Newswire) and perhaps I can tell.

[Wizlish]

dehusman

I don't see any of that happening. The Government has not given any grants for PTC, all of the equipment, all of the installation and all of the maintenance is paid for by the railroads themselves, not the government.

Not to say "yes, but..." in the wrong way -- but a great deal of the 'hard' part of PTC design and enablement was Government-underwritten, or at least assisted.  The Meteorcomm SBRs are one example... would that technology have been developed if it had to be commercialized and standardized and marketed to railroads?   This is the level I thought Government 'contribution' would be appropriate for oil-train 'safety systems'.

Meanwhile, I am tempted to say 'the government got what was coming to it' by mandating PTC without a corresponding Polaris/PERT-level technology organization and coordination effort -- which it could easily have engaged in.  Pity.

 

I see even less of an incentive for the government to get involved with oil train enhancements like ECP etc from a financial standpoint since its an even stickier wicket than PTC (more players).

I think you are right, but it might be possible for a properly-designed system, presented 'right' to the right people in the right timeframe, to become adopted.  So far, I haven't seen a train-control system or advanced brake system that wasn't designed by the kind of engineering effort that produced the SPV-2000.  That's not to say either one can't be developed for the 'sandbox' environment that Bakken/Eagle Ford crude trains offers.  Personally, I am hoping that the Government does mandate "ECP" for oil trains, because I'd like to see if anyone who steps up to the plate will 'get it'.  Even if the result doesn't make sense to roll out across the full range of interchange cars, it can't be bad to have defined standards for 'national ECP' rather than just a continuation of the half-baked adaptations we seem to have had so far.

[tree68]

Wizlish

There's a lot more to this issue, and I look forward to seeing some of the different points of view and opinions.

Indeed - although the thread has been running now for some five weeks...

As has been suggested, this is still really early in the game.  PTC became law in late 2008 and the end (full implementation) is still too far out to see from here.

PTC "cured" a problem that was largely non-existant.  In the 20 years prior to Chatsworth, only two major loss-of-life incidents had occured that would have been prevented by PTC.  The causes were later dealt with by rules changes.

The same can be said of many of the freight incidents.  Many railroads use the SPAF (switch position awareness form).  This is almost completely because of the incident in Graniteville.

There was no groundbreaking technology in that "fix."  Just a simple change in procedure.

Barring a knee-jerk reaction by law makers (see PTC...), this issue is going to sort itself out.  New standards and procedures will come forth and be implemented.  But it's going to take time.  A five week discussion on an on-line forum isn't going to solve the problem.  None of us here (that I know of) have the connections or ability to implement anything of that magnitude.  And any proposed solution will need to be evaluated.

So I, too, welcome some different points of view.  A continuous rehashing of the same ideas, not so much.

 

[dehusman]

Wizlish

(My guess is that grants will cover most of the 'special' equipment involved in any dedicated oil-train safety stuff, specifically including the brake-specific parts of Euclid's plan if adopted.  I'm waiting with some interest to see if, or perhaps when, we see if the new tank-car spec involves "ECP" as the Government considers it -- a magic bullet solution like PTC...)

To the extent that railroads are left 'holding the bag' for high maintenance, at a minimum they should request, and be granted, full deduction of those costs from the taxes they would otherwise be expected to pay. 

I don't see any of that happening.  The Government has not given any grants for PTC, all of the equipment, all of the installation and all of the maintenance  is paid for by the railroads themselves, not the government.  I see even less of an incentive for the government to get involved with oil train enhancements like ECP etc from a financial standpoint since its an even stickier wicket than PTC (more players).

[Wizlish]

BaltACD

One thing all these 'innovative solutions' overlook is the maintenance required to keep them operating as intended.  The maintenance required is far in excess of what is presently used to keep equipment in good repair and operating within its designed parameters.

Most of the stuff my father was working on is specifically designed for maintenance, and the various costs are defined or at least estimated in the system design.  One of the reasons for going a bit overboard with 'connectivity' is to make it as easy as possible to maintain the system in good running condition, and to ensure what I think is called 'graceful degrade' if any parts of it break or become disabled.  If the various components are monitored (or monitor themselves) and the system can 'phone home' if anything about it starts going wrong - with a detailed account of what's happening, how to fix it, and what components will be needed where - the real expense of maintenance (the emergency dispatch of manpower and equipment to distant locations, for example) can probably be avoided.

Yes, that increases the design and first costs, and puts additional complexity in the system.  In the absence of some (relatively low-level) artificial intelligence this might create too many complex interactions to be safe.  That's an issue to be discussed under a separate thread from ongoing maintenance and support.

Increased maintenance is increased cost.  Who supplies the manpower and picks up the tab?

I think we are all agreed that the marginal cost of operating any 'safe oil train' system should eventually fall on the shippers (who may require some contribution from producers, etc.).  Some percentage of the cost 'ought' to devolve on the Government, especially if safety equipment or procedures are 'mandated' with very high cost that can't be recovered reasonably from, say, surcharges on oil shipments.  (My guess is that grants will cover most of the 'special' equipment involved in any dedicated oil-train safety stuff, specifically including the brake-specific parts of Euclid's plan if adopted.  I'm waiting with some interest to see if, or perhaps when, we see if the new tank-car spec involves "ECP" as the Government considers it -- a magic bullet solution like PTC...)

To the extent that railroads are left 'holding the bag' for high maintenance, at a minimum they should request, and be granted, full deduction of those costs from the taxes they would otherwise be expected to pay.  That's a delayed recovery, but in some cases it may provide subsidized benefits to the industry as a whole, for example if it allows 'shakedown' of different systems and components of ECP over time, or costing-down of 'conversion' kits for one-pipe cars and the like.

There's a lot more to this issue, and I look forward to seeing some of the different points of view and opinions.

[oltmannd]

Euclid

I am just somebody who sees a rising problem of exploding oil trains growing with the fast rise in crude oil traffic.  So I suggest ways to solve that problem.  I think solving the problem will require changing something.     

 

Your solutions are too far out on the timeline - even if all hands were on deck - to be of any practical value to the situation at hand.

[BaltACD]

One thing all these 'inovative solutions' overlook is the maintenance required to keep them operating as intended.  The maintenance required is far in excess of what is presently used to keep equipment in good repair and operating within it's designed parameters.

Increased maintenance is increased cost.  Who supplies the man power and picks up the tab?

[Murphy Siding]

Wizlish

  Until he gets further than that, it's just Shari Lewis time...

 

   I don't wish to be part of the same, semi-monthly discussion at hand.  However, I do have to say, as one of those that understands the Shari Lewis reference, that I think that is a spot-on observation, and funny as heck.

[Wizlish]

Norm48327

I agree he has a right to post whatever he thinks but so do the others have a right to correct his misinformation

Thoroughly agreed ... as long as correcting misinformation is the activity, and not just making fun of him or baiting him.  Yes, it's infuriating when he keeps on going with some wack perspective or seems to be intentionally misunderstanding what someone is trying to tell him.  I myself have lost patience with a couple of his assertions, so I'm not trying to pretend I'm less atreous.

I do think it's a bad precedent to try to run someone out of their own thread, though.  I much preferred the gentle use of certain forms of off-topic post (root beer and candy being two notable 'hints') if for some reason the thread couldn't be left to die a natural death.

[Norm48327]

Wizlish

 

 If one of Euclid's ideas seems like a whopper, discuss it -- the idea -- as such. 

That's been tried, over and over. Bucky's refusal to see the viewpoint of others is the fly in the pointment.

That said, I agree he has a right to post whatever he thinks but so do the others have a right to correct his misinformation. His unwillingness to accept that is what provokes other posters.

[Wizlish]

Murray

You and Bucky are free to take your discourse here:

http://www.trainorders.com

 I'll consider myself free to take my discourse anywhere I please.  And I will abide by Forum principle when I do.

I happen to agree that much of the discussion in this thread is in fact tiresome and repetitive, and that some of the comments Euclid has made are unjustified in tone and dismissive both of other people's knowledge and of some of those people's honest attempts to help him see better perspectives on this hobby-horse issue.  However, I find it interesting that, although Dave Husman has been one of the more relentless critics of the idea and of the technical methods Euclid has been discussing, and has been the recipient of some of the most virulent 'yes, but' kinds of reply, he has not joined in the mockery and dismissal that have typified the last few posts.  If one of Euclid's ideas seems like a whopper, discuss it -- the idea -- as such.  But the best thing to do, if you think the thread is pointless, is either ignore it or let it die in the usual course of these things; once it falls off the first page of active threads, it will disappear just like the earlier ones did.

Personally - I think Euclid needed to be at the TIGER grant summit a week ago to get his proposal organized, filed, and in the hands of proper review.  That, not some Internet forum, is the sort of place he should be making his claims, defining his ideas, and gaining support for whatever practical system might eventually develop.  I am deeply concerned that he is just 'sputin with folks on this and perhaps other forums, changing his detail back and forth in critical areas, without ever defining the set of ideas he's proposing and then coming up with practical details to implement them.  Until he gets further than that, it's just Shari Lewis time...

[tree68]

Bucky - I'm not saying I'm right and you're wrong.  I'm saying (as does Murray) that you've aired your thoughts, which is fine - what you haven't been getting is buy-in from much of anyone, and what you have been getting a goodly amount of "that doesn't square with reality."

I, for one, can't stand to see incorrect information posted here - I feel it necessary to debunk such claims, and I do.  As has been noted here by many folks, you've posted stuff here that is little more than speculation while implying that it's fact.  And when you're called on it, you come back with "yes, but..."

You also can't seem to accept it when someone points out some fallacy in your reasoning.  

What may seem perfectly obvious to you oftimes doesn't bear the scrutiny of folks who have experience in the field.  

I'm not always right - but at least if someone points it out to me, I'll take them at their word.

'Nuf said.

[Anonymous]

You and Bucky are free to take your discourse here:

http://www.trainorders.com