Oil Train

[wanswheel]

If there’s any interest, MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow briefly interviewed Anthony Foxx (second link), after a fairly lengthy set-up (first link). Lots about oil trains, practically nothing about brakes, though.

http://on.msnbc.com/1ILJRoY

http://on.msnbc.com/1ILGhv0

[Euclid]

In the wake of the new tank car rules, here is the pivotal question about ECP brakes:

 

Do ECP brakes decrease train stopping distance by up to 70%—OR—do they decrease train stopping distance by up to 1%?

 

 

 

Here is the answer as I understand it:

 

Both are true, but each has a qualifier.

 

ECP brakes decrease train stopping distance by up to 70% with a “service” application of brakes.

 

ECP brakes decrease train stopping distance by up to 1% with an “emergency” application of brakes.

 

 

 

I conclude that the USDOT (astoundingly) fails to understand the qualifiers to the answer.  Here is their understanding of the answer upon which they base the ECP mandate:

 

“Transportation officials said the new type of brakes was already in use by some railroads for other types of commodities. Their use would decrease the chances of a catastrophic pileup, reduce the number of punctured cars in an accident, or allow train operators to stop faster if there was an obstacle on the tracks.”

 

 

The problem with that conclusion is that it is only true with the “service” application of brakes, and not with an “emergency” application of brakes.  The examples cited by the USDOT, that is, decreasing catastrophic pileup, reducing the number of punctured cars, and stopping faster for an obstacle are all related only to the use of an “emergency” application of brakes and not to a “service” application.  Therefore, these benefits claimed by USDOT are simply false.   

 

How could a gigantic institution such as the USDOT make such a fundamental error?  And how can the equally large institution comprised of the railroads, tank car owners, and oil producers fail to clearly explain the fundamental error in their reaction to the new ECP mandate?

 

I think there is an answer to that as well.  Since the introduction of ECP brakes starting in the 1990s, there has been intense promotion of the advantages of the system in comparison to the drawbacks of conventional air brakes.  ECP brakes have been promoted as the modern replacement for the “old, obsolete air brakes dating from the 1800s.”  Everyone in the industry was on the ECP bandwagon and singing the praise. 

 

One of the main points favoring ECP was said to be shorter stopping distance with all of the benefit of safety and efficiency that implied.  There is no end to references claiming that ECP provides a reduction of stopping distance of up to 70%.  But the qualifier to that claim was never included because it waters down the claim.  The bandwagon wanted the best news possible, so they did not want to mention that the 70% claim is null with an “emergency” application of brakes.  Yet leaving out that qualifier is disingenuous at best. 

 

Apparently, the USDOT never learned of the qualifier and went ahead with the ECP mandate as though the qualifier does not exist.  I wonder if there has ever been a regulatory error of this magnitude based on such a simple misunderstanding of a palpable engineering fact.  This is one for the record books. 

[dehusman]

And Euclid's been the head cheerleader for ECP on this list.

[BaltACD]

The US has the best form of government that MONEY can buy.

[schlimm]

Euclid

Apparently, the USDOT never learned of the qualifier and went ahead with the ECP mandate as though the qualifier does not exist.  I wonder if there has ever been a regulatory error of this magnitude based on such a simple misunderstanding of a palpable engineering fact.  This is one for the record books. 

I haven't the stomach for reading the entire thread.  It seems to me the point of ECP is to obviate the need for emergency brake applications (which may cause aforementioned pile-ups) by having safer, controlled, 70% shorter distance stops with service applications.    

[cefinkjr]

Euclid: You implied that you were quoting USDOT when you wrote "... allow train operators to stop faster if there was an obstacle on the tracks.”  It sounds enough like government bureaucratize to be from USDOT.  I assume by "train operators" they mean engineers.

Question for the many engineers on this forum: "How many times in your career have you stopped your train because of an obstacle on the track?"  And a companion question: "How often are you able to stop your train because of an obstacle on the track when you are moving at track speed?"

 

[zugmann]

All this talk about air brakes.  Yet dynamic braking and throttle modulation are the preferred ways to handle trains.  I guess ECP would help in severe grade territory to some extent, but they act like we need it to be safe. 

*shrugs*

I can stop fine with what we have now.   Perhaps we need to focus on skills and training and less on fancy gadgets.

 

Let's look at it this way.  Some hotshot engineer races to a stop signal, figuring his ECP brakes will let him stop 70% faster.  But the E in the ECP fails.  No problem, as you still have the ol' standard backup airbrake.  Only problem?  It's 70% worse.  Dump it and pray I guess.    I would never trust ECP to be 70% faster just because of that.  It's like using dynamics - you always have to be prepared in case they crap out. 

[Euclid]

Chuck,

 

The quote I posted above with comments from the USDOT is from the N.Y. Times today.  Last Friday, the following comments are attributed to Secretary of Transportation, Anthony Foxx after the mandate was announced.  This is the link: http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/obama-safety-regulations-train-oil-derailments-117550.html#ixzz3ZNbTCQWb

 

Here are the comments quoted:

 

Foxx maintained that the brakes could prevent a repeat of incidents like a December 2013 collision in which an oil train slammed into a derailed grain train, setting off a series of explosions outside Casselton, N.D.

 

 “ECP brakes can reduce how long it takes a train to stop,” Foxx said. “They can prevent cars from slamming into each other, they can decrease the number of cars that derail, they can greatly reduce the probability that tank cars will puncture. This is proven technology.”

So, here again is the reference to stopping short of an obstacle on the track.  In this case, Secretary Foxx refers to the derailed grain train as the obstacle that was struck in Casselton, ND by the oil train that exploded and burned. 

 

The ability to stop faster to avoid striking an obstacle is surely a valid point. I agree with your point that it is often not successful because the speed is too high and the distance too short.  However, avoiding a collision by stopping short has happened thousands of times in railroad history.  The only problem with the DOT comments is that there is no such enhancement of that ability given by ECP brakes.

[Norm48327]

"I conclude that the USDOT (astoundingly) fails to understand the qualifiers to the answer."

Are you saying that the people who deal with this on a daily basis don't know what they are talking about? Certainly sounds like it.

[Euclid]

Norm,

 

Yes, that is exactly what I am saying.  It is either that or the railroad industry does not know what they are talking about.  I think that the DOT was duped by a long standing exaggeration of ECP stopping power that has been intentionally implied, as I detailed in the second post on this page.  Some of the railroad industry itself has contributed to this exaggeration before this mandate was in the offing.  Unfortunately for them, they probably helped convince the DOT that ECP was the answer. So the exaggeration came back to bite them.    

[wanswheel]

I bet the railroads’ resistance to ECP is almost entirely about postponing an enormous expense, like standardizing a new gauge or something. FRA seized the opportunity to capitalize on concern about oil trains to force-feed a little ‘improvement’ they’ve long believed in.

 

Excerpt from 2009 FRA update on ECP

 

“FRA continues to believe that ECP brakes provide numerous safety and business benefits over conventional air brake systems. ECP brake technology provides simultaneous and graduated application and release of brakes on all rail cars within a train, resulting in shorter stopping distances. Trains equipped with ECP brakes provide locomotive engineers with better train control, lowering the risk of derailment…

 

“The final rule requires that ECP brake systems fully comply with existing industry standards and that certain railroad operating rules and training programs be modified to ensure workers have the knowledge and skills required to properly utilize the systems. While the final rule does not mandate adoption of ECP brakes, it establishes performance standards for their use. With the final rule in place, FRA is confident that it will facilitate more widespread deployment of the technology to the benefit [of] the rail industry...”

 

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CEIQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fra.dot.gov%2FElib%2FDocument%2F1602&ei=F0NKVdfvF4m6yQSM8YFI&usg=AFQjCNECHFaVGxvAqxcDEEUsn2faEc32RQ&bvm=bv.92291466,d.aWw&cad=rja

[Euclid]

dehusman

And Euclid's been the head cheerleader for ECP on this list.

 

 

Yes I have.  I just figured this out last night after spending a day trying to get an answer from the FRA, Wabtec, and New York Air Brake to explain the two conflicting claims of reduced stopping distance for ECP brakes.  It was the comment by Buslist yesterday that pushed me in the right direction.  As I recall, nobody else here has mentioned it so far in this thread.

 

Prior to the prospect of this mandate, even the railroads were on the same bandwagon as everybody else.  Canadian railroads reported great improvements in stopping distance without mentioning that it only involved service applications of braking.  They have only reversed their position since the prospect of an ECP mandate developed recently.

 

And from that point, leading up to the mandate, and even after the mandate, every reference from the railroad industry has failed to clarify the point about the claim of 70% shorter stopping time with ECP.  All they ever say is that DP is almost as good as ECP for improved stopping. I could never understand how “almost as good” could be a 69% difference.

 

I will also point out that my advocacy for ECP goes far beyond the dubious claim of the 70% reduction in stopping distance.  I advocate ECP as a necessary platform for further features that will offer real improvement in stopping distance. Those features are derailment sensors, empty/loaded switch, and differential braking.  Those features actually will accomplish what the USDOT mistakenly claims will be accomplished by ECP alone.  So I stand by my comments about improving oil train safety with ECP brakes. 

 

[tree68]

What benefit does ECP provide that will improve daily operations for the railroads?

Improved stopping distance in and of itself offers very little from what I can see.  Any engineer that's worth his salt can provide good train handling with existing equipment.  Shorter stopping distances may have value for commuter trains, where time is important, but there is no need for a freight train to make transit-variety stops.

 

[BaltACD]

Can't speak to Amtrak or the various commuter agencies of today, however back in days before Amtrak, the B&O used Electro-Pneumatic Braking on their passenger trains.

I suspect what is now termed ECP is being used on all passenger equipment today, however, what the inter-operatability is between the different carriers equipment is, I have no idea.

ECP in a freight enviornment is a totally different animal than it is in a passenger enviornment.  In the freight enviornment, cars are expected to run continuously between their mandated major air brake inspections (which I think is 5 years or more) with only brake shoes being replaced as necessary. Freight equipment will operate over multiple carriers and varying territories.

In the passenger enviornment all cars get a major mechanical inspection every day or before every multi-day trip, with all defects (big & small) being attended to, as well as passenger eqipment operating in narrowly defined runs.

[ricktrains4824]

So as not to hijack ECP discussion, here is a link to the newest derailment thread. http://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/t/247048.aspx

EDIT: and I see the link will not load correctly again.... Let's try again.

Nope, one more time.... Hey, now it works!

[Buslist]

BaltACD

Can't speak to Amtrak or the various commuter agencies of today, however back in days before Amtrak, the B&O used Electro-Pneumatic Braking on their passenger trains.

I suspect what is now termed ECP is being used on all passenger equipment today, however, what the inter-operatability is between the different carriers equipment is, I have no idea.

ECP in a freight enviornment is a totally different animal than it is in a passenger enviornment.  In the freight enviornment, cars are expected to run continuously between their mandated major air brake inspections (which I think is 5 years or more) with only brake shoes being replaced as necessary. Freight equipment will operate over multiple carriers and varying territories.

In the passenger enviornment all cars get a major mechanical inspection every day or before every multi-day trip, with all defects (big & small) being attended to, as well as passenger eqipment operating in narrowly defined runs.

 

 

The passenger electric brakes are a totally different beast. ECP is in essence a LAN running the length of the train that also carries the power bus to run the valves. It was difficult finding the chips that could handle the coms demand in a high voltage environment.

[Wizlish]

Euclid

Here is the answer as I understand it: Both are true, but each has a qualifier. ECP brakes decrease train stopping distance by up to 70% with a “service” application of brakes. ECP brakes decrease train stopping distance by up to 1% with an “emergency” application of brakes.

This is cute but you're missing the correct qualifier:

1) What is the stopping distance in feet (or meters or whatever) represented by that "70% shorter stopping distance"?

2) What is the stopping distance in feet represented by 'big-holing the Westinghouse' with ECP braking?

(You can then start getting into a discussion of things like ECP brake systems being able to detect and relieve wheelslide on particular cars when the brakes are in 'emergency', which I think bears some consideration if "safety" is a legitimate Government goal for improved brake systems.  But until we have actual numbers to use, the ECP 'pro' and 'con' factions are essentially talking past each other...

[Euclid]

Wizlish,

 

The qualifier to the stopping time and distance of ECP versus Westinghouse is whether the application is an emergency application or a service application.  It relates to the difference in the design of the service application in each of the two brake types.  The qualifier simply explains the discrepancy between the claims that ECP stops up to 70% quicker than Westinghouse, and that ECP stops about 1% quicker than Westinghouse.  The qualifier explains the 69% discrepancy in the conflicting claims. 

 

Why should I care about the number of feet it takes to stop?  I think I have explained as clearly as possible, assuming that my understanding of the flow controls is correct according to my reasoning in the last post of the previous page.  Certainly nothing I have seen from the USDOT or from the AAR has explained it at all. 

[Wizlish]

Euclid

Why should I care about the number of feet it takes to stop?

Because THAT'S THE ONLY DAMN THING THAT MATTERS HERE!

I could say this with the greater emphasis it deserves, but this is about as much as the Forum formatting tools provide.

If you have a service stop 70% shorter than what conventional air brakes provide, then you might well be looking at comparable distance to what a conventional emergency-brake application might provide.  If you actually looked at the numbers, that is, which you seem more than usually reluctant to do for some unaccountable reason.

I think it is established without doubt that emergency braking is considerably more dangerous than even full-rate service braking, especially if some cars in the consist are derailed or damaged.  So if ECP's controlled, proportional, graduated-release service brake stopping distance is at all comparable to 'conventional' emergency stopping distance, you'll have something important even before discussing differential braking ability or antilock-type wheelslide prevention.

That's just my 25 cents' worth, but I do think going round and round wondering about qualifiers is getting you even more nowhere than usual.

[Euclid]

Wizlish,

 

The service stop of ECP is up to 70% shorter than that of Westinghouse.  But here is the point:  The emergency stop of the two brake types is practically identical.  That is why I don’t care about the number feet represented by the 70% figure.  Even that percentage figure is said to vary from 30-70%.  It does not make any difference to the point I am making. 

 

The only relevance of the 30-70% figure is that it is NEVER presented with the qualifier that it only applies to the service applications.  That leaves people to naturally assume that ECP also yields some large reduction of stopping distance to the emergency application as well as to the service applications. Yet that is not true. 

 

There may be a small stopping time advantage of ECP over Westinghouse due to the quicker propagation time, but the industry is claiming that distributed power can reduce that advantage to near zero.  So the only stopping time advantage of ECP lies with the service application.  That is the qualifier, and leaving it out misrepresents the advantage of ECP brakes.  It overstates the advantage, which I assume is the point of leaving out the qualifier.

 

The reason that this is important is that the USDOT claims that the quicker stopping of ECP will mitigate derailment pileup and aid in collision avoidance.  Yet, both of those scenarios are related to only emergency applications, where ECP has no stopping distance advantage.  So the premise of ECP helping in those safety matters is flawed. 

 

I understand the point you are making about the ECP service application possibly being quicker stopping than the Westinghouse emergency application.  But still, the shortest stopping distance for either type of brake will be its emergency application.  So there would be no point in using an ECP service application because it is faster than a Westinghouse emergency application.  And besides, an engineer has no choice in the matter because a derailment will cause either brake type to automatically initiate an emergency application by default.    

[Buslist]

Euclid

Wizlish,

 

 

 

The only relevance of the 30-70% figure is that it is NEVER presented with the qualifier that it only applies to the service applications.  That leaves people to naturally assume that ECP also yields some large reduction of stopping distance to the emergency application as well as to the service applications. Yet that is not true. 

 

 

 

 

The point you are missing is that qualifier is NEVER mentioned is that the folks to which this stopping distance information is important already know that (or should), these reports are not written for the general public. 

We look at operational stopping distance to plan block lengths, signal aspects etc. This is how the railway operates day to day, not based on emergency brake application. Emergency stopping distance is irrelevant to these planning issues as A we can't plan for them and B it doesn't effect the design of the railway in any way. 

Probably an attitude of "If you have to be told, you really wouldn't  understand"

[Buslist]

Euclid

Wizlish,

 

 

 

The only relevance of the 30-70% figure is that it is NEVER presented with the qualifier that it only applies to the service applications.  That leaves people to naturally assume that ECP also yields some large reduction of stopping distance to the emergency application as well as to the service applications. Yet that is not true. 

 

 

 

 

The point you are missing is that qualifier is NEVER mentioned is that the folks to which this stopping distance information is important already know that (or should), these reports are not written for the general public. I suspect if someone read the report rather than the executive summary it would be obvious.

We look at operational stopping distance to plan block lengths, signal aspects etc. This is how the railway operates day to day, not based on emergency brake application. Emergency stopping distance is irrelevant to these planning issues as A we can't plan for them and B it doesn't effect the design of the railway in any way. 

Probably an attitude of "If you have to be told, you really wouldn't  understand". I'll relate to a mentor of mine who would say "as any school boy knows"

 

 

Sorry for for the double post

[daveklepper]

I wish to address the ECP vs. Westinghouse comparison with regard to emergency braking and service braking.  With Westinghouse, it does take time for the main pipe reduction to travel from the locomotive to the rear of the train.   So the chances for a pile-up under some but by no means all situations is definitely increased.  So on face there is an advantage to ECP in emergencies.  But one does not need ECP to overcome the dissadvantage of normal Westinghouse.  Distributed power narrows the advantage considerable, but also a proper FRED at the end of consists that dumps the air at the end or simply reduces pressure appropriately would do as much good as distributed power.  And there may be a way of attaching some kind of intermediat FRED say every ten cars along the length of the train and get practically the full advantage of ECP, including service braking, without the need to convert the fleet to ECP!  Would this be an idea the car builders and railroads find worth exploring?   The device would hang on a grab iror on the rear of the car and have two connections for two air hoses.

[Euclid]

Buslist

The point you are missing is that qualifier is NEVER mentioned is that the folks to which this stopping distance information is important already know that (or should), these reports are not written for the general public. I suspect if someone read the report rather than the executive summary it would be obvious.

We look at operational stopping distance to plan block lengths, signal aspects etc. This is how the railway operates day to day, not based on emergency brake application. Emergency stopping distance is irrelevant to these planning issues as A we can't plan for them and B it doesn't effect the design of the railway in any way. 

 

Absolutely, I understand and agree with that.  The emergency application has nothing to do with the design of the railway, planning for block lengths, signal aspects, etc.  All of that is based on service application stopping distances.

 

But that is not what the USDOT is concerned about in their mandate for ECP on oil trains.  Their concern has nothing to do with service braking applications and everything to do with emergency application.

 

They want ECP to stop trains quicker in order to avoid collisions and to reduce the number of cars getting shoved into a derailment pileup. Service braking is irrelevant to these emergency issues.  Only the emergency braking application is relevant to these issues.

 

For some reason USDOT has concluded that the stopping distance for emergency braking is substantially reduced with ECP brakes. That is the point of their mandate.  I suspect that they have reached that conclusion based on the erroneous assumption that the shorter stopping distance of ECP in service application also occurs with emergency applications.    

 

[zugmann]

Euclid

But that is not what the USDOT is concerned about in their mandate for ECP on oil trains. Their concern has nothing to do with service braking applications and everything to do with emergency application.

 

Sounds like the USDOT has absolutely no clue about train brakes at all.  But hey, let's insert more gadgets!  That'll work. 

 

Oh well.  We'll make do with whatever gets thrown down the pipeline.  That's what we do.  Then the people in charge can pat themselves on the back for doing a great job.

[daveklepper]

THEY MAY BE MORE CONCERNED WITH POSSIBLE PILEUP THAN WITH STOPPING DISTANCE.    DOES ANYONE SEE ANY TECHNICAL REASON WHY ADDITIONAL FREDS SHOULDN'T BE THE WAY TO IMPLEMENT ELECTRONIC BRAKING INSTEAD OF CONVERTING THE FLEET?

CONDITIONS FOR A PILEUP WITH WESTINGHOUSE WITHOUT A DERAILMENT INSTIGATION:  STEEP DOWNHILL AND SHARP CURVE.

[dehusman]

Part of the problem with this whole discussion is nobody has clearly defined what the real problem is, there are multiple "problems" as seen by various people and entities and they don't all coincide.  Different agendas drive different views to the point that some of the stakeholders have actually lost track of what the "real" problem is.  So each of the stakeholders has different solutions which don't solve or even address the "problems" as seen by other stakeholders.

Then on this list we come up with all sorts of "solutions" that may or may not have been considered in light of all the factors, and on top of that there is debate on how to overcome all the limitiations and baggage the "solutions" bring with them.  The result is 19 ot 20 pages of confusing mismash.

Before we start putting an EOT every 5 cars, do you even know if it will do anything to help the situation?  What problem do you think distributed EOT's will solve?  It won't meet the Federal requirements in any case. 

[zugmann]

daveklepper

ANY TECHNICAL REASON WHY ADDITIONAL FREDS SHOULDN'T BE THE WAY TO IMPLEMENT ELECTRONIC BRAKING INSTEAD OF CONVERTING THE FLEET?

If we are discussing using them for service braking?

 

1.  Need to redesign them.  EOTs are for monitoring and emergency braking only.

2. Need to have a way to reprogram them to the same number, or have to have the head end box be able to accept 10+ different EOT ID numbers at the same time.  Currently an engine can link up to only one.

3. You will need an entire department to manage EOT distribution.  Since not all trains are equal, you will get lots of EOTs in one terminal, and not enough in another.

4. Rules for EOT failures have to be re-examined.  If you are carrying around 12+, what happens if one fails?  Will you be limited to 30mph and prohibited from running heavy grades?

5. For the cost of all this - it may be cheaper just to get ECP brakes.

[Euclid]

Dave,

 

They are concerned with mitigating the pileup by reducing stopping distance.  Secretary of Transportation, Anthony Foxx said this as paraphrased by the article I linked above:

 

Foxx maintained that the [ECP] brakes could prevent a repeat of incidents like a December 2013 collision in which an oil train slammed into a derailed grain train, setting off a series of explosions outside Casselton, N.D.

 

He was referring to ECP brakes reducing stopping distance.  His point was that quicker stopping offered by ECP might have stopped the oil train before it collided with the fouling grain train in the Casselton wreck.

 

 

 

He also said this as quoted by the article I linked above:

 

“ECP brakes can reduce how long it takes a train to stop,” Foxx said. “They can prevent cars from slamming into each other, they can decrease the number of cars that derail, they can greatly reduce the probability that tank cars will puncture. This is proven technology.”

 

He was referring to the superior stopping power of ECP helping to mitigate the damage in a derailment after the derailment begins. 

 

The point that you make about additional FREDS reducing stopping distance equivalent to ECP is essentially the same point being made by the railroads as they oppose the ECP mandate.  But the railroads say this is already being accomplished by distributed power creating more holes in the brake pipe during an emergency application.

 

But, as I understand it, this improved stopping performance is very small no matter whether it comes from ECP compared to Westinghouse; or whether it comes from distributed power on Westinghouse compared to Westinghouse without distributed power. 

 

In either case, the improved stopping power is relatively modest, and not likely to produce the safety enhancement effects that the Secretary of Transportation cites in the quotes above.   

[zugmann]

As a railroader, I kind of like it when we create ideas where you don't have to dump the train.  By that point, something has already gone wrong.