Oil Train

[dehusman]

I do not expect everybody to agree with my ideas, but I do want to find out exactly why they disagree.

Since you want to understand, here are some observations on the Lynchburg derailment.

At various points in the converstaion you have described the first 7 or 8 derailed cars as some form of "upright and in line".  Upright and in line implies that the cars are on their trucks, merely derailed and are roughly parallel to rails of the track they are supposed to be on.  If a cut of cars is derailed "upright and in line" you should be able to use a set of frogs to rerail them.  Not a big deal in the grander scheme of things.

The first 7 or 8 derailed cars are NOT "upright and in line" by any stretch of the imagination.  The are derailed and on their sides.  They are completely off their trucks, the trucks are disassembled and the track they should be on is completely gutted.  The only reason they are not in a pile is that they fell over on flat ground, an adjacent track.  If there had been the river embankment in that area instead of a track, they would be down the embankment, in the river.  These cars cannot be frogged on.  It will take multiple side-booms or cranes to rerail those cars after track is built to them.

Something caught my eye as I watched the video that I would have to assume you did not see.  As I understand it, the differential braking concept is that the braking effort is reduced on the portion of the train ahead of the derailed cars to increase the draft forces on the cars ahead of the derailed cars, in order to keep the head end and the derailed cars stretched. The increased darft forces would prevent the cars from going out of line. Hold the thought about increasing the draft forces in the head end.

Between about 2:00 and 2:10 in the video the drone flies over and around the end of the first car in the pile, CBTX 741720.  Something is missing.  Its the drawbar.  The first car in the pile appears to have no drawbar in the end of the car away from the river, the end closest to the head end.  This train did not have differential braking.  If the video is clear and the drawbar is in fact missing, the "natural" forces in the train were sufficiently high to cause the drawbar to be ripped out of the car.  The intent of the differential braking is to increase the pull, the draft forces, in the head end.  If the forces are already high enough that it can tear apart the cars, what advantage would there be to INCREASING the draft forces using differential braking?

Maybe that car was further back in the train and the drawbar was ripped out sideways when it jacknifed.  I doubt anybody on this list knows for sure.  In any case, the missing drawbar is evidence that someplace in the derailment there were forces that exceeded the strength of the metal itself.  Before arbitrairily deciding to increase the draft forces in the train, it might be useful to know if the draft forces in the train were already near, at or exceeded the recommended draft forces for the structure of the cars.  Obviously at some point, on this car, in this derailment, some combination of forces were sufficiently high  to cause a structural failure.  Do the draft forces really need to be increased?  If they don't, why do you need differential braking?

These aren't personal attacks, these are what I feel are legitimate observations and questions about "physical evidence" that you are using to support your proposal.  About the only speculation is whether the drawbar is actually there or not and, if not, what caused it to be torn off.  If I can see this and ask these questions, then any professional railroader that sees this video can see it and may come up with the same observations and questions. 

[Buslist]

Euclid

Here is an FRA proposal for an overload detection device that would be a part of draft gear and record impacts in road and switching operations.  It mentions that TSB of Canada is considering that switching impact exceeding 7.5 mph would be illegal, and if it occurs, a structural integrity test of the tank car must be performed.  The concern is impact great enough to cause undetected damage that might lead to a structural failure later. 

However the FRA is considering the installation of a device that will actually measure impact force rather than just basing the assessment of damage on impact speed.  The Tank Car Committee is considering the use of accelerometers and/or strain gauges for the same purpose. 

https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L02906#p1_z10_gD_s23_y2002_y2001_y2010_y2012_lPO

Quote from the link:

“Rather than using speed as a measure for determining the severity of a dynamic event, FRA is considering research to help develop an “overload detection device” as an integral part of a draft gear. The device would detect dynamic loads near or exceeding the design limits for a tank car.

 

Much like a “telltale” indicator, an overload detection device would provide objective evidence that a condition exists that requires an investigation into the structural integrity of the tank car. In addition to FRA’s research, the AAR Operating Environment Task Force, operating under the auspices of the Tank Car Committee is exploring the feasibility of instrumenting and continuously monitoring tank cars for the same purpose using accelerometers and/or strain gauges.

 

Due to the increased number of 286,000-pounds GRL rail cars in service and longer trains, the magnitude of in-train and yard impact loads is likely to increase. With increasing loads, there are two issues of concern: (1) high-magnitude loads, discussed above, that may result in sudden crack nucleation, rapid crack propagation, or even failure of structurally significant items, such as a high- speed yard impact that results in sill separation; and (2) low-magnitude loads that are associated with crack growth by fatigue. To address these two issues, applicants must select an optimal cushioning system effective in minimizing the detrimental effects of both types of loads.”

 

What I'm surprised at is that no one has commented that the White Paper was written in 1999, and primarily address the topic of allowing 286K GRL tank cars for HazMat service. The upgrading of rolling stock was a big issue at the time. FRA had jurisdiction over HazMat tanks, the AAR over other types. I guess the sensors that FRA suggested were not very successful given their lack of use some 15 years later. Why this is catalogued in FRA's library under 2012 is anyone's guess.

[Euclid]

Dave,

 

Thanks for your comments.  They are indeed legitimate observations and questions, as you say.  I did look at that 741720 car and see what you mean about the pulled drawbar, and you raise some good points about what it indicates about adding draft force when the draft force is already high enough to part the train. 

 

I understand your point about the problem of increasing the pulling force to keep the train from jackknifing, and then defeating the purpose by pulling the train in two as a result of that increase in pulling. I agree that it poses somewhat of a problem.  It has to thread a needle between too little braking difference and too much braking difference.  So I think the solution has be to have differential braking force simply limited to what the drawbars and couplers can generally withstand, and be able to achieve benefit within that force limitation.

 

In any case, differential braking would become less able to keep the cars in line as the number of derailed cars increased.  The dragging cars would eventually pull apart as their number increased.  That does appear to be what happened in the Lynchburg wreck when car #8 separated from #9.  And then it happened again as the eight dragging cars separated in a couple places.  So I conclude that separation is always quite likely and will defeat the benefit of differential braking when the separation occurs.  So I agree that the added pull of differential braking has to be limited so as to not make separation likely.

 

You are right to conclude that if the natural draft force of the derailment is nearly high enough to part the train, then any further increase from differential braking will likely cause a parting.  However, the natural draft force is not constantly nearly high enough to separate the train.  Generally, if there is draft force in a derailment, it starts low and then rises as the number of derailed-dragging cars increases. 

 

But more important is the fact that many derailments will produce no draft force.  And those are the derailments that can most benefit from differential braking.  The derailments that do not produce draft force will instead produce buff force.  It is buff force that is the problem that jackknifes cars, so the differential braking will introduce draft force to offset the natural buff force.

 

Therefore, the main point of differential braking is limited to only providing positive opposition to any random run-in or introduction of buff force.  Those are the forces that can cause dragging cars to jackknife and begin a pileup when they derail.  The longer the cars are prevented from piling up, the less damage (and thus breach potential) there will be when they do finally begin a pileup.  So the differential braking draft force will be just enough to prevent or delay a pileup by offsetting the natural buff force.  That way the system will not apply heavy differential force that is likely pull the train in two. 

 

However, even if the train does part and pile up during differential braking, that does not mean it is a complete failure.  Just delaying that pileup as the speed drops would be a measure of success of the system.  For instance, I would not expect the system to stretch out the entire derailment and keep it all in line until the train stops, although that would be possible.  Say a derailment involved 15 cars at 50 mph.  It seems like it would be unlikely to stretch that out and keep it together until all 15 cars were on the ground and dragging.  It might be stretched at first at the highest speed, and even stay stretched for some time as the speed drops.   

 

But 15 cars would most likely pull apart if they were being dragged at the lower speeds.  However by that time, the dragging cars would have lost their impetus to jackknife due to all the decelerating friction working against them.  They would tend to stop like a speedboat in the water when you close the throttle.  So, for the dragging cars alone, the jackknifing potential disappears at some level of reduced speed.

 

But then if there are cars still on the rails behind those derailed-dragging, stretched out cars, the trailing cars on the rails would shove the in-line, derailed cars ahead and cause them to accordion, despite the friction holding those cars back.     

 

That is where ECP brakes would help because they could set up faster on those trailing cars still on the rails, and get as much energy out of those cars as possible during the time that the derailed cars are being dragged. But in order for that to happen, it would require derailment sensors.  And all of that is required to support the differential braking.  So ECP is the first basic foundation; and derailment sensors and differential braking are two add-ons.  Then the three components work together and provide essential support to each other.        

 

The very best result that this system could be expected to achieve is to prevent a fire.  I would expect the average result would be to lengthen the time between the start of the derailment and the start of the pileup.  During that time interval, the train will slow down and lose kinetic energy before going into the destructive pileup that causes the cars to breach from the high-speed, high-pressure impacts.  Dissipating energy before a pileup begins will reduce the size of the potential pileup, reduce the potential damage-breaching in the pileup, and possibly even prevent a pileup.  That is what I can see this system doing.  That is the intended result and benefit.

 

Here is one interesting detail that I noticed: 

 

Consider a train with conventional air brakes and slack bunched.  It begins to derail and the derailing cars will accumulate resistance that will act like braking force on them.  Since the train slack is bunched, there is no forward pull on the derailed cars unless or until that forward slack is stretched out by the resistance of the derailing cars.

 

So because the derailed cars are not being pulled, they have the opportunity to exercise their natural braking power (i.e. the resistance from being on the ground) in a way that impedes the trailing cars; and that force of resistance could cause the derailed cars to jackknife. 

 

This is all before any actual air braking takes place. Derailing during this bunched slack condition allows this natural window of opportunity for the pileup to begin before any braking begins.  The process of piling up would begin very quickly, say after two or three cars are on the ground.  Those cars will be shoved along with nothing pulling on them, and they will buckle due to their natural derailed resistance. 

 

However, with derailment sensors, the ECP brakes would immediately begin applying to those cars ahead. So while derailing cars would be trying to pull the slack out of the cars on the rails ahead, those leading cars would resist the slack pullout because their brakes are setting up.  The effect would be to pull on the derailed cars and overcome their resistance resulting from being derailed.  As that resistance is overcome, the derailed cars are pulled ahead, making them less able to impede the cars on the rails pushing from behind.  Therefore, the cars behind the derailed cars are less able to exert force on the derailed cars and jackknife them.

 

Also, at the same time, the brakes will be setting up on those cars behind the derailment, and thus limiting their ability to shove into the derailed cars.  So, in these ways, the system will affect the cars ahead of, and behind the derailment in a way that prevents the derailed and dragging cars from forming a destructive, high-speed pileup.      

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

After following this particular thread for an incredible length of time, I have come to the conclusion that Bucky/Euclid is making his presentation to the wrong people.  Very few of the members of this forum are professionals who could make a valid critique of his proposals.  He would better serve himself and others by presenting his proposals to various engineering and other professional organizations where they could be critiqued and developed as appropriate.

[Norm48327]

CSSHEGEWISCH

After following this particular thread for an incredible length of time, I have come to the conclusion that Bucky/Euclid is making his presentation to the wrong people.  Very few of the members of this forum are professionals who could make a valid critique of his proposals.  He would better serve himself and others by presenting his proposals to various engineering and other professional organizations where they could be critiqued and developed as appropriate.

 

AMEN!

[cx500]

While many of the members of the forum are indeed railfans rather than "professionals", I am aware that several of those who have regularly provided their critiques are working railroaders with experience in fields such as train operations, civil engineering and accident investigation.  They have been attempting to provide advice and corrections to some of Euclid's assumptions but it seems to be mostly falling on deaf ears. 

Any "engineering or other professional organization" would first require the scientific research and analysis to back up his proposals before even bothering to consider them.  We have been kinder here.  Imagination is praiseworthy and does occasionally lead to valuable innovation.  But that is highly improbable in this case for all the reasons the professionals have, with incredible patience, repeatedly tried to explain.

John

[Euclid]

I did not realize that ECP brakes are a part of the new oil train rules currently under review by the Obama Administration. My understanding was that Secretary of Transportation, Anthony Foxx had written a letter to the AAR and asked the industry to add ECP brakes to tank cars, but never actually included a requirement for ECP brakes in the proposed new tank car rules. 

 

This report implies that ECP brakes are part of the new rules.  However, the implication is not entirely clear because the article variously refers to ECP brakes and “advanced braking.”  Apparently, the call for ECP is simply an option that is under consideration and described as follows: 

 

“Option 1 would have 9/16 inch steel, would be outfitted with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes and would be equipped with rollover protection.”

 

As I understand it, the new rules are supposed to be released May 12, but it is not easy to find any confirmation of this, even at this late date.  I would not be surprised if this deadline slips further out.    

 

http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL1N0WC1Z520150310?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0

 

Quotes (in blue) from the link:

 

“WASHINGTON, March 10 (Reuters) - The U.S. rail industry is pushing the White House to drop a requirement that oil trains adopt an advanced braking system, a cornerstone of a national safety plan that will soon govern shipments of crude across the country.”

 

 

“Reuters reported last month that the national oil train safety plan now under review at the White House Office of Management and Budget would require the advanced braking system.”

 

 

“"Given the safety challenge we have right now, shame on us if we fail to embrace new technologies,"” said Joe Szabo, former chief of the Federal Railroad Administration.”

 

***********************************

 

The one benefit of ECP brakes that seems to be always cited in relation to oil trains is that ECP brakes will stop a train faster.  If the train is stopped faster, fewer cars will derail in any given derailment incident.  Here, from the link, is the industry’s basis for rejecting that advantage:   

 

“The industry claims fitting rail [rolling] stock with ECP brakes would not prevent accidents, but merely limit the number of cars that derail in an accident.”

[Buslist]

Euclid

I did not realize that ECP brakes are a part of the new oil train rules currently under review by the Obama Administration. My understanding was that Secretary of Transportation, Anthony Foxx had written a letter to the AAR and asked the industry to add ECP brakes to tank cars, but never actually included a requirement for ECP brakes in the proposed new tank car rules. 

 

This report implies that ECP brakes are part of the new rules.  However, the implication is not entirely clear because the article variously refers to ECP brakes and “advanced braking.”  Apparently, the call for ECP is simply an option that is under consideration and described as follows: 

 

“Option 1 would have 9/16 inch steel, would be outfitted with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes and would be equipped with rollover protection.”

 

As I understand it, the new rules are supposed to be released May 12, but it is not easy to find any confirmation of this, even at this late date.  I would not be surprised if this deadline slips further out.    

 

http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL1N0WC1Z520150310?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0

 

Quotes (in blue) from the link:

 

“WASHINGTON, March 10 (Reuters) - The U.S. rail industry is pushing the White House to drop a requirement that oil trains adopt an advanced braking system, a cornerstone of a national safety plan that will soon govern shipments of crude across the country.”

 

 

“Reuters reported last month that the national oil train safety plan now under review at the White House Office of Management and Budget would require the advanced braking system.”

 

 

“"Given the safety challenge we have right now, shame on us if we fail to embrace new technologies,"” said Joe Szabo, former chief of the Federal Railroad Administration.”

 

***********************************

 

The one benefit of ECP brakes that seems to be always cited in relation to oil trains is that ECP brakes will stop a train faster.  If the train is stopped faster, fewer cars will derail in any given derailment incident.  Here, from the link, is the industry’s basis for rejecting that advantage:   

 

“The industry claims fitting rail [rolling] stock with ECP brakes would not prevent accidents, but merely limit the number of cars that derail in an accident.”

 

 

Here's some actual quotes from the AAR. The folks that use this day to day rather than desk jockey.

 

Train braking. As of April 1, 2014, trains operating on main line tracks carrying at least 20 carloads of crude oil have been equipped either with distributed power locomotives (i.e., locomotives placed in locations other than the front of the train) or with two-way telemetry end-of-train devices. These technologies allow train crews to apply emergency brakes simultaneously from both the head end and locations further back in the train in order to stop the train faster.

 

(The new regulations should) Refrain from requiring electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes on tank cars used to move flammable liquids, as they are very costly systems not justified in terms of improved safety benefits, and could result in negative operational impacts on the network.  AAR also noted that under its voluntary agreement with DOT, railroads already have addressed braking systems for trains moving crude oil, using either distributed power or two-way-telemetry end-of-train devices on trains carrying crude oil. 

 

... the federal government is considering new regulations to require electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes for trains moving flammable liquids, including crude oil and ethanol. ECP brakes will not result in fewer accidents, and will not provide significant safety benefits. In fact, ECP brakes are costly and have issues with reliability that could erode network efficiency.

[Euclid]

From this link:  http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/us-dot-announces-comprehensive-proposed-rulemaking-safe-transportation-crude-oil

 

It sounds like ECP brakes are one of three options under consideration for inclusion in the new tank car rules.  The DOT released this July 2014:

 

·         Proposes new standards for tank cars constructed after October 1, 2015 (and that are used to transport flammable liquids as part of a HHFT) (e.g., thermal, top fittings, and bottom outlet protection; tank head and shell puncture resistance). PHMSA is requesting comment on three options for enhanced tank car standard requirements:

 

1.    Tank car option 1 would have 9/16 inch steel, would be outfitted with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes and would be equipped with rollover protection.

 

2.    Tank car option 2 would also have 9/16 inch steel but would not require ECP brakes or rollover protection.

 

3.    Tank car option 3 is based on a 2011 industry standard and has 7/16 inch steel, and does not require ECP brakes or rollover protection

 

 

I also called them today and learned that the new rules will be released to the public soon, and they may or may not include a requirement for ECP brakes on oil trains.  The three options listed above are still on the table in the decision making process. 

[n012944]

Buslist

 

 

 

 

 

Here's some actual quotes from the AAR. The folks that use this day to day rather than desk jockey.

 

 

That would be information that Bucky/Euclid would not be interested in....

[Norm48327]

I believe Bucky's audience has left the theater.

[Anonymous]

Norm48327

I believe Bucky's audience has left the theater.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmPhaG1ud38

 

 

 

[wanswheel]

May 1 (Reuters) - The U.S. and Canada rolled out new oil railcar standards on Friday that require a new car design to be phased in and introduce more stringent speed limits and enhanced braking for tank cars to reduce damage in derailments.

Under the regulations, tank cars built after Oct. 1 must have thicker hulls, full-height headshields, thermal protection, and improved pressure valves. Existing tank cars must be retrofitted with these components.

The rule requires replacing tank cars known as DOT-111 for crude by rail within three years.

http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/final-rule-on-safe-rail-transport-of-flammable-liquids

[Euclid]

Wanswheel,

 

Thanks for posting that new information about the finalized tank car rules.  They told me yesterday that the rules would be released “soon,” but they would not say when.

 

So ECP brakes for oil trains are now mandated with a phase-in period.  I was expecting that.

 

It is interesting that the DOTs’ reasoning for ECP brakes is to mitigate damage after a derailment begins.  That sounds familiar.

 

The industry cited that as a reason to reject ECP brakes, claiming that fitting tank cars with ECP brakes would not prevent accidents, but merely limit the number of cars that derail in an accident.  But apparently, the regulators saw the obvious benefit of reducing the number of cars in a derailment, even if the derailment is not prevented in the first place.    

 

[wanswheel]

Excerpt from the NY Times

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/business/energy-environment/us-sets-new-rules-for-oil-shipments-by-rail.html?_r=0

On Thursday, seven senators, including Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, unveiled a bill that would seek to impose a $175 per shipment fee on older cars to speed up their removal from service.

Senator Schumer said Friday’s announcement gave railroads too much time to remove older cars from service...

The Association of American Railroads said it backed the new tank car requirements but objected to a requirement that railroads should adopt new electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, or E.C.P., starting in 2021 for oil trains.

“The D.O.T. couldn’t make a safety case for E.C.P. but forged ahead anyway,” Edward R. Hamberger, the president and chief executive of the Association of American Railroads, said in a statement. “I have a hard time believing the determination to impose E.C.P. brakes is anything but a rash rush to judgment.”

[Euclid]

The AAR statement on the new federal mandate requiring ECP brakes on oil trains:

 

 

 

https://www.aar.org/newsandevents/Press-Releases/Pages/New-US-Rules-Governing-Flammable-Liquids-Moved-by-Rail-Enact-Misguided-Braking-Requirement-That-Threatens-Rail-Capacity.aspx

 

 

FOR​​​ IMMEDIATE RELEASE

 

New U.S. Rules Governing Flammable Liquids Moved by Rail Enact Misguided Braking Requirement That Threatens Rail Capacity and Service

Based on Flawed Safety Data; Will Trigger Slower Trains Nationwide

WASHINGTON D.C. May 1, 2015- The Association of American Railroads (AAR) today welcomed the tank car rule released by the Department of Transportation (DOT), which requires enhanced design standards the freight railroads have been advocating for years, but said it was disappointed the rule requires either the use of ECP brakes or imposes a 30 mph speed limit.

“First and foremost, the DOT has no substantial evidence to support a safety justification for mandating ECP brakes, which will not prevent accidents,” said Edward R. Hamberger, AAR president and CEO. “The DOT couldn’t make a safety case for ECP but forged ahead anyhow. This is an imprudent decision made without supporting data or analysis. I have a hard time believing the determination to impose ECP brakes is anything but a rash rush to judgment.”

Hamberger also questioned how a safety mandate of such magnitude could become a regulation when the negligible ECP simulation analysis the government conducted concluded with the cautionary note, “Given that this is based on a limited simulation set, the results could be a bit optimistic and should be taken with a grain of salt.”

“President Obama pledged to advance common-sense regulations that are based on the best available science, promote predictability and reduce uncertainty,” Hamberger said. “ECP brakes meet none of these.”

“DOT has handed down an unprecedented railroad operating requirement that is 100 percent dependent on the actions of rail customers or tank cars owners,” Hamberger said. “This decision not only threatens the operational management of the U.S. rail system, but trains moving 30 mph will compromise network capacity by at least 30 percent. The far-reaching effects of this decision will be felt by freight and passenger customers alike. Slow-moving trains will back up the entire rail system.”

“Attention and resources should be allocated to addressing the underlying causes of rail accidents and brakes simply aren’t on that list. Unjustified regulations such as this trigger a reallocation of investments that will not generate the kind of safety benefits the industry and the public expects. The regulation does not take into account the disruption the ECP mandate will wreak on railroad – both freight and passenger – operations.”

“We have worked cooperatively with the government during this rulemaking process, as our goal has always been to make a safe rail network even safer. We support tougher tank cars and we see many of the rule’s components building on our crude-by-rail safety achievements.”

However, the AAR President said the industry is extremely disappointed with how the ECP mandate unfolded. “DOT’s study is flawed and ECP brakes do not significantly improve safety and are unreliable. No justified safety case for ECP brakes has ever been made.”

Hamberger pointed out that freight railroads have on their own volition implemented stepped-up safety practices and protocols for handling and moving crude oil trains, as well as increased emergency training for firefighters and first responders. Last month, the AAR and the American Petroleum Institute announced a new crude-by-rail safety course for first responders offered through the TRANSCAER program​.

“The goal of America’s freight railroads remains zero accidents and we will continue doing what we can to prevent accidents from happening and earn the public’s trust and confidence,” Hamberger said.

[oltmannd]

Hamberger also said, " The DOT’s study is flawed and [electronic] brakes do not significantly improve safety and are unreliable. "

Do not underestimate the impact of "unreliable"!  

[Euclid]

Following the release of the new tank car rules Friday, this sums up the large disagreement between the AAR (quoting Ed Hamberger) and the USDOT (quoting Anthony Foxx) regarding the ECP brake mandate included in the rules.  It’s in this link followed by quotes in dark green:

 

http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/obama-safety-regulations-train-oil-derailments-117550.html

 

“The DOT couldn’t make a safety case for ECP but forged ahead anyhow,” railroads association President Ed Hamberger said in a statement. “This is an imprudent decision made without supporting data or analysis. I have a hard time believing the determination to impose ECP brakes is anything but a rash rush to judgment.”

 

 

 

Here is Secretary of Transportation Anthony Fox offering his view contrary to that of AAR President Ed Hamberger:

 

 

Foxx maintained that the brakes could prevent a repeat of incidents like a December 2013 collision in which an oil train slammed into a derailed grain train, setting off a series of explosions outside Casselton, N.D.

 

“ECP brakes can reduce how long it takes a train to stop,” Foxx said. “They can prevent cars from slamming into each other, they can decrease the number of cars that derail, they can greatly reduce the probability that tank cars will puncture. This is proven technology.”

 

What amazes me is that these two gigantic institutions can be so diametrically opposed on an objective engineering question regarding train braking.  Maybe the USDOT can be excused for acting on emotion instead of the engineering, but what about the AAR?  With the incredible cost being forced upon them to adopt ECP brakes; why, with this mandate looming; were they not able to make a convincing case to the regulators on such a simple issue as train stopping distance? 

 

Just reading between the lines, I think it was inevitable that the ECP mandate was going to be included in the new tank car rules.  That outcome was obviously portended in the “stacked deck” of three options that the USDOT released last summer.  I conclude that the AAR may have been blindsided by the power of the ECP supplier industry to seize the golden opportunity presented by the oil train crisis.  I’ll bet they made one heck of a presentation of ECP to the regulators.  I have no idea whether the AAR ever made their case to the regulators.  They sure are not doing so in the above statement by President Hamberger.   

 

 

*          *

[Buslist]

oltmannd

Hamberger also said, " The DOT’s study is flawed and [electronic] brakes do not significantly improve safety and are unreliable. "

Do not underestimate the impact of "unreliable"!  

 

 

Looks to me like Ed is setting the stage for a lawsuit here. The AAR has successfully sued FRA over regulations before. 

I'm not sure of the legal status of this regulation as there was no ANPRM or NPRM, does it still need to pass the OMB required cost/benefit analysis?

[Buslist]

Euclid

Following the release of the new tank car rules Friday, this sums up the large disagreement between the AAR (quoting Ed Hamberger) and the USDOT (quoting Anthony Foxx) regarding the ECP brake mandate included in the rules.  It’s in this link followed by quotes in dark green:

 

http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/obama-safety-regulations-train-oil-derailments-117550.html

 

“The DOT couldn’t make a safety case for ECP but forged ahead anyhow,” railroads association President Ed Hamberger said in a statement. “This is an imprudent decision made without supporting data or analysis. I have a hard time believing the determination to impose ECP brakes is anything but a rash rush to judgment.”

 

 

 

Here is Secretary of Transportation Anthony Fox offering his view contrary to that of AAR President Ed Hamberger:

 

 

Foxx maintained that the brakes could prevent a repeat of incidents like a December 2013 collision in which an oil train slammed into a derailed grain train, setting off a series of explosions outside Casselton, N.D.

 

“ECP brakes can reduce how long it takes a train to stop,” Foxx said. “They can prevent cars from slamming into each other, they can decrease the number of cars that derail, they can greatly reduce the probability that tank cars will puncture. This is proven technology.”

 

What amazes me is that these two gigantic institutions can be so diametrically opposed on an objective engineering question regarding train braking.  Maybe the USDOT can be excused for acting on emotion instead of the engineering, but what about the AAR?  With the incredible cost being forced upon them to adopt ECP brakes; why, with this mandate looming; were they not able to make a convincing case to the regulators on such a simple issue as train stopping distance? 

 

Just reading between the lines, I think it was inevitable that the ECP mandate was going to be included in the new tank car rules.  That outcome was obviously portended in the “stacked deck” of three options that the USDOT released last summer.  I conclude that the AAR may have been blindsided by the power of the ECP supplier industry to seize the golden opportunity presented by the oil train crisis.  I’ll bet they made one heck of a presentation of ECP to the regulators.  I have no idea whether the AAR ever made their case to the regulators.  They sure are not doing so in the above statement by President Hamberger.   

 

 

*          *

 

 What you are missing is that there some zealots in the Office of Safety that believe what they want to believe ( sound familier) independent of what data the AAR might presen. And I know a few of them.

[BaltACD]

Euclid

 

 

What amazes me is that these two gigantic institutions can be so diametrically opposed on an objective engineering question regarding train braking.  

The best arguments in the world are two engineers on different sides of the same fact - they will argue it to their deaths.  Since Foxx is a politician first it automatically takes 10 points away from whatever argument he proposes.  Cost/benefit analysis needs to be performed on any mandated appliances.  How many US lives have been lost, how many serious injuries have been caused in oil train derailments because of the lack of ECP on oil trains.

[Buslist]

Lots of knowledgeable folks questioning the ECP requirement.

 

[But] CN does not support the implementation of ECP brakes for high-hazard flammable trains as the rail industry is of the opinion this technology has not proven to provide a meaningful safety benefit. CN also has serious concerns about interoperability and the reliability of the technology in Canada’s harsh winter weather." — CN officials

 

 

On the other hand, we are deeply troubled by the requirement for ECP brakes, a braking technology that is still in development and not proven in regular service. This requirement could dramatically and widely slow railroad operations and impair railroads’ ability to serve customers in all sectors of a growing economy. With respect to sharing shipping information and supporting community readiness, CSX has long recognized the need for balance between national security interests and public agencies’ need to know about the products moving through communities." — CSX Corp. officials

 

NS has been experimenting with ECP brakes on a small number of coal trains since 2007, but it is not widely used on our system. We stand with the AAR and question the benefits and consequences of this rule. We will evaluate the new ECP rule to determine how it will impact our operations and work with the owners of the tank cars to determine the best way forward." — Norfolk Southern Corp. officials

 

"ECP brakes do not prevent derailments from happening; rather, this technology has some limited potential to mitigate the severity of a derailment. The Railway Association of Canada believes this marginal safety benefit must be weighed against the considerable operational challenges of implementing this technology, and the additional risk posed to employee safety. RAC believes that the new tank car standard recently announced by Transport Canada will deliver the most meaningful results in mitigating the impacts of a potential derailment. RAC also believes that by focusing resources on other technologies proven to prevent derailments, the railway industry can have a much more meaningful safety impact." — Railway Association of Canada officials

 

"It is disappointing that the final ruling [includes] ECP brakes and did not fully address our concerns as small businesses that are critical in the successful transportation of these commodities. We will be taking the next several days to carefully review these documents, evaluate the impact on our members and to consider next steps." — Linda Bauer Darr, president of the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association

 

The inclusion of a requirement for ECP brakes will add to the artificial constraints created by a timeline for retrofitting the existing tank car fleet that does not fully account for limited shop capacity available to complete the work. The safety impact of ECP brakes is marginal at best." — American Petroleum Institute President and CEO Jack Gerard

 

The DOT’s addition of ECP brakes to the retrofit standard is not only questionable from a safety improvement perspective, it makes the probability of retrofit even more unlikely for these cars." — GATX Corp. President and CEO Brian Kenney

 

RSI‐CTC provided extensive information and analysis to officials in the U.S. regarding the challenges of requiring ECP brakes to rail tank cars. That data and analysis show that ECP brakes do not achieve significant safety advantages in derailment scenarios as compared to alternative braking systems which are already being used and which present far fewer technical and logistical challenges than ECP brakes." — Tom Simpson, president of the Railway Supply Institute, on behalf of the Committee on Tank Cars

 

[Euclid]

BaltACD

 

Euclid

 

 

What amazes me is that these two gigantic institutions can be so diametrically opposed on an objective engineering question regarding train braking.  

 

 

 

The best arguments in the world are two engineers on different sides of the same fact - they will argue it to their deaths.  Since Foxx is a politician first it automatically takes 10 points away from whatever argument he proposes.  Cost/benefit analysis needs to be performed on any mandated appliances.  How many US lives have been lost, how many serious injuries have been caused in oil train derailments because of the lack of ECP on oil trains.

 

I am referring to the objective question of whether ECP brakes can reduce stopping distance by 70%, or whether they do not reduce stopping distance at all.  It seems like that is the pivotal question.  I am surprised that it seems to have no answer at this point in ECP development, testing, and application. 

 

The point of the quotes I posted was to show that the DOT at least offers a practical reason for ECP, whereas the AAR only says that DOT has not proven its case.  Secretary Foxx even went so far as to say that the shorter stopping distance of ECP will even prevent collisions such as the one that lead to the Casselton oil train wreck.   

 

I was surprised that AAR President Ed Hamberger suggested that President Obama broke his promise regarding the DOT rulemaking.

[wanswheel]

Old news (March 11, 2015) from OilPrice.com:

After a slew of oil train derailments over the past month, the Obama administration is under assault…from lobbyists that is.

A barrage of lobbying has descended upon the White House as it considers new regulations on trains carrying crude oil. And the petitioning is coming from all sides. EnergyWire reported that a day after a 105-railcar train jumped the tracks in Illinois and caught fire – which in turn came only two weeks after a massive train explosion in West Virginia – lobbyists from the rail industry visited the White House for private meetings.

According to White House logs, representatives from CSX, BNSF, Canadian Pacific Railway, Kansas City Southern, and the Association of American Railroads (AAR) – the rail industry’s trade group – met with officials from the executive branch. The brass from the rail companies wanted to head off new regulations from the Department of Transportation that would require trains install new high-tech brake systems intended to reduce the chance of a derailment. The regulations are currently under review by White House officials.

The so-called electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes would allow all railcars to slam on the brakes at the same time. Current brake systems occur sequentially, car by car. Ed Hamberger, CEO of AAR, says the rule would do very little for safety while adding costs onto the industry, and he called the Transportation Department’s analysis “flawed.” In fact, the trade group says, Transportation regulators “grossly overstate benefits and understate costs.”

[tree68]

wanswheel

Current brake systems occur sequentially, car by car

Much as I hate to post on this thread again.

ECP dumps all the cars at once.

On a mile long train with distributed power, doing so will take all of three seconds.  Big difference?  For a train doing 40 MPH, I think not...

One one thousand, two one thousand, three one thousand.  All brakes activated.  Actual application may take up to ten seconds longer...  

[Euclid]

tree68

 

wanswheel

Current brake systems occur sequentially, car by car

 

 

Much as I hate to post on this thread again.

 

ECP dumps all the cars at once.

On a mile long train with distributed power, doing so will take all of three seconds.  Big difference?  For a train doing 40 MPH, I think not...

One one thousand, two one thousand, three one thousand.  All brakes activated.  Actual application may take up to ten seconds longer...  

 

I agree that it does not seem like a few seconds would make any significant difference in total stopping time.  This seems obvious when you consider that total stopping time might be a minute or more.  And yet, there are published claims of reductions in stopping distance of up to 70% with ECP brakes.  The Secretary of Transportation himself has cited the reduced stopping distance in practical terms that implies significant difference in stopping distance between the two brake types.  It is hard to believe that such a claim would be made in total error.  So what is the explanation?  

 

My understanding is that there is a second reason why ECP brakes shorten stopping distance, in addition to the reason involving instant propagation versus sequential propagation.  This second reason apparently contributes far more to a shorter stopping distance than does the instant application.  The second reason is that the air that flows from the reservoir to the brake cylinder on each car moves faster with ECP brakes than it does with conventional pneumatically controlled air brakes.  

 

These are quotes from Railway Technical Web Pages which explain the second reason why ECP brakes stop trains faster.  Here is the site:  http://www.railway-technical.com/brake3.shtml

 

Here are the quotes:

 

 

 

“Because of the sequential operations of standard brakes, there is a flow control which limits how fast the air can flow into the brake cylinder. On ECP systems, because there is instantaneous reaction from all cars at once, these flow controls are not used. The lack of sequential activation and flow controls combined is what makes ECP brakes so responsive.”

 

 

“With the new responsiveness of ECP braking, braking distances will be reduced. A range of 30 - 70% reduction has been quoted. This will allow shorter stopping distances and will, in turn, allow higher speeds. The improved train handling will reduce slack action, breakaways and derailments and will lead to a reduction in draft gear maintenance.”

[dehusman]

Anybody besides me notice that virtually all the people who design, build, own, repair, use, operate or physically have to deal with tank cars or trains were against the ECP and all the people in favor of them were regulators, environmental or civic groups?

The AAR's report was developed by the foremost transportation research center in the US that has had a hand in testing most of the new developments in railroad safety for the last several decades.  Railroad safety and vehicle dynamics is what they do every day.  If anybody would know about train dynamics it would be them.

[Buslist]

Euclid

 

tree68

 

wanswheel

Current brake systems occur sequentially, car by car

 

 

Much as I hate to post on this thread again.

 

ECP dumps all the cars at once.

On a mile long train with distributed power, doing so will take all of three seconds.  Big difference?  For a train doing 40 MPH, I think not...

One one thousand, two one thousand, three one thousand.  All brakes activated.  Actual application may take up to ten seconds longer...  

 

 

 

I agree that it does not seem like a few seconds would make any significant difference in total stopping time.  This seems obvious when you consider that total stopping time might be a minute or more.  And yet, there are published claims of reductions in stopping distance of up to 70% with ECP brakes.  The Secretary of Transportation himself has cited the reduced stopping distance in practical terms that implies significant difference in stopping distance between the two brake types.  It is hard to believe that such a claim would be made in total error.  So what is the explanation?  

 

My understanding is that there is a second reason why ECP brakes shorten stopping distance, in addition to the reason involving instant propagation versus sequential propagation.  This second reason apparently contributes far more to a shorter stopping distance than does the instant application.  The second reason is that the air that flows from the reservoir to the brake cylinder on each car moves faster with ECP brakes than it does with conventional pneumatically controlled air brakes.  

 

These are quotes from Railway Technical Web Pages which explain the second reason why ECP brakes stop trains faster.  Here is the site:  http://www.railway-technical.com/brake3.shtml

 

Here are the quotes:

 

 

 

“Because of the sequential operations of standard brakes, there is a flow control which limits how fast the air can flow into the brake cylinder. On ECP systems, because there is instantaneous reaction from all cars at once, these flow controls are not used. The lack of sequential activation and flow controls combined is what makes ECP brakes so responsive.”

 

 

“With the new responsiveness of ECP braking, braking distances will be reduced. A range of 30 - 70% reduction has been quoted. This will allow shorter stopping distances and will, in turn, allow higher speeds. The improved train handling will reduce slack action, breakaways and derailments and will lead to a reduction in draft gear maintenance.”

 

. 

This discussion relates to service brakeing not emergency application where there is no need for flow control.

[Euclid]

Buslist

 

Euclid

 

tree68

 

wanswheel

Current brake systems occur sequentially, car by car

 

 

Much as I hate to post on this thread again.

 

ECP dumps all the cars at once.

On a mile long train with distributed power, doing so will take all of three seconds.  Big difference?  For a train doing 40 MPH, I think not...

One one thousand, two one thousand, three one thousand.  All brakes activated.  Actual application may take up to ten seconds longer...  

 

 

 

I agree that it does not seem like a few seconds would make any significant difference in total stopping time.  This seems obvious when you consider that total stopping time might be a minute or more.  And yet, there are published claims of reductions in stopping distance of up to 70% with ECP brakes.  The Secretary of Transportation himself has cited the reduced stopping distance in practical terms that implies significant difference in stopping distance between the two brake types.  It is hard to believe that such a claim would be made in total error.  So what is the explanation?  

 

My understanding is that there is a second reason why ECP brakes shorten stopping distance, in addition to the reason involving instant propagation versus sequential propagation.  This second reason apparently contributes far more to a shorter stopping distance than does the instant application.  The second reason is that the air that flows from the reservoir to the brake cylinder on each car moves faster with ECP brakes than it does with conventional pneumatically controlled air brakes.  

 

These are quotes from Railway Technical Web Pages which explain the second reason why ECP brakes stop trains faster.  Here is the site:  http://www.railway-technical.com/brake3.shtml

 

Here are the quotes:

 

 

 

“Because of the sequential operations of standard brakes, there is a flow control which limits how fast the air can flow into the brake cylinder. On ECP systems, because there is instantaneous reaction from all cars at once, these flow controls are not used. The lack of sequential activation and flow controls combined is what makes ECP brakes so responsive.”

 

 

“With the new responsiveness of ECP braking, braking distances will be reduced. A range of 30 - 70% reduction has been quoted. This will allow shorter stopping distances and will, in turn, allow higher speeds. The improved train handling will reduce slack action, breakaways and derailments and will lead to a reduction in draft gear maintenance.”

 

 

 

 

. 

 

This discussion relates to service brakeing not emergency application where there is no need for flow control.

 

Buslist,

 

You raise an interesting point, and I would like to see an elaboration.  Do you have a technical source that fully explains that?  Where exactly in the conventional air brake systems are the flow controls, what flow are they controlling, how do they control it, and why is it necessary to control it?

 

I find many sources that describe the much shorter stopping distance of ECP brakes, and none of them make the distinction that you have made; that is, that the shorter stopping distance only applies to service applications, and not to emergency applications. 

 

If you are correct, it seems like a leaving out that detail would be extremely misleading.  When I hear of comparison of stopping ability with any type of vehicle brake, I assume that the two brake types are being applied to their maximum stopping power.  So it seems very odd to compare stopping distance of train brakes, but to not include the fundamentally most effective stopping mode in that comparison.    

[Euclid]

Euclid

 

Buslist

 

Euclid

 

tree68

 

wanswheel

Current brake systems occur sequentially, car by car

 

 

Much as I hate to post on this thread again.

 

ECP dumps all the cars at once.

On a mile long train with distributed power, doing so will take all of three seconds.  Big difference?  For a train doing 40 MPH, I think not...

One one thousand, two one thousand, three one thousand.  All brakes activated.  Actual application may take up to ten seconds longer...  

 

 

 

I agree that it does not seem like a few seconds would make any significant difference in total stopping time.  This seems obvious when you consider that total stopping time might be a minute or more.  And yet, there are published claims of reductions in stopping distance of up to 70% with ECP brakes.  The Secretary of Transportation himself has cited the reduced stopping distance in practical terms that implies significant difference in stopping distance between the two brake types.  It is hard to believe that such a claim would be made in total error.  So what is the explanation?  

 

My understanding is that there is a second reason why ECP brakes shorten stopping distance, in addition to the reason involving instant propagation versus sequential propagation.  This second reason apparently contributes far more to a shorter stopping distance than does the instant application.  The second reason is that the air that flows from the reservoir to the brake cylinder on each car moves faster with ECP brakes than it does with conventional pneumatically controlled air brakes.  

 

These are quotes from Railway Technical Web Pages which explain the second reason why ECP brakes stop trains faster.  Here is the site:  http://www.railway-technical.com/brake3.shtml

 

Here are the quotes:

 

 

 

“Because of the sequential operations of standard brakes, there is a flow control which limits how fast the air can flow into the brake cylinder. On ECP systems, because there is instantaneous reaction from all cars at once, these flow controls are not used. The lack of sequential activation and flow controls combined is what makes ECP brakes so responsive.”

 

 

“With the new responsiveness of ECP braking, braking distances will be reduced. A range of 30 - 70% reduction has been quoted. This will allow shorter stopping distances and will, in turn, allow higher speeds. The improved train handling will reduce slack action, breakaways and derailments and will lead to a reduction in draft gear maintenance.”

 

 

 

 

. 

 

This discussion relates to service brakeing not emergency application where there is no need for flow control.

 

 

 

Buslist,

 

You raise an interesting point, and I would like to see an elaboration.  Do you have a technical source that fully explains that?  Where exactly in the conventional air brake systems are the flow controls, what flow are they controlling, how do they control it, and why is it necessary to control it?

 

I find many sources that describe the much shorter stopping distance of ECP brakes, and none of them make the distinction that you have made; that is, that the shorter stopping distance only applies to service applications, and not to emergency applications. 

 

If you are correct, it seems like a leaving out that detail would be extremely misleading.  When I hear of comparison of stopping ability with any type of vehicle brake, I assume that the two brake types are being applied to their maximum stopping power.  So it seems very odd to compare stopping distance of train brakes, but to not include the fundamentally most effective stopping mode in that comparison.    

 

Buslist,