FIVE WAYS THE LAC-MÉGANTIC CRASH CHANGED HOW WE SHIP CRUDE BY RAIL

[Will Davis]

Well, I can tell you one certain parallel between the nuclear accidents, and this rail accident, right now, and that's this:

A heated, and likely very productive, debate among those involved in the field as to what went wrong, right down to the nuts and bolts and second by second actions of persons involved.

Now, I only say "likely" productive because it appears that the discussion is occurring without all the facts being known.  That's right - if every single event, the condition of all the brakes on all the cars, etc. were recorded there'd be little debate as to what actually happened.  This exactly parallels the events (early on) at Three Mile Island, and even now concerning Fukushima Daiichi.  Work continues to develop a complete timeline, and only with dismantling of the plants will we finally have the answers as to what exactly happened and when.

This will apparently never be possible with the Lac-Megantic rail accident, so that defaulting to the two normally publicly discussed "fixes" is where the public debate will go.  That means the public says, in order:

•Who did what wrong?  Why did they do it wrong?  Did they know they were doing something wrong?

•Why didn't the equipment prevent such an accident?  Isn't it designed safely?

The first point can go from moment to moment actions on the part of the crew, to operating rules on the railroad, to industry-wide practices and inspections.  It branches to regulatory oversight as well.

The second goes not just to the cars (the tank section) but to the entire railroad train as a whole in the public eye, who see it as the entity whose runaway launched the accident.  Note:  For a long while, the public saw the earthquake as the entity which launched the Fukushima accident.  It was not; it was the tsunami that initiated all of the events that caused the accident.  Finding and identifying the actual triggering event is key in re-establishing public trust.  It's pretty clear the railroaders here are trying very hard to figure out just what exactly happened to start this specific event, and then apply that to railroading everywhere.

(Aside:  For those who have a more than passing familiarity with nuclear issues, the second of my points above has moved up the tree to include the overall safety / viability of every Mk I containment building used on boiling water reactors, anywhere in the world - whether this discussion is legitimate or not, I leave for a future time.  I have my opinions.)

When the industry loses control of the above debate with the public, it can and will default to an overreaching status such as "do we need nuclear power at all" or else, here, "do we need to ship oil by rail at all?" 

Rail has the added DISadvantage, if it can be believed that rail could have a safety perception disadvantage over nuclear, of actually being located right in and around populated areas.  You don't have exclusion zones around plants like we do.  This brings the risk right into people's laps, so that they're more, rather than less, likely to personally and emotionally adopt a "not in my back yard" type of mindset that would lead to "well, then no oil by rail at all" as an end result.  People don't like percentages of risk when it's their kids on a swingset 500 yards from a rail line.  They only want to hear "never."  This mindset would continue even in the face of skyrocketing gasoline prices, etc. should all oil shipment by rail cease, until some breaking point were reached wherein the safety risk would be topped by the need to travel for work or food.

And that's where risk perception comes in.  We all know, at least vaguely, that something like 30,000 people are killed in auto accidents every year in the USA, but we will still jump in the car to run to the store for a case of soda if we're out, then come home, then later run back out to get a movie at the RedBox, then come back home, etc.  We marginalize the risk based upon our perceived notion of how often that happens when compared with the general, normal day we usually have.  It's the "yeah, but I'm careful, that won't happen to me" sort of thing.  This is much easier when we have the choice - we can say, "well if I was that worried I wouldn't go out - heck, I don't drive when it's icy out."  This is impossible when the rail line nearby ships oil cars at times and proximities we certainly have no control over.  So then "if I can't control it, I'll stop it" becomes the mindset to mitigate risk.

Anyway, I hope that I haven't derailed (yuk, yuk) the discussion here, but I continue to notice the parallels and I certainly hope that some of what I've written makes some sense to folks who both work in railroading and have to deal with the public.  This is all coming from our experience, and if you're in railroad PR I'd certainly like to read your perceptions and reactions, and interactions with the public.

-Will Davis

[Euclid]

Any runaway is bad, but location also matters.  I cannot imagine myself feeling comfortable leaving a full train of flammable oil perched on a six-mile hill above a town bisected by the railroad on a speed-restricted curve.  For me, this would have been a major red flag, and I would have insisted on the utmost attention to establishing an infallible securement policy; and making sure it was always properly executed. 

[Euclid]

efftenxrfe

I stipulate that hand brakes set on  locomotive units  and a couple of cars held the train, (here's the catch) in combination with the engine's independent. (only the locomotive's brakes) securerment existed

The independent brake was supplied straight from the air pump. If the pump was shut down by a zealous firefighter,  those brakes would leak off.

Your scenario may be correct.  If anybody knows what actually happened to cause the air brake release, the details have not been made public.  What is known by the simple fact that the train rolled away is that there were insufficient handbrakes to hold it.  The Canadian securement rule calls for enough hand brakes set to prevent the train from rolling with air brakes fully released. 

I have seen news reports commenting that the engineer was highly experienced and competent.  So there is no obvious indication of why he would have substituted air brakes for handbrakes in the achievement of securement.  Certainly that decision saved time.

Regarding your characterization of a “zealous” fireman shutting down the engine:  It is a red herring to blame the firemen for shutting down the one running engine, even if the resulting loss of its compressor caused the loss of air brakes.  The fire department had been trained by the MM&A Railroad that the first thing they are to do when encountering a locomotive fire it to shut down the engine(s). 

The firemen did exactly what they were supposed to do, and MM&A had a representative on site with them to make everything known to company management.  MM&A supervisors knew that no engines were running before the train ran away, and they did nothing about it.    

[CN6218]

  I glad to see someone in the Energy source of the future Industry so interested in trains.  So my question to you:  Are you CANDU or PWR;  enriched U-235 or just ground U-238.

  And when will decentralized LFTRs become commonplace, and which nation will build the first one?

   We (the world) are a petroleum economy.  We cannot do without those polymer carbon chains.  All our tires, petrochemicals, cosmetics, MEDICINES, have a start with crude oil/natural gas. Many of the black tank cars you see on the railroads are carrying the sludge at the bottom of the distillation towers from our Oil Refineries.  This thick black gold is so important to the Cosmetics, Petrochemical, and Pharmaceutical Industries, that they simply call it their "Feedstock"   But no new oil in large quantities has been discovered, and what we have found is getting harder and harder to find and extract.  As costs increase and the price of Transportation fuels  escalates, alternative sources of energy will need to be brought online.

   Nuclear in a decentralized, extremely safe system, with no 20,000 year half life of the waste products of neutron bombardment and atom splitting, will be front and centre. 

  The LFTR (Liquid Flouride Thorium Reactor) is the answer. 

   Coal may be used specifically for making synthetic liquid fuels; thus the need for a Nuclear system to provide our electricity.

[blue streak 1]

Although not a final solution there is a quick partial fix. Split rail derails with a suitable berm beyond the derail any location where trains  ( not just oil ) are parked. ?  Note on past trip UP was already installing such at haz mat locations even on uphill grades . 

 

 

[Euclid]

zugmann

Euclid

  Maybe the handbrakes could be retained for that setout, but securement could just as well be accomplished by use of the single control, pneumatically powered brake lock to secure the car with air brakes set fully and mechanically locked in the set condition, just like securing a whole train.

Again - don't handbrakes set brakes mechanically?  I'm still lost with your definitions and nuances.

I am talking about a powered brake locking system for every car in a train.  It is set on or off from a single control inside the locomotive cab.  You set the air brakes, and then set the brake lock to locking position.  It mechanically locks the air brakes with a spring powered lock.  The lock is released by compressed air, and set by exhausting air. 

Just to be clear, once the brakes are locked, they are not depending on compressed air to hold them in a set application.  It just needs an air set to perform the locking procedure. 

The conventional handbrakes can be retained because they can be set without coupling air and charging the brake system in circumstances where this would be more work than just setting a handbrake.     

But as I mentioned earlier, this is for a highly specialized, dedicated oil unit train consisting of non-interchangeable equipment.  The point is to satisfy the public and regulatory demand for oil train safety.  Overall, this specialized train will have the following features:

1)      More crashworthy tank cars.

2)      ECP brakes.

3)      Single control parking brake.

4)      Zero-slack couplers without draft gear. 

[Ulrich]

Maybe they could do the crew change at the bottom of the hill instead of at the top? 

[MidlandMike]

dehusman

Just remember not all crude is the same, the ONLY crude that has had problems is the Bakken crude.  The crude from every other formation that railroads have been hauling for over  a century does NOT have those same problems. 

There is also a problem with Congress and the FRA just throwing solutions out there just because they are cool and high tech without thinking about whether they would have solved a problem.  ECP wouldn't have prevented Lac Megantic, it wouldn't have prevented Casselton, it wouldn't have prevented the release in Kentucky.

While the Bakken is highly flammable, it is not unique.  The Canadian TSB report on Lac Magantic analysed the tank car contents for flammability, and showed how it was comparable to other very light crudes such as condensates.  There is also potential for condensates to be rail hauled, as there is a big demand for them as dilutant for tar sands oil.  While oil has been hauled for over a hundred years, it has been a couple of generations since it was a significant source of rail traffic.  Even then there were crude tank car explosion/fires as shown by a photo in a previous Trains forum on CBR a few months ago.  As I recall it was near Columbus OH in about the 1940s.  No crude oil should be thought of as an inert product.

As has been pointed out by other posters, railroads have gone thru similar problems with propane, ethanol, and other more explosive/flammable cargo.  I believe that railroads will get thru this too.

[Euclid]

schlimm

A quick check on posts suggests the need for a uniform policy on safety with a stopped and shut down Bakken train.   There are several different opinions expressed on here as to the proper procedures.

There is a uniform policy, and it is actually pretty simple.  The discussion of what happened to the air brakes on the ill-fated MM&A oil train is anything but simple, however that has nothing whatsoever to do with proper securing of the train.

To achieve proper securement, you set hand brakes until you have enough set to hold the train with air brakes completely released on the train and the locomotive. The achievement of sufficient hand brake resistance is determined by a push pull test with the locomotive, plus a sense of judgment that the enough resistance has been achieved to prevent the train from rolling away once it is deemed to be secured.  That is basically Rule 112 in Canada.

What I am waiting for is the final report by the TSB of Canada and their analysis of the securement.  A few years ago, they basically said that Rule 112 is impossible to comply with on high grades.   

[schlimm]

Euclid

schlimm

A quick check on posts suggests the need for a uniform policy on safety with a stopped and shut down Bakken train.   There are several different opinions expressed on here as to the proper procedures.

There is a uniform policy, and it is actually pretty simple.  The discussion of what happened to the air brakes on the ill-fated MM&A oil train is anything but simple, however that has nothing whatsoever to do with proper securing of the train.

To achieve proper securement, you set hand brakes until you have enough set to hold the train with air brakes completely released on the train and the locomotive. The achievement of sufficient hand brake resistance is determined by a push pull test with the locomotive, plus a sense of judgment that the enough resistance has been achieved to prevent the train from rolling away once it is deemed to be secured.  That is basically Rule 112 in Canada.

What I am waiting for is the final report by the TSB of Canada and their analysis of the securement.  A few years ago, they basically said that Rule 112 is impossible to comply with on high grades.   

Again, note that operating personnel on this thread appear to have differing opinions.   That implies pretty strongly that the best procedure is hardly a uniform, settled issue.

[blue streak 1]

Will Davis gives us a very good idea of failure analysis.  Limited exposure to it in job certainly says he is correct.

[Euclid]

schlimm

Again, note that operating personnel on this thread appear to have differing opinions.   That implies pretty strongly that the best procedure is hardly a uniform, settled issue.

The Lac Megantic discussion always leads into the topic of air brakes because they played a role in that wreck.  In my opinion, the discussion of airbrakes is nearly beyond the ability to communicate on a forum because of the amount of detail that comes into play, and the common failure to fully define ones terms in the discussion.  It leads to constant miscommunication and misinterpretation. 

Adding to the problem of discussing airbrakes relating to the Lac Megantic wreck is that nobody knows exactly how the airbrakes were applied or why they released, so there are multiple possible scenarios.  So you are right that many knowledgeable people disagree about the role of airbrakes in the MM&A runaway.  There are many differing opinions, as you say.

However, you are asking about the proper train securement procedure, and that has nothing at all to do with airbrakes.  Airbrakes only come into play in the Lac Megantic wreck discussion because they were relied upon illegally as a substitute for the proper securement procedure.  So all of the disagreement over the role of airbrakes does not mean that there is disagreement over the proper securement procedure.  I do not recall any disagreement over the issue of proper securement. 

I should have also mentioned in my explanation of proper securement above, that there is usually a minimum number of handbrakes required at various locations and various train tonnages and makeup.  That minimum takes precedence over a successful push-pull test. 

In the case of the Lac Megantic runaway, it has been reported that the engineer did not set the minimum number of required handbrakes.  All of the news that I have seen on the Lac Megantic wreck has focused on the minimum number of required handbrakes at Nantes.  I have not seen anything reported stating that a push-pull test was required, nor whether one was performed.  On one hand, that is moot because the engineer failed to set the minimum number required regardless of any results from a push-pull test.

However, it would be possible to set a number of handbrakes that passed a push-pull test, and yet have that number fall below the required minimum.  If that is what the engineer did, it would reflect quite a bit differently on him; as opposed to failing to set the minimum and also failing to perform a push-pull test.  So the complete lack of mention of anything to do with a push-pull test seems to leave the story somewhat inconclusive. 

Also interesting is that the news has reported what other engineers have described doing to secure trains.  They talked about a prescribed number of handbrakes, and none that I have read about have mentioned doing a push-pull test.  Leaving out that component of securement Rule 112 violates the rule. 

So, overall, that suggests to me that there may have been a culture of omitting the push-pull test and relying on the precedent of trains not running away in the past with a certain number of handbrakes applied.  Or there may have been a culture of relying on airbrakes to hold a train, and downplaying the role of handbrakes as being only a backup.    

[edblysard]

Your last paragraph is without a doubt the most honest and intelligent comment any of you folks have made about this.

Although I don’t know of any engineer or conductor who would leave a train up there without the proper handbrake test, obviously this is what happened, but I am pretty sure he, (Harding) felt it was secure as he left it, after all, he went to the bottom of that same hill, took a room and went to sleep, with the train he left aimed right at himself.

The GCOR, Norac book of rules, and the Canadian rule book all have a procedure on securing a train, they all say the same basic thing, they all insist on a test and all include the phrase “sufficient number of brakes to secure against movement”…if the rule had been followed, we wouldn’t have anything to discuss.

Granted, there are extenuating circumstances and events beyond the control of the engineer, but still, had the rule been followed, nothing the fire department could have done, short of releasing the hand brakes, would have caused the run away.

Yup, the train could have been left down in town, but I bet the city didn’t want it there, they are noisy and smoke and create a nuisance…blocking the main was not a issue, it was blocking the same main up on the hill.

Did the FD screw the pooch by shutting off the lead unit?

Probably didn’t help matters much.

Should the dispatcher have sent a maintenance guy out to fix the lead unit before it caught fire?

Yup, but they didn’t, they sent a MOW guy out to see if it was really burning….lots of events that could have changed the entire outcome, any one could have prevented it, but the basic screw up was not setting enough handbrakes and not testing the ones that were set.

The securement rule wasn’t followed, simple as that.

All the inventions, EPC brakes, split rail derails, berms, wheel chocks, or the Force would have made no difference without the test.

[Euclid]

I would expect that the criminal trial will pursue the question of whether securement was routinely compromised on the MM&A as a part of company culture, and the engineer was just following that culture.  By charging two not only the engineer, but also two of his supervisors, it opens the door to pursuing the question of whether the securement fault was only a one-time violation by the engineer; or whether he acted accordance with some type of company sanctioned procedure.

However, it is disconcerting that in the news of criminal charges, there is no mention by the police of a push-pull test being performed or omitted. It leaves me wondering if the police even understand that element of the securement rule.

When you have special instructions on a railroad that talk about requiring a minimum number of handbrakes at different locations and with different tonnages, it would be easy to perceive that as being the only requirement.  It would be extremely easy and likely for an outsider to interpret it that way.  It might even be possible for a railroad culture to interpret that way with the aid of a little rationalization.  Just the sound of the special instruction leaves the impression that it fully addresses the securement requirement, when it is actually only a part of the requirement.           

[BaltACD]

Euclid

I would expect that the criminal trial will pursue the question of whether securement was routinely compromised on the MM&A as a part of company culture, and the engineer was just following that culture.  By charging two not only the engineer, but also two of his supervisors, it opens the door to pursuing the question of whether the securement fault was only a one-time violation by the engineer; or whether he acted accordance with some type of company sanctioned procedure.

However, it is disconcerting that in the news of criminal charges, there is no mention by the police of a push-pull test being performed or omitted. It leaves me wondering if the police even understand that element of the securement rule.

When you have special instructions on a railroad that talk about requiring a minimum number of handbrakes at different locations and with different tonnages, it would be easy to perceive that as being the only requirement.  It would be extremely easy and likely for an outsider to interpret it that way.  It might even be possible for a railroad culture to interpret that way with the aid of a little rationalization.  Just the sound of the special instruction leaves the impression that it fully addresses the securement requirement, when it is actually only a part of the requrement.           

When the trial is actually held, your assertions will be baby talk, in comparison to the actions and assertions of the lawyers on both sides of the trial.  The horse will be thoroughly beaten to death multiple times.

[BaltACD]

It is not only the ND crude oil shipments that are creating havoc.....

http://news.yahoo.com/saltwater-leak-alters-water-supply-1-nd-town-202349179.html

[jeffhergert]

There are allowances under the rules to omit a testing of the brakes and relying on a specific number of brakes.  Normally, that would be in instances where you were cutting away from the train with such a large number of cars that you either couldn't put enough handbrakes on to hold the entire train for the test or it would be severe overkill to do so. 

Doing the test, for us a complete release of engine and train brakes, is considered the "primary" method.  Relying on a specific number is considered the "secondary" method.  Our securement check lists have a place to record what method was used.  On Key trains, it is one of the subjects that is covered in the job briefing between the crew and train dispatcher.  (I heard a key train being secured yesterday.  The crew and dispatcher did the job briefing.  The crew used the primary method.  Then the dispatcher said he had to confirm with the superintendent that it was OK to leave the train.  First time I've heard of that requirement.  It was approved, but then the powers that be decided to run the train after all, so the crew had to go back and untie the train.)  

At first, I was going to use "minimum" instead of "specific" when referring to the required number.  The reason I didn't is that even places that require a minimum number, the release test is still required.  The minimum number reflects total cars in the train and sometimes that minimum may not be enough.  Those places using a specific number do so by using a chart (for us) and taking into account total tonnage and grade considerations.  Since using this method is for times when you can't release for a check, I'm sure the specific number required by the chart has a safety factor built in. 

Jeff

[BaltACD]

If the following article is anywhere near accurate - Lac Megantic is going to have an affect on the oil producers also, as they have not been as proactive in preparing Bakken Crude for safe shipment as they have for explosive varieties of Texas Crude.

North Dakota Fracking: Behind the Oil-Train Explosions
The Wall Street Journal (Online)
By Russell Gold and Chester Dawson
July 7, 2014

When energy companies started extracting oil from shale formations in South Texas a few years ago, they invested hundreds of millions of dollars to make the volatile crude safer to handle.

In North Dakota's Bakken Shale oil field, nobody installed the necessary equipment. The result is that the second-fastest growing source of crude in the U.S. is producing oil that pipelines often would reject as too dangerous to transport.

Now the decision not to build the equipment is coming back to haunt the oil industry as the federal government seeks to prevent fiery accidents of trains laden with North Dakota oil. Investigators probing crude-by-rail accidents, including one a year ago that killed 47 people in Quebec, are trying to determine why shale oil has proved so combustible-a question that has taken on growing urgency as rail shipments rise.

Only one stabilizer, which can remove the most volatile gases before transport, has been built in North Dakota and it hasn't begun operation, according to a review by The Wall Street Journal.

Stabilizers use heat and pressure to force light hydrocarbon molecules-including ethane, butane and propane-to form into vapor and boil out of the liquid crude. The operation can lower the vapor pressure of crude oil, making it less volatile and therefore safer to transport by pipeline or rail tank car.

As the Journal previously reported, oil tapped from shale is generally more volatile and more similar to jet fuel than traditional crude oil, which has seldom been linked to explosive accidents. The production of this volatile oil through hydraulic fracturing has soared, accounting for most of the additional 3 million barrels a day of oil that the U.S. produces today compared with 2009.

The federal government is weighing whether to require stabilization, holding high-level meetings with oil executives.

"We are open to any recommendations with a demonstrated ability to improve safety, including the stabilizing or further processing Bakken crude," says Sarah Feinberg, the chief of staff to Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx.

If the government mandates the use of stabilizers, companies would have to make big investments in equipment and might have to slow development of the Bakken oil field.

Energy executives point out that neither federal nor state regulations require crude to be stabilized before it is transported. Some say stabilization is unnecessary, noting that South Texas produces more of the highly volatile oil known as condensate.

"There is nothing wrong with the crude oil" in the Bakken, says Jeff Hume, vice chairman of Continental Resources Inc., one of the largest crude producers in North Dakota. "It does not need stabilization."

Robert Hall, a National Transportation Safety Board director, says the decision on whether to stabilize is driven by commercial considerations. "The regulations are silent," he says.

About a million barrels a day are pumped from the Bakken, an oil field that has grown so fast that few pipelines exist to transport the crude. Instead, about 630,000 barrels a day travel by train to refineries on the East, West and Gulf coasts, a trend that is growing because the energy industry has found rail shipments to be more flexible than fixed pipelines.

Federal officials have expressed concern that unstabilized Bakken oil has been loaded onto trains and shipped without proper labeling or handling. Local safety officials have warned that their communities aren't prepared to handle a derailment.

The American Petroleum Institute, a Washington-based lobbying group for the oil industry, doesn't offer standards for how crude should be treated before being shipped. "We have not seen any data to suggest processing crude in the field reduces risk," a spokesman says. The North Dakota Petroleum Council expresses a similar view.

But pipelines, which carry most of the crude oil moved in the U.S., at times require stabilization of oil for safety purposes, according to a spokesman for Enbridge Inc., one of the biggest pipeline companies in North America.

Many industry experts and energy executives say privately that using stabilizing units would improve safety but are reluctant to make that point publicly for fear of antagonizing the companies that do business in North Dakota.

One exception is a company that has built the first stabilizer there, which is scheduled to open in the next few weeks.

"It is safer to stabilize that product before it goes into rail cars," says David Scobel, chief operating officer of Caliber Midstream Partners LP of Denver. "It is not accurate to say, 'If we stabilize the crude, that's the magic solution so there will be no more fires.' But it is more stable."

Starting in 2008, energy companies that had been using new techniques to tap shale for natural gas began turning those methods, including fracking and horizontal drilling, on formations rich in oil. While much of this activity took place in Texas, which has a century-old oil industry, one of the most promising discoveries was in shale under North Dakota plains better known for producing wheat and canola.

Over the past six years, the industry has drilled 7,000 wells in North Dakota, almost all of them spread across about 15,000 square miles of the Bakken. Rather than installing pipelines to collect oil from these far-flung locations, companies used trucks to collect the oil and started building rail terminals to ship it by train. Crude-by-rail shipments from North Dakota have quadrupled since 2012.

The most combustible components of Bakken crude-known as light ends-constitute between 2% and 11.9% of its volume, according to an analysis by the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, an industry trade group. Other sources have a lower figure for Bakken light ends. These vaporous liquids can be valuable, but only if pipelines or special railcars are available to transport them.

Lacking that infrastructure, stripping out volatile liquids could hurt profits by reducing the volume of crude for sale. Stabilizing the crude could cut potential revenue by perhaps 2%, an industry executive estimates.

Hess Corp., a large Bakken-crude producer, considered building a stabilizer in 2011 for North Dakota oil. Instead, the company opted for a less expensive, more rudimentary process that heats oil to between 80 and 120 degrees Fahrenheit in so-called heater treaters to strip out light ends. A stabilizer wasn't needed, Hess Vice President Gerbert Schoonman says.

But heater treaters aren't as precise as stabilizers and can't remove as much volatile material, according to an executive at a company that produces both kinds of equipment.

The situation in the Bakken contrasts with the Eagle Ford Shale in South Texas. In 2012, there was basically no equipment to stabilize the crude. But companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to build centralized facilities and pipelines to move the resulting propane and butane to a Gulf Coast petrochemical complex.

The crude was stabilized enough to be shipped without incident through pipelines, trucks and rail tank cars, says Rusty Braziel, an industry consultant. "Over a two-year period of time, the vast majority of the problem went away."

[Euclid]

jeffhergert

There are allowances under the rules to omit a testing of the brakes and relying on a specific number of brakes.  Normally, that would be in instances where you were cutting away from the train with such a large number of cars that you either couldn't put enough handbrakes on to hold the entire train for the test or it would be severe overkill to do so. 

Doing the test, for us a complete release of engine and train brakes, is considered the "primary" method.  Relying on a specific number is considered the "secondary" method.  

At first, I was going to use "minimum" instead of "specific" when referring to the required number.  The reason I didn't is that even places that require a minimum number, the release test is still required.  The minimum number reflects total cars in the train and sometimes that minimum may not be enough.  Those places using a specific number do so by using a chart (for us) and taking into account total tonnage and grade considerations.  Since using this method is for times when you can't release for a check, I'm sure the specific number required by the chart has a safety factor built in. 

Jeff

Jeff,

I understand your distinction between the primary and secondary method.  But I don’t understand your comment as follows:

“Normally, that [secondary method] would be in instances where you were cutting away from the train with such a large number of cars that you either couldn't put enough handbrakes on to hold the entire train for the test or it would be severe overkill to do so.”

 

In thinking about it, I am guessing that you are referring to making a cut, leaving some cars, and pulling away with a large number of cars in tow.  I had not thought about how that would affect a push-pull test, but if that is what you are referring to, I can see the issue.

Say you had 60 cars, and you were going to stop and cut off the last 10 cars and leave them standing on a grade, and pull away with the engine and the first 50 cars.  I could see how you might set handbrakes on all 10 cars, release the airbrakes for a test, and have the engines and first 50 cars left with a high enough mass to roll away while dragging the 10 cars with handbrakes set.  The 10 cars would be as secured as possible with handbrakes, and yet the test could not confirm that.

So instead of confirming the securement with a release test, you simply set a “specific” amount called for in the instructions.  And that specific amount would have a generous safety factor determined by previous calculations and testing.   

[blue streak 1]

But pipelines, which carry most of the crude oil moved in the U.S., at times require stabilization of oil for safety purposes, according to a spokesman for Enbridge Inc., one of the biggest pipeline companies in North America.

Very interesting.  believe that this was hinted at in the past,  If Canadian transportation safety board finds out they may delay their report ?

[MidlandMike]

Regarding the WSJ article on crude stabilizers, it has been more practical to use them in Texas because of the availability of necessary infrastructure such as gas and propane lines.  It would help resource conservation if more gas lines were built to the Bakken, which is a regulatory issue.  But remember, the other byproducts of the stabilizers are propane, etc, which are even more explosive (google BLEVE), and would also be carried by thousands of tank car loads.

[Euclid]

Referring to the article linked to the first post, the five ways that Lac Megantic changed oil by rail is a work in progress, and I believe that it is less than half finished.  There are some big shoes yet to drop such as:

1)      The criminal prosecution of the engineer and two others, and the course it might take.

2)      The accident report from Transport Canada indicating what the train securement was and what it should have been; and the recommendations for future operations.

3)      The new U.S. federal tank car construction regulations.

Item #1 of the article’s list of five (stronger tank cars) is also far from resolved.  Most players agree that the DOT-111 tank cars are inadequate and must be phased out, however the speed of the phase-out and what will replace them is completely unresolved.  A newer car design known as the 1232 had been the intended replacement for the 111, but doubts have been raised as to whether the 1232 is adequate.  

The Federal DOT is developing the new regulations that will dictate the design of new tank cars, and nobody knows when they will release these regulations.  Meanwhile, the industry has responded by building a better tank car using their best judgment in lieu of any regulatory standard.  These cars are known as the “good faith” tank cars because building them without the assurance that they will meet the new federal regulations is an act of good faith. 

However, in my opinion, the “body language” of the DOT indicates that the “good faith” will be rebuffed, and the cars built under that standard will not meet the new federal regulations.  For this reason, the good faith effort is a gamble for the industry.  The fleet of existing cars is wearing out and replacement must be ongoing.  However, the prospect that the good faith cars might become prematurely obsolete upon the release of the new regulations is a risk in which the stakes rise as more good faith cars are built.  And yet, there is some indication that the new federal regulations which would resolve the matter will not be ready this year.  Will they be ready in 2015?  Will they ever be ready?  The indefinite lack of new regulations will ultimately lead to an entire tank car fleet made up of “good faith” cars.  If this incredible risk is not taken, the only alternative is to end shipping oil by rail.

Meanwhile, the U.S. DOT is asking the industry to respond to a new request that could become a federal mandate.  This would include the following:

1)      ECP brakes on oil trains.

2)      A 30 mph speed limit for oil trains.

3)      A ban on leaving oil trains unattended.  

This comes with the talk of a “crude by rail regulatory package” intended to be put forth by DOT, which would include operational measures.  BNSF says they would need to spend $2-billion in order to recover the lost capacity on their railroad due to a 30 mph speed limit on oil trains.

For more information on these new rules being considered, look at this:

http://cs.trains.com/trn/b/fred-frailey/archive/2014/06/13/the-next-rules-of-oil-by-rail.aspx

[dakotafred]

Not strictly related to the theme, but ...

Even the Wall Street Journal, in a story in its July 5-6 edition, reined in its habitual anti-rail bias to note, re. rail service to Lac-Megantic:

"Lac-Megantic exists because of the century-old railroad, and one in six jobs still depends on the rail, according to a provincial business-development agency.

"The railroad ... is a lifeline for the Eastern Townships region here. Some 50 businesses in the area rely on trains to ship 14,000 carloads a year. Those businesses support 4,200 jobs, 1,100 of which are around Lac-Megantic.

"For Tafisa Canada Inc., the town's largest employer, with 350 workers, the railroad is a crucial link to buyers of its particle board throughout the U.S. and Western Canada. About 50 railcars arrived at Tafisa's Lac-Megantic plant weekly before the derailment. After the accident, the company had to find alternate rail depots to reach by truck, adding under US$10 million to Tafisa's expenses.

" 'For our survival, we depend on the train,' says Chief Executive Louis Brassard." 

[rockymidlandrr]

The ban on leaving crude oil trains unattended could be very beneficial to the crews, because they would have to wait for the outbound crew.  So the overtime accumulated would be helpful, but the 30 mph speed restriction I don't ever see passing.  The loss of capacity would be big on carriers where speed is the name of the game, and running track speed.  BNSF has "fun" blending 70 and 55 mph trains, but my employer would be blending 60 and 30.  But on the other side of that coin, thats only 60 and 30 going  downhill because you only get enough power to just get over the hills anyways.

[tree68]

rockymidlandrr

The ban on leaving crude oil trains unattended could be very beneficial to the crews, because they would have to wait for the outbound crew.

Methinks that might depend on the requirements of "attending the train."  If all that is required is a babysitter, then a low-level laborer with minimal training could do the job.  Depending on labor agreements and a host of other considerations, it's possible the "babysitter" could drive the van to the train, then stay there while the crew drove back...  Or not...

It's interesting to note that one of the folks cited in Frailey's piece states that ECP and distributed power would have limited effect in preventing incidents.

The currently nebulous new construction requirements definitely place both the manufacturers and the car owners in a difficult position.  Kinda like the wife telling the husband the dining room needs to be painted before the big dinner party, but not telling him what color...

[rockymidlandrr]

As good as an idea is to put a lower wage worker on the train, that is against the labor agreement.  It would be the same as a trainmaster sitting on the engine, again against the agreements.  Having a fresh crew for the inbound train would be the ideal situation, and their train would become very "hot" as their time ran out to get to their destination.  But then again, I've seen situations too where a local was held out of the terminal long enough that they went dead on the main, stacking up a coal and intermodal train.  Four hours later, the crews on the other trains were running out of time and ended up not making it to their destinations either.

Back on subject, mandating ECP and DP on the trains would be a good step though as better train handling could be practiced as ECP is the future.

[Euclid]

rockymidlandrr

Back on subject, mandating ECP and DP on the trains would be a good step though as better train handling could be practiced as ECP is the future.

It was John Rimer, chief mechanical officer of CSX Transportation, who said that ECP brakes would not have any impact on preventing accidents and minimal effect on the distance required to stop a train.  I disagree.  I think ECP brakes would have an impact on preventing accidents for due to the following reasons:   

ECP brakes apply simultaneously on all cars, whereas conventional air brakes apply in propagation from one care to the next.  This wave of application propagation causes in-train forces that can cause derailments, so the lack of this application wave with ECP brakes reduces derailments.

Undesired emergency applications also cause in-train forces that are likely to be more severe than those caused by the propagation wave in service braking applications of conventional air brakes.  ECP brakes reduce undesired emergency applications, and thus reduce derailments due to that cause. 

Also, because of the application propagation wave of conventional air brakes, the full application takes more time to achieve than it does with the simultaneous application of ECP brakes.  Therefore, ECP brakes stop a train faster than conventional air brakes because they take less time to set on all cars.  Stopping a train amounts to dissipating its kinetic energy through braking friction.  The quicker this kinetic energy is dissipated, the less time there is for it to cause damage in the collisions between tank cars during a high speed derailment. So, in this case, ECP brakes reduce damage potential once a derailment has begun.    

[BaltACD]

rockymidlandrr

The ban on leaving crude oil trains unattended could be very beneficial to the crews, because they would have to wait for the outbound crew.  So the overtime accumulated would be helpful, but the 30 mph speed restriction I don't ever see passing.  The loss of capacity would be big on carriers where speed is the name of the game, and running track speed.  BNSF has "fun" blending 70 and 55 mph trains, but my employer would be blending 60 and 30.  But on the other side of that coin, thats only 60 and 30 going  downhill because you only get enough power to just get over the hills anyways.

Sounds great on paper!  Reality however, has a way of intruding on paper railroading.  With the upsurge in business outpacing the increase in hiring and qualifying T&E personnel - there are times when there is NO CREW to be had for 12 hours or more.

Once a crew goes HOS they begin accruing 'limbo time' until they are finally relieved at the destination terminal.  When they do mark off duty, the amount of 'limbo time' is added to the 10 hours undisturbed rest that the HOS law mandates.  So if a crew gets 4 hours of limbo time, they cannot be called for duty until 14 hours after their mark off time.  T&E personnel can only accumulate 30 Limbo Hours in a calendar month.

[Euclid]

rockymidlandrr

...but the 30 mph speed restriction I don't ever see passing.  The loss of capacity would be big...

I am not sure if this is a matter of a 30 mph speed limit on oil trains “passing” or not.  I don’t think it is something that Congress will vote on.  Instead it will be something simply imposed by the U.S. DOT.  It is being considered as a new regulation.  BNSF has referred to the idea as an unfunded mandate such as PTC.  They say it will cost them $2-billion in lost capacity.  So we are seeing the emergence of the following new regulations:

1)      Oil train babysitting.

2)      Oil train reduced speed limit.

3)      Oil train ECP brakes.

4)      Oil train stronger tank cars.

[Euclid]

If railroads are forced to equip oil trains with ECP brakes, the question is whether they will combine ECP with conventional automatic air brakes; or reduce cost by converting to ECP exclusively and rendering the cars unable to operate with cars having conventional air brakes.  I wonder what the cost tradeoff would be for those two alternatives.