Can anyone explain the principle behind the old DRG&W's "Short, Fast and Frequent" Concept??

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by rob_l

Mark said:

"One place where the philosophy of Kenefick stands out is motive power: Rather than the peculiar infatuation with big, inflexible, high-tonnage machines of the 1960s, namely the double-diesels and turbines, the Kenefick era zeroed in on two standardized locomotives, the SD40-2 for all types of main-line service (and its GE equivalent, the C30-7), and the GP38-2 for branch line and secondary service. Standardization is the hallmark of a railroad manager who seeks efficiency of the total operation, not just pieces of it that catch his fancy or speak to his background."

The standardization of UP motive power is really the doing of Frank Accord, who Kenefick brought over from NYC to succeed D S Neuhart as UP Chief Mechanical Officer. Accord had complete autonomy to decide what to do about motive power. I think his decisions had little or nothing to do with the total operation, they really had to do with cutting motive power maintenance costs.

The last straw was the U50C disaster (VPO Bill Fox called it "the biggest goof we ever made"), after that there was this gigantic swing in the opposite direction to make UP motive power as dull and as conservative as possible. And in this Accord succeeded very well. Accord did have to give in from pressures in the Traffic and Transportation Depts. for high-speed service, and so he was forced to re-gear a block of SD40-2s with passenger gearing (the so-called Fast Forties). But by and large he left his mark by making the UP motive power roster about as unimaginative and uninspired as anyone could conceive.

Although it's possible, I doubt Kenefick provided significant direction about striving for motive power cost savings by turning the UP into an SD40-2 railroad. To the contrary, I think he was quite enamored with being able to run a lot faster than the competition using the Centennials, with the PR prestige from having bigger, faster power than anybody else and with running a better carload railroad service than anybody else. This was the UP legacy he strived to uphold. He really was an Old School guy in that respect, perhaps even besting Al Perlman as the best of the old-era, quality-service managers. So I think it is very appropriate that they are planning a Kenefick Park on top of the hill in Omaha overlooking the MIssouri with a Centennial and a Big Boy stuffed and mounted therein. That's the kind of railroading where his heart was.

Best regards,

Rob L.

I look forward to hearing more from you sir.

[rob_l]

Mark said:

"One place where the philosophy of Kenefick stands out is motive power: Rather than the peculiar infatuation with big, inflexible, high-tonnage machines of the 1960s, namely the double-diesels and turbines, the Kenefick era zeroed in on two standardized locomotives, the SD40-2 for all types of main-line service (and its GE equivalent, the C30-7), and the GP38-2 for branch line and secondary service. Standardization is the hallmark of a railroad manager who seeks efficiency of the total operation, not just pieces of it that catch his fancy or speak to his background."

The standardization of UP motive power is really the doing of Frank Accord, who Kenefick brought over from NYC to succeed D S Neuhart as UP Chief Mechanical Officer. Accord had complete autonomy to decide what to do about motive power. I think his decisions had little or nothing to do with the total operation, they really had to do with cutting motive power maintenance costs.

The last straw was the U50C disaster (VPO Bill Fox called it "the biggest goof we ever made"), after that there was this gigantic swing in the opposite direction to make UP motive power as dull and as conservative as possible. And in this Accord succeeded very well. Accord did have to give in from pressures in the Traffic and Transportation Depts. for high-speed service, and so he was forced to re-gear a block of SD40-2s with passenger gearing (the so-called Fast Forties). But by and large he left his mark by making the UP motive power roster about as unimaginative and uninspired as anyone could conceive.

Although it's possible, I doubt Kenefick provided significant direction about striving for motive power cost savings by turning the UP into an SD40-2 railroad. To the contrary, I think he was quite enamored with being able to run a lot faster than the competition using the Centennials, with the PR prestige from having bigger, faster power than anybody else and with running a better carload railroad service than anybody else. This was the UP legacy he strived to uphold. He really was an Old School guy in that respect, perhaps even besting Al Perlman as the best of the old-era, quality-service managers. So I think it is very appropriate that they are planning a Kenefick Park on top of the hill in Omaha overlooking the MIssouri with a Centennial and a Big Boy stuffed and mounted therein. That's the kind of railroading where his heart was.

Best regards,

Rob L.

[rob_l]

I'm new to the Forum, but I'd like to jump in here.

While it's possible that DRGW's SFF carload freight operations may have contrasted somewhat with the the pre-1969 UP, they certainly did NOT stand out from the Kenefick-era UP. By then any distinction of DRGW SFF service was pure hype.

In gigantic contrast to the UP of today, the UP of those days had a very strong traffic department in close and frequent contact with all significant shippers and exercising considerable influence over the schedules and service required of the operating department. With the posible exception of certain very captive traffic such as Green River soda ash, ALL of UP's non-unit train freight traffic was run on fast, daily, relatively-light-tonnage symbol freights that adhered to schedule very consistently. All loads both ways between North Platte and the PNW and between North Platte and Southern California moved in 70mph trains limited to 4,000 tons. (Trains to and from the SP were somewhat higher-tonnage at SP's insistence, 5,500 tons EB IIRC.) UP invested in locomotives with passenger gearing (e.g., the fleet of Centennials) and other features oriented to high-speed operation of light-tonnage trains. The opening of the EB hump at North Platte enabled excellent single-classification service from the West Coast to Chicago gateways not matched by DRGW routings (not really DRGW's fault, just that they had to rely on connections without the volume, classification terminals, track quality and management attention to provide that kind of service). DRGW secured very little of the most time-sensitive traffic (e.g., perishables, intermodal merchandise). Their EB carload traffic was predominantly Oregon lumber and California canned goods, neither in a real big hurry (but requiring enough service that when the SP and WP connections showed up, you had to run a train, you couldn't wait for more volume -- hence SFF. Same for when the BN or Rock showed up in Denver or the MoP showed up in Pueblo. You had to go.)

DRGW carload traffic survived in a regulated environment whereby the rates were independent of route and there was sufficient traffic out there not in a real big hurry (and hence somewhat indifferent to route). I bet you will find that DRGW's Pueblo gateway traffic held up better than their Denver gateway traffic as the 70s wore on, and that the road's carload traffic became increasingly dominated by Texas/Southeast - N .Calif./PNW traffic.

Best regards,

Rob L.

[Anonymous]

Mark,

Did this work? If the price is the same - Cost were higher, profits lower. Correct? Did they generate more voulme by providing better service?

[Anonymous]

Can anyone explain the principle behind the old DRG&W's "Short, Fast and Frequent" Concept??

I know that there was ancient TRAINS mag article on the the operating concept over twenty years ago but I have trouble locating it.

What I remember about it is that the T&E crews loved it because they met their road requirements faster as well as the customers. and also that it enabled Rio Grande to effectively compete with the UP and to a certain extent the Santa Fe.

To all you opwerating types out there can this be used effectively today in the post Staggers Era??

Can this concept help increase the market viability of carload freight for hiher value merchandise in the intermodal age???