We can discuss the question of the number of brakes to set, but remember a couple of comments from railroaders on this subject: if you spin the wheel till it stops, you have not really accomplished much unless you tug hard to get that extra couple of clicks. It's not a simple question of set or not set.
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"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
BucyrusFor a grade as steep as the one leading to Lac-Megantic, the MM&A rules call for handbrakes to be set on 8% of the cars. For that same amount of grade on the CN, their rules call for setting brakes on 40% of the cars.
That statement, if accurate, suggests two very different rules on CN and MM&A, the CN requiring 5 times the number of brakes be set. So regardless if the engineer followed MM&A rules or not, that number (11 cars?) was totally inadequate, probably should have followed CN rule and been ~28 cars.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
At low speed, a portable derail or hop-toad may not even work.
(you expect all the stuff stored in the low nose or under the radiators to be there?)
zardoz Leave out the extra brake shoe, the extra air hose wrench, the spare main res hose, and the gallon thermos of coffee, and you'd have room for the derail.
Leave out the extra brake shoe, the extra air hose wrench, the spare main res hose, and the gallon thermos of coffee, and you'd have room for the derail.
The air compressor stays.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
If the crew sets handbakes on just the number of cars needed to hold the train, isn't it possible that a chain could break or the linkage could relax enough that the train starts slipping? It seems prudent to set some extra after the test.
MM&A could claim that the engineer was at fault because he was supposed to set enough handbrakes to prevent the train from rolling, and the train rolled. But that charge cannot stick because the engineer had no way of knowing how many brakes it would have taken to prevent the train from rolling. So the company’s requirement is invalid because the means of meeting it is unknowable unless the train rolls.
Or, the MM&A could claim that the engineer was at fault not setting 11 handbrakes per the MM&A requirement, and they could claim that this is proven by the fact that the train rolled. However, the MM&A has no way of proving that 11 handbrakes would have held the train; especially when the MM&A has no specification as to how tightly the brakes must be applied.
The engineer claims he set 11 handbrakes per the MM&A requirement, and there is no way anybody can prove otherwise. Ultimately, the MM&A will be held responsible for not having a reliable method of securing unattended trains at the top of that grade. And this, of course, is proven by the fact that one of their trains ran away and caused a disaster.
I would think a Derail would be assigned/attached as standard equipment on each engine (just like rerailers used to hang on the sides of tenders).
And I still think a wheel chock could be applied to the rail in front of a car or two without a man having to get near the wheels under the car. A long handle/lever could be used to place it and a good twist to lock the chock in place. It could be standard equipment on the engine too.
You don't leave on a trip without checking that the radio works, and you have fuel and FRED is in place, why not verify that the derail and wheel chocks are present, too?
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
tdmidgetThis engineer claims to have set 11 handbrakes in less than 25 minutes. It would be hard to walk to eleven cars and just give the wheel a spin in that time.
I dunno - I've set a few handbrakes in my time - that doesn't sound too far off the mark.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Well, since the regs say that a train may not be left secured unattended by air brakes alone, the one crew CANNOT be legal. There is no way he can be setting handbrakes and in the cab at the same time. So, during the period while he is (hopefully) setting handbrakes. the train is held by air alone.
Secondly the one man crew eliminates the possibility of a peer check, formal or informal. Much of my work is in the nuclear industry. The peer check is a basic human performance tool. It is simple, 2 heads are better than one.
This engineer claims to have set 11 handbrakes in less than 25 minutes. It would be hard to walk to eleven cars and just give the wheel a spin in that time. Would he have put more effort into it if there was a man in the cab who might question that?
Portable is a relative term.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I hope we don't have to start carrying around portable derails. My grip is heavy enough as it is.
I agree with you 100%. First of all, management must give clear written instructions to an operating crew regarding the many rules they must obey. Secondly, why was the train's engineer instructed to secure (tie-down) the train on a descending grade WITHOUT placing a portable derail directly in front of the train (maybe ten or twenty feet in front of the first locomotive.
It should be also noted that one or more of the derailed cars hit a propane tank which exploded and caused a B.L.E.V.E..
I don't like engineer only trains for this reason. One person is expected to do too much.
The last paragraph in your letter is very good---there is plenty of blame to go around.
Ed Burns
Retired NP-BN-BNSF clerk from Minneapolis
On the big thread about the Lac-Megantic runaway, there was a lot of discussion about air brakes and handbrakes. I found an excellent article analyzing the issues surrounding the question of applying handbrakes to secure trains. So I thought I would start a fresh thread focusing only on that element of the disaster.
On the other thread, we discussed whether the handbrake procedure was simple or complex. This article makes it clear that while setting a handbrake is simple, the proper procedure to secure a train on a grade is not so simple.
The rules call for setting a certain number of handbrakes on trains depending on the grade. An unaddressed complication enters in for trains standing on a varying grade. For a grade as steep as the one leading to Lac-Megantic, the MM&A rules call for handbrakes to be set on 8% of the cars. For that same amount of grade on the CN, their rules call for setting brakes on 40% of the cars. Variation in wind conditions can also influence need for handbrakes.
The guidelines allow an engineer to set more than the required amount at his own discretion. But what exactly does that mean in practical terms? Can you blame an engineer if the guidelines for the proper number of brakes were insufficient and the engineer’s discretion agreed with the guidelines? Well apparently the answer is yes. This is because, while the engineer is free to use his discretion, his discretion must prevent the train from rolling away. Here is the rule:
Section 112 states: “When equipment is left at any point, a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied to prevent it from moving. Special instructions will indicate the minimum hand-brake requirements for all locations where equipment is left.”
So you have to apply the minimum, and you have to apply enough to prevent movement. Many have mentioned the push-pull test to see if enough brakes are applied to prevent movement. That sounds like the practical solution, however; the article mentions this:
But in a 2011 report into a runaway train incident near Sept-Îles, the TSB noted that “it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades (so) locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management’s expectations have been met every time cars are secured.”
So, according to the TSB, the “practical method” of testing to see if enough handbrakes are applied is “impossible.”
I conclude that even if the investigation shows that the engineer did not set enough handbrakes, or did not set them tight enough, a large part of the blame is going to be placed on the MM&A Ry, and on the Canadian regulations.
http://www.montrealgazette.com/M%C3%A9gantic+clear+rules+train+hand+brakes/8679004/story.html
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