The train was parked at Nantes because the "yard" in town is much too short for it to fit without blocking traffic. It also permitted starting the train on a down slope. There is a similar siding named "Vachon" a similar distance and elevation east of Megantic.
With approximately 60 cars held only by air brakes slowly leaking air, it is almost certain that one of them relaxed enough the create a slight "twitch" setting the entire train in motion. The train set still for 45-50 minutes: Newton's Law, " A body at rest. . ."
Why didn't the Engineer ask for advice or actual help? Hubris? Was he working after his hours had expired?
David K. Wheeler
BaltACD So the TSB is stating that there is NO WAY for a train to be secured in Canada. How govermental of them.
So the TSB is stating that there is NO WAY for a train to be secured in Canada. How govermental of them.
BaltACDSo the TSB is stating that there is NO WAY for a train to be secured in Canada. How govermental of them.
Perfect is the enemy of good, once again.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
BucyrusSince the only point of the test is to verify, their statement that verification by the test is “impossible” has to mean that the test is so far from perfect that it is 100% worthless.
But they didn't say that. You are guessing.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
oltmannd Bucyrus “Because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management's expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112.” This is amazing. If the empirical test is unreliable, you don’t have a safe and reliable means to secure trains with handbrakes. "not being met EVERY time" <> reliable. It it possible to have a reliable system the does not work properly EVERY time. Block signals are a good example. You have to define the term "reliable", however.
Bucyrus “Because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management's expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112.” This is amazing. If the empirical test is unreliable, you don’t have a safe and reliable means to secure trains with handbrakes.
“Because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management's expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112.”
This is amazing. If the empirical test is unreliable, you don’t have a safe and reliable means to secure trains with handbrakes.
"not being met EVERY time" <> reliable. It it possible to have a reliable system the does not work properly EVERY time. Block signals are a good example. You have to define the term "reliable", however.
The term “unreliable” was my term, but it is a bit of a euphemism because I did not want to go too far out onto a limb. I agree that term, unreliable leaves open the question of degrees of reliability, and in the final analysis, nothing is 100% reliable.
However, the actual statement by the TSB was that it is “impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades,”
Since the only point of the test is to verify, their statement that verification by the test is “impossible” has to mean that the test is so far from perfect that it is 100% worthless. So it fails to work properly every time.
Yes, it is possible to move them with the locomotive, but keep in mind yards are flat, and with, say a pair of 1500hp switchers; it is still a struggle to move a cut with 4 handbrakes.
And the brakes in yards are set to absorb the shock of having cars kicked against them, so you don’t want them so tight they lock the wheel and slide…once you’ve broken the friction between the rail and the wheel, they will side till gravity and weight get them stopped….your goal is to make them behave like a shock absorber, not an immovable brick wall.
Securing out on the road is a little different, but the idea is the same, the brakes are used to hold the wheels in place, but so tight they lock the wheel, if it starts to slide, and it’s on a grade downhill….your goal is the same as with your automobiles ABS anti-lock brakes, locked wheels can’t stop the rail car or auto.
23 17 46 11
Has it occurred to anyone here that one or more of the handbrakes could have been released by a vandal?
Also, with 11 brakes tightly/properly set, pushing the train in the direction of the downgrade would very likely cause it to move. I have personally seen yard crews shove cars deeper into a yard track without releasing the handbrakes on them, just because it would be inconvenient to walk the cut ands release them. So it IS possible to move a cut with the handbrakes set.
And, as to how tight it tight enough, I've always been told by T&E personnel that if you grab the chain and try to shake it, it is fully set if the chain cannot move sideways, not even a little bit, i.e., so tight that it feels like a solid piece of steel.
Just my two cents...
Semper Vaporo Just asking a question here? If you were to set some brakes on a series of cars and then do the push/pull test, would re-checking the "tightness" of those that were set show that they are still set as they were before? As I remember of what I have seen of the braking system, there are a lot of chains and eyeloops involved in the linkages from the brake wheel to the brake hangars. Chains and eyeloops are notorious for not extended to the true possible length of the series of loops... rust and imperfections in the contact surfaces tend to seize before two segments reach the deepest interface. Thus, they can be brought to some tension level, but when jarred severely they can then slip past that imperfection and allow some small amount of slop in the tension. Does the test alter the results?
Just asking a question here?
If you were to set some brakes on a series of cars and then do the push/pull test, would re-checking the "tightness" of those that were set show that they are still set as they were before?
As I remember of what I have seen of the braking system, there are a lot of chains and eyeloops involved in the linkages from the brake wheel to the brake hangars. Chains and eyeloops are notorious for not extended to the true possible length of the series of loops... rust and imperfections in the contact surfaces tend to seize before two segments reach the deepest interface. Thus, they can be brought to some tension level, but when jarred severely they can then slip past that imperfection and allow some small amount of slop in the tension.
Does the test alter the results?
Yes. In fact, when you do a "golden shoe" test on a new or modified freight car design, you go around banging on the rigging to make sure you've handled all of the issues you mention.
jeffhergert rcdrye In reality the "normal" operation here by MM&A was a setup for failure. Instead of tying down a train (of any size, type or lading) in the flat yard at Lac Megantic, a onetime CP division point, the train was stopped near the single crewmember's favorite motel on a grade only seven miles away. It would take an almost impossibly conscientious person to walk down the train, climb up on a car from the ballast, fully set the hand brake, and drop off and repeat a dozen or more times, and then walk the 750 feet or so back to the locomotive, climb aboard, release the air brakes, test the hold, and then set the air and repeat if more hand brakes were required, when the run was almost over, the taxi was waiting for him, nobody was watching and he had been working almost 12 hours. Why go to all this trouble when he "knows" that the air brakes are set and will hold the train anyway? Most real RAILROADERS do. Yes, I must admit there are those who do take chances and short cuts, but most of us don't. Unfortunately, it's the ones that don't do their job (not saying this is the case for this incident.) and something happens and then the whole world paints every employee with the same brush. Besides being conscientious, there is another reason we do our jobs. Self-preservation. Managers can and do go out and check trains for proper securement. I take offence at this post, not that I think it should be removed or locked. Jeff
rcdrye In reality the "normal" operation here by MM&A was a setup for failure. Instead of tying down a train (of any size, type or lading) in the flat yard at Lac Megantic, a onetime CP division point, the train was stopped near the single crewmember's favorite motel on a grade only seven miles away. It would take an almost impossibly conscientious person to walk down the train, climb up on a car from the ballast, fully set the hand brake, and drop off and repeat a dozen or more times, and then walk the 750 feet or so back to the locomotive, climb aboard, release the air brakes, test the hold, and then set the air and repeat if more hand brakes were required, when the run was almost over, the taxi was waiting for him, nobody was watching and he had been working almost 12 hours. Why go to all this trouble when he "knows" that the air brakes are set and will hold the train anyway?
In reality the "normal" operation here by MM&A was a setup for failure. Instead of tying down a train (of any size, type or lading) in the flat yard at Lac Megantic, a onetime CP division point, the train was stopped near the single crewmember's favorite motel on a grade only seven miles away. It would take an almost impossibly conscientious person to walk down the train, climb up on a car from the ballast, fully set the hand brake, and drop off and repeat a dozen or more times, and then walk the 750 feet or so back to the locomotive, climb aboard, release the air brakes, test the hold, and then set the air and repeat if more hand brakes were required, when the run was almost over, the taxi was waiting for him, nobody was watching and he had been working almost 12 hours. Why go to all this trouble when he "knows" that the air brakes are set and will hold the train anyway?
Most real RAILROADERS do. Yes, I must admit there are those who do take chances and short cuts, but most of us don't. Unfortunately, it's the ones that don't do their job (not saying this is the case for this incident.) and something happens and then the whole world paints every employee with the same brush.
Besides being conscientious, there is another reason we do our jobs. Self-preservation. Managers can and do go out and check trains for proper securement.
I take offence at this post, not that I think it should be removed or locked.
Jeff
rcdrye I haven't seen anywhere that the number of handbrakes that had been set has been determined by the TSB. In reality the "normal" operation here by MM&A was a setup for failure. Instead of tying down a train (of any size, type or lading) in the flat yard at Lac Megantic, a onetime CP division point, the train was stopped near the single crewmember's favorite motel on a grade only seven miles away. It would take an almost impossibly conscientious person to walk down the train, climb up on a car from the ballast, fully set the hand brake, and drop off and repeat a dozen or more times, and then walk the 750 feet or so back to the locomotive, climb aboard, release the air brakes, test the hold, and then set the air and repeat if more hand brakes were required, when the run was almost over, the taxi was waiting for him, nobody was watching and he had been working almost 12 hours. Why go to all this trouble when he "knows" that the air brakes are set and will hold the train anyway?
I haven't seen anywhere that the number of handbrakes that had been set has been determined by the TSB.
Why do it? It is the mans job! It is the job his employer expects him to do! It is the job he is being PAID to do! Railroads do not expect impossibly conscientious employees - they expect employees that comply with rules and special instructions when handling and/or securing trains. It is not rocket science, brain surgery or slave labor - it is railroading 101.
Why not park the train 'in town' where the terrain is level? I suspect, the carrier has received numerous complaints from local residents for the noise and or smell of having the engine running to keep air on the train and responded by parking 'outside of town'.
jeffhergert Bucyrus jeffhergert Bucyrus Why does the Canadian TSB say that is unreliable? Maybe because it's the simplest explanation. Since the procedure was followed and it moved anyway, the test must be flawed or unreliable. Jeff, Thanks for that clarification about adding a safety factor. Regarding the statement by the TSB of Canada, when you say that “maybe because it’s the simplest explanation,” do you mean explanation of the Lac-Megantic runaway? Actually the TSB made their statement in 2009, so it is not a response to the Lac-Megantic wreck. In 2009, they said this: “Because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management's expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112.”I mean in response to the TSB's statement when ever it was made. They must figure if it (P/P test) was done and didn't work, it must therefor be unreliable.Jeff
Bucyrus jeffhergert Bucyrus Why does the Canadian TSB say that is unreliable? Maybe because it's the simplest explanation. Since the procedure was followed and it moved anyway, the test must be flawed or unreliable. Jeff, Thanks for that clarification about adding a safety factor. Regarding the statement by the TSB of Canada, when you say that “maybe because it’s the simplest explanation,” do you mean explanation of the Lac-Megantic runaway? Actually the TSB made their statement in 2009, so it is not a response to the Lac-Megantic wreck. In 2009, they said this: “Because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management's expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112.”
jeffhergert Bucyrus Why does the Canadian TSB say that is unreliable? Maybe because it's the simplest explanation. Since the procedure was followed and it moved anyway, the test must be flawed or unreliable.
Bucyrus Why does the Canadian TSB say that is unreliable?
Why does the Canadian TSB say that is unreliable?
Maybe because it's the simplest explanation. Since the procedure was followed and it moved anyway, the test must be flawed or unreliable.
Jeff,
Thanks for that clarification about adding a safety factor.
Regarding the statement by the TSB of Canada, when you say that “maybe because it’s the simplest explanation,” do you mean explanation of the Lac-Megantic runaway? Actually the TSB made their statement in 2009, so it is not a response to the Lac-Megantic wreck. In 2009, they said this:
They did make the statement about the unreliability of the push-pull test in a report on an earlier runaway, but they did not link the issue to that specific runaway. So it is unclear why they even mentioned it there in addition to the question of what they mean by saying that the test is unreliable.
In that runaway, the engineer started having trouble controlling the train on a down grade, so he made an emergency application. Once stopped, that called for setting handbrakes to hold the train during the recharge. The minimum number of handbrakes called for was 12. He set 35, but the train started to roll before he got back to the cab. He made it into the cab and put it into dynamic braking, but that did not hold it. The train finally stopped when the track leveled out. So the push-pull test never came into play during the incident.
The TSB comment is in this report of the runaway:
http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.asp
The comment is at the end of the section called, Train securement between Bybee and Tika.
jeffhergert Bucyrus jeffhergert Bucyrus Why does the Canadian TSB say that is unreliable? Maybe because it's the simplest explanation. Since the procedure was followed and it moved anyway, the test must be flawed or unreliable. Jeff, Thanks for that clarification about adding a safety factor. Regarding the statement by the TSB of Canada, when you say that “maybe because it’s the simplest explanation,” do you mean explanation of the Lac-Megantic runaway? Actually the TSB made their statement in 2009, so it is not a response to the Lac-Megantic wreck. In 2009, they said this: “Because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management's expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112.” I mean in response to the TSB's statement when ever it was made. They must figure if it (P/P test) was done and didn't work, it must therefor be unreliable. Jeff
I mean in response to the TSB's statement when ever it was made. They must figure if it (P/P test) was done and didn't work, it must therefor be unreliable.
Space shuttles are unreliable in a demonstrated way, also, yet we continued to fly them for quite a while after having two of them fail.
Because it is impossible to verify hand-brake ceramic tile effectiveness by inspection in space pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers astronauts cannot accurately know that management's expectations of safe reentry have been met every time cars are secured reentry is attempted
The TSB's statement is not useful or helpful.
jeffhergert For myself, I haven't ruled out malicious intent on the part of someone releasing hand brakes. Short of a confession, it would be very hard to prove. There are also reasons that the powers that be may want to down play this possibility. Which is worse, the fact that a railroad employee didn't do his job or that any unattended train could be so easily tampered with?
For myself, I haven't ruled out malicious intent on the part of someone releasing hand brakes. Short of a confession, it would be very hard to prove. There are also reasons that the powers that be may want to down play this possibility.
Which is worse, the fact that a railroad employee didn't do his job or that any unattended train could be so easily tampered with?
Now we're getting somewhere! Where is the real risk and what steps reduce that risk the most?
BucyrusIf the rule requires a crew to set enough handbrakes to hold the train, and if they tested, but still fail to set enough,
Stop there. If they set and test and the train holds, then they have set enough. That's the working definition of "enough" in this case.
Bucyrus...but still fail to set enough, would the rule infraction be forgiven on the basis that the test they performed was unreliable and failed to give the correct information?
If the train doesn't move after the handbrakes are set, yet later the train runs away, then something changed between "then" and "now".
One of those things would have to be the automatic and independent releasing or leaking off. On top of that, there would have to be something more. Maybe a a handbrake mechanism pawl failed. Maybe a trespasser knocked one off. Maybe the temperature rose a lot and the linkage expanded. Maybe the temperature dropped a lot and the linkage hit it's fatigue limit and failed. Maybe there was a bad weld between clevis and rod. Maybe something bumped the train. Maybe a meteor hit the train. (Most likely on CSX, obviously)
Maybe, maybe, maybe all adds up to pretty long odds. The rules rely on redundancy. There is no "fail safe" way to do this.
Semper Vaporo Of course, there has been nothing said about a person or persons, unknown, or some other event/circumstance that interfered with the brakes that were set and the number the engineer had set was totally adequate if the external interference had not occurred. I can think of at least one scenario where one of the firemen might have deliberately released the brakes on all the cars so as to prepare to get them moved out of the way, in case the engine fire spread. Then there is the unknown person that came by and did so maliciously. I hope they investigate enough to know for sure they are not just making the Engineer the "goat".
Of course, there has been nothing said about a person or persons, unknown, or some other event/circumstance that interfered with the brakes that were set and the number the engineer had set was totally adequate if the external interference had not occurred.
I can think of at least one scenario where one of the firemen might have deliberately released the brakes on all the cars so as to prepare to get them moved out of the way, in case the engine fire spread.
Then there is the unknown person that came by and did so maliciously.
I hope they investigate enough to know for sure they are not just making the Engineer the "goat".
Which is worse, the fact that a railroad employee didn't do his job or that any unattended train could be so easily tampered with? I think the general population will accept a lone screw-up more than an easily accessible rail system. If tampered with, it could have major ramifications, that could cost companies a lot of money to remedy, in the way trains are secured, or cars left in rail yards/sidings/spurs no matter what their size. There's a lot of places where unattended equipment is left.
Bucyrus I tried to ask the TSB what they meant by saying that it is impossible to know whether handbrakes would hold from conducting a push-pull test. They would not return the call, and I have since read that they will not engage in any discussions with the public about railroad train brake systems. That is not just in regard to discussion about the MM&A runaway, but the whole train brake subject in general. However, I would guess that the restriction of discussing brakes is based on the fallout of the MM&A runaway.
I tried to ask the TSB what they meant by saying that it is impossible to know whether handbrakes would hold from conducting a push-pull test. They would not return the call, and I have since read that they will not engage in any discussions with the public about railroad train brake systems. That is not just in regard to discussion about the MM&A runaway, but the whole train brake subject in general. However, I would guess that the restriction of discussing brakes is based on the fallout of the MM&A runaway.
TSB and for that matter NTSB are political entities - political entities will not put anything in writing to respond to mere peeons - they could be held accountable for it. The only things they will put in writing are their official reports and don't expect them to explain any inconsistancies that happen to be in them.
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
Yes, but....
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
I can see that possibility of a near zero safety factor causing a push-pull test to be unreliable, and maybe that is part of the reasoning by the TSB in saying that test is unreliable.
It seems to me that the issue of a safety factor partly depends on which of these two versions of the test is used:
1) The train is actually pushed or pulled to see how the handbrakes hold.
2) The air brakes are simply released on a standing train to see if the handbrakes hold.
People here have described both procedures.
With #1, you can at least judge how much safety factor there is by the way the push or pull feels.
With #2, there is no way to know how much safety factor there is.
With #2, if you set 15 handbrakes, release the air, and it holds, that only tells you that 15 is enough. If 10 would have held it, then you have 5 extra as a safety factor. But there is no way of knowing how many extra brakes have been set. It might be that 14 would not have held it, so in that case, you would only have one extra brake as a safety factor. It could be an even closer margin than one whole brake. What if the train would have rolled up to the point of having 14.9 brakes set?
Is it safe to leave a train parked on a grade just hanging by a thread so to speak? The equipment cools off, the ambient air temperature changes, the solar heating changes, and wind can kick up. If a train is on a grade with the smallest amount of handbrake safety margin, a cooling contraction of the rails could send a small impulse through the cars standing on those rails. The slightest slack effect created by the impulse of contracting rails could break the holding friction of one or more handbrakes. Once that breaks, the friction begins to fall off. And once that happens the necessary friction will never be regained. The train will roll, and the friction will continue to fall off as the speed increases.
But I am not sure if the Transportation Safety Board of Canada is referring to an uncertain safety factor when they say that it is impossible to know that the train is secured by using the push-pull test. What I find curious about their statement is that they link it with the condition of being on a “high grade.” I don’t understand why that would matter. If you push and pull on a grade, the resistance is going to be higher pushing or pulling up-grade that it will be down-grade. But why not just do the test for the downhill direction since that is the direction that the handbrakes need to work against?
OK we have now really covered the setting of hand brakes. What about the procedure(s) for releasing the brakes when you are a relieving crew that has no idea how they were set up ? Discuss both single person crew & two person crew ? And how are the possibilities that some car hand brakes will not set ?
One reason the "push-pull" test is unreliable is because of something I've seen numerous times. The hand brakes are holding the train/car just fine - often for extended periods with no air to help them out - yet when the car is moved (secondary to coupling or otherwise bumped), it will continue to roll.
Our procedure (specifically on grades greater than .5%) is to set hand brakes, release all air, and see if they hold. No power is applied. If they hold, we're good. If not, keep adding brakes until they do (or make sure the brakes already set are fully set).
Unattended trains/cars are also chocked.
Where there are enough cars (once I get to four on our local trains, I run out of cars anyhow), I can see setting enough to hold for a static test, then maybe a couple more. This could involve several trips between the cars and the locomotive, however.
Once a number has been established through repeated tests, though, I would opine that the guidelines would include that "finagle factor" so the operation would then be reduced to set and test. If conditions are such that the established number does not do the job, then more brakes, which should include that "finagle factor" should be set. If the number in the guideline is supported by sufficient testing, however, that should rarely, if ever, be necessary.
I've mentioned it a couple of times in these discussions, but that doesn't mean it's been brought up officially. I would opine that this may well have been the case in one form or another. Given the engine shutdown factor, it's my opinion that the "straw the broke the camel's back" was loss of the independent brakes, which take their air directly from the main res. No compressor, main res leaks off, independent brakes release, and away we go.
This still goes back to insufficient (or insufficiently set) brakes on the tank cars, as they should have been able to hold the train even without the locomotive brakes.
I mentioned elsewhere that setting 11 brakes on the cars would be 44 axles (assuming setting the hand brake applies brakes on all four axles). Add three axles on each of the five locomotives and you're up to 59. Add the other fifteen axles being held by the independent, and you're up to 74 axles with brakes applied, apparently enough to hold the train. Lose the independent and you're losing 20% of the axles holding the train - very possibly enough to allow the train to roll...
And all that requires is for the firefighters to shut the one running engine down. No other nefarious deeds needed.
The news indicates the Lac-Megantic runaway has rocked the consciousness of railroad safety in Canada, and the response might spread to all of North America. As many here have said, my question about the number of handbrakes is unanswerable. The number can only be found empirically, by a practical test to see if enough brakes have been applied tight enough to prevent the train from rolling. In Canada, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada has said in 2009 that the empirical test is unreliable on mountain grades.
In Canada, questions are swirling around this very issue of how to secure trains by handbrakes and know that it is safe. There has been a lot of news focusing on the recommended minimum number of handbrakes to set, and how that number varies widely from one railroad to another, and the fact that there are conflicting numbers on a single railroad. There is news about the rule calling for the empirical test to make sure enough handbrakes are set. There is news that asks how the empirical test can be safe without a safety factor, as Paul North had mentioned along with other excellent points in the last post on page 5 of this thread.
There is also some attention on the fact that railroads individually interpret these rules and recommendations according to their preferences, and are not required to make that information public. So they choose not to make it public. Therefore, in light of the MM&A disaster, there are a lot of questions about securing trains and not enough answers.
Whatever conclusion can be drawn from all this probing, it is clear that the empirical test is essential to the safe handbrake securement of a train on a grade. And yet, the preeminent railroad safety authority in Canada says that the empirical test is unreliable. They said this in 2009:
This is amazing. If the empirical test is unreliable, you don’t have a safe and reliable means to secure trains with handbrakes. That seems like an astounding revelation in the wake of the worst train runaway in Canadian history. The public asks how they can know that unattended trains are safe, and the answer is that they cannot know.
The public can’t know that trains parked on grades are secure until the Transportation Safety Board of Canada comes up with an effective alternative to the empirical test. I have not seen much beyond just a hint of what that alternative might be. It would be interesting to learn what their plan is, but right now, they won’t speak to the public about these train brake issues.
I can’t imagine that they are too comfortable about having announced that the empirical test was unreliable in 2009, and had four years to do something about it before the Lac-Megantic disaster. It appears as though the very core of the cause of that disaster goes right to the unreliable empirical test which was apparently omitted for some unknown reason.
One thing I will identify about railroad discipline - while the Conductor may be the individual responsible for applying the hand brakes to secure a train - if it rolls away - both the Engineer and Conductor will be charged and have discipline assessed against them. Operational failures are viewed as a team effort by ALL members of the crew. The team performs their duties properly or the team pays the price.
In the Spanish overspeed incident - if that were to occur in the US, the Conductor (from a crew discipline standpoint) would be charged in addition to the Engineer - the Conductor has available access to the Emergency Braking system and knows or should have known that the train was operating at a much higher speed than it should have been on the territory when the incident happened. In such cases it is the Conductors responsibility to use the Emergency Brake.
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