The recent Quebec disaster raised questions in my mind as to whether proper lay-up procedures were followed. If memory serves me, for lay-up, the train brakes should be placed in "Emergency" (zero brake pipe pressure) and hand brakes set on a number of cars as required by train length, and, if one or more locomotives are left running, independent brake should also be applied. Tests run by the AAR and FRA on PRR'S Horseshoe Curve in the 1930's (2% grade") showed that a fully loaded 150 car freight train with AB Brake systems in "Emergency Mode but without locomotives, would hold for a matter of days. I have been unable to locate the report on these tests. I suspect they were covered in Dave Blaine's "The Westinghouse Air brake Story" appearing in the December 1945 and January 1946 issues of TRAINS Magazine. Can anyone help on this?
Jerry Pier
I conclude that proper lay-up procedures were either not followed; or they were followed, but the condition created by those procedures was disrupted after the fact. It would seem to me that a loaded train parked atop a grade and left unattended is like a bomb ready to go off. And with a town certain to be devastated if the “bomb” goes off, it would be irresponsible to leave that train so that any passerby could release it and let it roll down the hill.
This raises the question of whether leaving a train parked under such circumstances is legal and proper. I am not sure what the answer to that question is.
There was a big controversy a couple years ago when a local TV news department went out and filmed the cab interior of a locomotive on a train that had been left running and unattended. They reported this on their news, raising the question of whether the practice leaving trains unsecured was safe and reasonable. As I recall, they brought this to the attention of the FRA, and the FRA promised to do something about it. We had a thread about it on this forum, but I do not know how to find it.
Trains (according to the LION'S thoughts) can from time to time and place to place be left unattended.
IF THE CARGO is such that it needs 24 hour attention, then the shipper sends a "minder" or an agent along with the lading, usually in a caboose or attached passenger car of some sort.
Railroads lay up trains in yards all of the time, and well, yards are protected places. You might think that the shipper's docks are protected places, but they really are not. Usually they are not even fenced in. Trains are left unattended all of the time here in Richardton. Not BNSF trains, mind you, but trains within the Ethanol Plant are "unattended" and their two locomotives are "unattended" from time to time and especially at night. While there are no grades here and the mane lion is protected from the private tracks by derails and LOCKED switch stands, the plant switches are not locked, and I suppose that the cars are free wheeling if the had brakes are not set.
The MMA is a light weight short line bridging from Canada to Canada across the state of Maine, and the lading originating in North Dakota, was consigned to a plant in Canada. The the product was in Canadian possession ever since it first crossed the border. There was no reason why the train should not be laid up somewhere for the night. It is not like this railroad is a 24/7 operation. But they should have been serious, very serious, about hand brakes.
There have been several terror plots involving Canadian rail transport that have been broken up by the Mounties. Was this one that they missed? Might the engineer have been in on the plot? LION does not know, the case is already complicated enough.
LION will design a safer oil tank train, and then let you know what he comes up with.
ROAR
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Well, holding the train from rolling away is one thing, but the point that the news orgainization was making when they videoed the cab of an unattended and running locomotive on a train was the point that a vandal could set it into motion. And this was out west in open country in a completely unsecurred setting.
If there was ever a need for an open derail, it would have been a need for one just ahead of that parked oil train that ran away last Sunday. It should be a 100% tamper-proof derail that can be locked into the open position, and connected to an alarm system that alerts the authorities if the closing mechanism is activated. Either that, or relocate the railroad so it does not pass through a town at the bottom of the hill on a 10 mph curve.
Bucyrus If there was ever a need for an open derail, it would have been a need for one just ahead of that parked oil train that ran away last Sunday. It should be a 100% tamper-proof derail that can be locked into the open position,
If there was ever a need for an open derail, it would have been a need for one just ahead of that parked oil train that ran away last Sunday. It should be a 100% tamper-proof derail that can be locked into the open position,
This formist fully agrees. An open derail can direct any runaway train into a large berm that will stop the train. SOU RR certainly had that on Saluda although it was an automatic operation that the downhill train had to be under control at less than some maximum speed.
Where do all RRs start??. Complicated question but certainly protect those grades that have haz- mat trains that park. Start with the steepest grades first & any locations that are subject to crew changes. ? Once haz-mat covered then all other regular manifest locations.
Those locations that a regular derail can reliably handle would not need the split rail ?
Main line split rails probably will be more expensive than siding ones?
As has been mentioned in the thread on the incident, enough handbrakes should be set to hold the train by themselves, with no help from the air brakes. Setting a full service does make it easier to wind up the handbrakes.
Not to mention the handbrakes on all of the locomotives (five in this case).
One has to consider that the locomotive left running could shut down for any number of reasons, ranging from deliberate vandalism to an unanticipated mechanical failure, with dozens of possibilities in between.
While some fingers are being pointed at the engineer for not setting enough handbrakes, it is entirely possible that enough were set, but only in a rudimentary manner - ie, turn the brake wheel until first resistance and quit. You need that extra click or two. Or three.
One thing that hasn't come out is how often this practice has occured - is it normal to tie the train down in that location and leave it unattended? If so, what varied from "normal" practice?
Grades are normal on railroads, and are handled daily with little or no problem. If trains are frequently parked at the location in question, then some form of protection is called for. If not, it's a waste of money and an additional maintenance headache for the MOW people.
We need a lot more information, which I'm sure will be eventually forthcoming.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
The point I tried to make (and and seemed have failed to) was yhat there is strong evidence out there that a train left on a steep grade in emergency mode should never run away. In this condition, each car is isolated and it'd brake cylinder pressure maintained by the auxiliary and emergency reservoirs. Unless someone moves the locomotive brake handle to "release" position this condition can be maintained for days no matter whether the locomotive(s) are running or not..
Jerry,
What if the air was in a service application, not emergency, possibly to expedite a speedy departure in the morning?
Jerry Pier...this condition can be maintained for days no matter whether the locomotive(s) are running or not..
That assumes there are no leaks. Given reports that these are some older cars, I doubt that is the case.
tree68That assumes there are no leaks.
I would not say that it assumes no leaks. It assumes an insufficient amount of leakage to release enough brakes to permit the train to roll.
There are two leakage scenarios:
1) The leaking of air pressurizing the cylinders individually on a case-by-case basis.
2) The leaking of air pressurizing the cylinders into a closed trainline, thereby raising its pressure and triggering a one-time release of all the cylinders.
What Jerry is referring to is item #1. It you set out 20 cars and dump the air, all cars go into emergency with full braking. Some of those cars might leak off quickly and release their brakes. Other cars in that cut may hold their air for weeks. But the point is that one leaking does not release all of the other cars. It only releases the car that is leaking.
So with scenario #1, if it is one car standing, and it happens to be one that does not hold the cylinder air very long, it will run away quickly. But if that one car is in a cut along with 100 other cars that do hold their air for a week, that cut will stay put for a week. The loss of air in that one car will not release the brakes of the other cars.
But in scenario #2, one car leaking can release all the brakes even in less time than it would take for that one car to leak down and release if it were alone.
Unattended trains with locomotives attached are not left with an emergency application. The brakes are left with a 20 lbs set (our rules anyway, some may require a full service of about 26-28 lbs set) to maintain continuity of the air brake system. If the train is left without air for over 4 hours, as would be the case with no air in the train line after an emergency set, the train would require a new initial terminal air brake test.
I don't know their rules, but we are required to release both the automatic and independent brake once the hand brakes are applied to ensure there is no movement. After doing this and satisfied that no movement will happen, both the automatic and independent brakes are reapplied. If the crew member did this before leaving the train to go tie up, a down load of the event recorder (the black box) on one of the engines, doesn't have to be the leader, will show if this was done. It would be proof that the train was properly secured before being left unattended.
Jeff
Jeff,
Once the 20 lb. set is made, and the locomotive is left running, is there any way that the brakes could release due to any kind of leakage?
If the answer is no, then what about if the locomotive is shut down? Could the brakes release due to leakage if the locomotive were shut down?
Reports that I saw said that the engine was shut down by the firemen after the fire, thus leaving no engine to keep tha iar pumped up. One and a half hours later the train started to run away. Since the fire departmetn never contacted the engineer to start another of the other locomotives to keep the air up, doesn't part of the blame belong to the fire department?
Ira
With a 20 lb reduction, engine left running, leakage should not cause a release. The brakes would have no greater a tendency to rapidly release with the engine shut down, other than any leakage in the trainline would not be compensated for by the pressure maintaining feature. The brakes would continue to draw down at a slow service rate, from leakage, until the brake pipe pressure reaches zero. The brake cylinder pressure would not diminish up to this point, after the train line reaches zero, natural leakage would eventually release the brakes. On a fully charged brake system, it should take a LONG time for the brakes to leak off on 73 cars. This is why I find the "insufficient hand brakes" explanation for the Quebec disaster hard to swallow. Something more had to happen.
rfpjohn With a 20 lb reduction, engine left running, leakage should not cause a release. The brakes would have no greater a tendency to rapidly release with the engine shut down, other than any leakage in the trainline would not be compensated for by the pressure maintaining feature. The brakes would continue to draw down at a slow service rate, from leakage, until the brake pipe pressure reaches zero. The brake cylinder pressure would not diminish up to this point, after the train line reaches zero, natural leakage would eventually release the brakes. On a fully charged brake system, it should take a LONG time for the brakes to leak off on 73 cars. This is why I find the "insufficient hand brakes" explanation for the Quebec disaster hard to swallow. Something more had to happen.
Okay, so leakage would not release the brakes within a couple hours if the brakes were set at a 20 lb. reduction. And shutting down the locomotive would not cause a release for any reason. What about leakage into the trainline from the car reservoirs? I gather that would not release the brakes because the pressure maintaining feature would prevent any trainline pressure increase. Therefore, the only way the air brakes could have gotten released is that somebody released them. Is my interpretation accurate?
caldreamer Since the fire departmetn never contacted the engineer to start another of the other locomotives to keep the air up, doesn't part of the blame belong to the fire department?
Per all the reports I've seen, the fire department did contact the railroad (I doubt the engineer left a note on the windshield saying where he was going). After than, it's on the railroad. They were informed that the locomotive was shut down.
That said, the nearest appropriate person who could respond may have been too far away to do any good in the time involved. The engineer was "on his rest" and may well have shut off his cell phone, if that is how the railroad was supposed to contact him. That's pure conjecture on my part, so consider it as such.
The next engineer wasn't due in until later that morning, and may also have been "on his rest" and incommunicado.
rfpjohnWith a 20 lb reduction, engine left running, leakage should not cause a release. The brakes would have no greater a tendency to rapidly release with the engine shut down, other than any leakage in the trainline would not be compensated for by the pressure maintaining feature. The brakes would continue to draw down at a slow service rate, from leakage, until the brake pipe pressure reaches zero. The brake cylinder pressure would not diminish up to this point, after the train line reaches zero, natural leakage would eventually release the brakes. On a fully charged brake system, it should take a LONG time for the brakes to leak off on 73 cars. This is why I find the "insufficient hand brakes" explanation for the Quebec disaster hard to swallow. Something more had to happen.
This is why I find the "insufficient hand brakes" explanation for the Quebec disaster hard to swallow. Something more had to happen.
I agree that something more had to happen in addition to the “insufficient hand brake” explanation. If the train had hand brakes set, it would not have rolled with air brakes released. But also, if it had air brakes set, it would not have rolled with hand brakes released. Since the train did roll, both brake systems had to have failed. So there needs to be an explanation for both brakes system failures.
Yet, it seems to me that, now that they believe the engineer failed to adequately set hand brakes, they are not interested in why the air brakes failed.
Consider this possibility: Suppose the engineer did not set any hand brakes, and somebody went into the cab and released the air brakes resulting in a disaster. Would the disaster be 100% the fault of the engineer for not setting the hand brakes to back up the air brakes?
tree68One thing that hasn't come out is how often this practice has occured - is it normal to tie the train down in that location and leave it unattended? If so, what varied from "normal" practice?
LION has confirmed: YES it was normal practice to stop here, this engineer stayed in the same motel about three times a week, and had a regular cab driver to take him from the train to the motel.
Even the cab driver noticed extra smoke from the locomotive and mentioned it to the engineer who was unconcerned.
LION also confirms that it was allowed by TSBC for the MMA to operate with a one man crew, a practice existing for about a year.
caldreamer Reports that I saw said that the engine was shut down by the firemen after the fire, thus leaving no engine to keep tha iar pumped up. One and a half hours later the train started to run away. Since the fire departmetn never contacted the engineer to start another of the other locomotives to keep the air up, doesn't part of the blame belong to the fire department? Ira
The firemen's job was to put out the fire (and then respond to the scene of the following disaster.) They did notify the RR, who then did not adequately follow-up. If the engineer had set an adequate number of hand brakes, then it would not have mattered what the firemen had to do to put out the initial engine fire. The railroad is ultimately responsible for what happens to an unattended oil train left on a grade.
BucyrusConsider this possibility: Suppose the engineer did not set any hand brakes, and somebody went into the cab and released the air brakes resulting in a disaster. Would the disaster be 100% the fault of the engineer for not setting the hand brakes to back up the air brakes?
LION has been trained by BNSF to shut down a locomotive in an emergency (got the paper and the hat to prove it!) One method is to bull the throttle handle out and then move it off past its normal stop. Al well and good. But what if a fireman in his haste pulled on a brake lever instead? Fortunately, I believed that they did use the button by the fuel tank, but....
Lion,
But what is the answer to my question that you quoted?
Jerry Pier [snipped - PDN] . . . I have been unable to locate the report on these tests. I suspect they were covered in Dave Blaine's "The Westinghouse Air brake Story" appearing in the December 1945 and January 1946 issues of TRAINS Magazine. Can anyone help on this?
"The importance of being able to stop - The Westinghouse air brake story" by Blaine, David G., from Trains, October 1975, p. 44
"Load-to-tare ratios vs. braking - The Westinghouse air brake story" by Blaine, David G., from Trains, December 1975, p. 48
- Paul North.
BUCYRUS: I think your interpretation is pretty spot on.
Perhaps the firemen responding to the first fire, entered the cab of the locomotive to shut it down. Firefighting attire tends to be a bit bulky. In maneuvering about the control stand, it would not be difficult to snag the automatic brake valve with said clothing, and return the handle to release position. Here's where insufficient hand brakes come into play. The air releases on the cars, leaving the independent brakes of the engines and whatever hand brakes applied to hold the train. As the engine brakes leak off, this will happen faster than a properly conditioned train brake system, the true test of the hand brakes happens. The independent brakes act on all wheels of the locomotive consist. Hand brakes act against one wheel per unit. The gradually diminishing engine brakes would be a possible reason for the lag in time between the fireman's visit and the train rolling away.
rfpjohn,
Thanks for that explanation. You have also answered some questions I had about the independent brakes. I can see your point about a fireman accidentally releasing the automatic brake, but the independent brake keeps holding long enough for everybody to leave and be unaware that they released the automatic brake. But shortly the independent leaks down and releases, and lets the train loose.
Would it be accurate to say that shutting down the engine and losing the compressor would cause the independent brakes to release? If so, would that release be due to air leaking from the pressurized cylinder circuit, and not being replenished by the compressor?
I would think that the event recorder is going to shed a lot of light on what happened with the releasing of the air brakes.
I would also think they would want to ask those 12 fire fighters and one MM&A man what they all did when they were at the fire event. I thought I read somewhere that the cab had been left locked. But that could have been mis-stated.
The possibility of a person accidentally releasing the brakes from the control stand has never been mentioned in all of the news reports. They only refer to shutting down the idling engine as causing the release.
Bucyrus,
You are right. The independent brake is "straight air", applied by drawing air directly from the main reservoir, whereas the automatic brake system on the cars is applied by using air from the reservoir on each car, making it a "failsafe" system.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
We don’t know that he didn’t in fact do exactly what you suggest….without the event recorder data we are simply guessing.
On my carrier, our engineers remove the reverser, and it goes into a holder on the control stand.
They carry spares, because when we have to use UP, BNSF KCS or other “foreign” power, the reversers are gone with the crew that brought the train in.
Not knowing this carriers rules, it is entirely possible there was no reverser or brake handle…then again, there may have been.
23 17 46 11
oltmanndThis is all really interesting and puzzling. Was the lead loco equipped with 26L brake? If so, why not zero the brake pipe at full service rate and take brake handles and reverser off the locomotive? Brake pipe continuity and brake test rules? Is this a case where stricter FRA rules actually worked against safety perhaps?
If the train line is below 60 psi for 4 hours or more, a full initial terminal air brake inspection must be made.
Taking the handle out would leave 0 psi in the train line. Would be a lot of walking for a single-person crew to re-airtest 70-some cars.
If the engine was shut down, the train line would eventually get down to zero, and the air brakes on the train should be set up. Air brakes should remain set for at least three minutes, and sometimes for years.
For the train to start rolling after a hour or two, I feel some outside force did something (tampering).
Mike WSOR engineer | HO scale since 1988 | Visit our club www.WCGandyDancers.com
I suspect the normal procedure was to leave the train "charged" at least 60 psig.. This allows the engineer hop on board in the morning, raise the brake pipe to 90 psig (or whatever they specify) and to do a "set and release" test and then get underway. The "set and release" is a reduction of the brake pipe by 20 psi and see that the rear brakes apply or that the pressure falls at least 15 psi on the rear of the train. As stated above, if you take the brake pipe to zero and leave the train, you would have to do an "initial terminal" test in the morning. That test requires charging up the train (maybe 30 minutes), setting the air brakes, inspecting all the brakes on the train, releasing the air brakes and inspecting that all brakes are released.
So what was most likely done is that the engineer stopped the train, did a 20 or so psi reduction on the train line to set the brakes on the train, set 10 or so hand brakes, set the independent and hand brakes on the locomotives full on and left for the motel. For the independents to stay on the locomotives must continue to put air into the locomotive brakes. The train brakes would actually only depend on the hand brakes as eventually the car air brakes leak out and release.
The fire department pushed "emergency stop" on the side of the locomotive and that shut off the air compressor. The locomotive slowly bled off and the independent brakes released. Now the only thing holding the train are the locomotive and car hand brakes. If the hand brakes were not sufficiently set the train would begin to roll. Previously, the locomotive air brakes helped hold the train, but with the locomotives shut down that didn't help.
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