466lexThe PTC mandate was established by a technologically illiterate body (aka, Congress). The FRA, charged by Congress to oversee the implementation of PTC, recognizes, much to FRA’s credit, the stupendous complexity of the undertaking and the dubious likelihood of meeting the mandate, and has so advised Congress. (See, again, http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L03718) Again, I suggest, read it and weep.
Again, I suggest, read it and weep.
I think you sum it up very well. Likewise, in reading the FRA report, it strikes me that they have succeeded in adding up trees to depict the forest. No detail is insurmountable, but it is just that there are so many of them. Of course, the deadline will not be meant, but that is probably the least of the problems.
Spend $15 billion, but “You'd have signs -- very much, I suspect, like the ones on the LGV in France -- noting when you're entering automatic control territory, or leaving it.”
This statement encapsulates, for me, the folly of a phased implementation.
The Chatsworth Metrolink operator missed the “sign”, aka, “signal”, “red board”, whatever. That’s why the PTC mandate exists.
My posing the Penn Central systems “phase in”/”data harmonization” disaster as an analogy is described as “an incredibly poor example”. Chastised again, but I’ll stick to my point: Attempting to manage a complex network with multiple information/control systems (in the instant discussion, PTC and legacy control systems) is, in my opinion, more than daunting. It is folly.
And opening myself to further chastisement, I will cite the UP-SP merger melt-down as an example of the hubris so often involved in underestimating the risks inherent in network integration. Thinking of PTC as a “mere” (implicitly meaning, in my simplistic interpretation, “simple”) “overlay” is to gloss over the reality.
The PTC mandate was established by a technologically illiterate body (aka, Congress). The FRA, charged by Congress to oversee the implementation of PTC, recognizes, much to FRA’s credit, the stupendous complexity of the undertaking and the dubious likelihood of meeting the mandate, and has so advised Congress. (See, again, http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L03718)
On the subject of operating with a PTC failure, I imagine it will be treated along the lines of how a cab signal failure is currently handled. You get an absolute block in advance of your movement and/or run on wayside signal indications (if any) or run at restricted speed until reaching wayside signal territory and/or receiving an absolute block.
I read somewhere (I think in a Railway Age article a few years ago) that it will be permissible to allow non PTC equipped trains to operate in PTC territory for short (20 or 25 mile zones, IIRC) stretches. The example given was for a short line that didn't need PTC on it's own lines but needed to use a section of trackage rights over what would be PTC territory on another railroad. We have some cab signal areas like that now. I understand they don't want to burden a small operation, but that kind of negates the whole idea behind PTC. Let's mandate a collision avoidance system and then allow loopholes large enough to run a train through. Or maybe short line railroaders are thought to be more reliable than class one railroaders.
Jeff
PTC as it is currently being designed is as a 'OVERLAY' on top of already existant means of traffic control. CTC areas with wayside signals will remain CTC areas with wayside signals - the PTC overlay will 'read the signals' and any other relevant directives in 'monitoring' the operation of the train. If the train operates outside of the parameters of the data that PTC has, PTC will undertake control of the train and bring it to a stop. All the utility of the preexisting control systems reamain in effect.
In the intial years of the implementation - PTC will not be 'running the train'. It will be monitoring the trains operation and braking the train when it is operating outside of the data parameters that PTC has been fed for the instant location.
Train passes an 'Approach' Signal indication - If the train does not start slowing within the parameters that PTC has been programmed - PTC will slow the train (most likely to a STOP). If the Engineer operates the train in conformity with the Signal Indication and any permanent and/or temporary speed restrictions as well as MofW Work Authorities - the engineer won't necessarily be aware that PTC is in operation.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
466lex Once “fully proven”, a “phased” installation would, again seems to me, present almost insurmountable problems of integrating operations on a network governed by multiple systems (PTC and legacy). (Only slightly less mind-boggling is the idea that PTC will “go live” at 12:01 AM, Jan. 1, 2016, nation-wide.)
Once “fully proven”, a “phased” installation would, again seems to me, present almost insurmountable problems of integrating operations on a network governed by multiple systems (PTC and legacy). (Only slightly less mind-boggling is the idea that PTC will “go live” at 12:01 AM, Jan. 1, 2016, nation-wide.)
There are no 'insurmountable' problems involved in switching from PTC sections to conventionally-dispatched, any more than there was historically in, say, extending CTC, or before that, implementing ABS with lighted signals. I wish Mark were still posting on here, as he could succinctly cover exactly how the procedures would be done. There is some choice, for example, of whether train-order control is continued over a mixed PTC-nonPTC route segment, or different train orders would be issued for the sections between operating PTC. You'd have signs -- very much, I suspect, like the ones on the LGV in France -- noting when you're entering automatic control territory, or leaving it.
As noted, I'd also expect much of the conventional system of dispatching to continue 'in parallel' with the PTC operations, and with the paper orders having precedence over the in-cab displays and 'permissive' aspects of the PTC system at least for a while. (Note that 'permissive' -- more restrictive actuation of PTC, for example in response to a perceived blocked crossing or impending slide (microquakes, etc. or machine-vision detection, to quote two sample technologies to do that), is no different from what happens today when a broken rail or activated slide fence puts the block or cab signals to red.
Likewise, 'instrumenting' a minimum number of switches out of the 'total' number given will allow at least some, possibly a significant degree of the 'safety' that can be provided by an operative PTC system, before there is complete -- I might use the word 'pervasive' in the MIT lab sense -- autonomic safety regardless of operating strategy.
The idea that PTC will be rolled out and operating by 2016, even with Manhattan-Project-like levels of funding and motivation, doesn't seem likely to me, either. Part of the problem, I think, is that the Government actually believes spending more money (or bullying railroads into spending more money) will get the job done right in a shorter period of time. It would be nice to re-create the moon shots... but there was a great deal more money, and actual competent systems engineering, built into that program.
One thing that concerns me, that I haven't seen brought up here, is what happens when the 'whiz kids' modernizing old paradigms of dispatching no longer think they need to worry about conflicts, breakdowns, etc. Will there come a time when dispatchers are looking at an illuminated display that gets them into much the same trouble as 'too much software representation' did on the Vincennes?
There is dramatic railroad industry precedence for the chaos which ensues from a “phased” installation: The Penn Central elected to utilize the PRR legacy operating information system on the southern side of the merged system, and to use the NYC legacy system on the northern side.
Pardon me for saying this, but that's an incredibly poor example, and does not even describe a phased implementation at all -- rather, just the opposite.
The 'example' in the Penn Central context would be phase-in of data harmonization (look it up) between the two systems... I tremble to think how this would have had to be done between the NYC and PRR "computer" systems as they were. The logical thing to 'phase in' would have been a system designed for Penn Central operations, either replacing both systems or rolling out one standard (probably PRR's wretched one, under the political circumstances) across an increasing number of the 'other railroad's' operations. [And yes, I do understand how impossible that would have been in practice at the time, in that context...] Slowly but surely, the 'phasing in' of either a harmonized or common-system computer operation would reduce the amount of disaster that actually occurred when the green team and the red team just tried to interwork incompatible systems, without either spending the money to upgrade or acquiring the people to process the transition. (And yes, there was in my opinion a situation where Perlman's computer operations were considerably more advanced than PRR's, and therefore 'hard to throw away' -- I'm sure the supposition was to merge the 'work product' where necessary, but you don't need 20/20 hindsight looking at the systems to understand why even with a very large DP budget (which of course PC didn't have) that wasn't going to work.
As a direct result, the railroad ground to a disastrous halt, ultimately resulting in bankruptcy.
There was a WHOLE lot more than computer confusion -- most of which concerned paperwork associated with car movements, not the actual making up of trains -- in the 'grinding to a halt' and the bankruptcy. In my opinion at least. (Or perhaps, to put it a different way, I don't think the computer problems alone were the major fatal factor, and I don't think even a proper and 'perfect' harmonization of the computer facilities and systems available at that time would have staved off the bankruptcy much, if any, longer than it took historically.
(Bear in mind, these relatively simple information systems had nothing to do with directly controlling trains, in that they had no link with signaling and dispatching functions.)
Well, if you have to spend extra time figuring out how to hump cars to make trains, and then you're not sure what's in those cars when they get to the next yard, it has a link with the dispatching function... Much more to trains than running them from point A to point B without hitting something.
edblysardStill no word on the badges and flip wallets?
While there might be a good career in my new bureaucracy (USBPTCD), the big bucks are going to be waiting for the new signal workers.
Quote from the report: [Formatting nightmare]
“The PTC system signal projects require a substantial amount of work in a limited period of
time by the railroads. Historically, railroads are staffed for a fairly stable amount of signal
work from year to year. The PTC system signal work has increased the workload for railroad
signal staff, resulting in a significant increase in the number of locations where signal work is
required. The limited number of qualified signal technicians available to the railroad
industry constrains the railroad’s ability to complete the design, installation, and testing work
required for PTC system signal projects. It has also adversely affected projects to increase
railroad capacity because the same employees are needed to perform both functions. The
increase in demand for signal technicians combined with the limited number available has
resulted in a tremendous increase in signal engineering and installation costs.
Railroad signalmen, the craft most responsible for PTC system installation, have fewer than
9,500 members nationwide.32 In addition to implementing PTC systems, these persons are
also working full time to keep currently installed signal and train control systems operational.
The work is also arduous. PTC system installers are often required to travel 100 percent of
the time away from home—sometimes, in excess of 300 miles—working either 4 days on
and 3 days off, or 8 days on and 6 days off. They work outdoors in all types of weather, over
uneven terrain, and are required to do heavy lifting, climb ladders and poles at heights that
can exceed 40 feet. All this while working under live rail traffic conditions where both the
reliability of the existing systems must be maintained at all times, as well as the personal
safety of all persons involved.
The industry has already hired more than 2,000 additional signal technicians specifically for
PTC and is planning to hire hundreds more. It typically takes 18–24 months for an individual to receive the training and gain the experience necessary to handle the complexities of a PTC system. On the Class I railroads alone, approximately 60,000 engineers and conductors, 6,500 signal employees, and 2,400 dispatchers will have to be trained on PTC systems. This number does not include the mechanics, electricians, and supervisors who will also require training.”
Still no word on the badges and flip wallets?
23 17 46 11
466lexOnce “fully proven”, a “phased” installation would, again seems to me, present almost insurmountable problems of integrating operations on a network governed by multiple systems (PTC and legacy). (Only slightly less mind-boggling is the idea that PTC will “go live” at 12:01 AM, Jan. 1, 2016, nation-wide.)
That seems to be the exact characterization of the quite comprehensive FRA report to Congress. For instance, look at page 32-33 where it details the task of equipping 18,000 locomotives with PTC technology.
http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L03718
Not only does this mandate need to be executed, but it also has to be managed at every step of the way to verify the progress with the mandate and confirm it to the government. I doubt the estimated cost will even pay for the paperwork.
Forgive me if I am a bit bemused by the vehemence sometimes instantiated by informal forum postings. First it’s “nonsense” that I’m guilty of perpetuating, and now I am “presuming”, “assuming”, “unaware” and am apparently one among “idiots”. But, no problem …. LOL!
PTC, as mandated, either positively controls trains or it does not. Until it does so successfully in a totally isolated “test-bed” environment, normal railroad operations as we know them today will, seems to me, continue.
There is dramatic railroad industry precedence for the chaos which ensues from a “phased” installation: The Penn Central elected to utilize the PRR legacy operating information system on the southern side of the merged system, and to use the NYC legacy system on the northern side. As a direct result, the railroad ground to a disastrous halt, ultimately resulting in bankruptcy. (Bear in mind, these relatively simple information systems had nothing to do with directly controlling trains, in that they had no link with signaling and dispatching functions.)
The reports that I see (all in the public domain) indicate that the railroads are investing heavily in an “all or nothing” strategy to meet the mandated deadline. Signal systems are being converted system-wide, entire locomotive fleets are being equipped, etc. Looks to me like they feel under the gun to cut-over en mass. “Who, me nervous?” are muttering CEO’s.
The above is offered as simply one (perhaps, simplistic) perspective. Dump on me as you will. LOL!
When railroads signalled their properties, it was not installed 'whole cloth' on the entire property - it was done subdivision by subdivision as both the need and financing allowed.
Likewise, when PTC is actively installed, it will also be done territory by territory. The carriers and vendors only have so many people to train and deal with the localized issues that will crop up as each new territory gets PTC activated. Remember, in most, if no all territories, PTC is being installed as a 'overlay' system upon the systems that already exists.
Overmod,
I believe there might be a misunderstanding that has crept into this discussion. In reading what 466lex has said and what you are saying, my interpretation is that the two of you are in agreement on this overall matter.
466lex"Phased implementation" of PTC would be like being half-pregnant. All of these complex systems must be "go" from day one
You are presuming these are being used as critical, automatic systems from day one. Evidently you are unaware of things that are common in computer or other complex systems, such as migration or cutover. Only idiots assume complex new systems will work perfectly when instantiated, with all the bits and pieces completely integrated and trustworthy.
The 1920 Esch Act provisions for ATC were intended to be made systemwide standards ASAP, just as PTC is now (I don't have the time to pull up the exact language of both old and new for comparison -- someone please do that). Because the technology was new and essentially untried at the time, the 'idea' was to phase in coverage, a division at a time, with the presumption that private companies would pile on the ATC-equipment bandwagon and perhaps more than one 'effective' solution would emerge. The principal difference is that in 1920 it was the functionality that was specified; now, the idea (perhaps taking a leaf from Hamilton and Dilworth's Electro-Motive philosophy, and part of the idea behind the Internet) is to provide all the complex components as common standards so that the system works 'any load - any road' without tinkering or interworkability issues.
I do not know if you mean the comment in the sense that all the devices and sensors, server networks and services, and communications technology (including what needs to be done to SDR) need to be present before PTC will provide 'what is promised'. That is technically true. One problem with the system model that was specified is that it is 'brittle'; another is that it presumes that all the different components are mandated, and therefore will be present or large fines and other enforcement will ensue. As I have noted before, the system ought to have transparent redundancy and effective failover; it should feature graceful degrade (for example, when communications integrity on one or more frequencies is lost or corrupted); and should, like the Arpanet, feature inherent "healing" and methods of assuring the coherency and completeness of both the communicated intelligence and the actions the system takes.
They are "vital" in the sense that failure is not an option or all benefits are lost, and, indeed, new risks are created by system failure
The first part is not necessarily right, although the latter part CERTAINLY is -- and you don't have to like the novel Jurassic Park to understand why brittle complex systems have all kinds of unanticipatable failure modes... even before you get to intentional or malicious tampering or cracking.
As an interesting aside: in the history of technology there are a number of instances where less-capable systems were mandated as a result of avoiding reliance on technology. Those of you who are apprentice or higher electricians may know the history of four-wire switches, and why they were made illegal in the late Thirties. I well remember PAR as a solution to airport accidents -- and why it became deprecated in favor of... well, the tender mercies and all-knowing skills of ATCs.
The take-home is that even parts of PTC, when functioning even autonomously, enhance safety. The gains in safety when more parts of the fabric interwork properly are usually synergistic, but that is not to take anything away from what the autonomous parts can do on their own. I trust that the current instantiation of PTC doesn't have those stupid programmer errors from NAJPTC like an occasional train length of zero -- but even if not, a little 'artificial common sense' in the code or the interface design will signal safe running well in time for a HUMAN CREW to act safely in controlling the train.
It would simply be unacceptable to conduct any routine commercial operations if "the technolgy and software are [only] somewhat mature."
"Unacceptable" to whom?
This is an idiom that has come into common English, and should be kicked back out as soon as possible. Operations may be wise, may be unadvisable, may be downright criminally negligent -- but who are you to indicate whether a technopolitical system is 'unacceptable'? Don't say it when you're in no position to accept or reject it! I've had enough junior executives say this in 'negotiations' as if it were some universal rule rather than their personal assessment of the situation -- and use it for full rhetorical semantic effect, too.
Believe me, there are a great many operations that run with 'immature' technology and software. Or did you think that system upgrades and maintenance were always perfect ab initio, or that component or link failures never occur? Did you think that testing, no matter how complete, substitutes for in-system field tests, which in the case of PTC in particular would require widespread (and expensive) capitalization to execute?
Contrariwise, although you might not think so, people in places like ITU R.10 actually do have some understanding of reusable software and patterns, and have designed effective hardware and software that will work in 'new' appications with reasonably high assurance. I think this situation is remarkably true for most of the RTOS system designers, especially those involved with 'aerospace' standards of quality.
The 'Job One' task of proper critical-systems design is (usually) to assure that the result will FAIL SAFE (remember that term?) In the case of PTC, a bit more is required (as otherwise trains will be stopped dead and immovable on countless mains for what may be minor glitches or environmental surprises). We come across this situation fairly often in software security -- brittle software security --, where there has to be some balance between 'stops where it should permit' and 'permits when it should stop.' One solution was, and is, to make the system more robust, use multiple forms of information transfer, 'design out' chances for common-mode errors, etc.
I am of the personal opinion that PTC is not, and shouldn't be, a catch-all-errors 'nanny' to protect sleeping, texting, railfan-loving crewpeople from themselves. Any subset of PTC, when considered in itself as a safety device, should work to enhance safety, even it it's as 'simple' as a radio proximity alert between locomotives (as on at least one mining railroad) or a remote crossing-intrusion system (with cameras and potentially-lucrative privatizable fines to catch the culprits' ID).
I am of the opinion that restricting discussion on this thread to something like 'will full implementation be required by the deadline?' Although the answer to that, given the numbers and the indeterminacies, will almost certainly be 'no', and I would hope that the prior examples of 'mandated improvements' -- usually rolling three-year extensions with certain 'benchmarks' to be met -- will be the model that the Government uses.
"Nonsense"
LOL! "Yes, you need most of the hardware and software"? How do you phase it in if you don't have all of the software and hardware operational?
And, of course, the whole network won't go "belly up if one part breaks" ... but what happens to the two trains being "protected" by PTC when the early, not-fully-perfected system fails?
You are simply describing the tightly controlled environment that must prevail as an R&D start-up. I don't consider that a "phased implementation", but perhaps it is simply a matter of semantics.
466lexPhased implementation" of PTC would be like being half-pregnant. All of these complex systems must be "go" from day one. They are "vital" in the sense that failure is not an option or all benefits are lost, and, indeed, new risks are created by system failure. It would simply be unacceptable to conduct any routine commercial operations if "the technolgy and software are [only] somewhat mature.
Nonsense. I know all about ARES and the AAR's mostly stillborn ATCS project.
You phase PTC in by territory. A "dark" branch, first. Yes, you need most of the hardware and software required for full implementation, but the whole network won't go belly up if one part breaks. In fact, you can run PTC in the background while controlling operation the "regular" way with track warrants, then turn off the manual portion of the track warrant system - it just becomes data.
That way you can see what the data traffic/coverage looks like, if the messaging schemes are solid, if the wayside devices are reliable, etc. etc. You don't have to worry about interoperability between the stand-alone and overlay variants that will exist when RRs start run thru PTC trains. You can work through "fall back" procedures for handling PTC disabled trains. You can work through hardware reliability issues. You can work through clunky software code issues.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
"Phased implementation would pretty much solve all the problems."
"Phased implementation" of PTC would be like being half-pregnant. All of these complex systems must be "go" from day one. They are "vital" in the sense that failure is not an option or all benefits are lost, and, indeed, new risks are created by system failure. It would simply be unacceptable to conduct any routine commercial operations if "the technolgy and software are [only] somewhat mature."
(Isolated "R&D" test operations under exceedingly close mamagement and control will certainly be required to prove out the software and technolgy. BN got that far with its ARES initiative, using a Minnesota iron ore line to prove out some of the fundamental concepts (GPS, etc).)
BaltACD The technical obstacles that have been identified to date fall into seven different categories: Communications Spectrum Availability Radio Availability Design Specification Availability Back Office Server and Dispatch System Availability Track Database Verification Installation Engineering Reliability and Availability
The technical obstacles that have been identified to date fall into seven different categories:
Communications Spectrum Availability
Radio Availability
Design Specification Availability
Back Office Server and Dispatch System Availability
Track Database Verification
Installation Engineering
Reliability and Availability
So, basically, all that's really set in concrete is the name...
Phased implementation would pretty much solve all the problems. Something like 5% of the covered miles in year one, another 5% in year two. 10% in year three and year four, 20% in year 5 and the remainder in year 6. It would allow "stand alone" route implementation in the first couple of years, then some targeted interline interoperability, then the whole enchillada when the technology and software are somewhat stable and mature.
It would also give the RR's a chance to think about and work on some of the secondary benefits that may be available through having the hardware in place. Right now, they don't have the time and resources to give it a second thought.
Even without the new research and development government bureaucracy that I proposed, the mandate, as it stands, will undoubtedly contain a large measure of government bureaucracy. After all, that is the point of these kinds of things. The beauty is the gigantic pool of funding available in the prosperity that railroads’ currently enjoy. After all, that prosperity was a gift from Congress, so all is fair. We were recently talking about the railroads’ cash cows. In the case of PTC, the railroads become the cash cow.
Obviously the mandate deadline will have to shift, but that is not a problem. It will just give more time to milk the cow. We will be able to watch the price meter on PTC spin as the approaching deadline is repeatedly advanced. The motivation to never get the job done because of a desire to keep milking the cow will never end. I don’t expect the endless development and implementation of PTC to ever catch up with the ever rising price tag.
The primary purpose of a committee (or bureau) oftimes seems to be ensuring its continued existance...
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Murphy Siding zugmann edblysard OMG, not a committee…. That means it will be 10 years or so before anything gets done, and it still won’t work …. Hey, wait a minute, a committee and bureau would be an excellent idea! Where can I send my resume? You're probably overqualified. I'm sure they'd be looking for someonw with experience in bureaus and committes, not in railroading.
zugmann edblysard OMG, not a committee…. That means it will be 10 years or so before anything gets done, and it still won’t work …. Hey, wait a minute, a committee and bureau would be an excellent idea! Where can I send my resume?
edblysard OMG, not a committee…. That means it will be 10 years or so before anything gets done, and it still won’t work …. Hey, wait a minute, a committee and bureau would be an excellent idea!
OMG, not a committee….
That means it will be 10 years or so before anything gets done, and it still won’t work ….
Hey, wait a minute, a committee and bureau would be an excellent idea!
Where can I send my resume?
Or those who have experience on donating large sums of money to political campaigns.
I wouldn't be surprised if some would rather have people who don't know how things work on such a committee. In the words used by businesses who bring in new senior management from outside their respective industry, "they don't know what can't be done." The flip side of that is that they have to learn the hard way what can't be done. Making the same mistakes the previous people did.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Regarding this FRA report:
The main thrust of the report seems to be that the railroads cannot meet the mandate deadline.
However, after learning about the incredible volume and complexity of unresolved technical issues in the present PTC art, I doubt that the development can keep up with the speed of the advancing science, let alone meet the implementation deadline. This government mandate seems like a staggering overreach being foisted upon the railroad industry.
It also raises this prickly question: How many additional deaths will occur that would not have occurred had this PTC mandate not displaced and suspended the normal course of advance train safety development that the railroads have been pursuing on their own volition?
Bucyrus A much better approach than this impossible mandate would be for the government to create a publically funded U.S Bureau of PTC Development (USBPTCD). They are always anxious to fund research in the public interest. Who better to perform this complicated task at the lowest possible cost? Then once the government perfects PTC ready for implementation, the railroads will be required to implement it. Wouldn’t this be the most streamlined approach to this complex matter?
A much better approach than this impossible mandate would be for the government to create a publically funded U.S Bureau of PTC Development (USBPTCD). They are always anxious to fund research in the public interest. Who better to perform this complicated task at the lowest possible cost?
Then once the government perfects PTC ready for implementation, the railroads will be required to implement it. Wouldn’t this be the most streamlined approach to this complex matter?
We need to know when and where you are starting the bureau, and where to send our resumes…
Do we get badges in those neato flip wallets?
I like badges....
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
466lex The FRA delivered a Report to Congress in August, 2012 which, without using inflammatory language, is quietly damning of the entire PTC effort. I cited this report in my original posting, but it seems to have been largely overlooked in the discussion. Here is the link again, and I urge a careful and complete reading to get the "flavor". http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L03718
The FRA delivered a Report to Congress in August, 2012 which, without using inflammatory language, is quietly damning of the entire PTC effort. I cited this report in my original posting, but it seems to have been largely overlooked in the discussion. Here is the link again, and I urge a careful and complete reading to get the "flavor".
The Executive Summary states things rather clearly.
Although the initial PTC Implementation Plans (PTCIP) submitted by the applicable railroads to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) for approval stated they would complete implementation by the 2015 deadline, all of the plans were based on the assumption that there would be no technical or programmatic issues in the design, development, integration, deployment, and testing of the PTC systems they adopted. However, since FRA approved the PTCIPs, both freight and passenger railroads have encountered significant technical and programmatic issues that make accomplishment of these plans questionable. Given the current state of development and availability of the required hardware and software, along with deployment considerations, most railroads will likely not be able to complete full RSIA-required implementation of PTC by December 31, 2015. Partial deployment of PTC can likely be achieved; however, the extent of which is dependent upon successful resolution of known technical and programmatic issues and any new emergent issues. The technical obstacles that have been identified to date fall into seven different categories: Communications Spectrum Availability Radio Availability Design Specification Availability Back Office Server and Dispatch System Availability Track Database Verification Installation Engineering Reliability and Availability
Although the initial PTC Implementation Plans (PTCIP) submitted by the applicable railroads to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) for approval stated they would complete implementation by the 2015 deadline, all of the plans were based on the assumption that there would be no technical or programmatic issues in the design, development, integration, deployment, and testing of the PTC systems they adopted. However, since FRA approved the PTCIPs, both freight and passenger railroads have encountered significant technical and programmatic issues that make accomplishment of these plans questionable. Given the current state of development and availability of the required hardware and software, along with deployment considerations, most railroads will likely not be able to complete full RSIA-required implementation of PTC by December 31, 2015. Partial deployment of PTC can likely be achieved; however, the extent of which is dependent upon successful resolution of known technical and programmatic issues and any new emergent issues.
466LEX,
Thanks for pointing that out. I have gone back to the first link several times, but overlooked the second link and your exerpts. I will check that out carefully. It looks very detailed and informative.
So where are the articles and references that describe the current PTC state of the art, and how much further research and development is needed to make it practical for application? It seems like an obvious and critical question, and yet nobody seems to be asking it, let alone answering it.
If I Google “Positive Train Control” criticism, I get a link where the railroads are criticized for being sluggish in advancing their PTC programs.
You do like to dream, don’t you?
edblysard Jeff pointed out something I have posted in several of these PTC threads…. While the government seems to think we are all inattentive and pretty useless at what we do, how many thousand train starts will happen in the next 24 hours that don’t result in a collision of any type? And, out of all of those train starts, the odds are fantastically good that every one of them will get where they are going without hitting anything at all, not an automobile, or a trespasser or another train.
Jeff pointed out something I have posted in several of these PTC threads….
While the government seems to think we are all inattentive and pretty useless at what we do, how many thousand train starts will happen in the next 24 hours that don’t result in a collision of any type?
And, out of all of those train starts, the odds are fantastically good that every one of them will get where they are going without hitting anything at all, not an automobile, or a trespasser or another train.
tree68 oltmannd We should really call it "PTS" - Predictive Train Stop. I'm sure most of us here, and most in the industry, would agree. OTOH, the folks who are calling for this probably like the term "control," as it offers the illusion that there is something (not someone) running the train that will prevent it from "causing harm." "Predictive Train Stop" may not give them that deceptive "warm and fuzzy." They (the public and the press) may even assign magical powers to PTC that it does not (nor is it intended to) have. I can see the stories after the first incident involving a PTC train in PTC territory - "We thought that this system had the train under control and would prevent such incidents!"
oltmannd We should really call it "PTS" - Predictive Train Stop.
We should really call it "PTS" - Predictive Train Stop.
I'm sure most of us here, and most in the industry, would agree. OTOH, the folks who are calling for this probably like the term "control," as it offers the illusion that there is something (not someone) running the train that will prevent it from "causing harm."
"Predictive Train Stop" may not give them that deceptive "warm and fuzzy." They (the public and the press) may even assign magical powers to PTC that it does not (nor is it intended to) have.
I can see the stories after the first incident involving a PTC train in PTC territory - "We thought that this system had the train under control and would prevent such incidents!"
I think the "positive" is the key word for the warm and fuzzy feelings. Positive means it won't let anything bad happen.
We've already had an incident in territory with Amtrak's form of PTC. Remember that open switch that appeared in Trains (News & Photos, January 2013 page 12) a couple months back? Now one could argue that it wasn't the failure of the PTC itself, but a failure in a related component. Still, I think most people would think that we were told with PTC incidents (like running into an open switch) couldn't happen, but one did. So is it really an improvement?
I think once PTC is up and running, it actually could compromise safety in some respects. It will work most of the time, so much that people will depend on it all the time. Then when it (or a vital component ) fails, the person who is supposed to take over may not immediately notice the problem. Being only an observer or otherwise "out of the loop" for a long time, they may not know the proper steps to take.
I suppose that as long as the number of any incidents in PTC territory falls under the bean counter's acceptable threshold, it will be OK.
OvermodWe really need a different acronym for it. Getting rid of 'A for automatic' was a good first step, but amending at least the semantics of 'positive' meaning 'assured by the system at all times' is really necessary before the legions of semi-idiot programmers will design proper systems.
We should really call it "PTS" - Predictive Train Stop. All it will do is make sure you stay under the braking curve from current location and speed to the "brick wall" at the end of your movement authority. I don't know, but I imagine it will have some sort of user interface like the Conrail LSL system - which gives the engineer time and/or distance to penalty brake application based on on current conditions. Engineer only loses control of the braking system if he fails to stay under the braking curve.
henry6This article could be a propaganda piece to make PTC look bad.
Are you kidding? The article goes to the end of the earth to make PTC look good.
I cannot find one shred of references on the Internet that is critical of PTC on any level.
BaltACD The catastrophic incidents that have had have pointed up the fact that the operators attention is not as 'sharp' as it would need to be to discern a system failure and take actions in time to prevent the collision. PTC will engender the same wandering attention as the system will be expected to be the fail safe for the operator. If it is made by man - it will fail, at some point in time! No matter how 'fool proof' you try to make a system - there will be one or more fools that out fool your testing fool and create a catastrophic occurence.
The catastrophic incidents that have had have pointed up the fact that the operators attention is not as 'sharp' as it would need to be to discern a system failure and take actions in time to prevent the collision. PTC will engender the same wandering attention as the system will be expected to be the fail safe for the operator.
If it is made by man - it will fail, at some point in time! No matter how 'fool proof' you try to make a system - there will be one or more fools that out fool your testing fool and create a catastrophic occurence.
One of the hysterical things about the 'current' UI for PTC, and I specifically include the traditional kind of 'vigilance control' in this, is precisely that it substitutes robot compliance for proper awareness and attention. (About what I would expect from Democrats... but I digress).
One significant issue is that if anything 'goes wrong' -- and there are, as indicated, large numbers of ways any brittle 'foolproof' system can fail -- the "user" will be expected to (1) comprehend how the system has failed, and (2) take 'correct' action to avoid trouble. In my very long history of looking at critical-systems design, any system that 'assumes command' from an operator is an accident waiting, even begging, to happen.
We really need a different acronym for it. Getting rid of 'A for automatic' was a good first step, but amending at least the semantics of 'positive' meaning 'assured by the system at all times' is really necessary before the legions of semi-idiot programmers will design proper systems.
I consider that a proper train-"control" system is advisory rather than minatory -- it helps and prompts people to work better, rather than either requiring actions to 'prove' the people are not asleep or shirking responsibility somehow, or to take all necessary actions should an emergency situation arise.
Of course there are times that a PTC system will control speed or stop trains where humans would not 'catch' the issue in sufficient time. Vehicles on grade crossings is one example; mistakenly-set switches is another. (That is one reason behind the horrifying implementation statistics for switches in the FRA report -- but we might remember that not all switches are 'equal' in producing high-speed danger to trains).
It's equally important, wherever possible, to prevent distracting operators. I had some trouble explaining why Craig Faust couldn't figure out what was happening during the TMI 1 incident ... until I found out he had an over-120-decibel horn that could not be turned off going in the control room. This is of a piece with those vigilance controls that badger people into anticipating the light instead of keeping their attention where it belongs. And it doesn't matter how sweetly you present a chime or an attractive female voice instead of a *** buzzer -- if it's modal, requiring some Pavlovian learned response, it's probably wrong.
Perhaps the take-home message is that very little, if any, of the installed equipment for the current 'flavor' of mandated PTC cannot be run in an advisory mode. It just isn't the way a normal RTFM programmer likes to have to think...
jeffhergert Bucyrus It is easy to conclude that the PTC mandate was necessary because the railroads have not installed PTC voluntarily. However, they cannot implement something until after it has been developed, and the development of PTC is not yet complete. So there is no basis to conclude that the railroads have been remiss, negligent, or careless in not yet installing PTC. The PTC mandate is more than just an order to install PTC. More significantly, it is a mandate to develop PTC, using the forced implementation on the operating railroads as a development laboratory, at the railroads’ cost. And as is the case of all research and development, the total cost has no known limit. And like all massive projects, the more you spend, the harder it is to back out of it. And also, like all massive projects, proponents lowball the initial estimates because they know that once the project moves forward, it becomes harder and harder to back out of it. I think one reason it was "easy" to mandate PTC is that so many think that PTC is already available, ready for deployment. Reading comments on various PTC discussions, not just here, it seems many are under the impression that the only reason railroads haven't installed PTC was because they just didn't want to spend the money. After all, the industry has been looking at PTC in one form or another for close to 30 years. There are claims that PTC or something similar is already in use, either in other countries or in the US on mass transit systems. Maybe some or all of these claims are true, but that doesn't mean that what's in use for a particular system will automatically work on the US freight railroad system. It probably doesn't help when railroads say they have a hard time making a business case for PTC. Most people take that to mean they just don't want to spend the money. Not the fact that a major news worthy accident is more the exception than the rule. It may come as a surprise to many, including some that have participated on these forums at times, but most of us railroaders, while not infallible (no one is) are pretty reliable. Jeff
Bucyrus It is easy to conclude that the PTC mandate was necessary because the railroads have not installed PTC voluntarily. However, they cannot implement something until after it has been developed, and the development of PTC is not yet complete. So there is no basis to conclude that the railroads have been remiss, negligent, or careless in not yet installing PTC. The PTC mandate is more than just an order to install PTC. More significantly, it is a mandate to develop PTC, using the forced implementation on the operating railroads as a development laboratory, at the railroads’ cost. And as is the case of all research and development, the total cost has no known limit. And like all massive projects, the more you spend, the harder it is to back out of it. And also, like all massive projects, proponents lowball the initial estimates because they know that once the project moves forward, it becomes harder and harder to back out of it.
It is easy to conclude that the PTC mandate was necessary because the railroads have not installed PTC voluntarily. However, they cannot implement something until after it has been developed, and the development of PTC is not yet complete. So there is no basis to conclude that the railroads have been remiss, negligent, or careless in not yet installing PTC.
The PTC mandate is more than just an order to install PTC. More significantly, it is a mandate to develop PTC, using the forced implementation on the operating railroads as a development laboratory, at the railroads’ cost. And as is the case of all research and development, the total cost has no known limit. And like all massive projects, the more you spend, the harder it is to back out of it.
And also, like all massive projects, proponents lowball the initial estimates because they know that once the project moves forward, it becomes harder and harder to back out of it.
I think one reason it was "easy" to mandate PTC is that so many think that PTC is already available, ready for deployment. Reading comments on various PTC discussions, not just here, it seems many are under the impression that the only reason railroads haven't installed PTC was because they just didn't want to spend the money. After all, the industry has been looking at PTC in one form or another for close to 30 years. There are claims that PTC or something similar is already in use, either in other countries or in the US on mass transit systems. Maybe some or all of these claims are true, but that doesn't mean that what's in use for a particular system will automatically work on the US freight railroad system.
It probably doesn't help when railroads say they have a hard time making a business case for PTC. Most people take that to mean they just don't want to spend the money. Not the fact that a major news worthy accident is more the exception than the rule. It may come as a surprise to many, including some that have participated on these forums at times, but most of us railroaders, while not infallible (no one is) are pretty reliable.
A brief, fact-based article on the PTC process: http://news.hntb.com/images/bulk_media_upload/docs/FINAL_PositiveTrainControl_2_0711_(2)_0.pdf
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
EMD#1 PTC will prevent head on collisions and collisions with on track equipment but there is still a possibility of a rear end collision unless PTC is installed in EOT devices. That is unless rules are changed prohibiting trains from passing a restrictive signal indication. Tim
PTC will prevent head on collisions and collisions with on track equipment but there is still a possibility of a rear end collision unless PTC is installed in EOT devices. That is unless rules are changed prohibiting trains from passing a restrictive signal indication.
Tim
The more reliance that is placed into technology to prevent catastrophe - the less human attention gets focused on preventing that same catastrophe. WMATA has run their system in 'automatic', where their signal and computer systems control the operation of their trains, with the 'operator' being along to supervise and 'take over when a system failure is noted'. The catastrophic incidents that have had have pointed up the fact that the operators attention is not as 'sharp' as it would need to be to discern a system failure and take actions in time to prevent the collision. PTC will engender the same wandering attention as the system will be expected to be the fail safe for the operator.
Bucyrus And without a mandate, a better solution would have no doubt been implemented in due course.
And without a mandate, a better solution would have no doubt been implemented in due course.
Dan
EMD#1 PTC will prevent head on collisions and collisions with on track equipment...
PTC will prevent head on collisions and collisions with on track equipment...
Never say never. They have't revoked Murphy's Law yet...
Not sure if it was mentioned but PTC will not be implemented on all lines, only routes with passenger trains and lines transporting a specific amount of toxic inhalation hazards. TIH cars traveling over lighter main lines which can be rerouted to lines where PTC will be mandatory will do so.
The railroads are doing well under deregulation, so they are ready for harvest; a sitting duck for reregulation. The railroads know this, so they have to bite the bullet and go along to get along. So when Congress tells the railroads to jump, the railroads jump.
ecoli But that gives me only 6 more months. UP is giving themselves an extra two years. :-)
But that gives me only 6 more months. UP is giving themselves an extra two years. :-)
Send 4 copies.
zugmann ecoli As for UP proclaiming that it won't meet the statutory deadline, can I tell the IRS that I won't be able to file my tax return on time, and offer UP as evidence of why they should cut me slack? IRS Form 4868.
ecoli As for UP proclaiming that it won't meet the statutory deadline, can I tell the IRS that I won't be able to file my tax return on time, and offer UP as evidence of why they should cut me slack?
As for UP proclaiming that it won't meet the statutory deadline, can I tell the IRS that I won't be able to file my tax return on time, and offer UP as evidence of why they should cut me slack?
IRS Form 4868.
At some point, mandating undesigned, unmanufacturered and unproven technology and reality come together. Rarely on the original timeline of the mandate.
ecoli Bucyrus Why have the railroads not voluntarily adopted PTC prior to this current mandate? Have they simply refused to invest in something that is necessary; or have they refused to invest because it is not necessary? If it is the former explanation, does that mean that Congress knows more about the safety issues and need for PTC than the railroads do? Or is Congress simply forcing something onto the railroad industry that is unnecessary? With something as big as the PTC mandate, there is an obvious commercial agenda of the PTC industry besides just preventing accidents. I wonder if that agenda pushed Congress to force a mandate on the industry that is not necessary. It wouldn't be the first time safety had to be forced upon the railroad industry. Consider the air brake, which was opposed by management because it would cost money, and by labor because it would eliminate jobs. If only PTC were as ready for adoption as the air brake was. As for the theory that it's a conspiracy by the PTC industry in conjunction with the dad-burn gummint, compare the total revenues of the railroads versus the total expenditures expected to flow to PTC suppliers, and consider which side had more resources to devote to lobbying, had the two decided to do battle. If one likes railroads, then instead of looking for every possible reason why PTC is impractical, will fail, and shouldn't be required, one should be hoping that it will succeed and will be implemented in a fashion that improves productivity.
Bucyrus Why have the railroads not voluntarily adopted PTC prior to this current mandate? Have they simply refused to invest in something that is necessary; or have they refused to invest because it is not necessary? If it is the former explanation, does that mean that Congress knows more about the safety issues and need for PTC than the railroads do? Or is Congress simply forcing something onto the railroad industry that is unnecessary? With something as big as the PTC mandate, there is an obvious commercial agenda of the PTC industry besides just preventing accidents. I wonder if that agenda pushed Congress to force a mandate on the industry that is not necessary.
Why have the railroads not voluntarily adopted PTC prior to this current mandate? Have they simply refused to invest in something that is necessary; or have they refused to invest because it is not necessary?
If it is the former explanation, does that mean that Congress knows more about the safety issues and need for PTC than the railroads do? Or is Congress simply forcing something onto the railroad industry that is unnecessary?
With something as big as the PTC mandate, there is an obvious commercial agenda of the PTC industry besides just preventing accidents. I wonder if that agenda pushed Congress to force a mandate on the industry that is not necessary.
It wouldn't be the first time safety had to be forced upon the railroad industry. Consider the air brake, which was opposed by management because it would cost money, and by labor because it would eliminate jobs. If only PTC were as ready for adoption as the air brake was.
As for the theory that it's a conspiracy by the PTC industry in conjunction with the dad-burn gummint, compare the total revenues of the railroads versus the total expenditures expected to flow to PTC suppliers, and consider which side had more resources to devote to lobbying, had the two decided to do battle.
If one likes railroads, then instead of looking for every possible reason why PTC is impractical, will fail, and shouldn't be required, one should be hoping that it will succeed and will be implemented in a fashion that improves productivity.
Yes I agree that the PTC mandate is similar to the air brake and automatic coupler with regard to a government set deadline. Maybe that is all it really amounts to. Maybe the PTC mandate is perfectly analogous to the air brake and coupler mandate. I really don’t know the answer.
But by mentioning the economic interest of the supplier, I am not suggesting that entire impetus for the PTC mandate was some deep conspiracy between suppliers and government. All I am saying that it would be foolish to believe that the only motive for something this massive is to save lives or save money for the railroads. Lots of backs get scratched when you spend money by the billions.
Even during the era of the coupler and air brake mandates, railroads were besieged with inventors trying to get their idea adopted. Railroads would be great customers for any mechanical improvement if it made sense to them. It is still that way, and to make this gigantic sale to the railroad industry with the aid of a government mandate is a very big deal in several different ways.
I would like to know more about the scale and terms of this PTC mandate compared to that of the coupler and air brake mandates. Maybe somebody here can shed some light on that. What was the cost of those early mandates, and how does that convert to today’s dollars for comparison to the price of the PTC mandate?
In any case, what we think or say about it is not going to make it succeed or fail. I think it pays to look at it critically. This type of forced action could very well cause damage. I am confident that the railroad industry would have moved in the right direction on their own volition. And I am sure their course of train control development would have been straight and efficient. Mandating this with so many engineering and system unknowns seems like a recipe for a course of development that will twist and turn.
If one likes railroads, then instead of looking for every possible reason why PTC is impractical, will fail, and shouldn't be required, one should be hoping that it will succeed and will be implemented in a fashion that improves productivity. Because the trucking industry is getting its productivity-improving technology developed for it, for free, by the world's largest internet search engine company. One could just hope that self-driving vehicle technology will fall on its face, but relying on the opposing team to mess up is not always a winning strategy.
Inter-operability: as I recall, there were at least two different ATS systems, differing in how the signal was picked up by the locomotive; what worked on one road could not work on another road which used another system. And, we have the difficulties with protecting detour movements over roads such as the former C&NW.
Incidentally, the Southern had ATS (the same system that the Southern used elsewhere) installed on a stretch of track that had no fast Southern trains--between Haleyville and Jasper, Alabama, which was used by the IC on its way into Birmingham; I have never known if the M&O and SLSF track also used by the IC on this route had ATS.
Johnny
Deggesty As I see the matter, it will be necessary to have one system nation-wide so that power can continued to be run through. Am I right?
As I see the matter, it will be necessary to have one system nation-wide so that power can continued to be run through. Am I right?
That is what inter-operatability is all about. What works on the UP must work everywhere else and vice versa. And that is where the complexity resides.
I don’t see any virtue in a deadline. There has to be a deadline only because the action is mandated. Without a deadline there can be no mandate.
edblysard I would think that with the almost light speed advancements in the technology of communications coupled with ability to cheaply send/, receive and process data, had nothing been mandated, you could have expected the carriers to move towards a simplified version of PTC within a decade, simply because it would be available in off the shelf hardware. The cost of real time accurate GPS would be of little consequence to the carriers, the ability to “phone” a locomotive and find out all the information you could need, from how the locomotive is doing in terms of maintenance needs, where exactly it is and where it is going and how fast it is going there coupled to a mainframe and good dispatchers would almost guarantee the same if not better performance than what the current mandated PTC offers. A computer can only follow the program it is running, any variables outside of that program are beyond the computer’s ability to manipulate. But, give a good dispatcher accurate time/location, direction and speed of travel, well, a good dispatcher can take actions to adapt to the variables, nullify them, or take advantage of them…with the right information, he or she can wring out every last foot of usable track of a district safely and efficiently.
I would think that with the almost light speed advancements in the technology of communications coupled with ability to cheaply send/, receive and process data, had nothing been mandated, you could have expected the carriers to move towards a simplified version of PTC within a decade, simply because it would be available in off the shelf hardware.
The cost of real time accurate GPS would be of little consequence to the carriers, the ability to “phone” a locomotive and find out all the information you could need, from how the locomotive is doing in terms of maintenance needs, where exactly it is and where it is going and how fast it is going there coupled to a mainframe and good dispatchers would almost guarantee the same if not better performance than what the current mandated PTC offers.
A computer can only follow the program it is running, any variables outside of that program are beyond the computer’s ability to manipulate.
But, give a good dispatcher accurate time/location, direction and speed of travel, well, a good dispatcher can take actions to adapt to the variables, nullify them, or take advantage of them…with the right information, he or she can wring out every last foot of usable track of a district safely and efficiently.
I hope that most of the contributors to this thread have read (though not all may have yet received the issue) page 19 in the May issue of Trains, where it is reported that the UP does not expect to have PTC operative before 2017-18, because of various problems.
Deadline is pretty optimistic (for lack of a better word), but I understand why one was implemented. It shows resolve, it shows determination, it shows "heck we are going to do something, and not have 56,000 more studies about doing something!"
We (as a people) complain when there's 56,000 studies and nothing gets done. Now when there's a deadline, we complain that there WEREN'T 56,000 studies done.
Interesting times ahead. That's all I know.
tree68 I would opine that the railroads are not publicly opposed to PTC because it would not be in their best interest to do so. And because the outcome of the implementation may be seen as beneficial. From where I sit, the problem is in the deadline. The railroads recently told congress that they don't believe they can meet that deadline - but not that implementation is impossible. Given that the technology, equipment, and standards are essentially being created on the fly, I certainly expect teething problems. Beyond that, though, I have to wonder how long it will be before our old friend Murphy (not the siding) will invoke his law and despite a perfectly functioning PTC system, some disaster will occur because of a situation that no one had envisioned.
I would opine that the railroads are not publicly opposed to PTC because it would not be in their best interest to do so. And because the outcome of the implementation may be seen as beneficial.
From where I sit, the problem is in the deadline. The railroads recently told congress that they don't believe they can meet that deadline - but not that implementation is impossible.
Given that the technology, equipment, and standards are essentially being created on the fly, I certainly expect teething problems.
Beyond that, though, I have to wonder how long it will be before our old friend Murphy (not the siding) will invoke his law and despite a perfectly functioning PTC system, some disaster will occur because of a situation that no one had envisioned.
Bucyrus However, I cannot find one shred of information that indicates that the railroads are opposed to PTC or even question its cost effectiveness. Are the railroad just playing possum in the hope that they can minimize their damage?
However, I cannot find one shred of information that indicates that the railroads are opposed to PTC or even question its cost effectiveness.
Are the railroad just playing possum in the hope that they can minimize their damage?
Mandating PTC as a requirement for railroads seems like a big deal, especially if it is something that the railroads have looked at, but rejected for not being the most cost effective solution to the problem. I would expect a reaction from them.
The predicted cost of the mandate is high, but surely there will be massive cost overrun. The presumed cost could easily double by the time the work is complete. And there will be even more cost in getting the bugs worked out of such a complex and unproven system. This project, given its national scope, the fact that it is mandate of a system that has not even been developed yet, and a mandate with a deadline, and a mandate on an industry with deep pockets-- all of that taken together has “boondoggle” written all over it.
Bucyrus I wonder how much it will really cost in the end. Is it fair to surmise that that the mandate is forcing railroads to do something that they should have done voluntarily? In other words, is PTC the right thing to do despite the fact that railroads have not done it?
I wonder how much it will really cost in the end. Is it fair to surmise that that the mandate is forcing railroads to do something that they should have done voluntarily? In other words, is PTC the right thing to do despite the fact that railroads have not done it?
It will be a long time, if ever, before it will be determined that expenditure of $19B on PTC was the most safety that could be purchased. That there were not other investments that the carriers could have done with that money that would have had a even larger safety return.
schlimmI was referring to the poster who brought up healthcare. Sorry I was not more explicit.
Oh, okay. Thanks for clarifying that.
Bucyrus schlimm Given that zugman actually works for a railroad operating a locomotive, I believe, it seems to me his opinion on PTC carries a lot more weight behind it than outsiders' opinions. Since it coincides with the historical record, warts and all (the record's not zugman's) it also seems less factually compromised by a recurrent ideological bias seen in so many postings on this and other topics. Gee, I was only asking a question. Does that constitute an ideological bias? Are all the so-called “insiders” in favor of adding PTC? If so, then why is a mandate needed?
schlimm Given that zugman actually works for a railroad operating a locomotive, I believe, it seems to me his opinion on PTC carries a lot more weight behind it than outsiders' opinions. Since it coincides with the historical record, warts and all (the record's not zugman's) it also seems less factually compromised by a recurrent ideological bias seen in so many postings on this and other topics.
Given that zugman actually works for a railroad operating a locomotive, I believe, it seems to me his opinion on PTC carries a lot more weight behind it than outsiders' opinions. Since it coincides with the historical record, warts and all (the record's not zugman's) it also seems less factually compromised by a recurrent ideological bias seen in so many postings on this and other topics.
Gee, I was only asking a question. Does that constitute an ideological bias?
Are all the so-called “insiders” in favor of adding PTC? If so, then why is a mandate needed?
If PTC were a off the shelf product that the carriers could go out, buy and install that is one thing. That is not the case! PTC is being designed 'on the fly' and has been since the mandate was published. PTC and it's requirement of inter-operability is a tall, tall order.
Signal systems that the carriers use run the gamut of manufacturers that have been in the business for the past 100 years or more. Signal systems were installed on each carrier on a subdivision by subdivision basis as both traffic volumes and finances required and/or permitted; as such each new installation would use 'state of the art' products when installed - and as each installation came along the state of the art moved accordingly - throw on top of that, that these legacy systems were installed over the 100+ Class I carriers that used to exist and each Chief Signal Engineer on each property beleived he had the 'latest greatest ideas' on how his signal systems should be designed and implemented. One more twist, each of those Chief Signal Engineers would change on each property from time to time, normally with the incoming person believing that he had to change the standards that had been established by his predecessor. What I am saying, in short, is - THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO STANDARDIZATION IN LEGACY SIGNAL SYSTEMS that today's Class I carriers. The fact that they work, day in, day out is a testament to the skills and perserverance of all the field level signal personnel in comprehending and working with ages old wiring diagrams that have been changed over the years.
With the implementation of PTC - what works on Amtrk must also work on NS, on KCS, on UP, on BNSF and on CSX as well as CN & CP and any other Short Line carriers have have lines that must be updated to PTC standards because of the commodities they handle. My understanding is 'the interoperatability standards have yet to be finalized', without finalized standards, production equipment can't be manufactured, sold and installed. The carriers are doing all they can to be ready to install the actual PTC hardware when it becomes a production item.
PTC is the federal govenment mandating the spending of approximately $19 BILLION in private capital by the carriers to facilitate compliance with equipment that did not exist at the time the legislation was passed.
Well just going back a couple posts, Overmod said this:
“Do you actually think that there is a PTC-industrial complex that has successfully lobbied the Congress and the Administration to implement a grand plan that shoves footballs of indiscriminate money into corporate coffers?”
I was not sure what corporate coffers he was talking about. Obviously, he must have meant the coffers of the PTC suppliers.
So to answer his question, I say YES I do think that there is a PTC industrial complex (or collective interest) that has successfully lobbied the Congress and the Administration to mandate PTC on behalf of the profit interest of the PTC industrial complex.
That has nothing to do with whether or not PTC is worthwhile. It may indeed by worthwhile. Or it may only be 75% worthwhile, and the lobbying by the PTC industry provided the other 25% of the impetus to get Congress to mandate PTC.
So I did not mean to suggest that the entire mandate for PTC was a product only of the PTC lobby, if that is what Overmod meant.
Bucyrus However, I am not sure what you mean by a grand plan "that shoves footballs of indiscriminate money into corporate coffers."
However, I am not sure what you mean by a grand plan "that shoves footballs of indiscriminate money into corporate coffers."
That would be like the only approved hook for our fire service "bailout" systems being sold by suppliers for $80+, when it's available retail from the manufacturer for half that...
It's a well-known axiom in the fire service that all you have to do is put "fire department" in front of an item and the price magically goes up. I'd imagine PTC will be little different...
Overmod BucyrusWith something as big as the PTC mandate, there is an obvious commercial agenda of the PTC industry besides just preventing accidents. I wonder if that agenda pushed Congress to force a mandate on the industry that is not necessary. Do you actually think that there is a PTC-industrial complex that has successfully lobbied the Congress and the Administration to implement a grand plan that shoves footballs of indiscriminate money into corporate coffers?
BucyrusWith something as big as the PTC mandate, there is an obvious commercial agenda of the PTC industry besides just preventing accidents. I wonder if that agenda pushed Congress to force a mandate on the industry that is not necessary.
Do you actually think that there is a PTC-industrial complex that has successfully lobbied the Congress and the Administration to implement a grand plan that shoves footballs of indiscriminate money into corporate coffers?
Well of course there is. How could you miss it? I don't think it has a name like PTC-Industrial Complex, but the effect is simple business strategy.
I wouldn't be surprised if there was some industrial "interference" on behalf of PTC, although all of the other factors mentioned undoubtedly stand higher on the list.
We deal with it in the fire service on a regular basis. An advisory body, whose standards carry a lot of weight, seems to come out with all too many "revisions" that somehow force fire departments to replace otherwise servicable equipment, or add thousands of dollars worth of "enhancements" to new apparatus and equipment purchases. Oddly, the manufacturers are major players in that process.
The legal system is a major player as well, as any accident that involves a piece of equipment 'governed' by a standard will invariably result in close scrutiny of that equipment to see if it meets the standard or not - regardless of whether complying with the standard would have made a difference...
I find it FAR more likely that it follows the hoary old model of Government interventionism that follows the .. well, the usual excuse for Government knee-jerk reaction. Several bad wrecks + a pack of 'let's spend money like water' Democrats = just the kind of massive get-em-out-by-Friday response we are seeing. And hey, if they can do it with OPM, so much the merrier...
zugmann It wasn't knee-jerk. But I think we found the tipping point. We've had cab signals/ATS/LSL/PTC in some form or another for over 100 years. But the railroads just didn't seem that interested in implementing the technology, so they had their hand forced. We've had enough major incidents in dark territory, or from stop signal violations that it was only a matter of time. Will PTC solve it all? I doubt it. Will it help? I'm sure. Is it worth the cost? Time will tell. But there is no way to expect the railroads to continue to be able to run away from emerging technology on the signal front.
It wasn't knee-jerk. But I think we found the tipping point. We've had cab signals/ATS/LSL/PTC in some form or another for over 100 years. But the railroads just didn't seem that interested in implementing the technology, so they had their hand forced. We've had enough major incidents in dark territory, or from stop signal violations that it was only a matter of time.
Will PTC solve it all? I doubt it. Will it help? I'm sure. Is it worth the cost? Time will tell. But there is no way to expect the railroads to continue to be able to run away from emerging technology on the signal front.
The RRs were looking at this sort of thing for a while, but always wound up on the short end of the ROI stick - so development pretty much slowed to a crawl.
It's not a complete train wreck that they are being forced to do it. What's bad is the timetable. It's too rapid and has to occur all at once. A slower, phased approach would have been more palatable and lower risk.
One thing the proponents tout and the RRs discount is the tangential benefits from having PTC equipment on the trains. I think those applications, like fuel consumption optimized operation, will have a good ROI since the hardware is already paid for. It's probably why the RRs didn't fight too hard against PTC. It's a huge investment.
MikeInPlano So, in short, once again the federal gov't acts rashly in a kneejerk reaction to some event and passes a not-even-half-baked law, in this case requiring PTC by December 2015. Not unlike rushing the un-Affordable Care through the House and Senate, only to find out 3 years later what a true disaster it is.
So, in short, once again the federal gov't acts rashly in a kneejerk reaction to some event and passes a not-even-half-baked law, in this case requiring PTC by December 2015. Not unlike rushing the un-Affordable Care through the House and Senate, only to find out 3 years later what a true disaster it is.
Why not stick with more appropriate actions that are railroad-related? Compare this particularly with the language in the Esch Act of 1920, which mandated ATC as one of the quid pro quos of relinquishing Federal control of the railroads? Or the ICC order of 1947 that mandated enforcement of the Esch Act terms for trains over 79 mph -- and made it stick -- to get around part of the significant need for a workable ATC/PTC system for railroads that did not need high-speed safety?
You might also compare this 'rash ... knee-jerk reaction' to the rather lamentable history of air brake and knuckle coupler implementation in the late 1800s... and later ... and later...
I can see your point about mandating safety technology in a 'rush' -- but let's face it, the time has long come for coherent anticollision implementation. And I do not really expect major implementation by the three-year deadline, any more than there was major implementation for the couplers and brakes and systemic ATC -- you will see the deadline extended in three-year intervals, with benchmarks to be met but also with what was referred to in the '60s and then again in the '80s as 'mid-course corrections.
Happily, the issue that caused the initial demise of ATC deployment after 1928 (greater emphasis on crossing safety issues) is being incorporated in the system design of PTC this time 'round. This represents a good example of technological synergy: it is comparatively easy to implement crossing alert if you have PTC instantiated, and comparatively easy to implement some 'flavors' of PTC if you have one of the current generation of crossing-alert systems.
Personally, I see most of the actual difficulties with PTC being the scale on which the implementation is to be made (and only slightly less, that it is essentially an unfunded mandate). The necessary tech issues are all solved ... although I have to admit that some elements of the systems developed recently, NAJPTC in particular, show "postwar technology" at its wacky worst...
schlimm Given that zugman actually works for a railroad operating a locomotive, I believe, it seems to me his opinion on PTC carries a lot more weight behind it than outsiders' opinions.
Given that zugman actually works for a railroad operating a locomotive, I believe, it seems to me his opinion on PTC carries a lot more weight behind it than outsiders' opinions.
And I'll pass on any comments about the non-railroad related health care bill.
The centerpiece of all official warning to drivers about grade crossings is the statement that trains take a long distance to stop. While that it true, it is also mostly irrelevant to grade crossing collisions. If a train is a half mile from the crossing, anything that it might attempt to stop for will be clear of the crossing by the time gets there. The stopping distance of the train is simply not the problem.
But nevertheless, the irrelevant point is made over and over again by the authorities as though it were the primary issue. Therefore, it is not surprising that PTC will be directed to make crossings safer by solving the imaginary problem of inadequate stopping distance.
zardoz BaltACD If technology is implemented that stops trains when there is a vehicle 'blocking' a crossing I can see a new game - Stop the Train. And laugh all the way home. Exactly! The desire to implement such a system would be among the dumbest ideas I have ever heard; although since the government is involved, anything is possible. $800 hammer, anyone?
BaltACD If technology is implemented that stops trains when there is a vehicle 'blocking' a crossing I can see a new game - Stop the Train. And laugh all the way home.
If technology is implemented that stops trains when there is a vehicle 'blocking' a crossing I can see a new game - Stop the Train. And laugh all the way home.
This is already occuring in conjunction with thefts. The perps cause the train to stop in a remote area, and while the crew is trying to figure out what happened to their mile-long train, the thieves are cleaning out the container of their choice (reportedly down to a specific container with a specific product).
Such a system would make it just that much easier to do. No trying to shoot out a brake line.
I don't think one could even begin to count the "close calls" that occur on the nations railroads in a day. In so far as PTC involvement in grade crossing safety, I believe it will only have an effect on trains holding a false activation or activation failure message. This message, as relayed from the dispatcher, will be in the system, which will then ensure that the order is complied with. It amazes me how much time and money are dumped into crossing safety projects when 99.9% of the time it is willful violation of the protection in place! The one that strikes me as a misplaced effort is the double gate protection. I've actually seen a car beyond the gate for their direction of travel, stop on the track when the second gate came down to block their exit from the crossing! The poor woman just sat there as we blew through on the other track which, fortunately, she was not fouling.
BaltACD,
I see what you are saying. The systems could give trains enough time to stop, but is that really the solution? Many detected reasons to stop will disappear long before the train arrives. It really amounts to trying to solve the wrong problem.
With mile and more stopping distances, the train will, in many cases, not even be in sight of the crossing when the technology commands the train to stop because of the 'blocked' crossing.
I cannot see PTC or any other technology being implemented that will 'prevent' trains striking vehicles at road crossings, without that technology seriously disrupting rail operations, as in the 2+ minutes that would be requred to bring the train to a stop short of the crossing, the vehicle causing the initiation of the braking event gets it's act together and departs the crossing (never having realized what actions were initiated on its behalf).
jeffhergertTo be able to detect a stopped vehicle would mean installing some form of detectors or sensors that could sense metals, weight and/or motion. (Just think of all the rabbits setting off motion detectors and bringing everything to a stop.) I haven't heard of any plans to start installing such items at crossings.
Jeff, look at the papers in the FRA digital library. There is a pretty good discussion of one approach for 'instrumenting' a crossing that covers many of the issues. (I can provide you a copy via PM if you can't locate it on line. Use the 'elib' link if you Google for it -- FRA has changed their document server tech.)
Jeff,
Yes perhaps you are right that this entire crossing vision will not be part of the first rollout. I can see the "smart" crossing (diagnostic) concepts being added at the get-go, but not the far ahead sensing of obstruction. Besides the cost of reliable sensors, there is the problem of separating objects ahead that will move in time from those that won’t. You can only secure the road so far in advance without unduly disrupting commerce ahead.
I think this first application of PTC will begin an evolution of train operation that basically never ends. There is a lot of energy expended in developing advanced products to sell to railroads. The vision is practically unlimited at this point. You pour diesel fuel in one end and transportation rolls out the other. Everything in between is up for grabs.
Bucyrus How many grade crossing crashes have been prevented by the preemptive action of the engineer? I know some are prevented if the train can be stopped short of a stalled vehicle on the track, but PTC will prevent that. If I am not mistaken, that is a planned feature of PTC. So, I do not see how the existence of grade crossing precludes driverless running.
How many grade crossing crashes have been prevented by the preemptive action of the engineer? I know some are prevented if the train can be stopped short of a stalled vehicle on the track, but PTC will prevent that. If I am not mistaken, that is a planned feature of PTC. So, I do not see how the existence of grade crossing precludes driverless running.
While signalled crossings are eventually planned to be integrated into PTC systems, I don't think it's to detect vehicles stopped on them. I've understood it to be that the crossing signal system will communicate it's "health," that is that the crossing systems have no malfunctions that would keep them from operating normally.
To be able to detect a stopped vehicle would mean installing some form of detectors or sensors that could sense metals, weight and/or motion. (Just think of all the rabbits setting off motion detectors and bringing everything to a stop.) I haven't heard of any plans to start installing such items at crossings.
In one of the Professional Icononclast columns many years ago, JGK mentioned using such a setup at crossings to appease the public when using fully automated (no onboard crew member) trains. He said a computer could react faster than a human and that some crashes would happen anyway because they would be too late for man or machine to react to. He also said that the detector systems could be programmed to take into account the size of a object, and he thought if the object was small enough that it wouldn't harm the train, the train shouldn't be stopped. Just let it barrel right on through.
BaltACD edblysard Buttered popcorn or plain? Beer or soda? Plain & Hard Lemonade
edblysard Buttered popcorn or plain? Beer or soda?
Buttered popcorn or plain?
Beer or soda?
Plain & Hard Lemonade
Let me have some of the latter. A lot of the latter. Perhaps as a chaser.
BucyrusI know some are prevented if the train can be stopped short of a stalled vehicle on the track, but PTC will prevent that. If I am not mistaken, that is a planned feature of PTC.
You are correct.
There are in fact a couple of systems independent of "PTC" that serve to alert engine crews if crossing warnings have failed, or if there is a vehicle resident on one of the loops or visible to radar or camera coverage. I don't have firsthand experience with them, or know how well they work.
So, I do not see how the existence of grade crossing precludes driverless running.
I could start semi-snarkily and say 'well, does the presence of grade crossing safety devices preclude collisions?' Systems fail or degrade, and in those cases, and many others, the judgment of an alert human engineer is the best 'protection'.
The trick is to design this so the engineer, and not the safety system or PTC, is actually driving the train. This rules out the usual sorts of 'cruise control' instantiations, or the ridiculous 'vigilance' alerter system. (Note that the FRA/DOT just remain puzzled about why this sort of system doesn't produce safety or satisfaction... pauvre petits)
The real issue with driverless running, whether of cars or consists, is that it's an open field day for plaintiff's bar. ANY problem caused by all those hellish foot-pounds of momentum will be deemed ever more likely to be -- at least in some part -- the railroad's fault or liability. And remember that under joint & several, even a fraction of a percent leaves the railroad liable for 'whatever the other parties did not pay'. Wanna bet the same problem comes up here as in medical-malpractice case law?
I am not holding my breath waiting for tort reform, or expecting some sort of Price-Anderson cap on railroad liability. On the other hand, some clear understanding of this must be developed, and all problems remedied, before autonomous train control becomes do-able (as opposed to technically practicable).
RME
Bucyrus Doing? What do you mean?
Doing? What do you mean?
No, no, no... you go ahead. I'll sit back and watch.
zugmann Bucyrus But why does a grade crossing matter to driverless trains? They can't stop in time to yield to road traffic anyway. I see what you are doing here.
Bucyrus But why does a grade crossing matter to driverless trains? They can't stop in time to yield to road traffic anyway.
But why does a grade crossing matter to driverless trains? They can't stop in time to yield to road traffic anyway.
We were discussing the eventual full automation of the railroad the other day in the crew room. It was agreed that eventually, when the already exsisting cameras focused out the front of the locomotive indicate that a crossing accident has occured, a computer program will access the damage and an ATM on the side of the locomotive will dispense the proper compensation. Perhaps a nice sympathy card in the case of fatalities.
I see what you are doing here.
BaltACD Bucyrus But why does a grade crossing matter to driverless trains? They can't stop in time to yield to road traffic anyway.But they can stop to take names and notify authorities and render human assistance.
I see what you mean, but couldn't that human assistance be called out as an automatic response to a locomotive colliding with something significant? Generally, it would seem that taking the crew off of a train would require added auxiliary support. ie: Lots of guys in trucks spread out along the way to take names, render assistance, replace knuckles, etc.
But they can stop to take names and notify authorities and render human assistance.
Public access as in grade crossings. The "driverless" trains in Australia are operated on the Pilbara ore lines on the far side of nowhere, where grade crossings don't exist because nobody lives there.
traisessive1 Bucyrus I could not see the point of driverless cars, but driverless commercial trucks makes lots of sense, especially when we all know that there will NEVER be driverless trains (unless they can develop a robot that can replace knuckles). There already are driverless trains. Australia started testing in 2008 and are still using the technology today. The technology is there and if Australia can send a train across the desert with a computer controlling it then any railroad here can too. The public access is the issue.
Bucyrus I could not see the point of driverless cars, but driverless commercial trucks makes lots of sense, especially when we all know that there will NEVER be driverless trains (unless they can develop a robot that can replace knuckles).
I could not see the point of driverless cars, but driverless commercial trucks makes lots of sense, especially when we all know that there will NEVER be driverless trains (unless they can develop a robot that can replace knuckles).
10000 feet and no dynamics? Today is going to be a good day ...
Yes, it is essential that the switch points be in the proper position and be locked in the proper position. However, as I recall, if the points are not in the proper position even if the hand throw lever is in the proper postion for normal traffic the block signals will show red.
I may not remember correctly, but, as I recall, if only one crossover switch is lined for a cross over movement the signals for both directions go to stop.
As to being locked, the night that I lined both switches back after a freight that had had to back over onto the wrong main to let the City of New Orleans was back on the right main, the conductor shone his light on what I was doing until I had locked both switches. The engineer did not have to stop for the rear end men to line the switches back; the conductor had told the fireman that I was going to line the switches and thus expedite the train on its way. Note: this took place forty-eight years ago, at a time when non-railroad employees who were known to employees could do things that are absolutely unheard of now.
The issue is not so much that they are 'connected to the signal system' as that the method by which they are is redundant and tamperproof. I have said elsewhere that there needs to be positive indication that the throw has been made completely (and perhaps relocked) and separate positive indication that the points are actually hard over and the rod not bent, etc. The usual method of activating the signal system won't assure either of those things.
Meanwhile, all that discussion 'back in the day' of ATC testing about what happens when you have relay-based ABS and back into the wrong block is still relevant in many places. If the ABS indication is the only input to PTC, the system is no more 'positive' than ABS+ATC is. And many sources have indicated that in this day and age, that's insufficient.
I do not have any idea as to how many of us non-railroad employees have had an opportunity to really look at hand throw switches used in signaled territory, but I did have such an opportunity when I was living in Wesson, Mississippi. There was a crossover (trailing points) between the two main tracks (double track) of the IC, and I saw that the switches (just as all others for the main tracks) were connected to the block signal system--they HAD to be, for safety's sake.
jeffhergert Hand throw switches in signalled territory aren't unmonitored, they are interlocked (for lack of a better word) into the signal system.
Hand throw switches in signalled territory aren't unmonitored, they are interlocked (for lack of a better word) into the signal system.
Hand throw switches in dark territory have no signal system with which to interface. If the railroad sees no reason to install signals, yet has to include some manner of PTC, then some interface has to be added.
The line of which I speak is single track - a GPS based system won't have to discern which track the trains are on. All it has to know is where the front and rear of the trains are.
Going have to spend something as "doing nothing" is no longer going to cut it.
zugmann While I agree there is no 100% solution, I still think that there has to be something better than a piece of paper for running on a track that allows speed greater than 10mph. Just my opinion.
While I agree there is no 100% solution, I still think that there has to be something better than a piece of paper for running on a track that allows speed greater than 10mph.
Just my opinion.
Like the old saying, "Speed costs money. How fast do you want to go?"
Hand throw switches in signalled territory aren't unmonitored, they are interlocked (for lack of a better word) into the signal system. So are some derails. When the main track switch or derail is opened, it is supposed to shunt the signal system. It didn't happen in the instance that appeared in Trains. It wasn't known at that time if a component had failed, or had been intentionally tampered with so as not to shunt the signal system.
The component, which I have seen called a "circuit controller," I don't know if that's the correct name though, is probably what will be added to switches in dark territory to show the position of the points for PTC.
Overmod tree68Methinks that such switches will become a thing of the past in PTC territory. Probably not. What WILL happen is more thoroughgoing installation of positive position indication on these switches, and some form of robust communication on switch position AND lock status to the "PTC system".
tree68Methinks that such switches will become a thing of the past in PTC territory.
Probably not. What WILL happen is more thoroughgoing installation of positive position indication on these switches, and some form of robust communication on switch position AND lock status to the "PTC system".
That's pretty much what I meant. I don't see manual switches going away, for cost reasons, as you point out - but totally unmonitored switches will be come exceedingly rare, at least on main track.
There are far too many places on current Class 1s where power-operated crossover switches aren't cost-effective. This is far more than just a 'siding' situation. But it's comparatively cheap and easy to instrument the switches (and most PTC systems I've studied have just that functionality implemented).
I feel that we need a less 'brittle' control modality if PTC is to work, and part of making the system better is to have positive indication when switches stop 'responding' or start providing improper data for any reason. Most of the 'rest' of the issues with these switches is already well addressed in operating and safety rules -- the PTC would just be doing supervisory checking on that activity...
jeffhergert In one of the front columns of Trains (Technology column?) a couple months back there was an incident in territory where the PTC (or near PTC) system Amtrak uses overlayed on an existing signal system failed to detect an open hand throw switch. (It sounds like the signal system failed to detect the switch.) I was surprised that I didn't see (unless I missed them) any comments on here about that. Since the signal system didn't "see" the open switch, the PTC didn't "see" it either, allowing a train to go into a side track at an unsafe speed. So maybe PTC would've prevented Graniteville, and maybe it wouldn't have.
In one of the front columns of Trains (Technology column?) a couple months back there was an incident in territory where the PTC (or near PTC) system Amtrak uses overlayed on an existing signal system failed to detect an open hand throw switch. (It sounds like the signal system failed to detect the switch.) I was surprised that I didn't see (unless I missed them) any comments on here about that. Since the signal system didn't "see" the open switch, the PTC didn't "see" it either, allowing a train to go into a side track at an unsafe speed. So maybe PTC would've prevented Graniteville, and maybe it wouldn't have.
Methinks that such switches will become a thing of the past in PTC territory. I'm seeing shelters going up along a line near here in the vicinity of switches. This is dark territory.
I have come to the conclusion, though, that while PTC will likely prevent another Graniteville, it will do nothing to prevent another Oneonta, Kingman, or Rockford.
None of the four railroad incidents in my immediate area that I'm aware of would have been prevented by PTC. No lives were lost, but they did tie the railroad up for a while and definitely caused damage to track and rolling stock.
I don't know what level, if any, GPS will be used in PTC. My consumer level GPS on my daily driver has a option to display the elevation in feet of the device. Personal observations of this function over time at the same locations shows a variation plus & minus 100 feet, as I have observed the same location (my driveway) have elevations between 300 & 500 feet and many of the 200 feet that are in between.
The Devil will be in the details.
henry6 PTC does more than save lives, it saves equipment and property and business and operations. If you don't have collisions you don't kill or injure people, you don't damage or destroy equipment, you don't stop doing business by not being able to operate for long periods of time. . PTC also allows for more frequent traffic depending on the system.
PTC does more than save lives, it saves equipment and property and business and operations. If you don't have collisions you don't kill or injure people, you don't damage or destroy equipment, you don't stop doing business by not being able to operate for long periods of time. . PTC also allows for more frequent traffic depending on the system.
I thin there is a misconception of what the first generation (the one they are working on deploying) can and can't do. Going by what I've read the first generation uses fixed points (block signals, mile posts, switches, etc) used either in signalled territory or movement authorities in ABS/dark territory. It won't have movable or "rolling " block capabilities, where the location of the preceding train changes and the system updates braking distances for a following train. That capability doesn't exist yet. Not in the US and I don't think anywhere else either. (I'm not sure that the rest of the world is really that much farther ahead of us in PTC development. Besides, many of the signal system vendors in the US are now global. Sometimes now owned by foriegn companies.)
It may not even prevent slow speed (within the parameters of restricted speed) rear end collisions like those that have happened within the last couple of years. And some of them resulted in fatalities.
We, the general public have become used to seeing the wonders of technology. We see the latest personal electronic gadgets or hear of the latest developments, both at home and in other countries. We see things on TV or in movies, things that have a kernal of reality and may actually be in development, and think those things or applications exist right now. Then when reality hits, we think it's because of the cost of something that technology isn't being adopted.
One has to wonder, too, about the unanticipated failure, like a mouse chewing through a cable in a shelter or an errant backhoe operator digging up a cable. I'm sure that such eventualities have been considered, but Murphy's Law dictates that something that can happen will not have been considered (whodathunk?), and Gumperson's Law dictates that it will happen at the worst possible time.
PTC is great in it's glittering generalities as presented by the media (and Congress for that matter). Like anything else in REAL LIFE, the devil is in the details and the details in the PTC mandate are near endless. Until gets put in play FOR REAL, we won't even uncover half the details.
Over the years I have been involved with myriad of operational change over in a number of areas of railroad operations. You can diligently work and think you have covered every possible happening that is germaine to the particular operation - within 8 hours of cut over - a raft of problems will be waiting for a solution. With PTC, the solution had better be a solution, as a mere 'work around' in such a system becomes a accident waiting to happen. As PTC gets implemented on additional territories - additional details will pop into the picture.
I agree, Graniteville was a preventable accident, which PTC could have prevented, or at least slowed the collision. I'm not sure what restricted speed under PTC control converts to. I'd venture to guess 15mph maximum, not forgetting the most important "stopping within one half the range of vission". I'm kind of wandering here, but I guess with PTC in place, the crew of the through train which ran into the local would have had at least the warning that signaled territory gives you. I started my railroad career on dark railroad back in the days of 4/5 man crews. The conductors all had decades of experience as did most of the engineers. Railroad knowledge was acquired primarily from on the job training, i.e. getting yelled at alot by people who had tons of experience and were genuinly interested in getting the job done without a rookie killing himself or anyone else and gumming up the works. Nowadays with instant conductors, who are almost immediatly assigned a student to train, I fear we have lost much of the art of railroading. How much experience did the NS local crew have?
rfpjohn I find the entire PTC mandate to be an enormass cost to the railroad industry with very little net possitive safety effect. We have, as a whole a very safe railroad system in this country. It is just an unfortuate fact that train wrecks, when they occur, make a spectacular mess. And as someone has previously stated, very few of these wrecks are as the result of a PTC preventable event. I have worked in the railroad industry for over 35 years, 32 as a locomotive engineer. What I have observed over the years is that rather than address the problem of a few bad apples, we tend to make more rules and restrictions. This is how we end up with manditory drug and alchohol testing, courtesy of a Conrail engineer known to be a problem. In the Metrolink case the underenforcement of cell phone restrictions appear to be a main cause. PTC is another huge response to problems that could be addressed on a railroad by railroad basis. Of course, then congress wouldn't look like heros and the FRA would be stymied in its attempt to dictate and moniter every facit of rail activity.
I find the entire PTC mandate to be an enormass cost to the railroad industry with very little net possitive safety effect. We have, as a whole a very safe railroad system in this country. It is just an unfortuate fact that train wrecks, when they occur, make a spectacular mess. And as someone has previously stated, very few of these wrecks are as the result of a PTC preventable event. I have worked in the railroad industry for over 35 years, 32 as a locomotive engineer. What I have observed over the years is that rather than address the problem of a few bad apples, we tend to make more rules and restrictions. This is how we end up with manditory drug and alchohol testing, courtesy of a Conrail engineer known to be a problem. In the Metrolink case the underenforcement of cell phone restrictions appear to be a main cause. PTC is another huge response to problems that could be addressed on a railroad by railroad basis. Of course, then congress wouldn't look like heros and the FRA would be stymied in its attempt to dictate and moniter every facit of rail activity.
[emphasis mine - zug]
One word: Graniteville.
Yes, there are isolated incidents, but I don't want to be that isolated crew. Without going into detail, I've even been in situations where PTC would have made a huge difference. Maybe the PTC mandate is too much, but I personally think there has been too much feet dragging on upgrading existing dark territory. But that's just my opinion.
Overmod In my opinion, the "problem" with Popular Science is that it's gotten away from being about science, and scientific basis, to "oooooohh! Shiny!!" aspects of tech.
In my opinion, the "problem" with Popular Science is that it's gotten away from being about science, and scientific basis, to "oooooohh! Shiny!!" aspects of tech.
I would argue that is not a problem with just Popular Science, but society as a whole.
When I was young I would go next door to my grandmother's house. She had difficulty climbing stairs. She would say to me "John. Go to the cellar and get me a scuttle of coal." First I would take out the ashes from her stove and then take the coal scuttle and go down stairs. When I got up she would have coffee and a sweet roll ready for me. If you said something like that to my now adult children they wouldn't understand what you meant.
A large part of the problem is that technology has changed so much in the past 40 years.
While this sounds like a "well, duh!" moment, let me explain.
Forty years ago, the average backyard mechanic could still do a full tune-up of his car with just a timing light, dwell/tach, and the requisite tools. Now you have to have a computer, and even getting the the spark plugs can be a real challenge.
Likewise, an audiophile might well be able to explain exactly how his stereo amp (tube or transistor) worked - and it was constructed at such a scale that the operation could actually be pointed out on the chassis. Today it's all on a chip, and the controls might just be virtual sliders on a touchscreen.
Early IC's (integrated circuits, not the railroad) contained just one, or maybe a few circuits. Today they have millions. The same with memory. Nobody had heard of a gigabyte. Now you can carry a little do-dad in your pocket that has 16 of them.
All in all, we've gotten to the point where "and then a miracle occurs" is the easiest answer.
Deggesty Erik. I, too, miss the "Model Garage;" when it was closed, I was not reading the magazine. Apparently Gus Wilson died, and there was no one who had his acumen to take his place.
Erik. I, too, miss the "Model Garage;" when it was closed, I was not reading the magazine. Apparently Gus Wilson died, and there was no one who had his acumen to take his place.
Martin Bunn had been writing the series for 44 years when the last regular installment was published in the June 1969 issue. There were at least two stories after that, with the last one published in 1971 or 1972, so I think it was a matter of Martin hanging up the typewriter rather than passing away. The "Model Garage" series was supposedly the longest running fictional short story for American magazines.
PopSci did have quite a few RR related articles in the past, one of the more interesting ones published 1961-62 or so was the runaway locomotive on the Jersey Central and the successful attempt to stop it with another locomotive.
- Erik
Which would not be so bad, except the 'backstory' to comprehend a lot of the nuts and bolts behind the shininess is either unknown to the authors, or would take too long (and perhaps require too much discipline on the readers' parts) to cover in an interesting story.
Note that I am NOT saying the modern readership is "dumber" or has "more ADD" or a 'shorter attention span" than older generations. On the other hand, much of modern culture is about quicker video downloads and snappy social-networking facileness, and many readers want to know WHAT it does, rather than WHY. And that is a terrible, terrible pity.
Of course, this is tied into my ancient jeremiad subject -- 'where are the Walter Lippmanns in todays media'? We have plenty of Arledges, plenty of Fallaci wannabees, even a couple of folks fit to shine Murrow's shoes ... but where are the Lippmanns? (And note that even that level was mocked by Heinlein et al.)...
erikemOne of my favorite sections in PopSci was Martin Bunn's stories on Gus Wilson and the Model Garage,
Erik,
The publisher of Popular Science or any popular magazine is in the business of selling the magazine to a wide audience. It is unlikely that the publisher does not know what readers will buy. That is not to say that you are in error. I think today's society lacks the direct knowledge of various technologies many people had in the 1960's and certainly in the 1940's. And I also think technology today is both more complicated in a real sense and less complicated in a user sense than it was back them. For example, in my current car (about 5 years old) I can no longer change the headlamp.
I wonder if this is good too but that's where our society is today. John
Deggesty The magazine, Popular Science, is not what it was when I began reading it in the forties. Back then, the people who wrote for the magazine did much better in reporting--and they knew how to construct sentences so that they were sentences and not simply groups of words.
The magazine, Popular Science, is not what it was when I began reading it in the forties. Back then, the people who wrote for the magazine did much better in reporting--and they knew how to construct sentences so that they were sentences and not simply groups of words.
It was still a pretty decent rag up to ~1969, but started going downhill when they really started pushing the "What's New" section.
One of my favorite sections in PopSci was Martin Bunn's stories on Gus Wilson and the Model Garage, a lot of interesting nuggets in those stories. Alden Armagnac (sp?) was another great writer, his story on the SL-1 reactor accident was by far the most informative that I've read on that incident. Robert Gannon was a fairly good writer, but not in the same level as Alden.
He mentioned split shifts; it seems to me that an employee should endeavor to get a little rest in the four and a half hours he was off duty.
$50,000 x 38,000 = $1,900,000,000; that is a little more than I receive every month. I wonder when all the roads that would have to modify their bungalows would gross that much, much less net that much.
I agree with you, Ed, on all counts.
Wow, this guy is a reporter?
Maybe he should go back to journalist school and re-do the part about fact checking,
He implies the engineer in the Graniteville accident was killed in the impact, when in fact, he died because he dismounted the locomotive and panicked, then ran through a cloud of chlorine trying to get away.
His running caused him to inhale a lethal amount of chlorine deep into his lungs.
The conductor, who was ex-military, assessed the situation, took his shirt off, soaked it in water, wrapped it around his mouth and nose, then walked away, through the same cloud, but slow enough so he did not inhale lung a full of the gas…his thinking saved his life, the engineer’s panic cost him his.
The rest of the report is just as full of inaccurate “facts” or facts designed to support the reporters personal opinion.
Note the “obese, diabetic high blood pressure and infected with HIV” description of the Metrolink engineer…as if his weight had anything what so ever to do with what happened.
That accident happened because the engineer broke several safety rules, not because he was fat or HIV positive.
That whole statement is simply to cause the reader to immediately dislike and condemn the engineer, before they have any of the facts surrounding the accident.
The entire article is biased, portraying the railroads as interested only in profit, and portraying the T&E employees as somewhat simpleminded sleep deprived automatons while the IT guys are presented as some type of savior…their laptops will save the day.
He did note, but glossed over the part where the IT guys states the cost to modify every signal shanty…$50,000.00 a shanty, with 38000 shanties…you do the math.
All of that to prevent 2% of the fatal accidents.
The other 98% don’t really count I guess, all we are doing is hitting the knuckleheads who run the gates or walk in the middle of the tracks.
You could build a lot of overpasses and close a lot of at grade crossings for that much cash.
This isn’t a “report”, it’s an op-ed piece designed to promote PTC.
With an aging population, I can see several points.
ecoliI have read accounts that suggest that the rails are investing in a level of PTC technology that meets the government mandate, but doesn't increase capacity. One hopes they're keeping an eye on the disruptive potential of the Google technology in the trucking industry.
zugmann ecoli Another interesting question is why Google has been able to create a driverless automobile that maneuvers in two dimensions and avoids crashing into anything, but the railroads find it impossible to implement PTC along the single dimension of a track. Yes, these are substantially different problems. But is it clear that PTC is more difficult? And if driverless motor vehicle technology eventually becomes widely accepted, will railroads find themselves competing against trucking companies whose payroll costs are zero? I would be like the government telling you that you have to buy a driverless google car in the next 5 years. What are the costs of the things? What can be done, and what can be done economically are two different beasts.
ecoli Another interesting question is why Google has been able to create a driverless automobile that maneuvers in two dimensions and avoids crashing into anything, but the railroads find it impossible to implement PTC along the single dimension of a track. Yes, these are substantially different problems. But is it clear that PTC is more difficult? And if driverless motor vehicle technology eventually becomes widely accepted, will railroads find themselves competing against trucking companies whose payroll costs are zero?
Another interesting question is why Google has been able to create a driverless automobile that maneuvers in two dimensions and avoids crashing into anything, but the railroads find it impossible to implement PTC along the single dimension of a track. Yes, these are substantially different problems. But is it clear that PTC is more difficult?
And if driverless motor vehicle technology eventually becomes widely accepted, will railroads find themselves competing against trucking companies whose payroll costs are zero?
I would be like the government telling you that you have to buy a driverless google car in the next 5 years. What are the costs of the things?
What can be done, and what can be done economically are two different beasts.
The self-driving Google cars have logged thousands of miles on ordinary highways with human-driven vehicles around them. Each car requires about $150000 worth of extra equipment, although some of that cost is a laser radar component which might drop in price considerably in the near future. See:
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/driveon/post/2012/06/google-discloses-costs-of-its-driverless-car-tests/1#.USGVGlriqnc
So far, Google puts a human in each car to take control if necessary. I would reserve judgement about how much further the technology must develop before it can operate safely without a human attendant, but it's interesting that Google has lobbied Nevada to legalize its use without an attendant:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/science/11drive.html
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics says that the annual mean wage for freight trucking is about 41000, so the payback period for a $150000 investment doesn't seem unreasonably long:
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes533032.htm
I have read accounts that suggest that the rails are investing in a level of PTC technology that meets the government mandate, but doesn't increase capacity. One hopes they're keeping an eye on the disruptive potential of the Google technology in the trucking industry.
John WRBucyrusWhat is coming to the private automobile is not self-driving. It is automatic toll charge per mile on all roads When is this automatic toll charge for all roads coming? I have heard that one state, Virginia, is considering putting a toll on one road, I-95 but there is a strong public outcry against it.
BucyrusWhat is coming to the private automobile is not self-driving. It is automatic toll charge per mile on all roads
When is this automatic toll charge for all roads coming? I have heard that one state, Virginia, is considering putting a toll on one road, I-95 but there is a strong public outcry against it.
John,
What is propelling this forward is a loss in gas tax revenue due to fuel efficiency being increased. Therefore some states are looking at a new roadway tax that applies per mile driven rather than by per gallon of fuel consumed.
This requires a GPS device in your vehicle that records everywhere you drive to. The system then charges you a toll based on your GPS record of driving. The toll can vary according to how busy the road is or how much in demand it is. This will produce a highly managed sort of traffic flow.
This is right around the corner.
PNWRMNM"I am from the Government and I am here to help"
In my state, New Jersey, recently our Governor Chris Christie was enraged because the Federal Government, while coming to help us recover from Sandy, wasn't coming fast enough to suit him.
BucyrusThe Google automatic car is about as goofy as the Segway scooter. What is coming to the private automobile is not self-driving. It is automatic toll charge per mile on all roads; coupled with automatic law enforcement of the driver. You will still be driving manually, but it will be like a police officer riding with you in the front seat in case you need a ticket.
"I am from the Government and I am here to help"
The Google automatic car is about as goofy as the Segway scooter. What is coming to the private automobile is not self-driving. It is automatic toll charge per mile on all roads; coupled with automatic law enforcement of the driver. You will still be driving manually, but it will be like a police officer riding with you in the front seat in case you need a ticket.
OvermodDon, you usually know what you're talking about, so explain to me in a bit more detail where you see two different implementation dates in this.
It's pretty plain that I am confused on this one. So, the "completely implemented" date is 2018?
A driverless automobile may maneuver rather well in two dimensions and not hit anything when it's the only moving vehicle, but the problem comes with doing this in traffic, where other vehicles are moving in a lot of different directions and not all of which are driverless.
Just because a concept can be built and shown to work doesn't mean it's practical.
I've been staying out of this one for professional reasons, but this deserves comment:
oltmannd [Looks like there are two dates in the law. (Sec. 103) Directs the Secretary to require each Class I railroad carrier, a railroad carrier that has inadequate safety performance, or a railroad that provides intercity passenger or commuter rail passenger transportation to develop, submit for Secretary approval, and if approved implement a railroad safety risk reduction program, including risk mitigation, technology implementation, and fatigue management plans, to reduce the rate of railroad accidents and injuries. Requires the Secretary to ensure that railroad carriers required to submit a technology implementation plan with a schedule for implementing a positive train control system comply with that schedule and implement such system by December 31, 2018. (Sec. 104) Requires each Class I railroad carrier and each entity providing intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation to develop and submit for Secretary approval a plan for implementing a positive train control system by December 31, 2015. Grants the Secretary authority to assess civil penalties for violation of related requirements. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR02095:@@@D&summ2=m& Looks like law has plan by 2015 and implement by 2018, but it seems FRA rule requires implement by 2015.
[Looks like there are two dates in the law.
(Sec. 103) Directs the Secretary to require each Class I railroad carrier, a railroad carrier that has inadequate safety performance, or a railroad that provides intercity passenger or commuter rail passenger transportation to develop, submit for Secretary approval, and if approved implement a railroad safety risk reduction program, including risk mitigation, technology implementation, and fatigue management plans, to reduce the rate of railroad accidents and injuries.
Requires the Secretary to ensure that railroad carriers required to submit a technology implementation plan with a schedule for implementing a positive train control system comply with that schedule and implement such system by December 31, 2018.
(Sec. 104) Requires each Class I railroad carrier and each entity providing intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation to develop and submit for Secretary approval a plan for implementing a positive train control system by December 31, 2015.
Grants the Secretary authority to assess civil penalties for violation of related requirements.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR02095:@@@D&summ2=m&
Looks like law has plan by 2015 and implement by 2018, but it seems FRA rule requires implement by 2015.
This law is what DETERMINES FRA scope and authority re actions involving mandated PTC.
The language in the first half of [103] does not deal with PTC explicitly at all, and if you were following the progress of the legislation up to 2008 you will know why it did not.
The second half of [103] looks only at implementation, and says the system a given railroad proposes to the Secretary (which of course means to the appropriate channel(s) in the bureaucracy) has to be implemented, and by logical extension operative if not operating, by the 2018 date.
Section [104] plugs the loophole that a given railroad might keep tweaking its implementation plan until close to 2008 and then come whining about cost overruns or changes in scope, or the kinds of issue that plagued NAJPTC, and claim they can't possibly meet the 2018 date. This is merely additional detail qualifying what was stated in [103], just as sections like [108] flesh out what was said in the first part of that section. It says that the PLAN for the complying PTC instantiation has to be finalized and submitted in all respects by the end of 2015; it does not require that any construction, testing, etc. must be completed by that date... leaving the three years for that construction, testing, etc.
Don, you usually know what you're talking about, so explain to me in a bit more detail where you see two different implementation dates in this.
PNWRMNM Don, Does the FRA have the legal authority to authorize phased implementation, or would congress have to address and fix their mistake? The whole thing is a waste or scarce resources that would be better invested elsewhere in my opinion. Mac
Don,
Does the FRA have the legal authority to authorize phased implementation, or would congress have to address and fix their mistake?
The whole thing is a waste or scarce resources that would be better invested elsewhere in my opinion.
Mac
I think they have a lot of latitude In Dec, the exempted some trackage that has only a trickle of TIH traffic from implementation.
Looks like there are two dates in the law.
Deggesty b. It seems to me that the people in Congress had no idea as to the immensity of what they have decreed. How many know anything about actual railroad operation?
b. It seems to me that the people in Congress had no idea as to the immensity of what they have decreed. How many know anything about actual railroad operation?
Congress very rarely, if ever, has any understanding of the imensity of the consequences of their actions.
My understanding is that even in dark territory, the switches will be tied into the PTC system.
Whether that would prevent an accident is, I think debatable. I say this because some recent articles (within the last year or so) have said that the first generation of PTC that's going to be deployed wouldn't have prevented some low speed collisions that have happened, like the one on the BNSF in southwest Iowa that was discussed on the forum. Even low speed collisions can be deadly.
I think that people in general, including those who you might think ought to know better, have seen to many movies, TV shows etc, that make it seem like our technology is much more advanced than it really is. That things that may be possible in 5 or 10 years is already here, that any possible obstacles are easily taken care of. That anyone who says maybe we aren't ready for something or that obstacles aren't as easily overcame as the "conventional wisdom" states is just stonewalling because they don't really want to spend the money on the technology.
Deggesty a. Would PTC have really prevented the accident at Graniteville--are all switches, even in dark territory to be tied into the system? b. It seems to me that the people in Congress had no idea as to the immensity of what they have decreed. How many know anything about actual railroad operation?
a. Would PTC have really prevented the accident at Graniteville--are all switches, even in dark territory to be tied into the system?
b. Maybe they were shocked at how much dark territory still exists?
schlimmOne of the reasons for its derailing was that many sheep were squashed under the wheels.
That reminds me of Frank Norris's The Octopus and the Cyclopian monster.
On the 26th of April in 2008 at about 9 p.m. an ICE High Speed Train with 135 passengers aboard dashed at more than 200 km/h into a large flock of sheep near Fulda/Germany. The unfortunate animals had gone astray only a few meters into a tunnel. The ICE needed about 1 km to stop and the entire train derailed. One of the reasons for its derailing was that many sheep were squashed under the wheels. No human being died, only forty of them were injured, most merely slightly.
Darn hardheaded sheep….
henry6 Ischlimm Loading gauges, etc. have nothing to do with a positive control system to avoid collisions. The system and software that are proven to work elsewhere should be able to work here with some adjustments. Much better to buy a proven system with the bugs worked out. Look back at the fiasco with implementing a new air traffic control computer system that was obsolete before it was installed. It does have something to do with it. As has been stated in these threads and posts and to me directly by manager of an international locomotive and car builder, America's heavy loading gauge prevents a lot of things from happening. We here have concentrated on heavier and more bolstered equipment to withstand collisions and derailments rather than installing enhanced and sophisticated signal and traffic control systems which keep trains from colliding.
I
schlimm Loading gauges, etc. have nothing to do with a positive control system to avoid collisions. The system and software that are proven to work elsewhere should be able to work here with some adjustments. Much better to buy a proven system with the bugs worked out. Look back at the fiasco with implementing a new air traffic control computer system that was obsolete before it was installed.
Loading gauges, etc. have nothing to do with a positive control system to avoid collisions. The system and software that are proven to work elsewhere should be able to work here with some adjustments. Much better to buy a proven system with the bugs worked out. Look back at the fiasco with implementing a new air traffic control computer system that was obsolete before it was installed.
It does have something to do with it. As has been stated in these threads and posts and to me directly by manager of an international locomotive and car builder, America's heavy loading gauge prevents a lot of things from happening. We here have concentrated on heavier and more bolstered equipment to withstand collisions and derailments rather than installing enhanced and sophisticated signal and traffic control systems which keep trains from colliding.
European lightweight construction held up so well in a sheep collision.
watch?v=LhplyPl14HA
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You can buy a lot of equipment for the cost of PTC.
BaltACD Nothing quite like Congress voting to spend other peoples money on a unfunded madate to implement uninvented interoperable technology all across the country by a specific near term date as a knee jerk reaction to a single individual's failure to do the job he was hired to do.
Nothing quite like Congress voting to spend other peoples money on a unfunded madate to implement uninvented interoperable technology all across the country by a specific near term date as a knee jerk reaction to a single individual's failure to do the job he was hired to do.
I don't think it was just that one incident. But that incident is the straw on the camel's back. Look how many miles of dark territory we still have. And not just industrial tracks or branch lines.
http://www.pbworld.com/pdfs/publications/pb_network/pbnetwork73.pdf
Many interesting articles, but particularly relevant here pages 23-30.
Oh, for a phased implementation! If only it had be 10% of track mileage a year for 5 years instead of 100% in 2015!
The two most likely outcomes for 2015 are the entire rail network grinds to a halt because of equipment, communication, hardware and software bugs OR the FRA grants an extension. Full, working implementation is not likely.
To implement or not to implement has an economic factor, and that is what drives a lot of decisions. And we're seeing that acknowledged with this issue.
While human lives are virtually impossible to put a price on, all the other economic factors do have a definite price. If the cost of PTC were clearly less than the losses it would prevent, I'm sure the railroads would be jumping at the opportunity to install the system.
And if the saving of lives is indeed our primary goal, let's put some of that money into grade crossing separations, ROW isolation, and other such initiatives - places we know there is a problem but where the resources apparently don't exist to remedy them.
Even after 100 years, we still don't have a universal signal system across the country. And they want a universal system it two years? Using a technology that is apparently unproven in the aggregate?
It's kinda like the Diesel regen systems. We're trying to get fire apparatus exempted from the automatic shutdown portions of the system, because, gee, how good would it be to have a fire engine shut down to regen in the middle of fighting the fire at your house?
henry6 PTC has proven itself on railroads in other countries...but here we have a different loading gauge and philosophy about how to run a railroad. We look at "collateral" damage as part of the system.
PTC has proven itself on railroads in other countries...but here we have a different loading gauge and philosophy about how to run a railroad. We look at "collateral" damage as part of the system.
Well, you have to. What roads get guardrails or traffic lights? Same thing. Human life has a price.
tree68 Sounds like some other issues that have been coming up of late. Oh, there's a problem? Why, we'll just pass a law and it'll go away!
Sounds like some other issues that have been coming up of late.
Oh, there's a problem? Why, we'll just pass a law and it'll go away!
I've said it before - we've had cab signals for almost 100 years, signal enforcement devices for ages, yet many railroads weren't even thinking about adding them to lines. PTC was only a matter of time in coming.
henry6... This article could be a propaganda piece to make PTC look bad. {emphasis added}
Railroads in other countries have a lighter loading gauge than we do, trains are not as heavy, etc. because we build to withstand accidents and collisions. Other countries' use avoidance signal systems to keep trains from colliding (like PTC).
I have no knowledge about PTC but a question that others might know answers to. Some other industrial countries have had systems that are the equivalent of PTC. Why couldn't those systems have been modified and used here to avoid some of the problems described above?
Part of the problem is that Class 1's, especially those without passenger service or low traffic levels to begin with, don't want Positive Train Control. Some don't like the price, others don't see a need for it on their railroads or application. This article could be a propaganda piece to make PTC look bad.
The signal people I know have been shaking their heads for a long time. A one time fix for a one size fits all solution is not out there and then there is the crushing cost of compliance for the shortlines.
(I don't want to be on the locomotive when the GIS to GPS software gets confused and wants to "recalculate".....and you are dealing with the absolutes that congress ASSUMED could be met. Stop the railroad every time it frequently wants to "recalulate" ?)
I am hearing that some shortlines will be forced to buy newer second and third generation locomotives just to have a prayer of a chance of having working equipment where they need it with their interchange partners.
Time to dust off the Urgent Deficiency Act of Oct 22 1913!
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