I don’t know if this will actually happen, but it seems like a rather broad swipe at the grade crossing problem. It is a uniquely interesting model of increasing crossing safety which amounts to increasing the collective crossing safety by raising the safety of non-signalized (passive) crossings. It does that by adding signal protection to the most dangerous existing non-signalized (passive) crossings.
It gets the funding for this by reducing the cost of signalized (active) crossings. It reduces the cost of signalized crossings by relieving the railroad from responsibility and ownership of all crossings, including the signalized ones.
The cost of fully signalized grade crossings is substantial, and that high cost limits the number of crossings that can be so equipped. Therefore, the application of automatic crossing protection is prioritized to equip the crossings where it can do the most good. However, the high cost still results in a net shortage which prevents many crossings that could benefit from signalization from receiving it.
According to the linked report, it would be possible to reduce the cost of the automatic crossing protection systems, and that would allow the protection to be broadened to cover more crossings that could benefit from automatic protection. They explain that reducing the cost is based on the fact that the cost is higher than it needs to be. They explain why that is, and what to do about it.
The report explores the origin of the automatic crossing protection and what led to the relatively high cost of such systems. It explains that railroads began to run electric current through their rails as a means of insuring continuity that would give an indication of track problems, and this evolved to control railroad signal systems. Once this was in place, it was only natural to use the same railroad signal technology to control grade crossing flashers. Therefore because the flashers were controlled by the basic track electric signal circuitry, the entire grade crossing protection system was part of the railroad infrastructure, and the company was therefore responsible for it.
This responsibility included the legal liability for the crossing protection being borne by the railroad companies. Because the companies bear legal liability for the performance of their crossing protection, they insist on an extremely high level of robustness in the system components and engineering. This drives up the costs, and this is where the report concludes that costs could be cut to reduce the cost of signal protection so it could be applied to more crossings. However, the railroad signal union opposes any cost reduction in the crossing protection system being generated by new product development by the labor force within the railroads companies.
Therefore the report concludes that to get “outside the box” so to speak, and develop lower cost crossing protection systems, the entire protection system must be taken out of the purview of the railroads and placed in the hands of the public sector. To do this, the crossing activation system has to be separated from the railroad tracks and made part of a public sector warning system.
Then as a final component of the plan, the railroads must be shielded from the crossing liability. Then they will just run their trains on their track, and the entire crossing installation will be completely outside of their ownership, control, and responsibility.
But until that that shielding from liability is put in place, the railroad industry resists the cost reduction of crossing systems. The report sums up that resistance with the following quote:
“It is also clear to some that looking to the railroads for “out of the box” solutions, when the railroads wish to stay in the box, will not yield great progress. This, coupled with the fact that the principal railroad union involved in grade crossing installation and maintenance, the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, does not support change, suggests that new ideas will have to come from outside the railroad industry.”
The report mentions that not only must this new development come from outside of the railroad industry, but also, that crossing installation cost can be reduced by taking the work out of the purview of unionized railroad workers.
This report goes into a lot of detail about the type and numbers of different crossing and trespassing accidents as well as the liability cost to the railroads for these accidents. It also discusses the relatively high maintenance cost borne by the railroads for crossing protection systems due to the stringent quality control to protect railroad companies’ liability for the crossings. The report also examines tort liability and how it applies to U.S. railroad versus how it works in other countries. It also describes the impediment to new crossing system development imposed by the MUTCD with their minimum standards that apply to all aspects of grade crossing warning system presentation.
The bulk of this paper is devoted to exploring a variety of signal activation methods that could replace the track shunt system used by the railroads.
SYNOPSIS:
Railroads currently own and maintain crossing protection systems and bear legal liability for them. To minimize liability losses, railroads insist on the highest quality, highest cost systems. The high cost limits safety coverage. Action Plan: Transfer ownership of the crossing and protection system from the private railroads to the public sector, and relieve the railroads of crossing liability. Public sector redesigns the crossing protection system to reduce the cost. Public sector further reduces cost of labor for installation and maintenance of crossings and protection systems.
Here is the link to the paper:
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/NotesDocs/3-76B%20Report.pdf
The results of the study are summed up on page 62 of the report: Tort Liability.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
This is not an FRA document.
I find it flawed in two important aspects. First, it does not evaluate the existing detection technology, so there is no baseline for comparison. Second, it is all about the cheapest part of a grade crossing installatiion, the detection system.
Looks to me like somthing to keep Aggies in funds.
Mac
The railroads were responsible for crossings long before automatic signaling. I remember many manned crossings with 4-quadrant gates when i was a kid.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
A number of decades ago an NTSB finding suggested replacing alternating flashers (but not gates) with RYG traffic lights identical to those used at road intersections. The staetment said something like: "drivers are familiar with them, respect them, and traffic laws make enforcement of violations straightforward." At that time passing a dropped crossing gate or running flashers wasn't even a violation in some states.
We, in this country, are experts at shifting blame to someone else. Banks have convinced us that when they loan money to someone who was dishonest about who they are, they have not stolen money from the bank, they have stolen YOUR identity and thus actually stole the money from YOU.
Trains cannot swerve, or stop quickly. Everyone knows that. When an idiot chooses to ignore warnings at grade crossings, somehow we have shifted blame to the railroad for not making the crossing idiot proof.
A stop sign would be sufficient warning for a person of average intelligence. It is not possible for a train to quietly sneak up on a crossing.
Dave
Lackawanna Route of the Phoebe Snow
9. Roop, S., Ruback, L., Intelligent Transportation Systems – Positive Train Separation
(ITS-PTS) Research Initiative, Texas Transportation Institute, 1997.
11. Warner, J., Roop, S., EVA Grade Crossing Warning Assessment: Tenneco Road,
Houston, Texas Transportation Institute, 2000.
There is so much assumption with the report its silly.
First and foremost, the cherry picking of supportive data is shameful, note that for crossing accidents they went to one of the worst years they could find in recent history…had they included the following years, the Bell curve one could draw would show a marked decrease in fatalities and motor vehicle accidents up to the current available number for 2011.
Stephen Roop is, for all intents and purposes, TTI…he was the founding researcher there when it was created.
I love the conclusion the report obliquely draws that the reason any new technology will be rejected by the railroads is because of the Signal Maintainers Union…
Fact is if someone came along, offered to buy out the signal maintainers, and assume liability for all grade crossing safety, not just the “passive” or rural crossings, most railroads would jump at the chance to opt out completely..
But under our current legal system, its either all in or all out, you can’t split the responsibility or liability.
I do like the fact the report pointed out the legal conundrum the carriers would find themselves in if somehow the “cheaper” technology was adopted.
“By this we mean that if the system put in place to warn
motorists of train movement was somehow better than existing systems (i.e., track circuit based),
then when an accident occurs at a location equipped with a traditional active system, plaintiffs
would contend that the railroads are liable because they know there are better systems available
but have chosen to neglect upgrading certain grade crossings — an act of omission. On the other
hand, if railroads (or any entity taking responsibility for risk at crossings) install equipment at a
grade crossing that is in any way inferior to current technology — independent of cost — then
liability will likely be maintained because the responsible entity knows that the alternative
system is not as good as existing systems – an act of commission.”
It’s a lose-lose formula, so railroads take the position that by buying tried and true components that have track records that most industries would envy, they preclude the assumption that they could have “done more”.
Something most folks don’t know is this…a relay purchased from Union Signal will work right out of the box, every time, simply because it already has been “in service” at Union Signal…they real time test every one under all extremes before they ship.
Now, before anyone jumps in and uses the old “you simply don’t like change” argument, let me say this.
If an entity would buy out the signal maintainers that could not be assimilated into the rest of the signal department, and by that I mean pay them the full amount due to retirement, (minus their cost of health insurance) guarantee their RRR pension, then assume all cost including liability at all grade crossings, then I would be the number one fan of such a move.
But assuming liability only at “Passive” or rural crossing will not solve any legal issue for the railroad, anyone hit at such a crossing will still have the argument of “there is better technology in the form of fully activated gates bells and lights, and you should have it at every grade crossing”.
This same argument is successfully used in every incident at rural crossings, currently it is financially beneficial for the carriers to simply pay out the lawsuits instead of up grading the 7000(?) crossings the report mentions.
Now, with all that said, it would be to your benefit to understand that S. Roop is also involved in the PTC program at A&M, it is in his interest for PTC and some form of associated grade crossing trigger device to be adopted.
Take this report for what it is, a biased presentation, with pre conceived desired results that simply went looking for scientific “facts” to support its conclusion, and disregarded any science that didn’t.
23 17 46 11
I agree with EdB ....Seriously warped and not based in reality. One case where academia ought to be labelling the report Op-Ed instead of science.
City wants SAFE and QUIET crossing, then CITY BUILD over-pass.
City Cheap? so sas. LOUD HORN... Train a'commin!
BTW: TRAINS can be VERY SILENT when they want to be. Try standing on an LIRR platform, A train will come in at 79 mph, and you will never hear it.
Yes, LION can hear BNSF locomotives 10 miles away and that is before they sound their horns. but LIONS know and love the sound of the train.
ROAR
The Route of the Broadway Lion The Largest Subway Layout in North Dakota.
Here there be cats. LIONS with CAMERAS
mudchicken I agree with EdB ....Seriously warped and not based in reality. One case where academia ought to be labelling the report Op-Ed instead of science.
I agree with his conclusion as well...confirmation bias all the way around it.
Any argument carried far enough will end up in Semantics--Hartz's law of rhetoric Emerald. Leemer and Southern The route of the Sceptre Express Barry
I just started my blog site...more stuff to come...
http://modeltrainswithmusic.blogspot.ca/
The one essential component of the proposal is to remove all crossing liability from the railroads and give it to the public sector.
I might have misinterpreted the report, but I assume that it proposes to take ALL crossings out of the purview of the private railroads, and not just the newly signalized passive crossings.
If it is true that the railroads would jump at the chance to “opt out” of the grade crossing ownership and responsibility, then it seems to me that the only obstacle would be to change the liability so it can happen. It does not seem to me that the report is asking anything of the railroads. So I cannot see how they would be in any position to criticize it.
“SUMMARY
Technological advances over the past decade suggest that there has to be a low-cost way
to signalize some of the thousands of passive grade crossings that exist in our country. Perhaps
the most likely candidate technologies that can reduce active warning costs are those with
significantly lower installation costs. In a fully redundant system, installation is one of the
largest cost items of systems now in use, ranging from 25 to 35 percent of the total system cost.”
From page 69,
“If we focus on the systems that are off of railroad property, there is an implicit suggestion
that the public sector can and would endeavor to install active warning systems at passive
crossings, independent of the operating railroad(s). This seems to the research team the most
plausible and practical path to pursue if in fact low-cost active warning is to become a reality.
Therefore, we will focus the remaining discussion on systems that do not require access to
railroad property.”
There are a few more references to passive crossings, I didn’t look them all up.
But the summary uses that phrase exclusive of active crossings, so that leaves only the mentioned passive ones.
That being what I read in this, then the possibility of this going forward with railroad cooperation is nil, until liability at all crossings, active or not, is assumed by whatever agency formed.
As I stated, it’s a all-in or all out proposition, ya can’t have both.
Low cost warning systems sound wonderful in concept, but a warning system that fails to warn is deceptively dangerous. I suspect the currently used systems could also be installed a lot more cheaply if standards were relaxed.
We have an interesting ethical dilemma. Lower cost will allow warning systems at more crossings, and presumably reduce accidents for inattentive motorists. But a less than 100% perfect system may lure the law-abiding careful motorist into danger when it fails to operate, whatever the reason. Do we sacrifice one intelligent person to save a dozen dummies? And, no, there isn't a correct answer to that!
One introductory comment did bring a question to mind, and that was the origin of the track ciruit. The authors suggest that the original purpose was broken rail protection, and that train occupancy detection was a serendipitous by-product. As far as I know, in fact the reverse is true, with the early track circuit installations in the 1870s developed as part of block signal systems.
John
Cx,
Your recall of history is correct.
Ed,
I understand your point about their references to passive crossings. I assumed that they intended to apply this to all grade crossings, but I cannot find that clearly stipulated. They do focus on passive crossings because that is where they expect to gain safety. So this is about passive crossings.
But I saw nothing indicating that present active crossings would not be a part of it. If cost could be saved on new crossing installations, it makes sense to save it on existing installations as they are maintained and upgraded. And if we can relieve the railroads from liability at crossings with cheap signals, we should not have anything to lose by relieving them from liability at crossings with expensive signals.
It seems to me that the paper assumes there will be no resistance from the railroads once the railroads are shielded from liability. So the report is ultimately an appeal to the public sector to make this happen. It would amount to nationalizing all railroad grade crossings.
However, doing this requires a legal sea change restructured by the government. If this were granted, I would expect it to apply to all existing and new crossings. Or at least, I can’t see why it would not be. So the railroads would be liberated from the entire crossing spectrum simultaneously. Why would railroads oppose that?
But even if the existing active crossings were grandfathered in to the old liability system; and the railroads owned and operated them as they always have; why would the railroads oppose the signalization of passive crossings under the new terms of public sector responsibility?
From what has been written in the report - the writer sounds like a heavy consumer of recreational pharmaceuticals and out of touch with 21st Century reality. The Lawyers, who form the bulk of Congress as well as State Legislatures would never agree to curtail one of their bread and butter torts.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
As an Aggie I find this report an embarrassment not worthy of a great school, but then the TTI always in a world of their own.
[Snipped] from Bucyrus' original Post:
"...Therefore the report concludes that to get “outside the box” so to speak, and develop lower cost crossing protection systems, the entire protection system must be taken out of the purview of the railroads and placed in the hands of the public sector. To do this, the crossing activation system has to be separated from the railroad tracks and made part of a public sector warning system..."
There are a couple of questions that seem to have been ignored by the report:
#1 My understanding of Signalized Crossings is that a local jurisdiction makes the determination that a signalized crossing is needed (studies done,etc.).
b.)Then in consultation with the railroad that owns the line involved.
c.)They agree on the signalization.
1.)The Cost is determined for the specified installation.
d.) The railroad crews do the installation, and the jurisdiction pays all the costs involved in creating the active crossing.
e.) The railroad then owns the equipment, and maintenance responsibility.
The most problematic part in 'The Report' seems to be the railroad(s) surrendering the crossing sites to a political entity that will bear liability and responsibility, as a Third Party.
I do not see the railroads surrendering that much control of their line and ROW. That proposition would seem to be a 'legal gold mine'. made for lawyers to get wealthy through litigation of every incident at a crossing.
Well everyone here agrees that grade crossing are a big problem for the railroads. And everyone assures us that the crossing problem cannot be fixed except by eliminating crossings. Otherwise, we are assured than nothing can make a crossing safer because drivers are incorrigible. Everyone here complains about tort liability and how unfair it is to the railroads because they can’t stop their trains fast.
So now comes a far sighted proposal to finally wipe the problem off of the map from the railroads’ perspective; and what kind of reaction do we get? Must be self-serving scheme. Must be junk science. Too many lawyers for it to happen. Seriously warped and not based in reality. No baseline in the report. Goes after the cheapest part of crossings for savings. Author must be on drugs.
Why on earth should railroads be liable for death, damage, or injury caused by their trains at public crossings? Everyone knows that trains cannot stop in time to avoid a vehicle, so the country grants trains the right of way at crossings. What kind of a society gives trains the right of way and then punishes them if they hit somebody?
I am sure that if you asked the American public if they thought it is fair to hold railroads liable for something they have no control over; they would agree that it is not fair. I am sure they would agree to collectivize the risk so it could be properly and fairly borne by society as a whole.
I can’t imagine why any railroader or person with railroad knowledge would oppose such a change.
Unfortunately, a problem wherever wheels ride the rails.
Level Crossings in UK
Artificial intelligence by no means beats human stupidity.
The fact is that some people will not be told 'no'. When that happens, the most unfortunate result is the effect on the conscientious and empathetic trainman. As cavalier and unempathetic as it may sound, a happy result should be that someone who can't see the value in a policy or law, and who wilfully flouts it, will pay the price that removes society of any further responsibility for that person...if things go the way they should.
Crandell
BucyrusI can’t imagine why any railroader or person with railroad knowledge would oppose such a change.
Nor can I but there sure seems to be a huge effort here to attack the messenger rather than indicate factually why elimination of responsibility from the freight rail companies would be a bad idea.
Bucyrus,
As one who criticized the report as junk science, I took the notion that "the public" would assume liability for grade crossings as not a serious proposal, given the context of the report The author did not make any case for that change.
If that was a serious proposal I am sure the railroads would be all for it. I do not take this document as a serious proposal to relieve the railroads of liability associated with grade crossings.
Mac,
I am not sure I understand what you mean by the report not being a serious proposal. On page 13-15, they seem to indicate that such tort reform would almost be essential. In other places in the report, they say that cost reduction cannot go forward without relieving the railroads from liability. Indeed it is the liability that has inflated the cost, according to the report. So as far as a proposal goes, it seems to me that report is making one. It must be serious, or else why else would they make it?
Whether such a proposal has any serious chance of going anywhere, I don’t know. Maybe that is what you mean by serious proposal. I don’t see it as an easy change to make.
And, while the proposal to nationalize grade crossings would end the problem for the railroads, the carnage would continue. Although it should reduce as more passive crossings are signalized due to new funding resulting from cost reducing crossing protection systems.
I took the general tenor of the piece to be that by reducing the cost of installing grade crossing protection from $1.00 to 50 cents, we could then put crossing protection on twice as many crossings. Much of the piece dealt with the pro's and con's of the replacement technologies.
As has been mentioned, however, only the potential replacements for existing technologies were evaluated in the various charts - we have no comparison between the present and the proposed future in terms of performance or reliability, or any other factor.
While ownership/liability is a very important consideration, including present technology in the comparison would provide a clearer picture of what would be gained or lost moving to a replacement. Those of us familiar with current crossing protection technology can do a mental overlay. Someone who doesn't know a cross arm from a crossbow doesn't have that ability.
This omission may have been by design. While I didn't spend a lot of time looking through the report, it appeared to me that none of the suggested solutions measured up to current technology, and making them do so raised the price to the point that the represented little or no savings.
Bucyrus SYNOPSIS: Railroads currently own and maintain crossing protection systems and bear legal liability for them. To minimize liability losses, railroads insist on the highest quality, highest cost systems. The high cost limits safety coverage. Action Plan: Transfer ownership of the crossing and protection system from the private railroads to the public sector, and relieve the railroads of crossing liability. Public sector redesigns the crossing protection system to reduce the cost. Public sector further reduces cost of labor for installation and maintenance of crossings and protection systems.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
I have no way of knowing whether they can deliver the promised cost savings. They say they can, so it is up to them to prove they can. I don’t expect to be asked to believe they can do what they say they will do without them proving their case economically.
As far as a lower cost resulting in lower quality, and thus lower reliability, they will have to prove that works too. But their premise at this point is that railroad owned systems have more quality than they need due to the railroad bearing the liability. So they are not presenting this as eliminating necessary quality. Nevertheless, I would be skeptical of a claim that significant cost could be saved by eliminating quality that is not needed.
However, there might be the calculation that society is collectively safer if we signalize all the passive crossings even if it is with systems that are ten percent less safe.
Interestingly, I had found another report that attempts to thoroughly discredit this one. And it does it a year earlier than the date of this report. So this idea must have been circulating a bit. Maybe I can find it.
Bucyrus, Schlimm…
Not so much attacking the messenger, but the message, and obviously you failed to read all of my post.
A few items you should be aware of before you go forward with your normal attack toward those who don’t agree with you that change is always good or that we should change because we can..
One, the “Tenneco Road” test actually took place at Jones Channel Road, which leads to the Tenneco/Georgia Gulf complex, it is locally known as Tenneco road.
Now, for a research scientist to not even give the proper official name to a location where testing and data gathering is done strikes me as odd, I know a researcher or two, and they are anal beyond belief about the most minute detail.
Two, the report states that the public pays for the installation of the crossing devices.
One would hope that a research scientist could at least spend the time to look up the facts, as here in Texas, TDot determines what, if any protection is required at any public grade crossing, and what type of protection installation is put in.
TDot does all the design and engineering specifications, the carrier has some input, but not much.
By state law, the carrier is responsible for 75% of the cost of installation, 100% of maintenance and repair.
The report claims/states the public pays 90% of the installation cost which is simply not true or correct in Texas, oddly the very state TTI is located in.
We, the PTRA, contract all of our active crossing device repairs to the UP Signal department, simply because of cost.
S. Roop is TTI, he has been doing “studies” of rail crossings, rail capacity, so forth and so on for years, all based on his version of junk science.
Had you read my post completely, you would have gotten to the part where I stated that, if there was an agency created to assume all liability at all grade crossings, and assume all the associated cost involved, I would be the number one fan of such a thing.
Most carriers would jump at that, in fact, most would gladly install a power lug for such an agency to use, and give that agency the electricity free, if the liability was removed.
And as a foot note, the test of the magnetic anomaly detector failed horribly, the PTRA main and UP main are maybe 100 feet apart there, our crews call in the UP signal problems along with ours as the same UP signal crew works both….the gates and lights malfunctioned continuously.
The detectors were set up outside/beyond the standard track circuit as a fail-safe, if the test equipment failed, the normal equipment would take over.
Speed over these two tangent crossings is, PTRA, Restricted speed not to exceed 20 mph, and UP, restricted speed not to exceed 20 mph.
Little hint, where you are 300 yards away from Buffalo Bayou, and about 5 feet above sea level (the Houston ship channel) you are in a swamp, and when you dig a hole more than 3 feet down in a swamp, guess what fills up with ground water?
Now, before you jump up with the “you guys just resist anything new, and any change “argument let me say this.
I am not a grumpy old head who still grumbles about the caboose going away…I have ridden in one, they suck and are dangerous and I am glad they are gone...I agree with a lot of the “new” rules put in place, the cell phone rule being my favorite in fact….unless used on/for company business, they have no place in the cab.
You can’t text, play Angry Birds or talk to your girlfriend and do your job safely, no matter what others might claim.
I do like good, valid research science, done the old fashion way, out in the field with hands on experience, collecting hard, empirical data based on real time real world observation.
TTI is simply a way to garner federal research dollars.
In every one of the “papers” and “reports” I have seen come out of that place, all have started with defined, expected results, they simply go looking for the “science” and “data” to support the pre-determined wanted results.
Last I looked, research started out with a hypothesis that had expected or desired results, you gathered both inclusive and exclusive data through field research, documented your findings then weighed the resultant facts against the hypothesis assumed conclusions, and made a determination based on what the facts showed you, not on what you wanted the result to be.
Now, you can go “Rah Rah, change for changes sake, think out of the box” if that's your thing,but this report has zero basis in reality, it makes huge and blatantly incorrect assumptions,( the word assume appears several times throughout the report), and assumption inplace of factual data has no place in research.
Buycrus, you of all the posters here should have taken one look at this “report” and deleted the link, what with your avid affection and experience with grade crossing accidents and safety.
Break it down….the proposal says if we cheapen all grade crossing protection, (really?) we can put more of the cheaper ones in place.
He assumes lives will be saved by placing these cheap devices at rural or passive crossings, but provides no real numbers about traffic use at these crossings, no data about deaths at them beyond broad assumptions.
TDot apparently deems these crossings the least in need of anything beyond the cross buck due to actual traffic counts.
He advocates we cheapen all devices simply because doing so will allow us to install more of these cheap devices at crossings where, statistically, they are not needed.
(clue, he has a vested interest in one of these systems)
While I can’t speak for other states, the majority of crossing accidents in Texas occur at urban, suburban and city crossings, not at rural ones.
Here’s a real fact…you stand a better chance of being bitten by a member of the pit viper family of rattlesnakes or other venomous snake than you have of being in a grade crossing accident.
(Luch, Andreas, ed. (2010). Molecular, Clinical and Environmental Toxicology)
There is an average between 7000 and 8000 venomous snake bites annually in the US, look at the FRA site and compare that to crossing accidents nationwide.
He further advocates we outsource the design, installation and maintenance of such devices to the low bidder, he bluntly states we should accept lower reliability and safety in exchange for lower cost.
(Anyone got some cheap shuttle booster O-Rings handy) we all have first-hand experience with low bid quality and performance.
You of all people…the one person who has in all of his posting regarding crossing safety pointed out that the general public blindly expects the warning devices at rail/road crossings to save their lives and provide adequate warning now advocate cheapening such devices and buying into an acceptable failure rate in exchange for installing more of the same, less reliable devices at places they are not really needed?
Frankly, all of your postings on the subject lumped together in my opinion contain more valid research and science than this guys “report”.
I mean, well come on guys, there has to be a point where you look at the brick wall and think “that’s gonna hurt something awful if I run into that”…
Tell me you don’t simply lower your heads and charge in simply because doing so it new, a change or “out of the box”?
I am not attacking anybody. And they used the term out of box. I only repeated it in reference to their usage. Although, I do know it is a hot button. As far as dismissing the report, I was not inclined to draw enough of a conclusion to dismiss it. So I just save all this stuff. I have reports on putting air bags on the front of locomotives in order to protect pedestrians. My only conclusion about this report so far is that it is a royal pain to read it.
And I did read all of your earlier post several times. I did notice that you said:
“Fact is if someone came along, offered to buy out the signal maintainers, and assume liability for all grade crossing safety, not just the “passive” or rural crossings, most railroads would jump at the chance to opt out completely..”
My interpretation of the report is that it is proposing exactly that.
But there is one specific point about this report that you raise in your latest post, and I am not sure what the report actually intends as a way of addressing it. They do say that they will reduce cost and that will reduce quality. But I hear them make the point that there is more quality than there needs to be. So even though quality will be reduced, it does not necessarily follow that it will be reduced far enough to reduce safety. But as I mentioned above, it is hard to believe that there is that much excess safety in the current systems.
Does it not strike anyone else as odd that this report purports to discuss and address grade crossing liability matters - but there is apparently no indication that competent legal counsel on the subject was engaged or relied upon for a professional opinion or guidance as to how to go about this, and what its prospects for success are ? (i.e., "What dog didn't bark ?" here ?)
Stated the other way around, would these traffic engineers be comfortable with a traffic signal system designed by a lawyer who may be an expert in traffic accident cases, but has no qualifications in highway engineering, signal systems, electronics, etc. ? (not some 'hybrid' / b*st*rd mix of both like me ) Why not obtain and include an opinion from an expert on the precise subject that's at the heart of this proposal ? Would that not make the report more complete and credible ?
On that precise subject - though I'm no expert: There's a fairly recent (10 - 15 years ago) Federal law that essentially (and overly simply stated here) immunizes the railroads from grade crossing accident liability provided that the signals are installed and maintained in accordance with state programs that are based on standards approved by and funding for same provided by the FRA. That law has been upheld as against some serious challenges, and this proposal could well be based on that same approach. Unfortunately, the report doesn't seem to say so. Did anyone see where it did ?
EDIT: Consider this excerpt from: http://georgiafela.com/Suing_Railroads.html
"V. D. (ii) Crossing Protection.
The Federal Grade Crossing Safety Program specifies that a "public agency," i.e. the Georgia DOT, makes the decision as to which crossings will be signalized. The complexities of the program are really not that important here. However, what is essential to understand is that once the first dollar of federal funds is spent at a crossing, the adequacy of the particular signal devices used at the crossing is a preempted question. This is because 23 CFR § 646.214 displaces state and private decision making authority:
"In short, for projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection. The regulations therefore cover the subject matter of state law which, like the tort law upon which respondent relies, seek to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings."
It is unclear whether the federal funds actually have to be used for the erection of a signal device or merely the planning for such a device. In Hatfield v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., preemption occurred when the "significant" federal funds for preliminary engineering were spent. In contrast, St. Louis Southwestern Railway v. Malone Freight Lines. Inc. held that preemption does not occur until federally funded devices are actually installed and operating. Federal funding for the installation of passive traffic control devices, e.g. cross buck signs, advance warning signs and pavement markings, has also been held to trigger preemption."
- Paul North.
P.S. - Ed, another excellent, thoughtful, forthright post about 2 above this one. Thanks for sharing your insights and comments. An intelligent and informed critic is often valuable, but you bring more than just skepticism to the discussion, and the additional facts, observations, and conclusions are welcomed. Thanks again ! - PDN.
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