schlimm But the point is that the CN was informed of the washout, where, etc. ONE HOUR before the incident and their system failed to inform the train crew.
But the point is that the CN was informed of the washout, where, etc. ONE HOUR before the incident and their system failed to inform the train crew.
Funny I read it different. The report said that the washout was discovered one hour before the incident, which is very different than the CN being informed one hour before. I would like to see a full report, with all the conversations and times
An "expensive model collector"
~
Bucyrus n012944: schlimm: But the point is that the CN was informed of the washout, where, etc. ONE HOUR before the incident and their system failed to inform the train crew. Funny I read it different. The report said that the washout was discovered one hour before the incident, which is very different than the CN being informed one hour before. I would like to see a full report, with all the conversations and times Yes, but the report says that it was CN that discovered the washout one hour before the derailment. So I would say that means exactly the same thing as saying that CN was informed about the washout one hour before the derailment.
n012944: schlimm: But the point is that the CN was informed of the washout, where, etc. ONE HOUR before the incident and their system failed to inform the train crew. Funny I read it different. The report said that the washout was discovered one hour before the incident, which is very different than the CN being informed one hour before. I would like to see a full report, with all the conversations and times
schlimm: But the point is that the CN was informed of the washout, where, etc. ONE HOUR before the incident and their system failed to inform the train crew.
Yes, but the report says that it was CN that discovered the washout one hour before the derailment.
So I would say that means exactly the same thing as saying that CN was informed about the washout one hour before the derailment.
Now maybe I am missing it, but no where in the report does it say who discovered the washout.
"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the washout of the track structure that was discovered about 1 hour before the train's arrival, and the Canadian National Railway Company's (CN) failure to notify the train crew of the known washout in time to stop the train because of the inadequacy of the CN's emergency communication procedures"
Edit....
After doing a little more research, it was not the CN who discovered the washout.
http://www.rrstar.com/news/trainderailment/x1161121396/In-Sundays-paper-Efforts-to-warn-train-failed
n012944Now maybe I am missing it, but no where in the report does it say who discovered the washout. "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the washout of the track structure that was discovered about 1 hour before the train's arrival, and the Canadian National Railway Company's (CN) failure to notify the train crew of the known washout in time to stop the train because of the inadequacy of the CN's emergency communication procedures" Edit.... After doing a little more research, it was not the CN who discovered the washout. http://www.rrstar.com/news/trainderailment/x1161121396/In-Sundays-paper-Efforts-to-warn-train-failed
You are correct about that. Thanks for finding that link to the reporting details. I thought I had read somewhere that CN had discovered the washout an hour before the derailment, but after my last post, it went back to double check the NTSB report, and as you point out, the report does not say that. So I am reviewing what was said where.
I see that the news article linked to the first post here says, “CN knew for an hour about the washout along the tracks near Rockford, but failed to notify a freight train in time to prevent a deadly derailment in 2009, the NTSB determined today.”
However, this statement is apparently untrue in view of article you linked. According to that article, the CN was informed about the washout 20 minutes before the derailment.
Does anyone have the link to the actual NTSB report?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
This is the preliminary report. The final has not yet been released:
http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2012/cherry_valley/index.html
from the Register-Star: The initial 911 calls regarding the washout came about an hour before the derailment occurred, where the CN tracks cross South Mulford Road. Despite delays in finding an available law enforcement officer to investigate, Winnebago County Sheriff’s Sgt. Aaron Booker notified the railroad of the damage 20 minutes before the derailment.
CN’s in-house police force in Montreal, in turn, tried for 17 minutes to reach the railroad’s dispatchers in Homewood, being blocked by busy signals or unanswered phones at every turn.
Only at 8:40 p.m., about four minutes after the derailment, was contact made.
In transcripts of interviews done in Rockford in the days after the derailment, NTSB investigator Russell Gober comments on the 17-minute effort during conversations with multiple individuals tied to the wreck.
“We know that you guys were trying. But your people made three attempts which would, on the third attempt ... if Homewood had answered, there would have still be five minutes before the wreck happened,” he said during an interview with Julia Vespoli, a CN police employee.
Investigators also focused on CN’s procedure to warn its trains of inclement weather. Two hours before the derailment, forecasting service AccuWeather issued a severe flood warning for the Freeport area, including Rockford. The alerts come to the Homewood dispatch center via a dedicated printer equipped with an alarm bell to alert staff of the weather report.
That night, however, it’s unclear when the report was delivered to Darnell Parker, the dispatcher in charge of the rail lines around Rockford. Parker never relayed the report to the CN train as it approached Rockford. It’s unclear what effect the warning would have had on the train, as CN procedures only call for engineers to be cautious in light of a flash flood warning, not to stop the train.
“We have some terrible mix-ups in communications between the dispatchers and the real world, it seems,” Gober said."
Understatement of the year.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Two new points:
1. It seems that both locomotives and many loaded tank cars - about 36 + 20 = 56 cars, or half the train - made it over the washout before the rail broke and caused the derailment - simply amazing ! See this transcript of the NTSB's interview/ deposition of the conductor 2 days later at: http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F48000-48499%2F48053%2F460268.pdf
2. Despite all the rain and flooding that day and night, the train crew apparently didn't see any need to go slower or stop. See this transcript of the NTSB's interview/ deposition of the engineer 2 days later at: http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F48000-48499%2F48053%2F460281.pdf
I found these interviews from the Rockford Register Star newspaper's links to them here: http://www.rrstar.com/news/trainderailment/x13287670/Train-derails-National-Transportation-Safety-Board-releases-information
Old point: "CN’s in-house police force in Montreal, in turn, tried for 17 minutes to reach the railroad’s dispatchers in Homewood, being blocked by busy signals or unanswered phones at every turn." Bet that's not the first time that happened ! More likely - a common if not everyday occurrence, which was routinely 'blown off' or simply ignored by upper management when called to their attention or when complaints were made - all in the name of 'efficiency' by having less than an adequate number of people on duty, of course. When will they ever learn ?
- Paul North.
As a Rockford, IL resident, I will say that you do have most of the facts straight--the washout happened about an hour before the train got to the crossing. There were severe thunderstorms that passed through the area, dropping a large amount of rain in a short time. A retention pond from a nearby subdivision filled up and then failed, sending a large amount of water down toward the parallel Union Pacific and Canadian National tracks at the Mulford Road crossing.
This exact spot had been the site of washouts--just like this one--that occured back in 2006 and then around 2000. The potential for a problem at this site was well known to the railroad and to local officials, because it had happened before.
Local residents informed the police, who did come out to the crossing and filmed the washout with his dashboard camera, showing the culvert washed out and the tracks suspended for about 20 feet just west of the Mulford Road crossing. The deputy was the one who called the CN to warn them of the situation, but the call went to Montreal and it took them too long to get in touch with the dispatchers in Homewood, IL. I think he called about 20 minutes before the train got there, but I haven't read the final report. The officer left the scene before the train got there (the Freeport Sub only runs one scheduled freight each direction daily) so it wasn't like there are frequent trains on the line.
The oddest thing to me is the two locos and 50 some cars made it over the washed out track before the train derailed. Although it was right about sunset--the large amount of standing water near the tracks at the location the crew should have seen something wasn't right as they approached the crossing.
Lance
First - I have no idea of any procedures that CN may or may not have had in place when this event happened.
With my carrier - the Chief Dispatchers desk for each territory has a physical 'Emergency Line' telephone - in addition to the line ringing on the computerized Avtech telephone system, the old dial style telephone with a loud ringer goes off. Instructions are that the CTD will drop any other business or call they may be handling and answer the Emergency Line - IF the CTD is away from the desk for some reason, since the phone can be heard by every Dispatcher in the office - the nearest will answer it. The Emergency Line number is the pre-programmed number that the company police center uses and all outside parties are directed to call it by the signs placed on both sides of every road crossing as well as the police center's handling with any local emergency personnel (police, fire etc.). The Emergency Line cannot be used to place a outbound call and has no other use than for EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION.
The ringing of the Emergency Line is not to be trifled with and it along with all other telephone lines used by contract personnel in the dispatchers office are on time stamped and recorded line.
Paul_D_North_Jr Old point: "CN’s in-house police force in Montreal, in turn, tried for 17 minutes to reach the railroad’s dispatchers in Homewood, being blocked by busy signals or unanswered phones at every turn." Bet that's not the first time that happened ! More likely - a common if not everyday occurrence, which was routinely 'blown off' or simply ignored by upper management when called to their attention or when complaints were made - all in the name of 'efficiency' by having less than an adequate number of people on duty, of course. When will they ever learn ? - Paul North.
Interesting but the CN dispatcher phones put you on hold. You shouldn't get a busy signal!.
We need more railfans with RR radios, red flags and fusees.
BTW if you see this sort of thing. Send someone 1 mile on either side of the washout and place a fusee or red flag or wave your hands wildly as a train goes by. All of those are signals to stop.
Pretty clearly the problem is in CN's communication system and over-centralization. Emergency phone calls should not have to go to Montreal and then to Homewood.for action (Perhaps the Homewood folks resent control in Montreal?). Or if CN insists on this system, Montreal should be capable of communication to loco crews directly. 17 minutes and nothing done. The response took 21.
petitnj Interesting but the CN dispatcher phones put you on hold. You shouldn't get a busy signal!. We need more railfans with RR radios, red flags and fusees. BTW if you see this sort of thing. Send someone 1 mile on either side of the washout and place a fusee or red flag or wave your hands wildly as a train goes by. All of those are signals to stop.
Yes that is what Kate Shelley would have done in the age of self-reliance and rugged individualism. But this is the Decade of Gotcha!
So if you were to take that responsible course today of flagging the train, you would probably get an unexpectedly speedy response from Homeland Security, the FBI, the local police, and the railroad police—all reading you your rights—as the train piled up in the background.
Do you believe that Bucyrus, or are you just trolling?
Sometimes I can't tell with you.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
As far as I am aware all the railroads do it the same way, just that the others have better internal procedures. And better communications systems.
zugmann Do you believe that Bucyrus, or are you just trolling? Sometimes I can't tell with you.
It must just be the way you are looking at it.
schlimm Pretty clearly the problem is in CN's communication system and over-centralization. Emergency phone calls should not have to go to Montreal and then to Homewood.for action (Perhaps the Homewood folks resent control in Montreal?). Or if CN insists on this system, Montreal should be capable of communication to loco crews directly. 17 minutes and nothing done. The response took 21.
Over-centralization has nothing to do with it. My carrier has exactly the same setup at the one BaltACD describes on the last page, with the police being located in Florida and the dispatch center located just outside of Chicago. There is no lag in notification, as any dispatcher will drop what they are doing to answer the hotline. Why the CN does not have a hotline between the police center and the control center, I do not know, and I hope that one is being installed. As far as the police being able to contact the trains directly, you do not want that. ANYTHING having to do with train movements on the main line needs to come from one voice, one person.
n012944 schlimm: Pretty clearly the problem is in CN's communication system and over-centralization. Emergency phone calls should not have to go to Montreal and then to Homewood.for action (Perhaps the Homewood folks resent control in Montreal?). Or if CN insists on this system, Montreal should be capable of communication to loco crews directly. 17 minutes and nothing done. The response took 21. Over-centralization has nothing to do with it. My carrier has exactly the same setup at the one BaltACD describes on the last page, with the police being located in Florida and the dispatch center located just outside of Chicago. There is no lag in notification, as any dispatcher will drop what they are doing to answer the hotline. Why the CN does not have a hotline between the police center and the control center, I do not know, and I hope that one is being installed. As far as the police being able to contact the trains directly, you do not want that. ANYTHING having to do with train movements on the main line needs to come from one voice, one person.
schlimm: Pretty clearly the problem is in CN's communication system and over-centralization. Emergency phone calls should not have to go to Montreal and then to Homewood.for action (Perhaps the Homewood folks resent control in Montreal?). Or if CN insists on this system, Montreal should be capable of communication to loco crews directly. 17 minutes and nothing done. The response took 21.
"We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo Possum "We have met the anemone... and he is Russ." Bucky Katt "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." Niels Bohr, Nobel laureate in physics
1. I did not suggest police contacting the crew directly.
2. The CN system may be the same as others, but it did not work in this case because of breakdowns in the chain of communication. If that isn't obvious, then there really is something fundamentally wrong.
3. CN's problem is that the central location (Montreal) could not get the dispatch center (Homewood, IL) to answer the phone and Montreal thus had no way to reach the crew. There should be a back up system in case normal channels break down.
Centralization has nothing to do with it. Lack of effective policy, procedures and hardware implementation within CN has everything to do with it. The police center in Montreal should have had a dedicated Emergency Line that the police center and the police center ALONE have the number to and that line must be restricted from being able to place outbound calls. There should NEVER be the occurrence of the line ringing busy, being placed on hold or not being answered. The police center should not be directing calls to any trick dispatchers desk (note - the phone systems in today's environment for most trick dispatchers will automatically answer a call after two rings and place the call on hold on the dispatchers console until they have time from their other duties to answer the call). Emergency calls must go to the Chief Dispatchers console and it must be ingrained for the Chief Dispatcher to answer the Emergency Line as THE PRIORITY MATTER of his job. Once the Chief Dispatcher gets the notification they can break into the appropriate trick dispatcher work stream to start the emergency ball rolling ie. stop trains approaching the affected area and take any other steps that may be necessary to protect both the carrier and the public.
Giving the public a single call center, no matter where it is physically located, enhances the overall response time to the emergency. In many cases the public may have numbers of yard offices, crew rooms, mechanical shops and who only knows what number that they consider 'the number' when it comes to contacting the carrier - calling any number other than the designated emergency contact number will only slow down the response and create unneeded confusion in handling the emergency situation. Getting the public to call the correct emergency number takes a concerted effort by the carrier over a long period of time to get the number out to the public.
No one but the dispatcher for the territory and the trains on the territory should have access to the radio in the territory. With nominally a single radio channel for a dispatchers territory and the number of trains that may be on that territory at any point in time - there can only be ONE LEADER of the band and that can ONLY be the Train Dispatcher - no one else. Any communication over the radio channel must go through the Train Dispatcher at his discretion as he is responsible for all directions that are issued to trains in his territory.
There is no excuse for CN's actions and lack thereof in this incident. They did not have a effective command and control structure in place to handle the incident promptly and efficiently.
schlimm 1. I did not suggest police contacting the crew directly. 2. The CN system may be the same as others, but it did not work in this case because of breakdowns in the chain of communication. If that isn't obvious, then there really is something fundamentally wrong. 3. CN's problem is that the central location (Montreal) could not get the dispatch center (Homewood, IL) to answer the phone and Montreal thus had no way to reach the crew. There should be a back up system in case normal channels break down.
1. You kind of did. IF the CN is anything like my railroad, the people on the line in Montreal ARE police. They are railroad police. By saying that Montreal should be able to talk to crew directly, I took it as the CN Police Command Center in Montreal should be able to talk to the crew without the dispatcher involved. Which is a bad idea. Was that not what you where implying?
2. I have not seen anyone say that there wasn't an issue with communication, that was the main cause here.
3. Again as pointed out, there does not seem to be a hotline for the police center to get a hold of the dispatcher center, it seems as they are just calling on a normal Bell line. That is THE issue, and I think a hotline, and its use, would have stopped the whole thing from happening.
Someone mentioned the possibility of flagging down the train. And yet it has also been suggested that only the proper authorities should be allowed to contact the crew. I believe that any way to get the message to the crew would have been just perfect for an emergency such as this one.
A police officer was the first authority to confirm this emergency by direct observation at the scene. He recognized the danger to a train and had no idea when one would show up. He could have turned on his flashing lights, and lit up some fusees just to buy some time. He could have called for more backup on the scene just to help get a warning established. I don’t know how much straight track visibility they had there, but a lit fusee at the washout would have gotten the train stopped short if the track was straight long enough to see the fusee and stop.
Here is a question: What should have been the proper emergency procedure if the police officer arrived at the scene of the washout and saw a headlight of a train say a mile or two away?
@n02944: I thought you were referring to the local Cherry Valley police trying to contact the crew, though I doubt if that is possible. So if the Montreal number is railroad police, with the CN they seem to have no backup plan to get hold of the necessary folks in Homewood. But wouldn't it be better for the CN railroad police to advise the crew than to not reach anyone and just let stuff happen?
schlimm @n02944: I thought you were referring to the local Cherry Valley police trying to contact the crew, though I doubt if that is possible. So if the Montreal number is railroad police, with the CN they seem to have no backup plan to get hold of the necessary folks in Homewood. But wouldn't it be better for the CN railroad police to advise the crew than to not reach anyone and just let stuff happen?
So tell me, how does the CN police know there is a train in the area? Again, a simple hotline to the dispatch office, with instructions that when it rings you stop what you are doing and pick it up, is all that is needed. There is NO reason to have the police giving instructions to the train crew if this policy is put into operation.
They would have no situational awareness. i.e. what radio frequency, which tower to activate, what train or trains need to be contacted, etc. The Dispatcher would know all these things. Fixing the communications link between the Police Call Center and the Dispatch Center is a much more straight-forward solution. The reason for having the calls go to the police center is to filter out the calls from irate citizens calling to complain about trains blowing their horns at night and similar. Having the Call Center adjacent to the Dispatch Center is a good idea, if the company has centralized their Dispatching. However I don't think any company is fully centralized at this time. CSX was until the Conrail split-up.
beaulieu However I don't think any company is fully centralized at this time. CSX was until the Conrail split-up.
However I don't think any company is fully centralized at this time. CSX was until the Conrail split-up.
CSX has always maintained a dispatching center in Chicago, as well as Wallaceburg, Canada.
It is also an indication of incompetence that CN/IC did nothing given the repeated problems with flooding over the past few years. Of course, Homewood Dispatch should answer the phone. But I believe all Montreal got was a busy signal for 17 minutes. Since Montreal has no knowledge of where crews are, then it is essential to have a back up plan for Montreal to use when they cannot get through. If not, as someone said earlier, the prospect of loaded CN/IC trains running through urban areas, like suburban Chicago is disturbing.
beaulieu As far as I am aware all the railroads do it the same way, just that the others have better internal procedures. And better communications systems.
Back when I was still a conductor, our dispatcher notified us that a person had called our RMCC (the phone number on the signal boxes) and reported our train had a container on a yellow flat car with the doors open and spilling it's contents. When notified we were about 25 miles from the place where the person had seen this. At least 25 minutes, probably a few more, would have elapsed from the initial spotting to the info getting to us. Allow maybe 10 minutes in case the person didn't have a cell phone and had to find a land line still leaves15+ minutes from the railroad receiving the call and the info getting to the crew (us).
I inspected our train and found a yellow flat car with a load of sheet steel, a few of which had shifted forward out over the couplers. We didn't have any COFC in our train to begin with. That means that somewhere along the line the report changed a bit. Someone misunderstood what the problem was. Either the person reporting or the person taking the call. (I've always felt the person reporting was someone I knew who was a retired railroader, but not from the CNW or UP. He's passed on and I never remembered to ask him. I know he could tell the difference between a container losing it's load and a shifted load, but I'm not sure the person answering the phone at RMCC could. Just because a person works for a railroad doesn't mean they are familiar with railroading in the field.) In the CN case, I would like to know what was said by the civilian police to the railroad police, and what they said to the dispatcher's office. I can't imagine that there could be any misunderstanding about a washout, but you never know.
About having the CN police in Montreal contacting directly any trains that may be close to the affected area, how would they do that? Of course by radio, but what I mean is that the CN is a big railroad. I'm guessing that like the UP, they would have multiple channels assigned across the system. Even if they use just one, to contact a train in a certain area you are going to have to know which base station/tower to use. (Not to mention like previously posted, you need to know if there is a train in that area.) The logistics to do all that probably could be worked out, but I bet the time involved wouldn't be any quicker.
I've read what the NTSB has so far said and some of the other reports provided. So far more information seems to come from news reports than the NTSB. I haven't seen everything but it almost looks (to me) that the NTSB has come to it's conclusions and now will only consider facts that support that conclusion.
Jeff
petitnj In recent years CN has issued RULE W warnings (severe weather) to trains along its subdivisions. Partial Quote: Flash Flood Warnings– At locations specified by the RTC, timetable or Operating Bulletin, trains will operate prepared to stop short of obstructions. I believe they have been working hard to get these warnings out and have trains slow down.
In recent years CN has issued RULE W warnings (severe weather) to trains along its subdivisions.
Partial Quote:
Flash Flood Warnings– At locations specified by the RTC, timetable or Operating Bulletin, trains will operate prepared to stop short of obstructions.
I believe they have been working hard to get these warnings out and have trains slow down.
I guess someone has to get the word out.
"Investigators also focused on CN’s procedure to warn its trains of inclement weather. Two hours before the derailment, forecasting service AccuWeather issued a severe flood warning for the Freeport area, including Rockford. The alerts come to the Homewood dispatch center via a dedicated printer equipped with an alarm bell to alert staff of the weather report.
That night, however, it’s unclear when the report was delivered to Darnell Parker, the dispatcher in charge of the rail lines around Rockford. Parker never relayed the report to the CN train as it approached Rockford. It’s unclear what effect the warning would have had on the train, as CN procedures only call for engineers to be cautious in light of a flash flood warning, not to stop the train."
schlimm It is also an indication of incompetence that CN/IC did nothing given the repeated problems with flooding over the past few years. Of course, Homewood Dispatch should answer the phone. But I believe all Montreal got was a busy signal for 17 minutes. Since Montreal has no knowledge of where crews are, then it is essential to have a back up plan for Montreal to use when they cannot get through. If not, as someone said earlier, the prospect of loaded CN/IC trains running through urban areas, like suburban Chicago is disturbing.
1. Flooding happens, not an indication of incompetence at all. To me, the incompetence would be the association that knew of the damage to the pond wall, and had not fixed it. Your dislike for the CN is showing and clouding your judgment.
http://www.rrstar.com/news/trainderailment/x65589116/Damaged-pond-wall-Group-was-working-on-it?zc_p=0
2. There has been no indication that the Homewood office did not answer the phone on purpose. It is very possible that the dispatcher was busy enough on the radio, or on other phone calls and was not able to get to the phone in time. Again if there is not a emergency tone, so the dispatcher KNOWS it is an emergency, most dispatchers will answer the radio/phone in the order that they come in. In this case, with no emergency tone, the dispatcher does not know if the call is about a washout, or a yardmaster looking for a headroom shot out of the yard.
3. Again, a hotline from the police command center to the dispatch office is a plan that works, and I am willing to bet that one has been installed as a result of this accident. I am not sure why you fail to accept that fact, especially when two dispatchers have told you in this thread that it works. I guess it might be the last sentence in number one again.....
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