jeffhergert beaulieu: As far as I am aware all the railroads do it the same way, just that the others have better internal procedures. And better communications systems. Back when I was still a conductor, our dispatcher notified us that a person had called our RMCC (the phone number on the signal boxes) and reported our train had a container on a yellow flat car with the doors open and spilling it's contents. When notified we were about 25 miles from the place where the person had seen this. At least 25 minutes, probably a few more, would have elapsed from the initial spotting to the info getting to us. Allow maybe 10 minutes in case the person didn't have a cell phone and had to find a land line still leaves15+ minutes from the railroad receiving the call and the info getting to the crew (us). I inspected our train and found a yellow flat car with a load of sheet steel, a few of which had shifted forward out over the couplers. We didn't have any COFC in our train to begin with. That means that somewhere along the line the report changed a bit. Someone misunderstood what the problem was. Either the person reporting or the person taking the call. (I've always felt the person reporting was someone I knew who was a retired railroader, but not from the CNW or UP. He's passed on and I never remembered to ask him. I know he could tell the difference between a container losing it's load and a shifted load, but I'm not sure the person answering the phone at RMCC could. Just because a person works for a railroad doesn't mean they are familiar with railroading in the field.) In the CN case, I would like to know what was said by the civilian police to the railroad police, and what they said to the dispatcher's office. I can't imagine that there could be any misunderstanding about a washout, but you never know. About having the CN police in Montreal contacting directly any trains that may be close to the affected area, how would they do that? Of course by radio, but what I mean is that the CN is a big railroad. I'm guessing that like the UP, they would have multiple channels assigned across the system. Even if they use just one, to contact a train in a certain area you are going to have to know which base station/tower to use. (Not to mention like previously posted, you need to know if there is a train in that area.) The logistics to do all that probably could be worked out, but I bet the time involved wouldn't be any quicker. I've read what the NTSB has so far said and some of the other reports provided. So far more information seems to come from news reports than the NTSB. I haven't seen everything but it almost looks (to me) that the NTSB has come to it's conclusions and now will only consider facts that support that conclusion. Jeff
beaulieu: As far as I am aware all the railroads do it the same way, just that the others have better internal procedures. And better communications systems.
As far as I am aware all the railroads do it the same way, just that the others have better internal procedures. And better communications systems.
Back when I was still a conductor, our dispatcher notified us that a person had called our RMCC (the phone number on the signal boxes) and reported our train had a container on a yellow flat car with the doors open and spilling it's contents. When notified we were about 25 miles from the place where the person had seen this. At least 25 minutes, probably a few more, would have elapsed from the initial spotting to the info getting to us. Allow maybe 10 minutes in case the person didn't have a cell phone and had to find a land line still leaves15+ minutes from the railroad receiving the call and the info getting to the crew (us).
I inspected our train and found a yellow flat car with a load of sheet steel, a few of which had shifted forward out over the couplers. We didn't have any COFC in our train to begin with. That means that somewhere along the line the report changed a bit. Someone misunderstood what the problem was. Either the person reporting or the person taking the call. (I've always felt the person reporting was someone I knew who was a retired railroader, but not from the CNW or UP. He's passed on and I never remembered to ask him. I know he could tell the difference between a container losing it's load and a shifted load, but I'm not sure the person answering the phone at RMCC could. Just because a person works for a railroad doesn't mean they are familiar with railroading in the field.) In the CN case, I would like to know what was said by the civilian police to the railroad police, and what they said to the dispatcher's office. I can't imagine that there could be any misunderstanding about a washout, but you never know.
About having the CN police in Montreal contacting directly any trains that may be close to the affected area, how would they do that? Of course by radio, but what I mean is that the CN is a big railroad. I'm guessing that like the UP, they would have multiple channels assigned across the system. Even if they use just one, to contact a train in a certain area you are going to have to know which base station/tower to use. (Not to mention like previously posted, you need to know if there is a train in that area.) The logistics to do all that probably could be worked out, but I bet the time involved wouldn't be any quicker.
I've read what the NTSB has so far said and some of the other reports provided. So far more information seems to come from news reports than the NTSB. I haven't seen everything but it almost looks (to me) that the NTSB has come to it's conclusions and now will only consider facts that support that conclusion.
Jeff
As with a number of others here I have been following this Thread as it wound through many levels:
This quote from Mudchicken in June of 2009 pretty much sums it up:
There is enough hyperbole, hysteria and hearsay floating around here to choke a horse.
It will be interesting to watch the outcome of the NTSB and FRA investigations when the facts can be scrutinized, especially where the digital and tape records from Homewood and the Sheriff's Office (plus a few more locations come into play)....It will also be interesting to see if the overly centralized DS center and staff workload comes into play along with how many bogus calls did the CN have to deal with along with the other calls. From experience, I know all too well that for every legitimate call, you get a pile of garbage calls to go with them. Every railroad MOW and signal supervisor has spent nights chasing phantom calls (this includes calls and over-reaction from emergency services people too).
So here we are almost three years later and still trying to figure out who and where 'the ball was dropped'. Still waiting for the NTSB Report(?).
There is and has been a lot of discussion here referencing this derailment; and on this previous Thread:
http://cs.trains.com/TRCCS/forums/p/155883/1719860.aspx#1719860
"Re: CN and 21 Minutes: Is it enough?"
"...I read the story today about the sheriff's office calling CN 21 minutes before the derailment on the Iowa division, to warn the railroad of the washout. Unfortunately, nothing was done, the train derailed, an ethanol car exploded, and a motorist died.
Initially, sorrow goes out for the motorist.
Putting on my non-human attorney's hat, I am just wincing thinking about the liability here. Any time you have a tragic death caused by major industry, you are dealing with a pretty strong claim to begin with. Throw in facts that make it look entirely preventable to average Joe Jurror . . . oh man..."
It would seem the one sure thing that will happen is somewhere there will be another derailment and possibly injuries (hopefully, not) but the important thing is to try and learn from this incident and create a system that will pre vent future incidents.
schlimm BaltACD: Should the CN Rockford incident have happened? No! Will or has CN implemented changed procedures? Only those on CN know. If CN or any other railroad existed in their own private domains that did not continuously border the rest of the world, the above would be fine. But it is the public's right to have some certain knowledge that safer procedures are being implemented. It is not enough for only those on CN to know.
BaltACD: Should the CN Rockford incident have happened? No! Will or has CN implemented changed procedures? Only those on CN know.
Should the CN Rockford incident have happened? No! Will or has CN implemented changed procedures? Only those on CN know.
If CN or any other railroad existed in their own private domains that did not continuously border the rest of the world, the above would be fine. But it is the public's right to have some certain knowledge that safer procedures are being implemented. It is not enough for only those on CN to know.
I would say that if there is a public safety interest in some aspect of a railroad’s interaction with the public, then it needs to be addressed through regulation from the public sector in order to make sure it gets done.
Other than vehicles stalled on grade crossings, I can’t think of too many incidents where the public has found an impediment to the safe passage of a train, and needed to contact the railroad to warn them about it.
Also, there ought to be some consideration of how the police officer should have reacted when he found the washout. For all the officer knew, a train may have been only a couple minutes away, which would have called for very quick action to prevent the probability of accidental death.
Flood Rockford again and find out. Corporations can feed the public anything they WANT to hear, the proof is in their actual response.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD Should the CN Rockford incident have happened? No! Will or has CN implemented changed procedures? Only those on CN know.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Human nature being what it is as well as corporate thought processes being what they are.
The history of rule and procedural improvements in the rail industry is one that is written in blood every step of the way. Every employee/organization believes they are doing the right thing until a incident happens that demonstrates to all involved that what they thought was correct - wasn't. When that happens corrective actions/procedures have to be formulated and implemented.
The previously mentioned Intercession City incident on CSX was one of the incidents that caused that carrier to totally rethink how it interfaced with the public in emergency situations and it set up a infrastructure to be able to handle those situations knowledgeably, effectively and swiftly. Is it perfect? No system is perfect.
The hardest task for railroad and non-railroad people to accomplish is to come to the correct mutual understanding of where HERE is.
I've read all the posts and CN should have had a better emergency system set up for communicating a problem, especially in an area that was known for flooding.
It should have only taken a minute or two to get a message through, with today's instant communication. Not like the old days, and someone mentioned Kate Shelley. She did what she had to do to let the crew of the train know and saved lives.
The policeman who discovered the problem should have tried to flag down the train, or certainly put out a fusee, I would assume they all carry flares but maybe not.
This is just a tragedy that did not need to happen. I'm sure the crew were not happy with CN, they were lucky they survived.
This was very bad on the part of CN. If they had that long to notify the crew and didn't do it, that is criminal negligence. I agree with someone citing Kate Shelley, she risked her life to save others. With cell phones and instant access today, someone should have let the crew know, it's a wonder they were not killed too.
In the old days, it would have been easier to understand, it was not so simple to pass along a warning, but not today.
Not familiar with Rockford, weary from looking thru this conversation for an inspired turn of suggestion like mine, I suggest that:
Assuming there was an operative form of some kind of Automatic Block Signal system, the responsibility lies at the police academy. If there are more than a few trains a week thru this outpost in the outlands, the patrol vehicles must be equipped with battery jumper cables that can connect over about a 6' span. To stop trains the lawmen need to know is to jumper the rails, which would throw red signals to all the winds. Approaching the jumper, trains would approach "prepared to stop within half the range of vision short of....." law-officer gesticulating frantically...."any object or person waving on or near the track....is a signal to stop."
Worry a lot if your local lawfolks don"t know the above procedure.
With highest respect for the NTSB, if omitting this procedure by local law enforcement wasn't considered to be a causal factor when the law was notified an hour prior to the event, I'm worried, very worried.
rasslands, the law enforcement forces
This reminds me of an Amtrak wreck in Intercession City, Fl back in the 1990s. A heavy haul move got hung up on a grade crossing with a large power plant generator sitting crosswise on the SCL mainline. As an escort, they had highway patrol cruisers with all the flashing lights and flares that could have easily flagged any approaching trains. And yet they instead chose to spend 15 minutes trying to call the railroad company without any result.
Nicely summed up, although I the record doesn't suggest language was a problem, just busy signals and not answering in Homewood. It is quite true that CN (former IC and EJ&E) has become disliked in the Chicago area. I don't see any evidence that other lines share this problem. Perhaps there are actual reasons for the public's view of CN, not some imputed prejudice.
I have read a lot of posts regarding the communication - or lack there of - between the CN police in Montreal and the dispatching center in Homewood, IL. There is another possible communication issue that nobody else has presented here. Montreal is in Quebec Canada. There are two primary languages: english and french (or french Canadian). I haven't read anything that would suggest that there was any kind of language barrier for this incident but what if the person answering the phone in Montreal only speaks french? It just adds a unqiue twist to an emergency hotline - having to cover two languages - that the big four US railroads don't have to contend with unless they also take spanish speaking calls.
I wouldn't say that party / person / whoever is responsible for the retention pond that has flooding issues is incompetent. Maybe lazy because all the responsible party (or parties) needs to do is hire somebody to fix it. Easier said than done because that requires money and there could be issues with who pays what. Call in the lawyers. The initial NTSB report was critical of CN for knowing about the situation but not having a plan in place to contend with the potential flooding - ie. flood warnings, slow orders, etc.
Please don't misjudge railfans in the Chicago area for not liking the CN when they are probably just frustrated with them. Myself included. There are certain towns and non-railfans (NIMBY's) in the Chicago area who are opposed to everything that CN has done in this area recently (read purchase of the EJE). Right now, it's hard to defend and explain the actions of this railroad to those people. In the last week the NTSB has come down hard on CN for not having an effective safety communication plan in place and Amtrak has filed a complaint for the tardiness of its' trains on two lines in the Chicago area. That includes a 99% late rate on southern Illinois / New Orleans trains.
CC
schlimm \not making excuses as you seem to do.
\not making excuses as you seem to do.
Excuses? I am pretty sure I have made my feelings on this case well known. If not please allow me to. The fact that the CN had no way to contact the dispatch center from the police center other than a bell line is unacceptable, and was one of the main causes of the accident. I would hope that the person who came up with that system is looking for work elsewhere. However you seem to be on a witch hunt, coming to strange and inaccurate conclusions, passing blame, and ignoring input of people who do this for a living. Judging from your post history you seem to dislike the CN, and it is showing in your posts.
An "expensive model collector"
Root Cause analysis - Incompetent owner of the retention pond - if ANY communities storm water retention pond has failed at least 3 times in 9 years there is incompetent design, construction and maintenance of said pond. Community would be better served with no retention pond at all than one that repeatedly fails.
There are locations that due to known waterways and geographical formations are flood prone areas. A area that is 'supposedly' protected by a retention pond is 'by design' not a flood prone area - repeated failures of the pond are not CN's responsibility - they are the responsibility of community that owns the pond.
CN screwed the pooch in communicating the wash out.
The Community that owned the pond screwed the pooch by causing the wash out.
schlimm 1. "Flooding happens." from the Rockford resident's post: "As a Rockford, IL resident, I will say that you do have most of the facts straight--the washout happened about an hour before the train got to the crossing. There were severe thunderstorms that passed through the area, dropping a large amount of rain in a short time. A retention pond from a nearby subdivision filled up and then failed, sending a large amount of water down toward the parallel Union Pacific and Canadian National tracks at the Mulford Road crossing. This exact spot had been the site of washouts--just like this one--that occured back in 2006 and then around 2000. The potential for a problem at this site was well known to the railroad and to local officials, because it had happened before.
1. "Flooding happens."
from the Rockford resident's post: "As a Rockford, IL resident, I will say that you do have most of the facts straight--the washout happened about an hour before the train got to the crossing. There were severe thunderstorms that passed through the area, dropping a large amount of rain in a short time. A retention pond from a nearby subdivision filled up and then failed, sending a large amount of water down toward the parallel Union Pacific and Canadian National tracks at the Mulford Road crossing.
This exact spot had been the site of washouts--just like this one--that occured back in 2006 and then around 2000. The potential for a problem at this site was well known to the railroad and to local officials, because it had happened before.
Local residents informed the police, who did come out to the crossing and filmed the washout with his dashboard camera, showing the culvert washed out and the tracks suspended for about 20 feet just west of the Mulford Road crossing. The deputy was the one who called the CN to warn them of the situation, but the call went to Montreal and it took them too long to get in touch with the dispatchers in Homewood, IL. I think he called about 20 minutes before the train got there, but I haven't read the final report. The officer left the scene before the train got there (the Freeport Sub only runs one scheduled freight each direction daily) so it wasn't like there are frequent trains on the line."
So pretty clearly, the problem at this site was known and had happened twice before in the previous 11 years. Yet nothing was done by CN to remediate. My point is that CN was negligent and incompetent in this case, which caused a dangerous accident which could have injured or killed the train crew and which did kill a totally innocent bystander.
2. Purposefulness is not the point. I doubt if most/any accidents are purposeful. For 17 minutes, Montreal could not get through. That is unacceptable.
3. I also hope CN has figured out its problems and installed a hotline, and hope someone isn't too busy to answer in the future. I accept that a hotline could work, but at the time of the accident, the CN had not, even though other railroads have such a plan. So it isn't a case of my judgment being clouded. Asking tough questions after an avoidable accident is a rational response in order to solve the problem, not making excuses as you seem to do.
schlimm It is also an indication of incompetence that CN/IC did nothing given the repeated problems with flooding over the past few years. Of course, Homewood Dispatch should answer the phone. But I believe all Montreal got was a busy signal for 17 minutes. Since Montreal has no knowledge of where crews are, then it is essential to have a back up plan for Montreal to use when they cannot get through. If not, as someone said earlier, the prospect of loaded CN/IC trains running through urban areas, like suburban Chicago is disturbing.
It is also an indication of incompetence that CN/IC did nothing given the repeated problems with flooding over the past few years. Of course, Homewood Dispatch should answer the phone. But I believe all Montreal got was a busy signal for 17 minutes. Since Montreal has no knowledge of where crews are, then it is essential to have a back up plan for Montreal to use when they cannot get through. If not, as someone said earlier, the prospect of loaded CN/IC trains running through urban areas, like suburban Chicago is disturbing.
1. Flooding happens, not an indication of incompetence at all. To me, the incompetence would be the association that knew of the damage to the pond wall, and had not fixed it. Your dislike for the CN is showing and clouding your judgment.
http://www.rrstar.com/news/trainderailment/x65589116/Damaged-pond-wall-Group-was-working-on-it?zc_p=0
2. There has been no indication that the Homewood office did not answer the phone on purpose. It is very possible that the dispatcher was busy enough on the radio, or on other phone calls and was not able to get to the phone in time. Again if there is not a emergency tone, so the dispatcher KNOWS it is an emergency, most dispatchers will answer the radio/phone in the order that they come in. In this case, with no emergency tone, the dispatcher does not know if the call is about a washout, or a yardmaster looking for a headroom shot out of the yard.
3. Again, a hotline from the police command center to the dispatch office is a plan that works, and I am willing to bet that one has been installed as a result of this accident. I am not sure why you fail to accept that fact, especially when two dispatchers have told you in this thread that it works. I guess it might be the last sentence in number one again.....
petitnj In recent years CN has issued RULE W warnings (severe weather) to trains along its subdivisions. Partial Quote: Flash Flood Warnings– At locations specified by the RTC, timetable or Operating Bulletin, trains will operate prepared to stop short of obstructions. I believe they have been working hard to get these warnings out and have trains slow down.
In recent years CN has issued RULE W warnings (severe weather) to trains along its subdivisions.
Partial Quote:
Flash Flood Warnings– At locations specified by the RTC, timetable or Operating Bulletin, trains will operate prepared to stop short of obstructions.
I believe they have been working hard to get these warnings out and have trains slow down.
I guess someone has to get the word out.
"Investigators also focused on CN’s procedure to warn its trains of inclement weather. Two hours before the derailment, forecasting service AccuWeather issued a severe flood warning for the Freeport area, including Rockford. The alerts come to the Homewood dispatch center via a dedicated printer equipped with an alarm bell to alert staff of the weather report.
That night, however, it’s unclear when the report was delivered to Darnell Parker, the dispatcher in charge of the rail lines around Rockford. Parker never relayed the report to the CN train as it approached Rockford. It’s unclear what effect the warning would have had on the train, as CN procedures only call for engineers to be cautious in light of a flash flood warning, not to stop the train."
beaulieu As far as I am aware all the railroads do it the same way, just that the others have better internal procedures. And better communications systems.
beaulieu However I don't think any company is fully centralized at this time. CSX was until the Conrail split-up.
However I don't think any company is fully centralized at this time. CSX was until the Conrail split-up.
CSX has always maintained a dispatching center in Chicago, as well as Wallaceburg, Canada.
schlimm @n02944: I thought you were referring to the local Cherry Valley police trying to contact the crew, though I doubt if that is possible. So if the Montreal number is railroad police, with the CN they seem to have no backup plan to get hold of the necessary folks in Homewood. But wouldn't it be better for the CN railroad police to advise the crew than to not reach anyone and just let stuff happen?
@n02944: I thought you were referring to the local Cherry Valley police trying to contact the crew, though I doubt if that is possible. So if the Montreal number is railroad police, with the CN they seem to have no backup plan to get hold of the necessary folks in Homewood. But wouldn't it be better for the CN railroad police to advise the crew than to not reach anyone and just let stuff happen?
They would have no situational awareness. i.e. what radio frequency, which tower to activate, what train or trains need to be contacted, etc. The Dispatcher would know all these things. Fixing the communications link between the Police Call Center and the Dispatch Center is a much more straight-forward solution. The reason for having the calls go to the police center is to filter out the calls from irate citizens calling to complain about trains blowing their horns at night and similar. Having the Call Center adjacent to the Dispatch Center is a good idea, if the company has centralized their Dispatching. However I don't think any company is fully centralized at this time. CSX was until the Conrail split-up.
So tell me, how does the CN police know there is a train in the area? Again, a simple hotline to the dispatch office, with instructions that when it rings you stop what you are doing and pick it up, is all that is needed. There is NO reason to have the police giving instructions to the train crew if this policy is put into operation.
Someone mentioned the possibility of flagging down the train. And yet it has also been suggested that only the proper authorities should be allowed to contact the crew. I believe that any way to get the message to the crew would have been just perfect for an emergency such as this one.
A police officer was the first authority to confirm this emergency by direct observation at the scene. He recognized the danger to a train and had no idea when one would show up. He could have turned on his flashing lights, and lit up some fusees just to buy some time. He could have called for more backup on the scene just to help get a warning established. I don’t know how much straight track visibility they had there, but a lit fusee at the washout would have gotten the train stopped short if the track was straight long enough to see the fusee and stop.
Here is a question: What should have been the proper emergency procedure if the police officer arrived at the scene of the washout and saw a headlight of a train say a mile or two away?
schlimm 1. I did not suggest police contacting the crew directly. 2. The CN system may be the same as others, but it did not work in this case because of breakdowns in the chain of communication. If that isn't obvious, then there really is something fundamentally wrong. 3. CN's problem is that the central location (Montreal) could not get the dispatch center (Homewood, IL) to answer the phone and Montreal thus had no way to reach the crew. There should be a back up system in case normal channels break down.
1. I did not suggest police contacting the crew directly.
2. The CN system may be the same as others, but it did not work in this case because of breakdowns in the chain of communication. If that isn't obvious, then there really is something fundamentally wrong.
3. CN's problem is that the central location (Montreal) could not get the dispatch center (Homewood, IL) to answer the phone and Montreal thus had no way to reach the crew. There should be a back up system in case normal channels break down.
1. You kind of did. IF the CN is anything like my railroad, the people on the line in Montreal ARE police. They are railroad police. By saying that Montreal should be able to talk to crew directly, I took it as the CN Police Command Center in Montreal should be able to talk to the crew without the dispatcher involved. Which is a bad idea. Was that not what you where implying?
2. I have not seen anyone say that there wasn't an issue with communication, that was the main cause here.
3. Again as pointed out, there does not seem to be a hotline for the police center to get a hold of the dispatcher center, it seems as they are just calling on a normal Bell line. That is THE issue, and I think a hotline, and its use, would have stopped the whole thing from happening.
Centralization has nothing to do with it. Lack of effective policy, procedures and hardware implementation within CN has everything to do with it. The police center in Montreal should have had a dedicated Emergency Line that the police center and the police center ALONE have the number to and that line must be restricted from being able to place outbound calls. There should NEVER be the occurrence of the line ringing busy, being placed on hold or not being answered. The police center should not be directing calls to any trick dispatchers desk (note - the phone systems in today's environment for most trick dispatchers will automatically answer a call after two rings and place the call on hold on the dispatchers console until they have time from their other duties to answer the call). Emergency calls must go to the Chief Dispatchers console and it must be ingrained for the Chief Dispatcher to answer the Emergency Line as THE PRIORITY MATTER of his job. Once the Chief Dispatcher gets the notification they can break into the appropriate trick dispatcher work stream to start the emergency ball rolling ie. stop trains approaching the affected area and take any other steps that may be necessary to protect both the carrier and the public.
Giving the public a single call center, no matter where it is physically located, enhances the overall response time to the emergency. In many cases the public may have numbers of yard offices, crew rooms, mechanical shops and who only knows what number that they consider 'the number' when it comes to contacting the carrier - calling any number other than the designated emergency contact number will only slow down the response and create unneeded confusion in handling the emergency situation. Getting the public to call the correct emergency number takes a concerted effort by the carrier over a long period of time to get the number out to the public.
No one but the dispatcher for the territory and the trains on the territory should have access to the radio in the territory. With nominally a single radio channel for a dispatchers territory and the number of trains that may be on that territory at any point in time - there can only be ONE LEADER of the band and that can ONLY be the Train Dispatcher - no one else. Any communication over the radio channel must go through the Train Dispatcher at his discretion as he is responsible for all directions that are issued to trains in his territory.
There is no excuse for CN's actions and lack thereof in this incident. They did not have a effective command and control structure in place to handle the incident promptly and efficiently.
schlimm Pretty clearly the problem is in CN's communication system and over-centralization. Emergency phone calls should not have to go to Montreal and then to Homewood.for action (Perhaps the Homewood folks resent control in Montreal?). Or if CN insists on this system, Montreal should be capable of communication to loco crews directly. 17 minutes and nothing done. The response took 21.
Pretty clearly the problem is in CN's communication system and over-centralization. Emergency phone calls should not have to go to Montreal and then to Homewood.for action (Perhaps the Homewood folks resent control in Montreal?). Or if CN insists on this system, Montreal should be capable of communication to loco crews directly. 17 minutes and nothing done. The response took 21.
n012944 schlimm: Pretty clearly the problem is in CN's communication system and over-centralization. Emergency phone calls should not have to go to Montreal and then to Homewood.for action (Perhaps the Homewood folks resent control in Montreal?). Or if CN insists on this system, Montreal should be capable of communication to loco crews directly. 17 minutes and nothing done. The response took 21. Over-centralization has nothing to do with it. My carrier has exactly the same setup at the one BaltACD describes on the last page, with the police being located in Florida and the dispatch center located just outside of Chicago. There is no lag in notification, as any dispatcher will drop what they are doing to answer the hotline. Why the CN does not have a hotline between the police center and the control center, I do not know, and I hope that one is being installed. As far as the police being able to contact the trains directly, you do not want that. ANYTHING having to do with train movements on the main line needs to come from one voice, one person.
schlimm: Pretty clearly the problem is in CN's communication system and over-centralization. Emergency phone calls should not have to go to Montreal and then to Homewood.for action (Perhaps the Homewood folks resent control in Montreal?). Or if CN insists on this system, Montreal should be capable of communication to loco crews directly. 17 minutes and nothing done. The response took 21.
Over-centralization has nothing to do with it. My carrier has exactly the same setup at the one BaltACD describes on the last page, with the police being located in Florida and the dispatch center located just outside of Chicago. There is no lag in notification, as any dispatcher will drop what they are doing to answer the hotline. Why the CN does not have a hotline between the police center and the control center, I do not know, and I hope that one is being installed. As far as the police being able to contact the trains directly, you do not want that. ANYTHING having to do with train movements on the main line needs to come from one voice, one person.
"We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo Possum "We have met the anemone... and he is Russ." Bucky Katt "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." Niels Bohr, Nobel laureate in physics
zugmann Do you believe that Bucyrus, or are you just trolling? Sometimes I can't tell with you.
Do you believe that Bucyrus, or are you just trolling?
Sometimes I can't tell with you.
It must just be the way you are looking at it.
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