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1974 Wreck of Penn Central Train OV-8

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1974 Wreck of Penn Central Train OV-8
Posted by pc046340 on Thursday, January 5, 2012 10:23 AM

Could a member offer me help. I believe I remember years ago seeing a photo in an old issue of "Trains" of a Penn Central wreck at a drawbridge in Cleveland, Ohio. It was a Penn Central freight that hit the lowered drawbridge counterweight at speed, shearing the EMD locomotives down to the bare frames, cleaning off diesel engines, cab, etc. The wreck happened I believe in May of 1974. Does anyone out there remember or know which issue the photo (s) appeared in, I'd like to try to obtain an issue on the internet, but don't know which issue to look for. Thanks so very much! 

 

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Posted by Stourbridge Lion on Thursday, January 5, 2012 10:39 AM

pc046340- Welcome to Trains.com! Cowboy

I have the Trains Archive DVD set at home so I will try to remember to do a search and see if I can find out which issue it is.  If I don't post back please ping me to remind me about this.

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Posted by Anonymous on Thursday, January 5, 2012 11:31 AM

I have that issue, but it would take all day to find it.  The coverage was in the front under news coverage.  It would be interesting to see the full report of that wreck.  The use of radios played a critical role because the bridgetender told the engineer he had it all lined up, so the engineer could expect a clear signal at the bridge.

But then the bridgtender took the route away from the railroad and gave it to a boat.  He did not inform the engineer of that, however, he was not required to because the signal indication was the only proper authority. 

The train was not going very fast, but the gigantic counterweight, when lowered, had its bottom just above the elevation of the locomotive frames.  So the entire momentum of the whole train shoved through the couplers, passing under the counterweight, and the counterweight cleanly sheared off everything above the locomotive frames.   

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Posted by pc046340 on Thursday, January 5, 2012 11:40 AM

Thanks for your insight, you can access the NTSB's full report of the incident online, I've read it already, it's about 30 pages long,  but the report doesn't have the pictures I was seeking. Thanks again!

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Posted by Paul_D_North_Jr on Thursday, January 5, 2012 8:49 PM

August 1974 = Vol. 34, No. 10 issue, pg. 11 (top half).  [Edited 5:15 PM 09 Jan. 2012] The cover is a New Haven passenger freight train with a lone electric locomotive in the McGinniss orange and black color scheme crossing a low-level vertical lift "bridge over the Harlem River" something like Hell Gate Bridge, with a caption referencing the lead article "How to Run a Railroad in the Northeast" (a John Kneiling article/ diatribe).

- Paul North.    

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Posted by pc046340 on Friday, January 6, 2012 9:00 AM

Paul;

Thanks for the help, I have no idea how I would have found it myself, this forum is GREAT!

   Bob Holt

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Posted by Boyd on Monday, January 9, 2012 1:03 PM

I sure hope the engineers made it out alive.

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Posted by CSSHEGEWISCH on Monday, January 9, 2012 2:00 PM

Boyd

I sure hope the engineers made it out alive.

The head-end crew was killed.  If I remember correctly, the locomotives were sheared at frame level by the counterweight, with the frame of the lead locomotive shooting into the Cuyahoga River, just missing the boat that was passing through.

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Posted by Paul_D_North_Jr on Monday, January 9, 2012 4:15 PM

Yes, and the caption to the photo I referenced above says it shows the frame of the 2nd unit hanging most of the way out beyond the end of the bridge segment under the tower and counterweight.  That frame seems to have been held in place from tipping over into the river as well only by the counterweight and weight of the wreckage on the rear end of the remains of that unit.

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Posted by Anonymous on Monday, January 9, 2012 5:06 PM

I seem to recall some reference to the speed being around 20 mph at the time of impact.  The main strength of a freight train is lengthwise through the center sills of the cars and locomotives.  The counterweight was like an immoveable object blocking the train just above the line of the center sills. 

If a train hits a solid object such as another train, the cars and locomotives generally jackknife or override each other as the force dissipates.  In the case of this wreck, all the force of the train was directed just below the solid object, so it shoved the locomotive frames through as the massive counterweight sheared off the superstructure above the frames, crushed it into a wad, and piled up in a vertical mass 2-3 stories high. 

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Posted by pc046340 on Tuesday, January 10, 2012 6:38 AM

Here's a photo i found, not the one I've been searching for, but it gives an idea of what happened. Go to:   www.clevelandmemory.org and type a search for "Penn Central OV-8". You can enlarge the photo to get a good look.

 

      

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Posted by Leo_Ames on Wednesday, January 11, 2012 5:04 AM

If I knew the staff wouldn't mind, I'd post a shot of the news page for you. Not sure what their policy is on such things.

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Posted by tree68 on Wednesday, January 11, 2012 7:01 AM

Here's the report, which contains some interesting information.  Train speed is given as around 33 MPH, and the BAC of the engineer was .05... 

Oddly, the report kinda gives him a pass on this, noting that an experienced engineer such as he should be able to compentently operate a train at that level.

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Posted by edbenton on Thursday, January 12, 2012 7:26 AM

Tree remember this was BEFORE the Chase MD collision and before Dug and Alchohal Testng became such a 800 LB Gorilla.  It was nothing back then for OTR drivers to have a few at night then drive the next morning. 

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Posted by Paul_D_North_Jr on Thursday, January 12, 2012 3:59 PM

Thanks for that link, Larry  Thumbs Up (32 pages, approx. 1.37 MB in size for that 'PDF' format version). 

The Blood Alcohol Concentration of the engineer was not a causal factor or the proximate cause of that wreck, as I understand it, although the NTSB was clearly puzzled and troubled by the apparent total failure of the engine crew to brake the train to any degree even though they could see the 'Stop' indication of the 'home' signal at least 2 full minutes before the impact. 

Instead, it appears from the NTSB's view of the facts, the engineer likely still would have hit the counterweight when the bridge operator lowered it in front of the approaching train after giving the train radio permission to proceed.    

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Posted by tree68 on Thursday, January 12, 2012 6:22 PM

No question on the D&A thing - the timing or the acceptance at that time.

Today that .05 or .06 would probably get you a conviction for driving while impaired.

That said, the poor communication was undoubtedly a primary cause. 

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Posted by CSSHEGEWISCH on Friday, January 13, 2012 7:23 AM

Poor communication was definitely an issue and this accident goes a long way in explaining why it took so long for the FRA to approve the use of radio to govern train movements, as in the use of track warrants.

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Posted by Anonymous on Friday, January 13, 2012 10:27 AM

It is interesting that the DB operator imposed his own authority between the engineer and the wayside signals, and because the operator partly controlled those signals, the engineer accepted the operator’s personal authorization, and let it override the authority of the wayside signals. 

 

Then when the operator realized he had made a mistake in giving his personal authorization to the engineer, the operator simply rescinded it without telling the engineer.  It makes you wonder why the operator did not tell the engineer that he was taking the route away from the train after telling the engineer that he (the operator) had given the route to the train. 

 

The only explanation I can see, is that the operator simply assumed it was not necessary to tell the engineer because the rules required the engineer to obey the wayside signal indications.  Perhaps the operator was a bit embarrassed for making the mistake of forgetting about the boat he had waiting for the bridge to open, and did not want to broadcast it on the radio. 

 

There was a similar situation on the Milwaukee Road coming down the hill into St. Paul.  There was a switch tender at the base of the hill.  Trains had to approach that location prepared to stop until they got a highball from the switch tender.  About a quarter-mile earlier, there was an open station at Chestnut Street where the operators would hold up their arms in an “X” shape as a signal that the switch tender had the route lined for them.

 

The point was that the “X” signal acted like an approach signal to the switch tender, so that trains did not have to slow way down and crawl up to the switch tender to see if he would give a highball.  The operating assumption was that if you got an “X” from Chestnut Street, you could expect a highball from the switch tender. 

 

Of course this was a complete fallacy, because only connection between this improvised approach signal and the “home signal” of the switch tender were the intentions of two human beings communicated by telephone.  If an engineer relied on the “X”, expecting a highball from the switch tender, and did not get one, he would not be able to stop in time.  The switch tender was free to line up the route or not, no matter what the engineer had been told ahead of time by the Chestnut Street operator.    

 

So, when coming down the hill, the new brakemen would call out the “X” signal to the engineer by saying “The crossing is clear.”  And then the engineer would tell them to ignore that signal because it has no meaning.   

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Posted by Anonymous on Friday, January 13, 2012 10:36 AM

I suggest that the moderators or the original poster change the title of this thread to something like:

 

1974 Wreck of Penn Central Train OV-8

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Posted by pc046340 on Friday, January 13, 2012 12:07 PM

Not a problem, I'm trying to edit this Subject right now, but I'm new to the forum. I originally just wanted to find the issue of "Trains" in question, I already knew about the wreck as a former PC employee,(1974 hired) and I didn't realize my question would spark such interest. Thanks to all who have helped.

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Posted by Anonymous on Saturday, January 14, 2012 7:36 PM

I read the report, but I cannot say I absorbed every word of it, so perhaps I am missing something.   But from what I gather, some questions and observations come to mind.

 

The report concludes that part of the cause was that the interlocking operator for the drawbridge issued a verbal instruction that undermined the engineer’s reliance on wayside signals.

 

While they apparently did establish as fact that the operator issued the verbal instruction, I see no proof that this undermined the engineer’s reliance on the wayside signals.  All that the evidence shows is that the engineer failed to heed the wayside signals.  There is no way to prove that this failure to heed the signals resulted from the operator’s verbal highball. 

 

The fact that the route was not lined for the train would have given the engineer a red home signal.  Yet the engineer did not apply the brakes in approach to the home signal even though he had plenty of time to do so. 

 

Even by the time the engineer and fireman were able to see the lowered counterweight, they had plenty of time to jump off of the locomotive.  Yet they did not jump. 

 

These two unexplainable facts suggest that the reason the engineer failed to heed the wayside signals was broader than the fact that the operator had issued a verbal highball.  To go further, I would conclude that those two facts suggest that the verbal highball issued by the operator did not play a part in the crash.

 

If the operator’s verbal highball were the cause, the scenario would have been that the engineer would have approached too fast to stop for the red home signal.  But certainly, he would have made every attempt to stop for it once he saw it.  The result would have been that the train slid past the red home signal and hit the counterweight.  A head end crew that was familiar with the bridge, when approaching unable to stop, with the bridge lined against them—such a crew would almost certainly have jumped off because they would have been aware of the insurmountable risk of staying on the locomotive. 

 

One possible cause that would perfectly explain why the engineer did not brake and did not jump would be that he was asleep.  There is no way to know if he was or not, but if he was, that would explain the accident details.

 

Page 15, first paragraph of the report, the last sentence says: “In any event, the radio conversation caused the engineer to disregard the visual wayside indications.” 

 

I do not see any proof of that statement.  While it is true that a verbal highball such as the one issued by the operator would have been capable of causing an engineer to disregard the wayside signals; I see no conclusive evidence that indicates that was the case with the OV-8 wreck.  At best, it is circumstantial evidence.  And moreover, the fact that additional cause would be needed to explain the circumstances of the accident moves toward the improbability of more than one fatal error occurring coincidentally to cause an accident. 

 

So, I believe the conclusion of the report is based on flawed logic.    

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Posted by tree68 on Saturday, January 14, 2012 8:51 PM

Bucyrus
The report concludes that part of the cause was that the interlocking operator for the drawbridge issued a verbal instruction that undermined the engineer’s reliance on wayside signals.
 
While they apparently did establish as fact that the operator issued the verbal instruction, I see no proof that this undermined the engineer’s reliance on the wayside signals.  All that the evidence shows is that the engineer failed to heed the wayside signals.  There is no way to prove that this failure to heed the signals resulted from the operator’s verbal highball. 

Nor is there any way to prove otherwise.

Bucyrus
 
 
The fact that the route was not lined for the train would have given the engineer a red home signal.  Yet the engineer did not apply the brakes in approach to the home signal even though he had plenty of time to do so. 
 
Even by the time the engineer and fireman were able to see the lowered counterweight, they had plenty of time to jump off of the locomotive.  Yet they did not jump. 
 
These two unexplainable facts suggest that the reason the engineer failed to heed the wayside signals was broader than the fact that the operator had issued a verbal highball.  To go further, I would conclude that those two facts suggest that the verbal highball issued by the operator did not play a part in the crash.

I would opine that the verbal highball had everything to do with the crash, as it is entirely possible that the crew wasn't watching where they were going, or was doing so only perfunctorily.

Bucyrus
If the operator’s verbal highball were the cause, the scenario would have been that the engineer would have approached too fast to stop for the red home signal.  But certainly, he would have made every attempt to stop for it once he saw it.  The result would have been that the train slid past the red home signal and hit the counterweight.  A head end crew that was familiar with the bridge, when approaching unable to stop, with the bridge lined against them—such a crew would almost certainly have jumped off because they would have been aware of the insurmountable risk of staying on the locomotive. 

Such familiarity can cause one to have false confidence.  Since they "knew" the bridge was clear, and they were familiar with the route, they may have surmised that for the next X distance, they had nothing to be concerned with.  See my previous comment.

Bucyrus
One possible cause that would perfectly explain why the engineer did not brake and did not jump would be that he was asleep.  There is no way to know if he was or not, but if he was, that would explain the accident details.
 
 
Page 15, first paragraph of the report, the last sentence says: “In any event, the radio conversation caused the engineer to disregard the visual wayside indications.” 
 
I do not see any proof of that statement.  While it is true that a verbal highball such as the one issued by the operator would have been capable of causing an engineer to disregard the wayside signals; I see no conclusive evidence that indicates that was the case with the OV-8 wreck.  At best, it is circumstantial evidence.  And moreover, the fact that additional cause would be needed to explain the circumstances of the accident moves toward the improbability of more than one fatal error occurring coincidentally to cause an accident. 

There is no proof that this was, or wasn't, the cause of the collision.  The only people who could have cleared that up didn't survive. 

Bucyrus

So, I believe the conclusion of the report is based on flawed logic.    

 

I'd prefer to think that it was based on a "best guess" based on what the investigators saw in their investigation.  We can't prove them right or wrong.

[quote user="Bucyrus"]

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Posted by Anonymous on Saturday, January 14, 2012 9:43 PM

Yes, I have no way of proving what happened.  I won’t even speculate.  But I had assumed that the investigation purported to show facts that could be concluded from the evidence.  I did not realize that the investigation draws conclusions as speculation, and then declares them to be fact because they can’t be proven otherwise.  In any case, it is as plain as day that the investigation has drawn a conclusion for which there is no evidence. 

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Posted by CSSHEGEWISCH on Tuesday, January 17, 2012 10:10 AM

A similar situation was the Newark Bay Bridge disaster of 1958.  A CNJ suburban train came off the NY&LB and plunged over the opening of a raised vertical lift bridge.  The ICC accident investigation concluded that the accident was caused by failure to operate in accordance with signal indications.  Radio transmissions were not involved but the engine crew worked this route as their regular assignment so they may have expected clear indications with the wayside signals as part of their normal routine.

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Posted by Anonymous on Saturday, January 21, 2012 6:50 PM

Here again is the NTSB report of their investigation of this accident:

 

Here's the report

 

I believe that this investigation was simply unable to explain the fundamental cause of this accident, and therefore, they did their best to cobble together an explanation anyway.  They offered the obvious and undisputable conclusion that the engineer failed to respond to wayside signals.  In many past collisions, that has been the fundamental cause without any way to explain why the engineer failed to heed signals.  But, in this accident, the investigators went further and speculated as to why the engineer failed to respond to the signals.     

 

It seems as though the investigation has simply added the operator’s verbal highball to the cause because the it was a rules violation, and it seemed to be a piece that fit the puzzle.  But does it really fit? 

 

While it appears to fit as far as it goes, it still leaves a major element unexplained.  That is the fact that the engineer did not apply the brakes once he was within visual range of the home signal.  At the speed of around 33 mph, the engineer had about two minutes to react between the point where he could first see the home signal and the point where he hit the counterweight.  That would have probably been enough time to stop.  And if he could not stop, he and the fireman could have easily gotten off the moving train before impact.

 

The investigation blames the operator for giving the engineer verbal assurance that the route would be lined up for him.  That was indeed a rules violation.  But the investigation seems to place more emphasis on blaming the operator for taking the route away after telling the engineer he had given him the route, and taking the route away without telling the engineer he had done so.  That, however, was not a rules violation.  No matter what the operator told the engineer about having the route, there is no excuse for the engineer relying on that verbal assurance and thus ignoring the wayside signals.     

 

Every engineer knows that even when he has a route lined up through an interlocking plant, he has to watch for, and expect that route to be taken away by a change in signal indication.  And every engineer knows that he is not permitted to ignore a signal once it is perceived to be giving a clear indication. 

 

In order for the operator’s verbal highball message to have even played a role in the cause of this wreck, the following would have had to happen:

 

Upon hearing from the operator that the route was lined up, the engineer completely suspended his forward attention at minimum for the time it took from the home signal coming within visual range until the time of hitting the counterweight. 

 

No engineer is going to do that just because they are told that the route has been lined for them.  

 

Therefore, this is the only explanation that I can imagine that would be directly related to the operator’s message playing a role in the wreck:

 

When the train was four minutes from the bridge, the operator told the engineer that the route was lined for the train, and the engineer acknowledged.  Because of that assurance of a lined route, before the home signal came into visual range, the engineer lost conscious free will, and remained in that condition until striking the counterweight.  He either suffered a medical emergency, fell asleep, or was hypnotized by the operator’s message.  At the same time, the fireman was also lacking conscious free will for some unknown reason.

 

The only possible connection I can see between the operator’s verbal highball and the crew’s lack of conscious free will would be that the operator’s verbal highball put the engineer and fireman into a hypnotic trance.  How likely is that?

 

So overall, the investigation was willing to include the minor rules violation of the operator’s verbal highball as part of the cause without any actual proof.  And yet, oddly enough, they were unwilling include, as partial cause, the fact that both the engineer and fireman had consumed alcohol while on duty prior to the accident.  And yet, that too was a rules violation; arguably a far more serious rules violation than the operator’s verbal highball.   

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Posted by edbenton on Sunday, January 22, 2012 6:20 AM

What is Ironic is that 13 Years Prior to one of the Worst Passenger train accidents in the Nations History the NTSB had evidence that Drugs and Alchohal caused Fatal accidents and still refused to act on it.  Only after the Colonial Accident on the NE Corridor they acted.  Remember that during this time it was nothing for OTR drivers to have a few Beers at night heck from this one lookslike RR workers even drank on the job.  Yet they did not act.  Only when people DIED that were not Transportation workers did they act.  You all know the saying it takes Blood to get action in Washington. 

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Posted by BaltACD on Sunday, January 22, 2012 6:52 AM

At the time this incident occurred, the DWI limit was 0.10, not the 0.08 that has become commonplace across the country at present.

My understanding is that at present, during a drug test, railroad employees are allowed up ot 0.02 and are judged as fit for duty.  I believe this standard also applies to airline pilots.  To my knowledge, no one has a 0.00 standard.

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Posted by edbenton on Sunday, January 22, 2012 7:27 AM

OTR is .04 by the FEDS however most if not all COmpanys have a POLICY you get caught with ANY booze in your system YOUR FIRED and if you had an accident YOUR ON YOUR OWN COME LAWSUIT TIME.  Even Cough Syrup is enough to get your but Fired in OTR at times.  That tell you something. 

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Posted by Anonymous on Sunday, January 22, 2012 2:09 PM

BaltACD

My understanding is that at present, during a drug test, railroad employees are allowed up ot 0.02 and are judged as fit for duty.  I believe this standard also applies to airline pilots.  To my knowledge, no one has a 0.00 standard.

0.02 is the current legal limit for motorists under 21, as some medicines (cough syrup has been mentioned) and mouthwash either contain small amounts of alcohol or give a false positive indication of 0.01 or 0.02 BAC. A 0.00 standard isn't possible.

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Posted by Anonymous on Sunday, January 22, 2012 6:45 PM

The issue in the case of this wreck is not about employees coming to work with alcohol in their system.  It is about consuming alcohol while on duty the day of the wreck.  And that could not possibly have had anything to do with a collision resulting from lack of attention.  

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