I've been through a few (non railroad) mergers and acquisitions and it ain't easy. One set of rules and theories clash with a different and opposite set. Then personalities clash, All communication and understanding is lost followed by employees and then customers. The "we've always done it this way so that's the way' we'll continute to do it no matter what you say" attitude is as defeating as, "now I'm in charge and you'll do it my way." Why a surprise that it happens when different railroads and railroad companies merge or acquire? EL, PC, UP-SP, BN-SF, SF-SP, ACL-SBD, oh, I could write the recipe for alphabet soup here and none of it would ever taste good!
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PNWRMNM The consensus of what got reported is that the CNW merger did NOT go smoothly. If ever there was a merger that should have gone smoothly the UP-CNW was it. The only thing UP really cared about was getting from Fremont/Omaha to Chicago. In retrospect it was an indication of what would come in the SP merger which basically was to ignore, run off, and fire the incumbent middle management. UP made its own unnecessary messes in both cases.
The consensus of what got reported is that the CNW merger did NOT go smoothly. If ever there was a merger that should have gone smoothly the UP-CNW was it. The only thing UP really cared about was getting from Fremont/Omaha to Chicago. In retrospect it was an indication of what would come in the SP merger which basically was to ignore, run off, and fire the incumbent middle management. UP made its own unnecessary messes in both cases.
It did not go smoothly.
If someone does a book on the subject some day, it would be interesting to read a developed history and context of why BN and its successors generally managed the organizational aspects of mergers quite well, and why Union Pacific generally didn't.
Murphy Siding If fans of NP, or Milwaukee Road, or Anti-fans(?) of GN want to believe that "They did it wrong", I guess I'm OK with that. I just haven't seen anything that would convince me of that. So, back to my opinion- I just don't buy it.
I'm not sure how the "railfans" all of a sudden got drug into this.
It's not really a railfan issue and I sure wouldn't make my opinions based on what your select group "wants to believe." These are fact issues and while I don't see much use of them in discussion like this, they are still the key to any analysis. In the case of railroad mergers, there are well developed records of expectations that preclude just making up a personal judgment. An opinion without a reference to those well-developed records is well short of useful.
Generally, the record of "business mergers" is also quite well developed. There are books all over the place on the topic. Generally, they fail to meet their goals. A reasonable first opinion, then, on any given merger would be to take a skeptical attitude, simply because that reflects the informed and experienced judgment of history on the topic.
Murphy Siding YoHo1975: Murphy Siding: But why can't we make the assumption, that they knew what they were doing? So again, why would you "assume" they knew what they were doing. The record will illustrate that they did or they didn't. Fair enough question, I suppose. My thought is this: These folks were running the railroads in question at the time. Who better than them, knew the ins and outs of traffic, maintenance costs, operations, etc. on their own lines? They had all the information. They were already running the railroads in question. ...
YoHo1975:
Murphy Siding: But why can't we make the assumption, that they knew what they were doing?
But why can't we make the assumption, that they knew what they were doing?
So again, why would you "assume" they knew what they were doing. The record will illustrate that they did or they didn't.
Fair enough question, I suppose. My thought is this: These folks were running the railroads in question at the time. Who better than them, knew the ins and outs of traffic, maintenance costs, operations, etc. on their own lines? They had all the information. They were already running the railroads in question. ...
Well, if the Penn Central wasn't an object lesson on this, perhaps there can be no lessons from history ...
Any given merger occurred, of course, because of the presumption that "they knew what they were doing." One of the good studies done by the old ICC showed that "mergers rarely achieved their goals," and this was, of course, troubling to the regulatory agency tasked with approving such mergers, when the records of implementation was quite poor.
And of course, that begged the question: was it the caliber of the officers implementing the mergers, or was it an intrinsic weakness in the concept of "merger" itself?
I tend to take the latter view: mergers don't fix problems, they obscure them.
Of course, that underscores my earlier point: there are tangible metrics by which to judge a merger: the pro forma projections created by the "folks running the railroads at the time." That is, the explicit reasons given for the merger.
And, for those paying attention to those, I think the opinions on the relative success or failure of a merger is at least informed by something other than something happening to a different company, under different economic circumstances, under a different regulatory scheme, forty years later.
Daimler Chrysler is a very good case study for anyone that gets too enamored of "mergers". The most profitable American car company at the time (!) combined with a company with a solid engineering tradition, combining some of the best and most experienced automotive industry brains in the business world and advised by the best merger experts money could buy.
Link to photo (not mine) clearly showing 'notching' at top arch of the Cascade Tunnel at Stevens Pass to provide sufficient clearance for double-stack container trains:
http://www.railpictures.net/viewphoto.php?id=111611
There used to be more and better photos of that on the PR.net site, but they seem to have disappeared . . .
For a fair depiction of a 'lower-height' double-stack train at the portal, see also:
http://www.photographersdirect.com/buyers/stockphoto.asp?imageid=700430
- Paul North.
YoHo1975 The Current tunnels on Steven's pass have always had their current dimensions, so that was a benefit to the line, but the Tunnel is so long that it restricts movement. Steven's is still a problem for the railroad.
The Current tunnels on Steven's pass have always had their current dimensions, so that was a benefit to the line, but the Tunnel is so long that it restricts movement. Steven's is still a problem for the railroad.
Oh gosh, no. In order to fit COFC, BN had to go in and "notch" the upper sides of the tunnel curvature. It is a very tight clearance for COFC,and it required weakening the tunnel concrete arch. This caused more water flow into the tunnel, which degrades the ties and ballast more quickly. In order to "lower" the tunnel floor, ties made of a specific Brazilian hardwood, which allowed the ties to be about 3" shallower and about 6" broader, had to be installed throughout the entire length in order to allow modern freight through. This special hardwood accommodates the lower drainage capacity and higher moisture levels, but oh my goodness, they are expensive pieces of wood ....and then there are the two full-time 645 engines running to power the blowers,on 2.2% grades in both directions, so generally, BNSF utilizes the 533 mile "detour" for heavy trains.
That's a 533 mile detour to achieve "efficiency."
And that's simply a close look at "merger planning" at any given merger -- did they really seek to maximize "efficiency"? I would say that had to be the objective objective.
Was that the result? That's a tougher answer based on 1) misapprehensions about what that meant, 2) internal politics, 3) irreversible historical decisions.
And, "for the record," personally, the NP was not the "better route" objectively, but historically NP had put more money into ties and rails, and in some respects had better capacity because of its lack of long tunnels with heavy grades compared to GN. The GN people dominated the merger committees, however.
Between the three northern tier routes, GN, NP, MILW, straightforward econometric analysis provides the authentic comparison and an analyst would need to refer to those metrics before making a conclusion. However, the original BN merger was driven entirely by internal dynamics and like many such undertakings, the final result was imperfect not because of implementation, but because the raw material was not perfect in the first place, i.e. first rule of business.
Insofar as NP/GN/CBQ or UP/SP were more dependent on internal, not competitive considerations, they had to work with what they had, not what they wished they had.
Mac,
Thank you, I remember hearing SP was a delicate balancing act that UP didn't care about and insisted doing things their (UP's) way the instant the sale was completed. I did not know it went that way with C&NW.
James
James,
Mac
Could someone remind me, did UP+C&NW go smoothly? I do not remember a SP like meltdown. The company my father worked for was a C&NW customer and I remember hearing complaints about how car request rules changed overnight.
If it did go smoothly, could that have been justification for the Feds. to allow following mergers whose results are now infamous?
Falcon48 Ignore the last two paragraphs of my post of a few minutes ago, which are a bit of gibberish. I meant to delete them, but forgot to do so before I posted the note (there no longer appears to be a way to edit posted material or, if there is, I can't figure it out). Of course, you may not be able to tell the difference between the gibberish in the last two paragraphs and the other gibberish in the post which I actually meant to send.
Ignore the last two paragraphs of my post of a few minutes ago, which are a bit of gibberish. I meant to delete them, but forgot to do so before I posted the note (there no longer appears to be a way to edit posted material or, if there is, I can't figure it out). Of course, you may not be able to tell the difference between the gibberish in the last two paragraphs and the other gibberish in the post which I actually meant to send.
I also wanted to say this is one of the better threads in a while. Thanks to all involved for their insights!
Dan
Murphy Siding YoHo1975: Murphy Siding: But why can't we make the assumption, that they knew what they were doing? So again, why would you "assume" they knew what they were doing. The record will illustrate that they did or they didn't. Fair enough question, I suppose. My thought is this: These folks were running the railroads in question at the time. Who better than them, knew the ins and outs of traffic, maintenance costs, operations, etc. on their own lines? They had all the information. They were already running the railroads in question. They weren't in the same condition as competitor Milwaukee Road. Their railroad is still here 40 years later. I've never read anything that said these men weren't respected individuals in their field at the time. I've never seen a book or magazine article that says "They did this wrong. They should have done this......" (If such a book or magazine article exists, I'd surely like to read it to learn more.) The only place I've ever seen it suggested, or assumed that they "Did it wrong" is on internet message boards- specifically this one. If fans of NP, or Milwaukee Road, or Anti-fans(?) of GN want to believe that "They did it wrong", I guess I'm OK with that. I just haven't seen anything that would convince me of that. So, back to my opinion- I just don't buy it.
Fair enough question, I suppose. My thought is this: These folks were running the railroads in question at the time. Who better than them, knew the ins and outs of traffic, maintenance costs, operations, etc. on their own lines? They had all the information. They were already running the railroads in question. They weren't in the same condition as competitor Milwaukee Road. Their railroad is still here 40 years later. I've never read anything that said these men weren't respected individuals in their field at the time. I've never seen a book or magazine article that says "They did this wrong. They should have done this......" (If such a book or magazine article exists, I'd surely like to read it to learn more.) The only place I've ever seen it suggested, or assumed that they "Did it wrong" is on internet message boards- specifically this one. If fans of NP, or Milwaukee Road, or Anti-fans(?) of GN want to believe that "They did it wrong", I guess I'm OK with that. I just haven't seen anything that would convince me of that. So, back to my opinion- I just don't buy it.
I've seen too many people that were, lets say middle management, that knew the roads much better at a more personal level that have had bad things to say.
On top of that, yes, BNSF is still with us and that seems to indicate they did right, but that doesn't really follow. The Frisco Management team that came into BN was widely considered horrible and yet BN survived...at great cost, buying back Stampede pass. Recreating and upgrading track, because other track had been removed. Supposedly BNSF is still would like to kick MRL out and get that track back. They are paying a lot of money to move trains over that line and they have minimum movement required. Prior to Frisco, they had Snoqualmie too. A route that would have already been able to move doublestacks without the literally suffocating cascade tunnel.
I've heard it attributed to Matt Rose that when he went to work for BN, his comment was "What have you done to this railroad?!?"
Also, a note on the Milwaukee,
There was major track work in '71 and '73. The real distruction of the line was in the horrible winter of '77-'79.
Also, there were system and division timed freights not just 261/262 and those 2 ran more often as extras as noted. The line wasn't dead.
Thanks for the fill-in on the west end; I mentioned some of the changes in the Twin Cities and Twin Ports area in my previous messages but said someone more familiar with the western portion of the GN/NP/BN should explain the situation there.
Kurt Hayek
YoHo1975 So, I hate to ask people on the Day before Thanksgiving to devote time to educating little ole me on the internet, but I'm curious to see a bit more debate on the GN vs. NP routing. It seems that in fact the merger team spent the better part of a decade if not longer figuring out which route would result in better efficiencies, but that maybe all of that was based on a false assumption?
So, I hate to ask people on the Day before Thanksgiving to devote time to educating little ole me on the internet, but I'm curious to see a bit more debate on the GN vs. NP routing. It seems that in fact the merger team spent the better part of a decade if not longer figuring out which route would result in better efficiencies, but that maybe all of that was based on a false assumption?
YoHo,
I spent about an hour explaining the planning on the west end but exited before positing, In error. It would be nice if this site had a scratchpad for long responses.
The GN, NP and SP&S had more infrastructure across the state of Washington than was necessary for the traffic of the late 1960's. Puget Sound was where big traffic volumes originated and terminated. East of Spokane GN and NP each had routes to the CBQ at Laurel Montana and to Minneapolis/St Paul and on to Chicago. The obvious solution was to route long east, St. Paul and Chicago, traffic via the GN and Denver, Kansas City & St Louis traffic via the NP. The GN branch between Cut Bank and Laurel could be reduced to local service only, as could the NP main line east of Laurel for about 1,000 miles.
In the Puget Sound region both NP and GN extended from Canada to Portland, Oregon. The NP had a double track main line between Portland and Seattle which was used by GN and UP on trackage rights. NP's origin point for eastward trains was Auburn. NP served Tacoma, Seattle, and Everett from Auburn by turnaround jobs from Auburn to each of these "outlying" points. NP also had a pair of time freights between Auburn and Sumas. At Sumas NP interchanged with BC Hydro and CPR. NP also built an intermodal yard at South Seattle in the 1960's.
GN's trains originated at Balmer Yard/Interbay in Seattle. The GN main ran north 30 miles to Everett before it turned east, so thru traffic was set out and picked up at Everett. The GN had two north/south lines north of the main at Everett. One ran up the waterfront and the other was on the east side of the hill Everett sat on. This line passed by Delta Yard and the then largely inactive shops there. The two joined just north of Everett and continued to Bellingham WA, New Westminster BC and Vancouver BC.
The SP&S and NP had yards in downtown Portland, and at Willbridge, and used the Portland Terminal's Lakeyard. SP&S had its big yard at Vancouver WA.
GN and NP crossed the Cascades via Stevens and Stampede Pass respectively while the SP&S went up the Columbia River Gorge. The GN and NP lines both had several miles of 2.2% ruling grade in both directions. Both lines had summit tunnels. The GN tunnel was long and the NP tunnel had tight clearances. SP&S was .2 or .3% ruling grade between Vancouver and Pasco. GN was 330 miles between Seattle and Spokane, while NP was 390 miles. SP&S was 370 miles between Vancouver and Spokane. With each line doing about three pairs of freight trains per day the obvious solution was to shift the NP traffic to the GN and SP&S routes.
Major changes were needed to blend and then separate the traffic flows somewhere in the Spokane area. This was accomplished by the new Latah Creek bridge which connected the GN main to the NP main at the west edge of Spokane. At Sandpoint Idaho a new connection was required between the NP and the GN. The prefered Seattle to Chicago route thus became GN to Spokane, NP between Spokane and Sandpoint, and GN east of Sandpoint. The GN line was rendered surplus between Spokane and Priest River Idaho and portions were ultimately abandoned.
The City of Spokane wanted the GN off Havermale Island and the UP/MILW off their joint route thru downtown Spokane. The NP had a double track elevated grade separated line thru Spokane. BN built the bridges abandoned the GN main thru town and sold Havermale Island to the City for the site of Expo 74. The UP moved over to the NP through Spokane. The City got its wish and the BN got some cash to pay for its new bridges and associated line changes. The BN also had to revise the connection between the NP at Yardley and the GN at Hillyard to maintain access to the GN's Kettle Falls branch lines. Hillyard shops and yards were eliminated with the work shifted to Yardley.
That was the plan and what was done in terms of main lines. Of course as time went on additional changes were made but that is another story entirely.
YoHo1975 Murphy Siding: But why can't we make the assumption, that they knew what they were doing? So again, why would you "assume" they knew what they were doing. The record will illustrate that they did or they didn't.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Which is exactly my point.
YoHo1975Pennsylvania and New York Central was filled with professionals who knew what they were doing....
I'd probably say that is open to debate.
henry6 Transcons were scary to many back then... Still are today in this country for some reason...only the Canadians understand and are not fearful! EL and SFe was bantied about at CR time, too. I think the MLW was spoken of because both were in similar financial situations and the concept was that two minuses make one plus (which doesn't make sense to me either!).
Transcons were scary to many back then... Still are today in this country for some reason...only the Canadians understand and are not fearful! EL and SFe was bantied about at CR time, too. I think the MLW was spoken of because both were in similar financial situations and the concept was that two minuses make one plus (which doesn't make sense to me either!).
I think the reason a true transcon is "scary" to many railroad managements may be that they don't feel that such a merger, once everything shakes out, will leave them better off than before the merger. Right now, you have some parity between east and west - two big western roads and two big eastern roads. The eastern roads are largely neutral about which western road they interchange with, and vice versa.
Now what happens if, say, BNSF were to merge with NS? You can bet it would be quickly followed by a merger between, say, UP and CSX. The next thing that would happen is that the merged systems would internalize their transcontinental traffic routings as much as possible. For example, traffic that BNSF used to interchange with CSX would, instead, be handled by the combined BNSF-NS system wherever possible. Ditto for UP-CSX. So each of the merging roads would a greater share of the transcon traffic of their merger partner, but would get a smaller share of the traffic from the rival partners. In other words, the traffic effect could be very nearly a wash. Add to that mix the likelihood that the price for such a wave of mergers, at least for the foreseeable future, would likely be a substantial amount of re-regulation, probably in the form of so-called "open" access. It's an open question whether this would make either of the merged roads any better off than the current system, particularly since most U.S. rail traffic doesn't move transcontinentally.
itto for follwedThe first thing that would happen BNSF would turn CSX into a relatively hostile connecting road. Sure, CSX would with the combined BNSF-NS if there were no other way to handle the traffic, but it would no longer be neutral. Same theing would happen in the west, where UP would no longer be a friendly connection.
The next thing that happens in response to a BNSF-NS merger, of course, would be that UP and CSX merge. The effect of the two mergers is to cause traffic to stay within the merged systems to the extent possible - so BNSF-NS
Once BN and SF had merged anyone who could read a map could see that UP was surrounded, so to speak, and having CNW in its pocket did nothing the break the encirclement. Only the acquisition of SP would allow UP to break out of the stranglehold created by the formation of BNSF. Fortunately for them, the SP was vulnerable because it was a very rundown property with excellent routes but desperately in need of a massive cash infusion to revive it.. UP did just that although it chose to obliterate the SP's corporate pedigree in the process..
Murphy Siding But why can't we make the assumption, that they knew what they were doing? They were professional railroaders. They had time and resources to check out all the angles. They had absolutely nothing to gain by picking either the NP or GN mainline. I'd suggest that they did their homework, used the information available at the time, and made the best decisions they could, based on what they knew at the time. The conspiracy theories about GN being "chosen" over NP or Milwaukee Road by those mysterious powers that be seems like like wishfull rewriting of history by fans of NP and Milwaukee Road. I don't buy it.
But why can't we make the assumption, that they knew what they were doing? They were professional railroaders. They had time and resources to check out all the angles. They had absolutely nothing to gain by picking either the NP or GN mainline. I'd suggest that they did their homework, used the information available at the time, and made the best decisions they could, based on what they knew at the time. The conspiracy theories about GN being "chosen" over NP or Milwaukee Road by those mysterious powers that be seems like like wishfull rewriting of history by fans of NP and Milwaukee Road. I don't buy it.
Frisco Management were professionals as well. Most seem to suggest that they ruined the BN.
Pennsylvania and New York Central was filled with professionals who knew what they were doing and yet Penn Central was by all accounts a mistake.
The corporate world is littered with the ruins of companies run by professionals who knew what they were doing.
I'd reverse the question why would anyone assume that anyone knew what they were doing unless the results back them up? That's just blind faith.
And at this point, this thread seems to be about weeding out the fact from fiction surrounding this. And only by doing that can you know.
I have also read that a merged Erie Lackawanna and Milwaukee Road could have offered great potential as a transcon.
Paul_D_North_Jr Was this based on - and/ or are you familiar with - the paperbound booklet Profit Management Systems; Key to Stronger Railroads by Edward C. Christ (of ConRail), published by Simmons-Boardman, New York, in 1977 (86 pp.) ? That described and advocated a similar cost-accounting system that would yield similar decision and results. See also "RAIL PROFIT RESPONSIBILITY AND PROFIT MEASUREMENT: REORIENTING DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURES AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS TO THE COMTEMPORARY DEREGULATED RAILROAD ENVIRONMENT" by M. B. Lawrence and R. G. Sharp, Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, 1989, at - http://tris.trb.org/view.aspx?id=302482
Was this based on - and/ or are you familiar with - the paperbound booklet Profit Management Systems; Key to Stronger Railroads by Edward C. Christ (of ConRail), published by Simmons-Boardman, New York, in 1977 (86 pp.) ? That described and advocated a similar cost-accounting system that would yield similar decision and results.
See also "RAIL PROFIT RESPONSIBILITY AND PROFIT MEASUREMENT: REORIENTING DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURES AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS TO THE COMTEMPORARY DEREGULATED RAILROAD ENVIRONMENT" by M. B. Lawrence and R. G. Sharp, Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, 1989, at - http://tris.trb.org/view.aspx?id=302482
Can't say, as I'm not familiar with either of these publications, but I'd say Santa Fe was certainly very successful in working along those lines. Every sales rep had access to excellent decision-support information right at his/her fingertips, and if you had questions, the people generating the data were accessible and helpful. When I later moved to CN, they had a similar costing system but the information was not nearly as accessible. As a result I used it less and can't vouch as much for its quality.
A point not specifically discussed here but alluded to is the fact that the operating business model being adopted over the past 30 or so years has leaned to the economy of moving freight from point A to point Z with no consideration for stops between from B to Y along the way if at all possible. American invstors moved so many industrial jobs out of the country there was no need to stop in many places, But whatever line avoided congested areas of population was favored. ( I almost believe the EL merger was the last one that chose routes through instustrial cities instead of leaner trackage. Not only did that backfire on them but CR also demoted, detached, destroyed, and dismantled much of the route when it got hold of it causing further industrial erosion along the route.) The NS and CXS acquisition recognized the high terminal costs of congested areas like NJ and Michigan and thus Conrial Shared Assets was formed. Similarly there are many terminal lines in and around Chicago co owned by the big guys but designed to absorb the costs of terminal operations.
jrbernier The NP was in much better shape, but again had too many mountian grades/helper districts. The GN 'highline' was devoid of population centers, but only had one real helper district(Marias). ... ... Remember, it's not how many trains you run or the tonnage - Did you make any money doing it? Jim
The NP was in much better shape, but again had too many mountian grades/helper districts. The GN 'highline' was devoid of population centers, but only had one real helper district(Marias). ...
...
Remember, it's not how many trains you run or the tonnage - Did you make any money doing it?
Jim
The Assertion earlier in this thread was that the NP made more money moving trains over it's "too many mountain Grades/helper districts."
That the notion that the NP route was too winding to be profitable is hogwash.
I'd suggest that stating it is not an assumption we can make in this thread.
And it's interesting to note that Hunter Harrison was a key part of that Frisco management team...
...just stirring the pot
OK, I'm sorry to spam the thread, but a few things I've learned.
They've done the survey work to "fix" stampede. Just waiting on the money and being told to start.
Also, BN did the preliminary work to connect Snoqualmie to the Stampede Pass Line. Snoqualmie had it's tunnel floors cut down and widened in the 1960s in anticipation of new services. So in fact, Snoqualmie would have offered the best root for modern traffic types.
Finally, I was reminded that between the formation of the BN and the merger with SF, BN absorbed Frisco and brought in Frisco's management and THEY completely changed the direction of the railroad and slashed budgets and plans. So that makes it even harder to judge the choices of those at BN in 1970 and what BNSF is today.
It would appear though that optimal is not a word that describes the situation.
The Milw was in terrible shape by the 60's The Pacific extension was down to 261/262(XL/Thunderhawk) road freights and 263/264 many time operated as a 'dead freight'. When traffic did increase, a 261TC section ran west from the Twin Cities to move the extra traffic. The Milw route had too many mountains to climb. Two railfan trips in 1972 & 1974 revealed how bad things were on the Milw. On one trip we watched as 261 arrived in Haugen, MT. The crew wentto bed, and there was not a 'rested' crew to move the train over St Paul pass. It sat there until a dead freight arrived from the west. The train left with a crew with short hours and died on hours before arriving at the next terminal. This was not a bad weather situation - it was summer! The 1974 trip was to see the end of the electric operation.
The NP was in much better shape, but again had too many mountian grades/helper districts. The GN 'highline' was devoid of population centers, but only had one real helper district(Marias). The limiting factor of the GN line was the limit of trains that could be run through the Cascade Tunnel. The NP had a lot more 'on-line' traffic, but the future was through traffic between the Pacific and Chicago. GN 97/82(West Coaster) always ran much faster than the NP 600 series road freights. The NP main(now MRL) is used for overflow traffic, or traffic originating from KC/Denver/PRB. Even some of that traffic moved north to the High Line via Great Falls after the line rebuild there.
JJ Hill controlled the GN . And the NP when he saved it after the 1880's panic. GN had the contracts with the ocean shipping, and his Glacier Park Company controlled vast areas of forests and mining. He leased this out to his friends like Weyerhaeuser, and set up companies like Plum Creek Lumber.
Modeling BNSF and Milwaukee Road in SW Wisconsin
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