Really, IMO this story is more about Nationalism and Protectionism more then it is about Hunter Harrisons ability to manage. This is all very political. The VIA Rail Crew was French Canadian as well. Normally, not very pro-American.
Not really a proponent of Hunter Harrison but I think more perspective is needed here.
Ulrich Business owners and/or manage very seldom create anything of lasting value that transcends the businesses we run. You may be a great leader and a great manager...but none of that will matter to anyone once the business is gone. Look at some of the great business leaders of the 50s and 60s...Langdon of B&O is a great example. He was a apparently a great leader at B&O...a great innovator at B&O..and did great things...for B&O shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders. However B&O has been gone for years and I really doubt if anything that Langdon did 40 years ago can be recognized and identifed as uniquely his at CSX today. Same with Hunter..and all the rest of us who are employed as managers today... if we're good we create value TODAY for the businesses we run and hopefully hand off the business to the next generation in better shape than we found it.. but that's it... Want to create lasting value? Then write a great book that people will still want to read in hundreds of years from now..or invent something.
Business owners and/or manage very seldom create anything of lasting value that transcends the businesses we run. You may be a great leader and a great manager...but none of that will matter to anyone once the business is gone. Look at some of the great business leaders of the 50s and 60s...Langdon of B&O is a great example. He was a apparently a great leader at B&O...a great innovator at B&O..and did great things...for B&O shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders. However B&O has been gone for years and I really doubt if anything that Langdon did 40 years ago can be recognized and identifed as uniquely his at CSX today. Same with Hunter..and all the rest of us who are employed as managers today... if we're good we create value TODAY for the businesses we run and hopefully hand off the business to the next generation in better shape than we found it.. but that's it... Want to create lasting value? Then write a great book that people will still want to read in hundreds of years from now..or invent something.
You seem very certain of this. I have no interest in disputing you. If you'd like to know why I feel comfortable that every senior officer at a railway today would disagree with you, I'd be happy to explain.
RWM
Please do... I welcome (and don't take offence to) alternative views.
Ulrich Please do... I welcome (and don't take offence to) alternative views.
And so forth.
EJE818 On the EJ&E, CN overcharged USS to the point where USS had enough with CN. USS now relies on IHB for switching instead of CN. They also stalled on the hill out of Joliet twice in a week because of underpowering trains and started brush fires in Crest Hill and Plainfield.
On the EJ&E, CN overcharged USS to the point where USS had enough with CN. USS now relies on IHB for switching instead of CN. They also stalled on the hill out of Joliet twice in a week because of underpowering trains and started brush fires in Crest Hill and Plainfield.
NS is running a new train nightly to Van Loon, the 324. I took a look at the train last week and it consisted of 60 EJE coil cars, plus a few misc cars. Has there been a new traffic pattern established with the CN takeover of the EJE? The 323 appears to run daily (picking up EJE coil cars at Van Loon). This appears to be a second type dedicated train.
ed
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler made decisions at various times in their history that have completely gutted and changed the course of the domestic auto makers.
Mistakes in business history are often as interesting as successes. Iridium was a satellite phone service which Motorola launched (66 satellites, hence the name after the 66th on the chemical chart). Rapid advancements in cellular service rendered it a complete failure.
Recently the rapid investment in energy, first ethanol and now possibly wind power, is following a similar course. T. Boone Pickens has pulled the plug on his giant wind farm in Texas....wanna purchase a wind turbine cheap? Meanwhile Exxon Mobile has discovered a HUGE natural gas field in BC.
You better be correct when you bet the farm, particularly if you have skin in the game.
Is it prudent that CP seems to be pulling back on expanding into PRB coal fields? Or will we in 10 years ago be questioning their lack of aggressiveness in that project? So many factors can go into the outcome.
No doubt the heavy investment in the Transcon by BNSF and the Sunset Route by UP will be rewarded....but it might take a bit longer than projected.
It has been said that any manager in baseball will win 60 games and lose 60 games, it is those 42 other games which determine greatness from average and mediocracy. Isnt that the same with railroad managers these days? A certain level of success is guaranteed, but a few correct (or incorrect) decisions affects results for many years.
CMStPnPTellier was a former government employee that was appointed by the Canadian Government to run CN Rail he was not hired. Of course the change to CN Rail was also controversial because it removed the name "Canadian" from the business and many in Canada thought that was done to appease the U.S. because of Canadian opposition to the Iraq war in 2003. The allegations of a "culture of fear" at CN started from the Canadian governement after Hunter Harrison took over. It was a classic elevator whisper campaign, started for political reasons. Really, IMO this story is more about Nationalism and Protectionism more then it is about Hunter Harrisons ability to manage. This is all very political. The VIA Rail Crew was French Canadian as well. Normally, not very pro-American. Not really a proponent of Hunter Harrison but I think more perspective is needed here.
You are correct re: Mr Tellier. He was the Clerk of the Privy Council Initally under Mr Trudeau and letterly under Mr Chretien (in Canada the Clerk is the head of the Civil Service in effect and works in close relationship with the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Privy Council) of the day) and upon retirement from that position was appointed to the CN as its CEO. He has since gone to Bombardier. He may still be there. He had much to do with the initial downsizing of the Canadian Civil Service in the 1990's IIRC and went on to do much the same thing at CN. He was hired by Bombardier for the same reasons. He has a track record in this area.
Regarding your 'Culture of Fear' comments. As a Canadian, I was not aware of this particular assessment of CN until the Transport Canada report issued two years ago under the aegis of Lawrence Cannon, federal Minister of Transport. At that point this particular description of CN corporate culture surfaced. To the best of my knowledge this occasion was the first substantive use of the term in public discourse. About the 'elevator whisper campaign' of which you speak, I cannot comment. That happens everywhere as I'm sure you are aware.
Regarding the politicization of the name change. That had been evolving over a period of years IIRC. The final change was not political, that was made from a business point of view, I believe. At the time you cite, 2003, there was little appeasement of the US and its policy in Iraq coming from the Government of Canada. Jean Chrietien, Prime Minister of the day, refused to send troops to Iraq (preferring to concentrate Canadian Armed Forces strength in Afghanistan, which had been, and continues to be, Canadian Government policy) and in fact followed anything but an appeasement policy vis a vis this particular request of Mr Bush. His Chief of Staff, Francine Ducros, was heard to describe Mr Bush as an 'idiot' and Mr Chrietien did little to dispel the effect of her comments. His relationship with Mr Bush was 'correct' as we say here and little else. To suggest the name change was appeasement is egregious in my view.
Also....nationalism and protectionism is not the province of the Canadian federal government alone. US history is full of such activity beginning with the Monroe Doctrine and followed through by various US presidents of whom Theodore Roosevelt was one of the more notable. I again suggest it is egregious to state that this thread and many of the comments made here are being made for political and nationalistic reasons. As I have understood this thread, much of the comment has had to do precisely with Mr Harrison's managerial abilities pro and con. To divert it in this way is inaccurate and unnecessary in my view. More like a red herring....
I also need to say that your assessment of the VIA crew in question is a bit questionable. Labelling Quebecois as antiAmerican is somewhat inaccurate. In the history (recent or otherwise) of Quebec sovereignty, more than once Quebec, as a province, has considered some form of relationship with the US. Personal views were being expressed by the crew as I read the original reference. To label them as a broad based Quebecois attitude is little much and I believe does the crew's nationality a disservice. I was not there to assess what went on of course but this kind of remark has a way of fanning flames of the wrong kind. Individual views yes. To categorize them in the way you did is unfair and perhaps quite unjustified. Perhaps trying to 'tar everyone with the same brush'....
I agree, perspective is needed here...just not this kind.
Charlie
Chilliwack BC
CMStPnP [snip] Of course the change to CN Rail was also controversial because it removed the name "Canadian" from the business and many in Canada thought that was done to appease the U.S. because of Canadian opposition to the Iraq war in 2003. [snip]
Unless I'm really missing some deep corporate name change nuance here . . .
The name change to CN/ CN Rail and dropping of ''Canadian'' effectively happened long before 2003 - even before the mid-1990s privatization. Canadian/ Canadien National became the CN 'wet noodle' logo in the mid-1960s or 1970s, and has continued in one form or another since then. Certainly it was known and marketed as ''CN'' or ''CN Rail'' by Paul Tellier's time. Later, there was the ''CN North America'' paint scheme with the map outline on the sides of the units in the mid- or late-1990s, if I recall correctly. I don't have my references with me at the moment to thoroughly document and detail all this - but I could - or maybe someone else here could, if it matters that much.
- Paul North.
beaulieu Paul_D_North_Jr <snipped> As a result, a full-size main-line locomotive could not successfully hold back a single loaded lumber car on a 2.2 per cent grade. Doesn't that seem odd to you [Q] Even back in the day of the steam locomotives and hand brakes, they did better than that. Sure, the dynamic brakes would have prevented this, but that misses the key question of, 'What else went wrong here [Q]' <snipped> Paul, that train is a dangerous combination due to the fact that there was only one freight car to one locomotive, and worse that one freight car exceeded 100 tons per operative brake system. Look at BNSF or UP's ETT covering operation of such a train on a similar grade like Cima Hill on the UP or Cajon on BNSF. There is no margin for error in the train handling, the safe course would have been to bring along 4 or 5 empty freight cars for extra braking effort. As for being safely done in the Steam Era, no trains in that era had freight cars approaching that weight on four axles, retainers would have been used without question, and the rules would have specifed that the train had to have added empty freight cars for additional braking effort.
Paul_D_North_Jr <snipped> As a result, a full-size main-line locomotive could not successfully hold back a single loaded lumber car on a 2.2 per cent grade. Doesn't that seem odd to you [Q] Even back in the day of the steam locomotives and hand brakes, they did better than that. Sure, the dynamic brakes would have prevented this, but that misses the key question of, 'What else went wrong here [Q]' <snipped>
Paul, that train is a dangerous combination due to the fact that there was only one freight car to one locomotive, and worse that one freight car exceeded 100 tons per operative brake system. Look at BNSF or UP's ETT covering operation of such a train on a similar grade like Cima Hill on the UP or Cajon on BNSF. There is no margin for error in the train handling, the safe course would have been to bring along 4 or 5 empty freight cars for extra braking effort. As for being safely done in the Steam Era, no trains in that era had freight cars approaching that weight on four axles, retainers would have been used without question, and the rules would have specifed that the train had to have added empty freight cars for additional braking effort.
beaulieu, I'm remiss in taking so long to thank you for pointing this out and adding that ''real-world operations'' insight. Although I'm not qualified in such things, it makes sense to me - now. Superficially, of course - ''Who'd a thunk it ?'' Curiously, I don't recall that was ever mentioned in the TSB investigation and report that I referenced above - which raises some questions there, too.
More to the point, though, that just leaves us with even more questions about the quality of the supervision and management at the time and place of that incident. For example - Since the train was as dangerous as you say, why did the crew attempt that run anyway ? Why did they think they could - or had to - 'get away' with it ? Was the operating supervision [trainmaster] aware of the daily 'work list', and the end-of-the-day result that the crew would be coming down that grade with a single loaded car like that ? If so, why weren't they stopped ? If not, why not ? You get the picture - this might have been a ''one-of'' situation, but I kind of doubt it. As I've said before, the quote from Railway Gazette in the late 1800s bears repeating here, to the effect of - ''All negligence that causes disaster will be found to have been more or less habitual''. [I gotta retrieve the source so that I can quote and cite it properly.]
Paul_D_North_JrUnless I'm really missing some deep corporate name change nuance here
There is a difference between a legal name and what a company may be marketed as. Unless I am very mistaken, up to and including after privatization the legal name was always Canadian National Railway (after 1923). The CN wet noodle was introduced in 1960.
I had heard that the current Conservative government had a problem with the word National as it smacked of government ownership which was at variance with their rabid free enterprise philosophies My apologies, I lost my head and became political. Until I read this thread I hadn't realized there had ever been a problem on either side of the border with the word Canadian.
I better cut back on the caffeine for breakfast.
AgentKid
So shovel the coal, let this rattler roll.
"A Train is a Place Going Somewhere" CP Rail Public Timetable
"O. S. Irricana"
. . . __ . ______
Railway Man Ulrich Please do... I welcome (and don't take offence to) alternative views. Because the railway route structure for practical purposes is permanent. Few businesses are as equally tied to geography. If you are in the auto assembly business, and you realize your factory is obsolete, built in the wrong place, or inefficient, at worst case you can wait 30 years for the investment to amortize, tear it down, and rebuild in an entirely different country. Route structure decisions made in the 1830s -- some good, some not so good -- still matter today. Because the railway alignment is also nearly permanent. While line changes can be made, there's an economic limit on how far offset from the existing alignment they can be. A century ago it was feasible to offset by 100 miles (e.g., the Leamington Cutoff, Tennessee Pass). Fifty years ago, it was possible to offset by 30 miles (e.g., the Lucin Cutoff, the Crookton Cutoff, or the Harriman Cutoff). Today it is virtually impossible to offset by 500 feet. I could take you on a tour of several Class 1s and show you all sorts of alignment decisions made circa 1900 that were good ideas or bad ideas, and decisions made in the 1950s, and decisions made in the 1970s. Because I don't know of too many other private industries that build infrastructure with 100-year lifespan expectations. In fact, I am having trouble thinking of one that does that as a regular practice, as railways do. Because the transportation service gambles are very long term. When a railway decides to build something like a second main track for 1000 miles, or a new hump yard, it is betting the company for the next century. It is literally looking that far into the future when it makes its decisions. And so forth. RWM
No doubt about it..the BUILDERS' accomplishments are long lasting. These accomplishments are probably equal in value and importance to inventions and discoveries in other areas of human endeavour...and probably just as long lasting because as you say the best routes are fixed by geography. However I was talking about managers..the folks who run the businesses...like many of us today including Hunter. Our accomplishments and value added are in the "here and now" almost exclusively... it is very unlikely that our efforts will have any long lasting implications because what comes after us will very likely greatly alter or eliminate what we've done. Thus..Hunters accomplishments can be rightly asssessed in the light of today...In 50 or 100 years from now CN may very well be gone completely..absorbed into one of the other systems...and any efforts aimed at making CN a viable entity in 2009 will then be no more that historically interesting. That's not to diminish his contributions or the contributions of any manager...we contribute in the here and now...(like the captain of an Exxon supertanker or a 747 jet) ... there's not much long lasting about what we do.
I read the article and all I can say is "Some people love him and some people hate him, but he sure does run an efficient railroad".
Strictly my opinion: There has been a very nonchalant attitude toward business decorum, responsibilities, organization, and authority over the past several decades; and today its coming home to roost. White shirts and ties in offices and by officials has gone by the way side, everybody is called by their first name, titles are given in place of financial rewards and mean little, the boss may or may not have come through the ranks. If the latter, if not up through the ranks, the boss may not receive the respect or may not command the authority as one who did; everyone is on a first name basis, there is no "Mr., Miss, Mrs. or even Mz" anymore. I visit many car dealers in my job as a radio salesman. In most salesmen are dressed casually, sometimes with a "uniform" golf shirt witht he dealer's and his name on it. If more than two get together is looks like they are goofing off. One dealer I went to the other day was different. All the salesfloor people wore white shirts and ties! There was a sense of decorum and professionalism I sensed here not sensed in any other dealers's showroom. My bosses are often in golf shirts and jeans but the managers here were in shirts and ties! Impressive? You bet! Authortative? You bet! Professional and reassuring? You bet! Oh, I usually wear shirt and tie except for days I probably won't be seeing clients, and then I am wearing a station logo golf shirt, but never jeans.
What I am trying to say is that some of that old line pride and professionalism has been pushed aside by a relaxed, casual management style and allows for "labor" to become just as relaxed, just as casual, and often not as "professional" as we used to be. There is no need for it if management does not care..."do as I do, why not!". Professionalism, pride, and care for the business at hand and the customer will return when discipline and chain of command respect do and respect for the order is returned. Harrison is suffering as much from today's business culture as anything.
RIDEWITHMEHENRY is the name for our almost monthly day of riding trains and transit in either the NYCity or Philadelphia areas including all commuter lines, Amtrak, subways, light rail and trolleys, bus and ferries when warranted. No fees, just let us know you want to join the ride and pay your fares. Ask to be on our email list or find us on FB as RIDEWITHMEHENRY (all caps) to get descriptions of each outing.
Paul_D_North_Jr cnwfan2 [snip] Have anyone of you ever read Mr.Harrison's book on the CN? Its called "How We Work and Why",the other is, "The Pig that Flew", by Harry Bruce. I recommend you read them both. [snipped] Minor correction - The Pig That Flew has nothing to do with Mr. Harrison, as it pre-dates IC's and hence his appearance on CN by several years. Instead, it is mainly about CN CEO Paul Tellier and the mid-1990s privatization of CN. I do believe that Mr. Harrison has written a 2nd book, with a similar title, but I'm having trouble finding that title or other reference quickly. It's probably in this month's Trains article, but that issue is at home today . . .
cnwfan2 [snip] Have anyone of you ever read Mr.Harrison's book on the CN? Its called "How We Work and Why",the other is, "The Pig that Flew", by Harry Bruce. I recommend you read them both. [snipped]
Minor correction - The Pig That Flew has nothing to do with Mr. Harrison, as it pre-dates IC's and hence his appearance on CN by several years. Instead, it is mainly about CN CEO Paul Tellier and the mid-1990s privatization of CN.
I do believe that Mr. Harrison has written a 2nd book, with a similar title, but I'm having trouble finding that title or other reference quickly. It's probably in this month's Trains article, but that issue is at home today . . .
OK, here they are - from page 36 [left. col.] of the August 2009 [Vol. 69, No. 8] issue of Trains, article on Mr. Harrison;
- ''How We Work and Why'', 2005 - apparently privately published by CN.
- ''Change, Leadership, Mud and Why [How We Work and Why, Vol. 2]'', 2008, published by Canadian National [privately [Q] - doesn't seem to be available in or on the general marketplace yet]
- The Pig That Flew: The Battle to Privatize Canadian National,by Harry Bruce, 1997, Douglas & McIntyre, ISBN 1550546090 (1-55054-609-0)
Finally, in running these down I also found a reference to a more available book -
Henry:
Good point about the relaxing of standards, particularly dress. In the 1990's I wore a suit daily, it was mandated by the "suits" at work. It didnt matter if I called on a CEO or a mechanic in the garage, I wore a suit (left the suit jacket in the car often). The very first time I heard "casual Friday" was in 1993 when calling on ACF Industries in St. Louis. I was told to "dress down". I didnt.
About five years ago I went to a major petroleum (MAJOR, think top 3) attired in a suit. I was the only one in the building with a tie on, let alone a suit.
Our "suits" still require we wear ties on sales calls or when we are in the office. It can be stretched a bit, but the law has been written.
I am not sure if this relaxation in dress code has affected other aspects of discipline and respect or not. There has been a rewriting of word rules and conduct over the last couple of decades. So many of us now work out of our homes (shorts and tee shirt as I write this). Yet my productivity has never been higher (other than recessionary factors). While there has been a drop in formality, I do believe there is a considerably higher level of responsibility and effort. Gone are the days of 8-5. One is now connected via Blackberry, laptop, cell phone, and occassionally by fax machine. My customers call me at 630am, 9pm, Saturday evenings, Sunday afternoons. I email them at anytime.
Cradle to grave employment is a thing of the past. I have had two employers in my 32 years working. Only two. There is little loyalty (either direction) at this time in most companies. Give me results now or headcount will be reduced.
Things have changed, for sure.
Same here...last time I wore a suit was on my wedding day. I usually wear jeans and a T shirt to work. When I visit customers I don't do anything differently...jeans and a T shirt all the way.
Paul
The change to the CN noodle logo occurred under the leadership of Donald Gordon, a former chairman of the CNR as it was then known, about 1964. It was an image rebranding that worked really well IMHO. Mr Gordon was responsible for many changes in the railway operating structure. My late father in law who worked for the CNR until 1979 at Pointe St Charles Shops in Montreal as millwrighting/maintenance gang general foreman saw him as quite an innovator and a bit of a character.
Among other things:
He did introduce Red, White and Blue passenger fares to encourage increased ridership, in much the same way Mr Harrison has done with freight pricing. He was responsible for the upgrading of equipment and right of way and buildings. Local stations became a wild mixture of red white and blue colours. Made stations quite eyecatching. He also did much to make the CNR a more efficient federal Crown Corporation (as publically owned entities were and are known in Canada). In my view he was one of the more innovative leaders of the company and his long tenure really began the later significant corporate changes that Mr Tellier and Mr Harrison inherited. There are some good books out there about the early and later history of CN. I'll try to dig them up and post titles.
The CN North America logo came in the late 90's I think, as part of a legal name change process.
Further legal changes IIRC occurred later in Mr Tellier's time and in Mr Harrison's time I believe and were business decisions as I have understood them.
FWIW
Chilliwack, BC
Again, the Lillooet TSB report at Section 2.5 (Safety Management Practice) I believe provides some insight. Corporate Safety Management practices were deficient and did not take account of the extreme mountainous terrain in which CN was now operating, not only with this wreck but a number of others on the Squamish/Lillooet Subs. The report makes reference to the fact that following of these wrecks CN did not follow proper safety management protocols by instituting formal Risk Assessment procedures. One can only speculate why this was so, However, as the report also points out CN had no other similar territory in its system and failed to take into account previous BCR operating practices as these applied to the Exeter Switcher.The result was a series of wrecks which then occasioned the Transport Canada Report I referenced earlier into CN operating practices and mandated a number of changes in order to prevent further extension of this string of wrecks on the BCR. Goes back to what Tyler said earlier about workplace culture.
To use Charlie's from Chilliwack expression I looked at Wikipedia, FWIW, to check on a few points.
The legal name from 1978 to the present is Canadian National Railway. From 1918 to 1978 it was Canadian National Railways. US lines are incorporated under Grand Trunk Corporation.
The wet noodle was introduced in 1960. The CN North America logo was in use from 1993 to 1995 when the wet noodle was put back into use.
The whole article is very long and I intend to devote some time to reading it all, it just won't be today.
Charlie -
Thanks for the details on the CN name evolution - that pretty much squares with what I recalled.
The ''workplace culture'' aspect is significant, I also believe. The really interesting thing is that in my research to previously post the titles of the 3 recent books [above], it seemed to me that CN's emphasis on ''culture'' and change of same virtually oozed from every reference. For one example, see the interview with Peter Edwards, the HR VP, at -
http://irc.queensu.ca/gallery/1/dps-switchpoints-culture-change.pdf
Now, the question becomes - Is culture and culture change only a ''from-the-top-down'' or 'one-way street' thing that is forced on the rank-and-file - or is there room for a 2-way dialogue for the rank-and-file to legitimately 'inform' / educate/ enlighten the management, esp. about unique local circumstances such as this. And does the management have an obligation - and is it perceptive enough - to listen to what is communicated back to them. Clearly the management is / should be in charge, but nowhere is it written in stone that management has a monopoly on wisdom or knowledge of the actual facts and real world, and esp. not in a far-flung railroad enterprise such as CN.
I need to re-read those TSB reports. If they didn't expicity mention the TPOB = Tons Per Operable Brake criteria / standards and issue - as at least something to be looked at further - then it seems to me that problem was 'white-washed' 'swept under the rug' and buried under the more general heading of ''Risk Assessment'', instead of 'naming' it front and center. But I could have a mis-guided 'take' on this, too - anybody else have any thoughts or comments [Q]
I believe Mr Harrison has a profound impact on the workplace culture of CN.
For instance:
1. Hunter Camps: I didn't realize how many of these he actually appears to conduct himself. He appears to have extensive operating experience in very particular areas of railroading, especially in Train and Yard operation. He was described as being an intimidating presence...to put it kindly.
2. He appears to have a very hands on style of management. From the Trains article: I can only imagine how the Yazoo Sub dispatcher felt on that night shift. Might have been greatly enriched by the experience or scared out of his tree....take your pick. Imagine also the 'lowly trainmaster in Saskatoon with the car sitting three days' also quoted in the article.
3. I haven't seen anywhere that he has extensive mountain railroading experience.
4. I got the impression that he relies on himself and his knowledge base, which to be fair is considerable. He appears to be very much his own man as a leader. I can't imagine him being very consultative. I don't know how well he would listen, especially to those underneath him.
However:
In my thirty years of experience in supervision and management ( I hasten to add not on the rails) such characteristics tend to lead to a top down style of management which coupled with a 'paramilitary' style can lead to some disastrous consequences for the following reasons:
1. You know if you are at a lower level on the workplace totem pole that you are subject to considerable scrutiny.
2. You know that if you 'cross the line' discipline can be retributive and definitely harsh.
3. You know also that the orders come from high and that there likely is little opportunity to express an opinion about these orders...apart from 'Yes, Sir!'
4. You know in an employee downsizing corporation as CN has been that you could be next...for a variety of reasons.
I'm sure you know the fable about "The Emperor who had No Clothes.'....remember how the populace responded except for the little child who pointed out the obvious.
In a way I believe that is what has happened at CN. The information flow has been top down. As has been the decision making process.
For example: 1. I am amazed that non db power was placed on the Exeter switcher when MANY years of previous BCR operating experience dicated otherwise. 2. I am likewise amazed that after a series of wrecks on the Squamish and Lillooet Subs that management didn't do some significant head-scratching and initiate some formal Risk Assessments. No instead they continued to operate overlength trains (120 cars or so) in territory which for years had run trains no longer than 70-80 cars. Ask Tyler. I'm sure he'd tell you. I remember it that way too and I'm a lowly trainwatcher. No wonder the federal Transport Department ordered them to shorten trains and restore db equipped locomotives to the BCR.
Who at the higher levels was listening, either to the experienced operating crews. Remember the TSB report and the Transport Canada report refer to crew concerns being ignored. What trainman after being ignored continually is going to stick his/her neck out in an OSH cttee. All it could get you is black marks and worse from higher ups....especially in a top down culture.
Regarding the TSB report regarding TPOB there is considerable analysis done leading to the recommendations regarding quality of brakeshoes, wheels and inspection practices, especially in mountainous territory in Canada.
I think Mr Harrison has led CN into some new and perhaps dangerous territory. I can imagine a bean-counter slavering over a 60% operating ratio, but in an enterprise such as railroading I expect this ratio would come with a high degree of risk. In the power engineering field, in which I used to work, we used to talk of 'factors of safety' in different magnitudes for pressure vessels, piping and controls, depending on the operating conditions one faced. One tampered with those degrees of magnitude at their peril. The result could be material or other operating failure with disastrous consequences. CN and Mr Harrison is experiencing the result of such 'pushing of the envelope'
Perhaps it is time he retired.
AgentKidUntil I read this thread I hadn't realized there had ever been a problem on either side of the border with the word Canadian.
Until I read this thread I hadn't realized there had ever been a problem on either side of the border with the word Canadian.
Seriously though, I wasn't taking political sides it was inferred because I used the term "French Canadian" which is apparently sensitive to Canadians, there are French Americans within driving distance of where I live in Texas.....not sensitive to call them French Americans. I honestly don't have an opinion one way or another with Quebec or what Politics take place North of the Border for the most part. That was all inferred because I mentioned a lot of this seemed to be politics driven. Americans as a whole (me included) really do not care what goes on up there nor do most of us think it is relevant to our daily lives.
Anyhow, I was just expressing a viewpoint based on what I observed.
CGW Los Angeles Rams Guy For the most part, I like what CN has been able to do with the former IC/ICG Iowa Division and making it look like something again although I am disappointed that they haven't pushed for a paired track arrangement with UP between Denison and Council Bluffs AND pushed the Council Bluffs/Omaha gateway harder; particularly for auto and auto parts traffic. I agree with you LA Rams Guy. Two reasons I can only speculate on why auto traffic is not seen on the Iowa line is: A. Long haul revenues may not be sufficient to make it worth shipping from Michigan to Council Bluffs or B. There may be tunnel clearance issues at East Dubuque, IL that won't allow Auto racks and stacks to pass through. However, I am no expert on railroading, just a fan. Jeff
Los Angeles Rams Guy For the most part, I like what CN has been able to do with the former IC/ICG Iowa Division and making it look like something again although I am disappointed that they haven't pushed for a paired track arrangement with UP between Denison and Council Bluffs AND pushed the Council Bluffs/Omaha gateway harder; particularly for auto and auto parts traffic.
For the most part, I like what CN has been able to do with the former IC/ICG Iowa Division and making it look like something again although I am disappointed that they haven't pushed for a paired track arrangement with UP between Denison and Council Bluffs AND pushed the Council Bluffs/Omaha gateway harder; particularly for auto and auto parts traffic.
I agree with you LA Rams Guy. Two reasons I can only speculate on why auto traffic is not seen on the Iowa line is:
A. Long haul revenues may not be sufficient to make it worth shipping from Michigan to Council Bluffs or
B. There may be tunnel clearance issues at East Dubuque, IL that won't allow Auto racks and stacks to pass through.
However, I am no expert on railroading, just a fan.
Jeff
Jeff,
I'm not aware of any clearance issues with the tunnel at East Dubuque that would prohibit the movement of either autoracks or doublestacks through there although I could be wrong. You may have a good point about the revenue considerations wrt auto traffic and pushing the Council Bluffs/Omaha gateway, though.
I still think, though, that both CN and UP are missing the boat wrt the paired track arrangement possibilities between Denison and Council Bluffs. Given the agreements that CN currently has in place with my employer, Canadian Pacific, this one seems like a no-brainer.
Charlie, there's a lot of 'meat' in your post above, but I can only take the time now to respond to one portion of it, as follows:
lenzfamily [snipped; emphasis added - PD]] 3. I haven't seen anywhere that he has extensive mountain railroading experience. 4. I got the impression that he relies on himself and his knowledge base, which to be fair is considerable. He appears to be very much his own man as a leader. I can't imagine him being very consultative. I don't know how well he would listen, especially to those underneath him. [snips] In a way I believe that is what has happened at CN. The information flow has been top down. As has been the decision making process. For example: 1. I am amazed that non db power was placed on the Exeter switcher when MANY years of previous BCR operating experience dicated otherwise. 2. I am likewise amazed that after a series of wrecks on the Squamish and Lillooet Subs that management didn't do some significant head-scratching and initiate some formal Risk Assessments. No instead they continued to operate overlength trains (120 cars or so) in territory which for years had run trains no longer than 70-80 cars. Ask Tyler. I'm sure he'd tell you. I remember it that way too and I'm a lowly trainwatcher. No wonder the federal Transport Department ordered them to shorten trains and restore db equipped locomotives to the BCR. Who at the higher levels was listening, either to the experienced operating crews. Remember the TSB report and the Transport Canada report refer to crew concerns being ignored. What trainman after being ignored continually is going to stick his/her neck out in an OSH cttee. All it could get you is black marks and worse from higher ups....especially in a top down culture. [snip] I think Mr Harrison has led CN into some new and perhaps dangerous territory. I can imagine a bean-counter slavering over a 60% operating ratio, but in an enterprise such as railroading I expect this ratio would come with a high degree of risk. . . . . The result could be material or other operating failure with disastrous consequences. CN and Mr Harrison is experiencing the result of such 'pushing of the envelope' [snip]
[snips] In a way I believe that is what has happened at CN. The information flow has been top down. As has been the decision making process.
[snip] I think Mr Harrison has led CN into some new and perhaps dangerous territory. I can imagine a bean-counter slavering over a 60% operating ratio, but in an enterprise such as railroading I expect this ratio would come with a high degree of risk. . . . . The result could be material or other operating failure with disastrous consequences. CN and Mr Harrison is experiencing the result of such 'pushing of the envelope' [snip]
An objective point of reference here my be helpful: Al Krug's ''Major Railroad Grades'' page on his ''Railroad Facts and Figures'' website at - http://www.alkrug.vcn.com/rrfacts/grades.htm - lists the following:
At the bottom of the tabulation, Mr. Krug notes: ''Because of the many grades in the 1% range please limit your additions to 1.2% or greater unless it is unusually long, famous, or otherwise special.'' Clearly, the listed CN grades don't meet those criteria - so I surmise that they are shown likely simply because they are the maximum that CN has.
Further, the total fall on BC Rail's Kelly Lake Hill at 2.2% = 116 ft. per mile x 24 miles = 2,784 ft. In comparison, the total fall on CN's Yellowhead Pass at 0.4% = 21 ft. per mile x 17 = 357 ft. - only about 13 % or 1/8 as much. More importantly in this context, the drop over a mere 1 mile on the 2.2 % grade will theoretically accelerate an unbraked, uncontrolled, frictionless train to almost 60 MPH; on the CN's 0.4 %, that train would be moving only at about 25 MPH - this can be demonstrated and confirmed easily enough within the 1st minute of a ride on most amusement park's roller-coasters. And to perhaps state the obvious - the CN's grades aren't even in the same league with BCR's - or anyone else's, for that matter.
I agree that it is likely - but not absolutely certain - that Mr. Harrison's admittedly extensive experience is all on ''flatland'' railroads, and that he has no personal extensive mountain railroading background. Mr. Harrison's former employers per the Trains article, Illinois Central and St. Louis-San Francisco [''Frisco''] are nowhere on Krug's list, nor are any of the grades within the Chicago Region of BN that he was in charge of. However, when he was the No. 2 of BN's Seattle Region, it is quite likely that the former NP's Stampede Pass / Tunnel route, and the former GN's Stevens Pass / Cascade Tunnel route - both of which are also on Krug's list, each with 2.2 % grades, both WB and EB, which are significant grades in anybody's book - were within his territory. But we've not been told that he ever had anything to do with either of those grades on a day-to-day, in-the-field, on-the-train operating basis - in other words, it does not appear that he ever 'got his hands dirty' with those operations.
So the question I have to ask now: Is the CN management smart enough to 'know what they don't know' - or, in the words of the Serenity Prayer, do they have ''The wisdom to know the difference''. These events indicate that they do not.
Only a few days around a mountain railroad are enough to teach that 2 major different challenges are involved there, and the most difficult one - which also affects safety - is keeping the train under control during the descent. And that's not news or rocket science - it's been an inherent part of the business for almost 150 years now. To not know or respect that displays a stunning ignorance of some fundamental principles - ''Railroading 101'', as someone else in the Trains article said. Mountain railroaders are indeed a different breed, and - in order to survive, literally - have developed extremely different and specialized train-handling knowledge, techniques, and skills. That's not insulated small-group arrogance, that's a practical real-world fact - conversely, the mountain crews would probably be terrible at handling a high-speed freight train across a hog-back profile, or braking a 90 MPH passenger train.
Recently I've been reading several articles about the 1-mile long 2.3 % ''Slide'' at the top of the otherwise 1.8 % 12-mile EB descent from Gallitzin summit towards Horseshoe Curve and Altoona, PA. For decades now the rule there has been 12 MPH max. [only 8 MPH for 'mineral' trains'] approaching the Slide - any more than that and Klaxon horns go off, the signals go to stop, and the train is supposed to stop - or a penalty brake application will occur - and be inspected until the problem is ascertained and corrected. More important in this context Helpers are often assigned to EB downgrade trains simply to add their dynamic braking capability. Interestingly, the January 1985 Trains article on that operation was authored by the same Fred Frailey, who quotes a RFE saying '' If you don't have your train fully under control when you start down The Slide, you may already have eaten your last meal'' [pg. 31], and the Superintendent saying ''Our people have to be aware that under no circumstances are they to deviate from instructions. You just cannot play around with this mountain. The rules are time-proven and they are law as far as I am concerned.'' Notably, that Allegheny Division was the first ConRail division to go 1 million hours of work without a reportable injury. [pp. 31 - 33; emphasis added - PDN]
So what part of this hard-earned [in the blood of our predecesor trainmen, as is often said], long-standing - and far from secret - institutional knowledge and laws of physics were the CN officials unaware of, or think they were exempt or immune from [Q]
That 60's % Operating Ratio looks great - but that may be obtainable and sustainable only in a 'flatlands' railroad environment. In mountain territory, there are inherently going to be slower speeds and added costs - that just comes with the territory. A much higher OR and lower productivity than for the rest of the system are inevitable - but these are differing 'apples vs. oranges' situations, so should not be directly compared. To ignore or dismiss those kinds of fundamental differences may be symptomatic of an unwillingness to accept the reality that there are indeed some things that cannot be changed by sheer force of will or the 'culture', and that there are actual limits to one's personal power, no matter how forcefully expressed. Even BNSF's Rob Krebs figured that out.
cmstpnpI really don't want to get into an argument with you.
Hopefully both of us have more sense than that....
To clarify: I was quoting your remarks about the French Canadian VIA crew, more specifically your observation that they were not particularly proAmerican. IMHO you then made a generalization about the naming process being politics driven. This flowed from your further observations based on the crew's remarks. I disagreed and gave my reasons why.
I'm no expert. I'm an observer who happens to love railroading. It's literally in my genes from my mother's side of the family.
I know the BCR country. I have friends who worked for the old BCR and they definitely lived and worked in their own world, especially in the Squamish and Lillooet Subs. They had to, or as your quoted superintendent said, they could well have eaten their last meal many more times than once. the railway is famous for its sharp curves and its amazing grades in both of those subs. Even the roads in the area are something else. When CN took over most of these experienced people were either let go or retired or transferred as I understand things.
Their inspection procedures were rigorous. IIRC track inspectors preceded every train in the area...due to numerous rockslides, avalanches and the like. I believe that CN just wasn't prepared nor did they understand the need for that kind of operational rigour and the expense it entailed. As far as lengthening trains and the resulting stringlining and then repeating the exercise on a variety of other occasions....I can only conclude that management just didn't get it and that the 'one size fits all' approach they employed was finally ended by federal and provincial government mandate. Surprising, but there it is and its all a matter of public record. The McBride wreck includes a litany of other deficienies in corporate culture. TSB reports as I read them are like 'canaries in the mineshaft'.
CN's 'mineshaft' is getting dangerous.
lenzfamily [snip] I believe that CN just wasn't prepared nor did they understand the need for that kind of operational rigour and the expense it entailed. [snip]
That thesis / conclusion is gaining traction in my mind. Thank you for the additional background detail - typical for mountain railroads, but utterly foreign and incomprehensible to the 'flat-lander' operations. Perhaps nothing that Mr. Harrison and his cohorts had encountered before quite prepared them for this - it just didn't fit in or resonate with their 'mind-set'. If their overriding goal was to force it into the mold of a 60 per cent operating ratio - well, that just wasn't going to happen. But who among them was going to be the bearer of that bad news to Stalin - er, Harrison - and then get shot for failing to report total success [Q]
In the interview with Peter Edwards that I referenced in one of my posts yesterday, he claims [pg. 3] that there was an ''openness to trial and error'', and that ''it worked because ultimately we knew where we wanted to go. In reality, we always kept saying - 'There are many roads to Rome, but we know we're going to Rome.' '' That's all well and good - but what happened here when the locals essentially told them that the road they had chosen leads not to Rome, but instead over a cliff [Q] [literally, too, here] Again, I question whether management's obsession with 'making the numbers' blinded them to recognizing the unavoidable facts here. Not until after that series of wrecks and the TSB reports did the federal and provincal governmental orders step forward much like referees in a boxing ring and essentially declare that the match was over, and that further, futile struggle must now cease.
lenzfamilyI am likewise amazed that after a series of wrecks on the Squamish and Lillooet Subs that management didn't do some significant head-scratching and initiate some formal Risk Assessments. No instead they continued to operate overlength trains (120 cars or so) in territory which for years had run trains no longer than 70-80 cars. Ask Tyler. I'm sure he'd tell you. I remember it that way too and I'm a lowly trainwatcher. No wonder the federal Transport Department ordered them to shorten trains and restore db equipped locomotives to the BCR.
zardoz lenzfamilyI am likewise amazed that after a series of wrecks on the Squamish and Lillooet Subs that management didn't do some significant head-scratching and initiate some formal Risk Assessments. No instead they continued to operate overlength trains (120 cars or so) in territory which for years had run trains no longer than 70-80 cars. Ask Tyler. I'm sure he'd tell you. I remember it that way too and I'm a lowly trainwatcher. No wonder the federal Transport Department ordered them to shorten trains and restore db equipped locomotives to the BCR. [emphasis added - PDN] This alone should give you an idea of how the CN operates: even after multiple incidents, it still took government directives to change the way they operated over that district. Perhaps the ego of certain high-ranking officials got in the way of logical thinking, or did they think they were such hot stuff that they could circumvent the laws of physics? [emphasis added - PDN]
lenzfamilyI am likewise amazed that after a series of wrecks on the Squamish and Lillooet Subs that management didn't do some significant head-scratching and initiate some formal Risk Assessments. No instead they continued to operate overlength trains (120 cars or so) in territory which for years had run trains no longer than 70-80 cars. Ask Tyler. I'm sure he'd tell you. I remember it that way too and I'm a lowly trainwatcher. No wonder the federal Transport Department ordered them to shorten trains and restore db equipped locomotives to the BCR. [emphasis added - PDN]
This alone should give you an idea of how the CN operates: even after multiple incidents, it still took government directives to change the way they operated over that district. Perhaps the ego of certain high-ranking officials got in the way of logical thinking, or did they think they were such hot stuff that they could circumvent the laws of physics? [emphasis added - PDN]
Which reminds me of that old joke -
Sometimes, to get the mule's attention, first you have to hit him over the head with a 2 x 4 . . .
As Professor Henry Higgins said in My Fair Lady, 'I think you've got it.'
I really wonder if the apparently rigid (despite the VP's comments) top down, 'one style fits all' culture is serving them well.
I'm just reading too much negative comment, based on what I consider to be quite an objective viewpoint, from operating people far more experienced than I regarding current CN operations and management style. It's on this forum, it's from BCR friends and from friends locally who have either worked for CN or have encountered CN crews in the course of trainwatching.
For example:
A local friend connected with a through crew recently while they were sitting on a passing track waiting for overtaking traffic. He stated the motive power looked like **** oil and **** dripping everywhere and the crew's comments about the condition of same generally weren't much better. Sends me a message.
Another friend, now retired from signals like our friend Clique of One, commented to me some time ago that CN had basically enlarged the signal maintainer crews territory from Fort Langley, just east of Vancouver, to somewhere east of Hope, IIRC as far as Boston Bar in the Fraser Canyon. That drive, on a good day, takes at least three hours from end to end, never mind the work a person has to do to keep the plant running adequately. He worked for CN all his life and when the time came to 'pull the pin' he was more than ready to do so.
This sounds like a potential trainwreck (excuse the pun) when you start adding up the pieces.
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