BREAKING NEWS - Amtrak train rear ends freight in Chicago

[Centaur]

Below is a portion of the most recent related article on the Chicago Tribune's website.

NTSB Vice Chairman Robert Sumwalt said officials were on a "fact-finding" mission Saturday to determine why the Amtrak train from Grand Rapids, Mich.-minutes from its Union Station destination-rear-ended the 20-car Norfolk Southern freight train that had stopped on the same tracks. The Amtrak train was traveling about 35 m.p.h. at the point of impact, officials said.

Sumwalt said the Amtrak train had slowed to 9 to 10 m.p.h. as it passed through a track intersection in Englewood, switching from one set of tracks to another to pass a standing train, according to information culled from the event recorder. After the Amtrak train passed, it began to accelerate to 40 m.p.h. The speed limit for a passenger train in that area is 79 m.p.h.

The train barely reached 40 m.p.h. when the engineer saw the freight train and "put the train into emergency breaking." The distance from the Englewood interlocking to the point of impact was 1.7 miles and took 4 minutes to travel.

About 9 seconds passed from the point where the engineer applied the Amtrak train's brakes to the point of impact, in which it rode up on the back of a freight train car.

Track signals were tested and appeared to be working, but officials will not know how they operated leading up to the crash until they recover the event recorder in the signals, Sumwalt said.

For the full article, click:  http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-trainsdec02,0,7175642.story?coll=chi_tab01_layout

 

[jeaton]

"The Amtrak train's engineer told investigators that after he switched tracks as instructed by a dispatcher, he accelerated to 40 mph; when he saw the freight train, he applied his brakes and hit the stationary train at between 33-35 mph, Sumwalt said. It took 9 seconds from the moment the engineer hit the brakes and the collision with the freight train, the NTSB official said."

***

"The Chicago Tribune reported Saturday that a dispatcher in Michigan told the Amtrak train to slow down, prepare to switch tracks and proceed with caution as it approached Chicago's Union Station.

The train's crew did as it was told, but still slammed into the freight train about a mile later. The Amtrak train applied its emergency brakes as it approached the freight train, but wasn't able to stop before the impact, the newspaper said."

Source: http://cbs2chicago.com/local/amtrak.crash.investigation.2.600105.html

So, do we know what the signal (at 63rd Street?) was actually displaying and if the dispatcher used the word "proceed with caution" as reported, does that mean "restricted" or "approach?" 

 

 

Good question.  If that quote is accurate, it has to indicate some unusual conditions.  If the track from the interlocking to the point of collision is governed by signals-either CTC or block-then the signals indicate the maximum authorized speed.  I am not a rules expert, but I think that if there is a condition where signals would not protect a stretch of track, then the dispatcher would have to issue a warrant or order that would include a speed order if the train was to proceed at something less than normal maximum track speed. 

That is a busy piece of railroad and I would guess that the running tracks in that area are signaled for movement in either direction.  If not, and the train was operating north on track only signaled for southbound movement, I'd figure that the maximum would be "restricted speed".

Needless to say, I await the report of the NTSB with interest.

[chefjavier]

Looking at the video and the clock on the screen, it took about 5 seconds for the entire train to enter the picture.  The length of 3 Superliners and a P42 is 325 feet which means that the train was moving at a speed of 65 feet per second, 3900 feet per minute or about 44.3 MPH.

If I have it right, that compares to the guess of the passenger who said 15 to 20 MPH.   I am not too surprised at the difference.  Unless a person had experience checking speeds, the perspective from the upper level of a Superliner is is going to cause the perceived speed to be less than the actual speed.

That's very good detective work, jeaton.  I read it as 6 seconds for the Amtrak train to travel its length before the collision.  I'm not an expert, so I'll accept your figure for the length of the train.  Therefore, I deduce an average of 37 mph while the train was moving for the camera.  If it were braking, then it would have been travelling faster than 37 mph when it first entered the field of view.   

 

Where do you get your calculations.. Keep in mind you have emergency breaking active.

As I previously stated, chefjavier, my figure is an estimate of the average speed while the train was moving in front of the camera.  As I also said, if the train were braking it would have been travelling faster than that average when it first it entered the field of view.  Naturally, that implies that if it were indeed braking, it would have been moving slower than that average immediately before the collision.  The question is whether it was proper for the train to have been moving around 37 mph at any time while in that rail yard.

The 325 ft length given by jeaton appears accurate.  The three passenger cars are each 85 ft and the engine is 70 ft.  I suppose some more length could be added between cars, but that would not change the estimated speed by much.  Of course, my reading of 6 seconds is imprecise, but it's close enough to get a ballpark estimate of the average speed.

325 ft / 6 sec x 3600 sec/hr / 5280 ft/mi = 37 mi/hr

It seems your theory is right on the ball park. Good guest.

[RRKen]

Very good guest indeed.   His calculation was also pretty darn close.  In viewing the video, my eye said 30+ given the camera was still moving.   Now to wait and see what indication he had in the field.

[Dutchrailnut]

Last signal he/she saw was the signal at crossover, the train took crossovers at 10 mph but then accelerated to 40 mph ??????

 

My Theory the fairly new engineer thought the restricted speed applied to interlocking only.  while it governs to next favorable signal.

 A case of premature acceleration.

[cr6479]

poor fred (EOT) is dead. did the signal show yellow over green, yellow over red, flashing yellow over red or green????

[Dutchrailnut]

NTSB: Amtrak Train Followed Dispatcher
Feds Say Engineer Followed Instructions To Switch Tracks Before Crash



CHICAGO (CBS) - The NTSB spent the weekend in Chicago collecting perishable evidence and released some of their findings before investigators left town. Key evidence came from a signal recording and interviews with the train conductor and engineers, as CBS 2's Joanie Lum reports.


Sunday afternoon, NTSB investigators looked at the mangled tracks where the crash occurred. The Amtrak train was traveling about 40 mph when it applied its brakes for nine seconds and skidded some 500 feet, hitting a stopped freight train on the same set of tracks Friday.


Investigators confirmed that a signal at the crossover in Englewood, 1.7 miles south of the crash site, showed what's called a restrictive red over yellow light signal, meaning the train should have been going less than 15 miles an hour.


The facts are the train should not have been operated at a speed in excess of 15 mph and yet it was operating at 40 mph.


NTSB investigators say the engineer saw the restrictive signal but they refuse to say whether the signal was misinterpreted. Investigators say they'll do more follow-up interviews and might even dismantle the locomotive to see if mechanical issues contributed to the collision.

Before it plowed into the back of a freight train on the South Side on Friday, an Amtrak train followed instructions from a Michigan-based dispatcher to switch tracks, apparently to avoid the standing train.

"The problem here apparently was that two trains were on the same track at the same time at the same location," said Robert Sumwalt, the National Transportation Safety Board's vice chairman. "Obviously, that is not supposed to happen."

Amtrak's Pere Marquette train out of Grand Rapids, Mich., was loaded with holiday shoppers and going just over 30 mph when it slammed into a Norfolk Southern freight train near 52nd Street. Sixty-two people were injured.

Federal investigator Robert Sumwalt says investigators aren't assessing blame at this point.

The freight train was stopped, waiting for a signal to proceed.

Data from the passenger train's event recorder show that the engineer of the Amtrak train switched tracks "in accordance with signal indicators" controlled by a Norfolk Southern dispatcher in Dearborn, Mich., Sumwalt said.

Tests performed Saturday on the signals showed they were "working as designed," he said.

There also did not appear to be any mechanical problems with the Amtrak train, although the brakes are too badly damaged to be analyzed.

After making the track switch, the engineer of the Amtrak train told the NTSB that he saw the freight train ahead of him and applied the emergency brakes. The collision occurred nine seconds later, Sumwalt said.

Six teams of federal investigators fanned out around Chicago on Saturday to interview witnesses and gather evidence at the scene. While the on-site portion of the investigation is wrapping up, it could take several months before the NTSB arrives at a probable cause.

In addition to data from the event recorder, the NTSB also retrieved 36 hours of "good quality" security camera footage from a Norfolk Southern freight yard camera that shows the crash, but not the signals, Sumwalt said.

He said the trains involved in the crash were not equipped with positive train control, a system that can slow or stop a train when personnel on board fail to obey signals or spot obstacles ahead.

But he stopped short of saying the system could have prevented Friday's crash.

Initial estimates put the cost of the crash at $1.3 million.

The

[CShaveRR]

I love the headline about the engineer following directions.  His engine followed the rails, that's what happened!

And skidded?  Not too likely, especially not in good weather.

I guess the NTSB is dumbing things down for public consumption, or perhaps this is some over-dramatizing, under-informed journalist's interpretation of accurate facts presented.

Time to go to the fridge and hide some perishable evidence!

[Dutchrailnut]

The FRA did not release this report and any dumbing down of facts can be atributed to CBS.

 The NTSB released some of these findings  but its media that puts it as a story.

[CShaveRR]

Sorry--I'll correct that.

Oh--for the record, the speed limit is 70, not 79, m.p.h.  Makes little difference in this case, since their limit was 15 in the best of conditions and visibility.

[CShaveRR]

"The Amtrak train's engineer told investigators that after he switched tracks as instructed by a dispatcher, he accelerated to 40 mph; when he saw the freight train, he applied his brakes and hit the stationary train at between 33-35 mph, Sumwalt said. It took 9 seconds from the moment the engineer hit the brakes and the collision with the freight train, the NTSB official said."

***

"The Chicago Tribune reported Saturday that a dispatcher in Michigan told the Amtrak train to slow down, prepare to switch tracks and proceed with caution as it approached Chicago's Union Station.

The train's crew did as it was told, but still slammed into the freight train about a mile later. The Amtrak train applied its emergency brakes as it approached the freight train, but wasn't able to stop before the impact, the newspaper said."

Source: http://cbs2chicago.com/local/amtrak.crash.investigation.2.600105.html

So, do we know what the signal (at 63rd Street?) was actually displaying and if the dispatcher used the word "proceed with caution" as reported, does that mean "restricted" or "approach?" 

Good question.  If that quote is accurate, it has to indicate some unusual conditions.  If the track from the interlocking to the point of collision is governed by signals-either CTC or block-then the signals indicate the maximum authorized speed.  I am not a rules expert, but I think that if there is a condition where signals would not protect a stretch of track, then the dispatcher would have to issue a warrant or order that would include a speed order if the train was to proceed at something less than normal maximum track speed. 

That is a busy piece of railroad and I would guess that the running tracks in that area are signaled for movement in either direction.  If not, and the train was operating north on track only signaled for southbound movement, I'd figure that the maximum would be "restricted speed".

Needless to say, I await the report of the NTSB with interest.

I believe the signal at Englewood displayed a Restricting indication.  This is assuming that my track diagram is correct and that there were no other signals between the control point (which is, by the way, controlled by Metra) and the accident site (and also assumes that signals were working properly, as is stated by the NTSB report).  Speed should, as has been pointed out, never have been increased beyond 15 m.p.h., if that high.

This is Rule 261 Terrtory (NORAC rules)--Track signaled in both directions.  The Amtrak train crossed over from Track 1 to Track 2 to clear for an eastbound train on Track 1 (which started moving before the collision).

I doubt that the dispatcher said anything like "slow down" or "proceed with caution".  They are usually much more precise in what they say, to prevent any misunderstandings.  (S)he might have told them to proceed at Restricted Speed, but more likely just informed them that they would be crossing over at Englewood (a courtesy remark, since the signals would have told them that anyway), and would have expected them to be governed by the timetable speed for the crossover and by signal indication for proper speed beyond the crossover.

[jjtrains]

"Federal investigator Robert Sumwalt said the speed limit on the stretch of track where Friday's accident occured was 15 miles per hour.

Sumwalt says the Amtrak train was going 40 miles per hour when the engineer saw the freight train and applied his brakes. He says the Amtrak train was going about 35 miles per hour when the crash occurred."

(Source: http://www.wzzm13.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=84462)

It seems that this would confirm that NTSB has already determined that the signal governing Pere Marquette was displaying proceed at restricted, not approach, speed. 

And, if so, this would appear to be a repeat of:

 

"NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT

PB2001-916304

NTSB/RAR-01/04

REAR-END COLLISION OF NATIONAL RAILROAD

PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK) TRAIN P286

WITH CSXT FREIGHT TRAIN Q620 ON THE CSX

RAILROAD AT SYRACUSE, NEW YORK

FEBRUARY 5, 2001

http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2001/RAR0104.pdf

Accident Synopsis

At about 11:40 a.m., eastern standard time, on February 5, 2001, eastbound

Amtrak train 286, with 100 passengers and 4 crewmembers, struck the rear of eastbound

CSX Transportation (CSXT) freight train Q620 on the CSXT Railroad near Syracuse,

New York. On impact, the lead Amtrak locomotive unit and four of the train.s five cars

derailed. The rear truck of the last car of the 92-car CSXT freight train derailed, and the

car lost a portion of its load of lumber. At the time of impact, the passenger train was

traveling 35 mph; the freight train was traveling 7 mph. The accident resulted in injuries to

all 4 crewmembers and 58 of the passengers aboard the Amtrak train. No CSXT

crewmember was injured. A small amount of diesel fuel spilled from the fuel tank on the

lead Amtrak locomotive unit, but no fire resulted. Total damages were estimated to be

about $280,600.

 ***

According to the signal computer memory log, signal 6E at the time Amtrak train

286 approached displayed a .solid,. or steady, red light over a solid yellow light. The solid

red-over-yellow aspect of this signal display is called restricting, and indicates to the

engineer that he is to proceed at restricted speed. (See table 1.) During postaccident

interviews, the engineer stated that when he saw signal 6E, he believed it displayed a solid

red light over a flashing yellow light, indicating medium approach. This signal aspect

would have required him to not exceed 30 mph and be prepared to stop at the next signal

(which was about 2.7 miles past the interlocking, at milepost [MP] 288). According to

locomotive event recorder data, the train went past signal 6E at about 28 mph.

***

According to the signal computer memory log, signal 6E at the time Amtrak train

286 approached displayed a .solid,. or steady, red light over a solid yellow light. The solid

red-over-yellow aspect of this signal display is called restricting, and indicates to the

engineer that he is to proceed at restricted speed. (See table 1.) During postaccident

interviews, the engineer stated that when he saw signal 6E, he believed it displayed a solid

red light over a flashing yellow light, indicating medium approach. This signal aspect

would have required him to not exceed 30 mph and be prepared to stop at the next signal

(which was about 2.7 miles past the interlocking, at milepost [MP] 288). According to

locomotive event recorder data, the train went past signal 6E at about 28 mph."

 

 

The NTSB in 1995 identified what might be a simple solution to these repeat errors:

(http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/1995/R95_40.pdf):

"The Safety Board also determined that other railroads either do not use a restricted proceed signal indication or have stopped using it after experiencing several rear-end collisions. For example, CSX Transportation used restricted proceed from 1989 to 1992 and on January 4, 1993 changed to a stop and proceed signal indication after experiencing several rear-end collisions?  Other railroads have replaced the restricted proceed with a stop and proceed signal indication, which requires that an engineer bring his train to a stop before entering the track area controlled by the signal. The companys have found that using the stop and proceed signal serves to enhance the engineers awareness of the train's location, the circumstances of the signal indication, and create an environment in which his response to the unexpected would be improved.  The FRA has advised the Safety Board that it is aware of only four major class 1 carriers using the restricted proceed signal indication such as BN did before this accident: Illiiois Central Railroad Company, Kansas City Southem Railway Company, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, and Soo Line (CP Rail System Heavy Haul-US).  Based on the circumstances of this accident, the Safety Board concludes that the use of the restricted proceed signal indication may he a less safe operating practice than use of a stop and proceed signal indication and should not be used in general applications to control train movement. However, the Safety Board is aware that under certain applications, such as requiring a heavy tonnage train to stop on a grade, the elimination of the restricted proceed signal indication could present unreasonable operating difficulties."

 

 

 

 

 

[CShaveRR]

JJ, a misunderstanding about "Restricted Proceed" would not have entered into this.  The signal at Englewood would have been a Restricting signal (red over yellow), permitting the train to proceed without stopping.  Since this was a home signal at an interlocking, a Restricted Proceed indication (still shown in NORAC rules pertaining to NS) would have been impossible.  The indication would have been STOP.  The Englewood control point is, as was stated previously, controlled by Metra, so I doubt that the NS dispatcher could authorize a movement beyond the stop signal.

[jeaton]

Not knowing the meaning of every signal arrangement used by the railroads, the discussion of the red over yellow "restricted speed" aspect adds some light to my ideas about the accident.

I am not going to get into who might be at fault, but I have to go along with the NTSB's suggestion that the signal can be misunderstood.  Consider that in a single aspect signal, yellow usually means that the block controled by that signal is unoccupied, but it orders a reduction in speed and also indicates that the following block may be occupied.  Accordingly, the engineer must be prepared to stop at the following signal. 

Of course, I understand that a double aspect or triple aspect signal is most often a "positive" signal meaning that red over red, or red over red over red will mean stop and don't proceed.  That complicates the process when such signals are a home signal for an interlocking plant.  There needs to be a proceed aspect using a green or yellow to let the train through the interlocking while at the same time provide an indication of the occupancy status of the block that the signal governs.  There is a partial solution to that problem in that a signal can be located a short distance past the limit of the interlocking to to indicate the status of the block it governs. 

 

[Chris30]

Quote from NTSB report:

Investigators confirmed that a signal at the crossover in Englewood, 1.7 miles south of the crash site, showed what's called a restrictive red over yellow light signal, meaning the train should have been going less than 15 miles an hour.

Now I'm scratching my head and I'm a little confused. So, according to the NTSB report the last signal was 1.7 miles (@8,900 ft.) behind the stopped freight that was struck by the Amtrak train and the signal aspect was red over yellow restrictive diverging for an occupied block?? My understanding is that yellow leads to red, not to a stopped train. We know that the stopped freight that was rear-ended was approximately twenty cars in lenght and that it was stopped at a signal. So, figure the block lenght to be @eleven-thousand feet, or just over two miles. Add to this the slight left-hand curve (westbound (direction north)) and the congestion of a nearby freight yard that reduced visibility. I'm thinking, guessing, whatever that the signal at Englewood should have been all red for Amtrak 325 requiring the passenger train to come to a complete stop and wait for the requested route/block to become unoccupied. Only after the freight train ahead had restarted and cleared the plant that it had stopped at should Amtrak 325 have been given a red over yellow restricted diverging signal to follow at 15 mph, or less. Of course, the signal aspect doesn't change the fact the Amtrak engineer didn't follow the restricted speed set by the restrictive signal.

Any thoughts on this??

CC

[wabash1]

Quote from NTSB report:

Investigators confirmed that a signal at the crossover in Englewood, 1.7 miles south of the crash site, showed what's called a restrictive red over yellow light signal, meaning the train should have been going less than 15 miles an hour.

Now I'm scratching my head and I'm a little confused. So, according to the NTSB report the last signal was 1.7 miles (@8,900 ft.) behind the stopped freight that was struck by the Amtrak train and the signal aspect was red over yellow restrictive diverging for an occupied block?? My understanding is that yellow leads to red, not to a stopped train. We know that the stopped freight that was rear-ended was approximately twenty cars in lenght and that it was stopped at a signal. So, figure the block lenght to be @eleven-thousand feet, or just over two miles. Add to this the slight left-hand curve (westbound (direction north)) and the congestion of a nearby freight yard that reduced visibility. I'm thinking, guessing, whatever that the signal at Englewood should have been all red for Amtrak 325 requiring the passenger train to come to a complete stop and wait for the requested route/block to become unoccupied. Only after the freight train ahead had restarted and cleared the plant that it had stopped at should Amtrak 325 have been given a red over yellow restricted diverging signal to follow at 15 mph, or less. Of course, the signal aspect doesn't change the fact the Amtrak engineer didn't follow the restricted speed set by the restrictive signal.

Any thoughts on this??

CC

You must think differantly about stack trains. they say its 20 cars. and this is true but 1 car may be 5 articulated cars and this train is probley much longer than you are thinking, on the ns we count each group as 1 some groups are 3 some are 5 some are 4, there is no way of telling with out the paperwork  how long the ns train is. a 2 mile block is not uncommon,  the crew on amtrak screwed up, and i can almost bet the crew on the ns train felt the slack adjust...

[karldotcom]

Well, I am not sure what is accurate in the above, but on Metrolink here in LA they have a lunar signal, which is sometimes used to put two trains into one siding.....usually a long siding that can fit two trains.  Even sometimes one freight is dead, they will put a passenger train in behind it, let a train pass, then back it out and send it on its way.  Very rare but have heard it done.

Now this case sounds like permission was given to proceed after stopping for a red, restricted speed, train ahead.

You arent going to need black box as this will be recorded and should be written down on the track warrant in the cab.

 

[chefjavier]

What type of signal was use?

http://www.cordovastation.ca/refrence/signals.htm

 

[eolafan]

This morning the Chicago Tribune and WGN radio both reported that the feds have concluded the engineer at the Amtrak throttle was "speeding" and was not abiding by the red over yellow signal which (according to the reports) restricted the Amtrak train to 15 mph and he was actually doing approx. 40 or 25 mph over his restriced speed limit.  More to come I am sure.

[Anonymous]

What exactly is known about the people in the cab?  I have heard there were five, including a student engineer.  Who was running the engine, and what was the purpose of the others?

[DMUinCT]

  Please,

   I am sure the NTSB is not talking to the press.  They will gather all the data, including sending the "Black Box" to Washington.   They will check and compair ALL recordings.  They will interview all with knoledge of the accident.  They will look at all work rules.

Then, and only then, will they make public there Full Report. 

 As a friend who serves on the board e-mailed me,  "I really have no idea what happened and won't know until the Preliminary Investigation is finished.  I learned long ago to pay little attention to the media for correctness." 

[CShaveRR]

I think that people who know and are familiar with railroads are qualified to offer opinions on what may have happened, and that you're more likely to get straight information from them than you are from newspapers that have to appeal to the general public, and either have an inaccurate interpretation of the facts presented to them, or feel that the public just won't understand.

Bucyrus, the NTSB reports that there were only two people in the cab:  the engineer, and the deadheading engineer (who may have been totally unaware of what was going on--not his fault).

Having said all of that, I think that, starting with Jay's comment on the last page, we're probably getting to the crux of the matter.  You have an engineer who was called from the Chicago extra board and brought out to New Buffalo to relieve the engineer who'd brought the train from Grand Rapids that far before his Hours of Service expired.  The relieving engineer has to be familiar with, and qualified on, all routes running out of Chicago--and there are a lot of them, far more than anywhere else.  You're talking rules for all six of the major railroads, with all of their subtle differences.

The Restricting signal the engineer encountered (oh, all right--probably encountered) at Engelwood was red-over-yellow.  On each of the other five railroads, and also on Amtrak's own trackage in Chicago, Restricting signals have lunar white somewhere in their aspects.  On most of these other railroads, Red-over-yellow is Medium Approach or Diverging Approach, at least around Chicago.  Suppose this engineer came on the red-over-yellow at Englewood and thought "Diverging Approach"?  He would have gone through the interlocking at the prescribed speed (10 m.p.h.), then brought his speed back up to 40 m.p.h., prepared to stop at the next signal (which would have been CP518).  That's precisely what the instructions for a Diverging Approach call for!  He wouldn't have expected a train between him and that signal.  But on NS, and only NS (in this area), red-over-yellow is Restricting, and meant that there likely was a train ahead.

So yes, the engineer was at fault--I think we all realized that from the NTSB's statements.  But why did it happen to begin with?  Anyone else think that NS should start using Lunar signals to avoid future occurrances?

[wabash1]

I think that people who know and are familiar with railroads arequalified to offer opinions on what may have happened, and that you're more likely to get straight information from them than you are from newspapers that have to appeal to the general public, and either have an inaccurate interpretation of the facts presented to them, or feel that the public just won't understand.

Bucyrus, the NTSB reports that there were only two people in the cab:  the engineer, and the deadheading engineer (who may have been totally unaware of what was going on--not his fault).

Having said all of that, I think that, starting with Jay's comment on the last page, we're probably getting to the crux of the matter.  You have an engineer who was called from the Chicago extra board and brought out to New Buffalo to relieve the engineer who'd brought the train from Grand Rapids that far before his Hours of Service expired.  The relieving engineer has to be familiar with, and qualified on, all routes running out of Chicago--and there are a lot of them, far more than anywhere else.  You're talking rules for all six of the major railroads, with all of their subtle differences.

The Restricting signal the engineer encountered (oh, all right--probably encountered) at Engelwood was red-over-yellow.  On each of the other five railroads, and also on Amtrak's own trackage in Chicago, Restricting signals have lunar white somewhere in their aspects.  On most of these other railroads, Red-over-yellow is Approach Medium or a Diverging Approach for most of the other railroads around Chicago.  Suppose this engineer came on the red-over-yellow at Englewood and thought "Diverging Approach"?  He would have gone through the interlocking at the prescribed speed (10 m.p.h.), then brought his speed back up to 40 m.p.h. prepared to stop at the next signal (which would have been CP518).  That's precisely what the instructions for a Diverging Approach call for!  He wouldn't have expected a train between him and that signal.  But on NS, and only NS (in this area), red-over-yellow is Restricting, and meant that there likely was a train ahead.

Anyone else think that NS should start using Lunar signals to avoid future occurrances?

diverging approach on the ns is not 40mph  its 30 mph , also im taking it that this is a dwarf signal . and with that it would have at least 3 differant meanings on the ns also. you haft to be qualified to run and that means signals also, lunar white NO.

[CShaveRR]

Yes, Wabash, Medium Speed (or slow speed) are defined on railroads that use indications with those words in them.  But, if this engineer thought he had a Diverging Approach (I know, not thinking NS), the speed is specified--30 mph on BNSF, 40 on CN, CP, or UP.  Medium Approach has a defined speed of 30 on Amtrak as well.

The signal encountered at Englewood is a high signal, on a bridge.

[jeffhergert]

Flashing Red also works (UP) for Restricting.  Is that acceptable?

Jeff

[Anonymous]

Thanks Carl.  The news media must have gotten confused with their claim of five people seriously injured while occupying the cab; student engineer, trainer, etc.  Also, I agree that there is nothig wrong with informed speculation with events such as this.  It carries no official weight and won't compromise the objectivity of the official investigators.  It is only they who are not free to speculate publicly.  But privately, I am sure that even they speculate to explore every conceivable scenario. 

[tomwazy]

 

    Chris

  The Amtrak was operating on ex Conrail (nee PRR) trackage at the time,governed by NORAC rules. NORAC signals convey track condition and speed as opposed to track condition and direction,ie diverging. I have worked in this territory for many years as a Conrail engineer. Only knowing what I read,it appears the Amtrak engineer used restricted speed to cross over and through the limits of the interlocking,but then for some reason,increased speed afterwards. The speed should have been mainted at or below 15mph looking out for any of a number of reasons for the restrictive signal.The block he was entering is well over 3 miles in length and curvy in nature. As an engineer,if I am operating on a restrictine signal,and have a limited line of sight,I would be certain to be able to stop in an extremely short distance.  

 

[tomwazy]

 

   That signal is goverened under NORAC rules. A restricting signal does not convey route,only track condition and speed. The Amtrak could have received that same signal and not been lined to diverge. Those who use the term "NS operating rules" have to differeniate as to which operating rules apply to a given territory as there are two different rules applied. All ex Conrail territory,on which this incident occurred,is NORAC rules.

[Murphy Siding]

     Given this accident, and that fact that there is more and more traffic on everybody's rails, maybe this would be a good time to consider having all the railroads use a uniform type of signaling?

[CShaveRR]

    Chris

  The Amtrak was operating on ex Conrail (nee PRR) trackage at the time,governed by NORAC rules. NORAC signals convey track condition and speed as opposed to track condition and direction,ie diverging. I have worked in this territory for many years as a Conrail engineer. Only knowing what I read,it appears the Amtrak engineer used restricted speed to cross over and through the limits of the interlocking,but then for some reason,increased speed afterwards. The speed should have been mainted at or below 15mph looking out for any of a number of reasons for the restrictive signal.The block he was entering is well over 3 miles in length and curvy in nature. As an engineer,if I am operating on a restrictine signal,and have a limited line of sight,I would be certain to be able to stop in an extremely short distance.  

You're basically agreeing with me, Tom.  You're absolutely correct in what the engineer should have done under NORAC rules.  But those rules are the only ones I can find in my CORA book in which a yellow light in the aspect doesn't assure one of an unobstructed block to the next signal.  He apparently was going under a general (though incorrect) idea of the authority he had--I don't believe that he realized that his signal was a Restricting.  I don't think he was being inattentive, as it sounds like he braked as soon as the train ahead (obscured by the curve and trains on adjacent tracks) became visible to him.