Baltimore has it now..
Website:\ webcast:
http://wjz.com/
I saw it on wgn news out of chicago.hope everyone heals quickly.
stay safe
joe
Deshler Ohio-crossroads of the B&O Matt eats your fries.YUM! Clinton st viaduct undefeated against too tall trucks!!!(voted to be called the "Clinton St. can opener").
benburch wrote:Isn't that Chicago Belt Railway there?
The accident occurred inside the NS 47th/51st Street intermodal rail terminal yard.
Krazykat112079 wrote: benburch wrote:Isn't that Chicago Belt Railway there?The accident occurred inside the NS 47th/51st Street intermodal rail terminal yard.
"We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo Possum "We have met the anemone... and he is Russ." Bucky Katt "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." Niels Bohr, Nobel laureate in physics
Here we go again ! ! New Flash, without checking facts ! ! !
ABC News reports an Amtrak train struck the back of a "Conrail" freight. The Amtrak Engine appears to be on top of a "Box Car" in the freight train.
Don U. TCA 73-5735
Remember if you hear it on the news it is probably wrong.
The AP said it was a "red box car". They did get the color of that container right anyhow.
George
Gotta remember those reporting the news are not railfans and will not have all the facts straight, particularly at the beginning of an accident such as this.
ed
I watched the coverage on the live internet feed from ABC Channel 7 for about 2 hours (even after the broadcast went back to the normal programming). They talked about signalling and the helicopter panned up and down the tracks behind the train trying to find the last signal tower. They were never able to spot it. In all the pictures they showed I can easily see why the engineer might not have the brakes sooner. Coming around that small dog leg, I'll bet from the cab it looked like the stopped train was on the adjacent track.
Some of the views showed a train on the third track too. A double stack. When I saw it the end was almost even with the one that got hit. It might have been a factor in the "view" the engineer had also.
The P42 engine involved in the wreck was #8...the very same locomotive was leading No. 6 when I saw it on November 4th with the GrandLuxe cars...and wasn't this the same lead engine on the Crescent that hit that woman's car in October? When I saw it on the 4th, I was suprised that it looked so good...man, it sure doesn't now. Looks like the nose will have to be replaced and lots more.
Hope everyone is okay and things don't get delayed too much. Hope #8 is repairable.
Your friendly neighborhood CNW fan.
conrailman wrote:Could Amtrak sue the NS railroad over this wreck?
They could try, but unless they could convince someone that the NS train was backing up-good luck.
jeaton wrote:The AP and Crain's are reporting that the 5 injured are Amtrak employees that were on the engine. Curious.
The Trains Newswire reports that 3 Amtrak employees were in the engine cab. Unconfirmed, but the Newswire reporter notes that the second and third persons in the cab may have been a roadmaster and engineer trainee.
....Is it known which train really was at fault....?
Quentin
The camera you mentioned is owned by NS, but is tied in with the Chicago Police Department system. I believe that it was confirmed that the camera caught the wreck. Don't know what that will tell anyone (unless the NS train had been backing up).
Remember the thread we had on communivcations-based train control, or Positive Train Control? Would have been mighty handy here!
Three Superliner cars remained upright and on the rails, but sustained a bit of haphazard rearrangement of seating, based on reports. Most people sent to hospitals have been released.
I'm not sure whether this wreck was far enough north to affect Metra's Southwest Service (apparently not--Metra's website shows no service delays). If it was not, there may be a usable detour via the former C&WI to Pullman Junction and the BRC to South Chicago, if everyone cooperates.
TV footage an hour or so ago showed four sidebooms (like Hulcher uses), two on each side of the locomotive, reportedly "stabilizing" the unit.
The term "human error" covers a multitude of things that could have gone wrong, and I'd bet that the final cause, or at least exacerbating factors, will be covered under that large umbrella. Crew fatigue is unlikely in this case--I've seen elsewhere that this was a "dog-catch" crew that boarded the train at New Buffalo. Reports have indicated that four people were in the cab; one could have been the deadheading engineer.
Carl
Railroader Emeritus (practiced railroading for 46 years--and in 2010 I finally got it right!)
CAACSCOCOM--I don't want to behave improperly, so I just won't behave at all. (SM)
Krazykat112079 wrote:Who owns the tracks there? They ran up the back end of an intermodal in what ABC is calling it a transfer yard.
Once again, CSX
chefjavier wrote: Once again, CSX
Looks like someone has it out for CSX. Need some facts before blaming a company that didn't even occur on its rails. And for the record, it happened on the NS
http://www.youtube.com/user/pavabo
http://www.flickr.com/photos/paulvbox
Tom
COAST LINE FOREVER
It is better to dwell in the corner of a roof than to share a house with a contentious woman! (Solomon)
A contentious woman is like a constant dripping! (Solomon)
That security video is wild....I wasnt aware it was that violent an impact.
http://www.trainfoamers.com/phorum2/read.php?10,29111
My train videos - http://www.youtube.com/user/karldotcom
Straight from amtrak's site (bold emphasis is mine):
Train 371, the Pere Marquette - Service Disruption Near Chicago
November 30, 2007 7:30 pm CDT
Amtrak is working with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and other agencies following a collision involving Amtrak Train 371, the Pere Marquette, of Friday, November 30, with a Norfolk Southern (NS) freight train on NS tracks south of Chicago.
There were 187 passengers and six employees on board the Amtrak train. Most passengers and crew members were unhurt and were later transported to Amtrak Chicago Union Station and on to their destinations. Amtrak will work through the weekend, if needed, to care for affected passengers and employees. Two Amtrak employees were among the most seriously injured.
Amtrak service has resumed over this route between Chicago and points east, including Michigan, subject to some delays in the affected area. The only significant service disruption on Saturday, December 1, is the operation of Train 371, which will be represented by chartered motorcoaches for the full route south and west from Grand Rapids to Chicago.
Passengers should call 800-USA-RAIL or visit Amtrak.com for specific information and train status updates.
This information is correct as of the date and time above and will be updated as needed.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
karldotcom wrote: That security video is wild....I wasnt aware it was that violent an impact.http://www.trainfoamers.com/phorum2/read.php?10,29111
Too bad you have to be a member to access it.
try:
http://www.rfdi.info/amtrak.wmv
I saw that on the news when I got home last night, it was really strange for me watching it because Friday I finished my First Responder training for work and the last thing we went over in class was MCIs (Multiple-Casualty Incidents) and the Triage system and im standing there watching TV like "Holy crap I know what there doing!"
It could have been alot worse, Im glad it wasnt
Dutchrailnut wrote: try:http://www.rfdi.info/amtrak.wmv
This link worked for me...it may just be my perception from the video, but the Chicago Tribune reproted this morning that the Amtrak train was doing max 15 mph when he went into emergency and it seemed to be doing more than 15 in the video, perhaps it was just the poor nature of the video or something.
eolafan wrote: Dutchrailnut wrote: try:http://www.rfdi.info/amtrak.wmvThis link worked for me...it may just be my perception from the video, but the Chicago Tribune reproted this morning that the Amtrak train was doing max 15 mph when he went into emergency and it seemed to be doing more than 15 in the video, perhaps it was just the poor nature of the video or something.
I also watch the video this morning and I notice the blind spot from the left train. It may be going 15mph in a slighty curve yard but because,the train were moving each side it may even see it coming to last moment. I guest this a mistake of the dispacther. Does anyone have another opinion?
chefjavier wrote: eolafan wrote: Dutchrailnut wrote: try:http://www.rfdi.info/amtrak.wmvThis link worked for me...it may just be my perception from the video, but the Chicago Tribune reproted this morning that the Amtrak train was doing max 15 mph when he went into emergency and it seemed to be doing more than 15 in the video, perhaps it was just the poor nature of the video or something.I also watch the video this morning and I notice the blind spot from the left train. It may be going 15mph in a slighty curve yard but because,the train were moving each side it may even see it coming to last moment. I guest this a mistake of the dispacther. Does anyone have another opinion?
You can throw all the opinions and trash you want out here, 1st off it was a NS train not a csx train that this amtrak train ran into, 2nd if I remeber right it was CN trackage. No the NS train was not backing up it was stopped. I wont go into detail about other factors such as amtraks speeding, signals and other things . just wait til the investigation is done,
First, I just want to say how amazing that it is to have video of this - and so soon.
Based on what I've seen and heard/read it looks like the NS Dispatcher crossed the Amtrak passenger train over from one track to the next with instructions to follow the freight train that it hit at restricted speed. I'm guessing at this point that both the NS dispatcher and the Amtrak train crew were expecting the freight train to have restarted and proceed sooner than it did. This could be a classic case of the Amtrak engineer "riding the yellows" (expecting the red stop signal to change to yellow restricted at the very moment that they pass the signal aspect except that the signal stays red and it's too late to stop). The television news coverage shows a bunch of empty tracks and you wonder why the engineer didn't see the train ahead. The security camera video shows a much better perspective of an active rail yard with a t least three different moving trains. The Amtrak train came around the slight left hand turn and couldn't see the stopped freight train ahead until it was too late because of traffic on other tracks that blinded their view. The security video could prove to be incriminating for the Amtrak engineer and assistant engineer.
I was impressed with the amount of damage done to the underside of the engine and that the fuel tanks/diesel fuel didn't catch on fire (reports say they did leak, but didn't rupture). Also, the three passenger cars remained upright and any damage looks minor. With the exception of the train crews injuries, most of the injured weren't seriously hurt.
CC
When one receives a restricting signal, one proceeds prepared to stop. It's all on the crews' shoulders. One never knows what one might encounter on a restricting signal and one must operate accordingly.
wabash1 wrote: chefjavier wrote: eolafan wrote: Dutchrailnut wrote: try:http://www.rfdi.info/amtrak.wmvThis link worked for me...it may just be my perception from the video, but the Chicago Tribune reproted this morning that the Amtrak train was doing max 15 mph when he went into emergency and it seemed to be doing more than 15 in the video, perhaps it was just the poor nature of the video or something.I also watch the video this morning and I notice the blind spot from the left train. It may be going 15mph in a slighty curve yard but because,the train were moving each side it may even see it coming to last moment. I guest this a mistake of the dispacther. Does anyone have another opinion? You can throw all the opinions and trash you want out here, 1st off it was a NS train not a csx train that this amtrak train ran into, 2nd if I remeber right it was CN trackage. No the NS train was not backing up it was stopped. I wont go into detail about other factors such as amtraks speeding, signals and other things . just wait til the investigation is done, You should check your information before posting on the forum.
You should check your information before posting on the forum.
Looking at the video and the clock on the screen, it took about 5 seconds for the entire train to enter the picture. The length of 3 Superliners and a P42 is 325 feet which means that the train was moving at a speed of 65 feet per second, 3900 feet per minute or about 44.3 MPH.
If I have it right, that compares to the guess of the passenger who said 15 to 20 MPH. I am not too surprised at the difference. Unless a person had experience checking speeds, the perspective from the upper level of a Superliner is is going to cause the perceived speed to be less than the actual speed.
jeaton wrote: Looking at the video and the clock on the screen, it took about 5 seconds for the entire train to enter the picture. The length of 3 Superliners and a P42 is 325 feet which means that the train was moving at a speed of 65 feet per second, 3900 feet per minute or about 44.3 MPH.If I have it right, that compares to the guess of the passenger who said 15 to 20 MPH. I am not too surprised at the difference. Unless a person had experience checking speeds, the perspective from the upper level of a Superliner is is going to cause the perceived speed to be less than the actual speed.
Not to burst your bubble but I think you may be going to aggresive with the speed.
Just heard on the news that the train loco was so damaged they might not be able to recober the black box.
Chico
OldBNfan wrote:Local news here in Kalamazoo reported..., that the train was headed directly into the sunlight (potentially obstructing their forward view).
The train was heading directly north.
That's very good detective work, jeaton. I read it as 6 seconds for the Amtrak train to travel its length before the collision. I agree with your figure of 325 feet. Therefore, I deduce an average of 37 mph while the train was moving for the camera. If it were braking, then it would have been travelling faster than 37 mph when it first entered the field of view.
www.CurtRenz.com
Centaur wrote: jeaton wrote: Looking at the video and the clock on the screen, it took about 5 seconds for the entire train to enter the picture. The length of 3 Superliners and a P42 is 325 feet which means that the train was moving at a speed of 65 feet per second, 3900 feet per minute or about 44.3 MPH.If I have it right, that compares to the guess of the passenger who said 15 to 20 MPH. I am not too surprised at the difference. Unless a person had experience checking speeds, the perspective from the upper level of a Superliner is is going to cause the perceived speed to be less than the actual speed.That's very good detective work, jeaton. I read it as 6 seconds for the Amtrak train to travel its length before the collision. I'm not an expert, so I'll accept your figure for the length of the train. Therefore, I deduce an average of 37 mph while the train was moving for the camera. If it were braking, then it would have been travelling faster than 37 mph when it first entered the field of view.
That's very good detective work, jeaton. I read it as 6 seconds for the Amtrak train to travel its length before the collision. I'm not an expert, so I'll accept your figure for the length of the train. Therefore, I deduce an average of 37 mph while the train was moving for the camera. If it were braking, then it would have been travelling faster than 37 mph when it first entered the field of view.
Where do you get your calculations.. Keep in mind you have emergency breaking active.
chefjavier wrote: Centaur wrote: jeaton wrote: Looking at the video and the clock on the screen, it took about 5 seconds for the entire train to enter the picture. The length of 3 Superliners and a P42 is 325 feet which means that the train was moving at a speed of 65 feet per second, 3900 feet per minute or about 44.3 MPH.If I have it right, that compares to the guess of the passenger who said 15 to 20 MPH. I am not too surprised at the difference. Unless a person had experience checking speeds, the perspective from the upper level of a Superliner is is going to cause the perceived speed to be less than the actual speed.That's very good detective work, jeaton. I read it as 6 seconds for the Amtrak train to travel its length before the collision. I'm not an expert, so I'll accept your figure for the length of the train. Therefore, I deduce an average of 37 mph while the train was moving for the camera. If it were braking, then it would have been travelling faster than 37 mph when it first entered the field of view. Where do you get your calculations.. Keep in mind you have emergency breaking active.
As I previously stated, chefjavier, my figure is an estimate of the average speed while the train was moving in front of the camera. As I also said, if the train were braking it would have been travelling faster than that average when it first it entered the field of view. Naturally, that implies that if it were indeed braking, it would have been moving slower than that average immediately before the collision. The question is whether it was proper for the train to have been moving around 37 mph at any time while in that rail yard.
The 325 ft length given by jeaton appears accurate. The three passenger cars are each 85 ft and the engine is 70 ft. I suppose some more length could be added between cars, but that would not change the estimated speed by much. Of course, my reading of 6 seconds is imprecise, but it's close enough to get a ballpark estimate of the average speed.
325 ft / 6 sec x 3600 sec/hr / 5280 ft/mi = 37 mi/hr
Dutchrailnut wrote:not according the passengers, no braking was felt till just before crash.
There was contradictory testimony from witnesses on that matter. Some reported braking and some did not.
Centaur wrote: chefjavier wrote: Centaur wrote: jeaton wrote: Looking at the video and the clock on the screen, it took about 5 seconds for the entire train to enter the picture. The length of 3 Superliners and a P42 is 325 feet which means that the train was moving at a speed of 65 feet per second, 3900 feet per minute or about 44.3 MPH.If I have it right, that compares to the guess of the passenger who said 15 to 20 MPH. I am not too surprised at the difference. Unless a person had experience checking speeds, the perspective from the upper level of a Superliner is is going to cause the perceived speed to be less than the actual speed.That's very good detective work, jeaton. I read it as 6 seconds for the Amtrak train to travel its length before the collision. I'm not an expert, so I'll accept your figure for the length of the train. Therefore, I deduce an average of 37 mph while the train was moving for the camera. If it were braking, then it would have been travelling faster than 37 mph when it first entered the field of view. Where do you get your calculations.. Keep in mind you have emergency breaking active. As I previously stated, chefjavier, my figure is an estimate of the average speed while the train was moving in front of the camera. As I also said, if the train were braking it would have been travelling faster than that average when it first it entered the field of view. Naturally, that implies that if it were indeed braking, it would have been moving slower than that average immediately before the collision. The question is whether it was proper for the train to have been moving around 37 mph at any time while in that rail yard. The 325 ft length given by jeaton appears accurate. The three passenger cars are each 85 ft and the engine is 70 ft. I suppose some more length could be added between cars, but that would not change the estimated speed by much. Of course, my reading of 6 seconds is imprecise, but it's close enough to get a ballpark estimate of the average speed.325 ft / 6 sec x 3600 sec/hr / 5280 ft/mi = 37 mi/hr
You got your facts straight but we need to wait for the NTSB to tell us what inspired those crucial seconds before impact. Do you think Amtrak locomotives have cameras install in their cab?
Centaur wrote: Dutchrailnut wrote:not according the passengers, no braking was felt till just before crash.There was contradictory testimony from witnesses on that matter. Some reported braking and some did not.
As a fairly frequent rider on Superliners, I can understand that passengers might give mixed reports on the question of braking. The sound made by applied brakes is isolated, so it mostly depends on a person's sensitivity to decceleration.
Since it is still an educated guess, I am OK with 6 seconds on the elapsed time. It just gives us an idea of the speed and of course, doesn't answer why the train was moving at that speed. If the black box doesn't have it, the NTSB collision specialists will probably be able to figure it from the damage.
Jay
WLS Channel 7 ABC Television in Chicago had an update report on its late evening news broadcast (around 11 p.m. Saturday following the Missouri v Oklahoma football game). NTSB spokesman was shown stating that the Amtrak engineer has confirmed 40 mph speed going into the slight curve, then applying full emergency and impacting at 33-35 mph. So, if signal and/or dispatcher instruction was for "restricted" speed, wouldn't this be a plain violation, possibly on account of a mistake in signal recognition confusing Restricting (R/Y) for an Approach (Y/R)?
"The Amtrak train's engineer told investigators that after he switched tracks as instructed by a dispatcher, he accelerated to 40 mph; when he saw the freight train, he applied his brakes and hit the stationary train at between 33-35 mph, Sumwalt said. It took 9 seconds from the moment the engineer hit the brakes and the collision with the freight train, the NTSB official said."
***
"The Chicago Tribune reported Saturday that a dispatcher in Michigan told the Amtrak train to slow down, prepare to switch tracks and proceed with caution as it approached Chicago's Union Station. The train's crew did as it was told, but still slammed into the freight train about a mile later. The Amtrak train applied its emergency brakes as it approached the freight train, but wasn't able to stop before the impact, the newspaper said."
Source: http://cbs2chicago.com/local/amtrak.crash.investigation.2.600105.html
So, do we know what the signal (at 63rd Street?) was actually displaying and if the dispatcher used the word "proceed with caution" as reported, does that mean "restricted" or "approach?"
Below is a portion of the most recent related article on the Chicago Tribune's website.
NTSB Vice Chairman Robert Sumwalt said officials were on a "fact-finding" mission Saturday to determine why the Amtrak train from Grand Rapids, Mich.-minutes from its Union Station destination-rear-ended the 20-car Norfolk Southern freight train that had stopped on the same tracks. The Amtrak train was traveling about 35 m.p.h. at the point of impact, officials said.Sumwalt said the Amtrak train had slowed to 9 to 10 m.p.h. as it passed through a track intersection in Englewood, switching from one set of tracks to another to pass a standing train, according to information culled from the event recorder. After the Amtrak train passed, it began to accelerate to 40 m.p.h. The speed limit for a passenger train in that area is 79 m.p.h.The train barely reached 40 m.p.h. when the engineer saw the freight train and "put the train into emergency breaking." The distance from the Englewood interlocking to the point of impact was 1.7 miles and took 4 minutes to travel.About 9 seconds passed from the point where the engineer applied the Amtrak train's brakes to the point of impact, in which it rode up on the back of a freight train car.Track signals were tested and appeared to be working, but officials will not know how they operated leading up to the crash until they recover the event recorder in the signals, Sumwalt said.
For the full article, click: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-trainsdec02,0,7175642.story?coll=chi_tab01_layout
jjtrains wrote: "The Amtrak train's engineer told investigators that after he switched tracks as instructed by a dispatcher, he accelerated to 40 mph; when he saw the freight train, he applied his brakes and hit the stationary train at between 33-35 mph, Sumwalt said. It took 9 seconds from the moment the engineer hit the brakes and the collision with the freight train, the NTSB official said."***"The Chicago Tribune reported Saturday that a dispatcher in Michigan told the Amtrak train to slow down, prepare to switch tracks and proceed with caution as it approached Chicago's Union Station. The train's crew did as it was told, but still slammed into the freight train about a mile later. The Amtrak train applied its emergency brakes as it approached the freight train, but wasn't able to stop before the impact, the newspaper said." Source: http://cbs2chicago.com/local/amtrak.crash.investigation.2.600105.htmlSo, do we know what the signal (at 63rd Street?) was actually displaying and if the dispatcher used the word "proceed with caution" as reported, does that mean "restricted" or "approach?"
Good question. If that quote is accurate, it has to indicate some unusual conditions. If the track from the interlocking to the point of collision is governed by signals-either CTC or block-then the signals indicate the maximum authorized speed. I am not a rules expert, but I think that if there is a condition where signals would not protect a stretch of track, then the dispatcher would have to issue a warrant or order that would include a speed order if the train was to proceed at something less than normal maximum track speed.
That is a busy piece of railroad and I would guess that the running tracks in that area are signaled for movement in either direction. If not, and the train was operating north on track only signaled for southbound movement, I'd figure that the maximum would be "restricted speed".
Needless to say, I await the report of the NTSB with interest.
It seems your theory is right on the ball park. Good guest.
Last signal he/she saw was the signal at crossover, the train took crossovers at 10 mph but then accelerated to 40 mph ??????
My Theory the fairly new engineer thought the restricted speed applied to interlocking only. while it governs to next favorable signal.
A case of premature acceleration.
I love the headline about the engineer following directions. His engine followed the rails, that's what happened!
And skidded? Not too likely, especially not in good weather.
I guess the NTSB is dumbing things down for public consumption, or perhaps this is some over-dramatizing, under-informed journalist's interpretation of accurate facts presented.
Time to go to the fridge and hide some perishable evidence!
The FRA did not release this report and any dumbing down of facts can be atributed to CBS.
The NTSB released some of these findings but its media that puts it as a story.
Sorry--I'll correct that.
Oh--for the record, the speed limit is 70, not 79, m.p.h. Makes little difference in this case, since their limit was 15 in the best of conditions and visibility.
jeaton wrote: jjtrains wrote: "The Amtrak train's engineer told investigators that after he switched tracks as instructed by a dispatcher, he accelerated to 40 mph; when he saw the freight train, he applied his brakes and hit the stationary train at between 33-35 mph, Sumwalt said. It took 9 seconds from the moment the engineer hit the brakes and the collision with the freight train, the NTSB official said." ***"The Chicago Tribune reported Saturday that a dispatcher in Michigan told the Amtrak train to slow down, prepare to switch tracks and proceed with caution as it approached Chicago's Union Station. The train's crew did as it was told, but still slammed into the freight train about a mile later. The Amtrak train applied its emergency brakes as it approached the freight train, but wasn't able to stop before the impact, the newspaper said." Source: http://cbs2chicago.com/local/amtrak.crash.investigation.2.600105.htmlSo, do we know what the signal (at 63rd Street?) was actually displaying and if the dispatcher used the word "proceed with caution" as reported, does that mean "restricted" or "approach?" Good question. If that quote is accurate, it has to indicate some unusual conditions. If the track from the interlocking to the point of collision is governed by signals-either CTC or block-then the signals indicate the maximum authorized speed. I am not a rules expert, but I think that if there is a condition where signals would not protect a stretch of track, then the dispatcher would have to issue a warrant or order that would include a speed order if the train was to proceed at something less than normal maximum track speed. That is a busy piece of railroad and I would guess that the running tracks in that area are signaled for movement in either direction. If not, and the train was operating north on track only signaled for southbound movement, I'd figure that the maximum would be "restricted speed".Needless to say, I await the report of the NTSB with interest.
jjtrains wrote: "The Amtrak train's engineer told investigators that after he switched tracks as instructed by a dispatcher, he accelerated to 40 mph; when he saw the freight train, he applied his brakes and hit the stationary train at between 33-35 mph, Sumwalt said. It took 9 seconds from the moment the engineer hit the brakes and the collision with the freight train, the NTSB official said." ***"The Chicago Tribune reported Saturday that a dispatcher in Michigan told the Amtrak train to slow down, prepare to switch tracks and proceed with caution as it approached Chicago's Union Station. The train's crew did as it was told, but still slammed into the freight train about a mile later. The Amtrak train applied its emergency brakes as it approached the freight train, but wasn't able to stop before the impact, the newspaper said." Source: http://cbs2chicago.com/local/amtrak.crash.investigation.2.600105.htmlSo, do we know what the signal (at 63rd Street?) was actually displaying and if the dispatcher used the word "proceed with caution" as reported, does that mean "restricted" or "approach?"
I believe the signal at Englewood displayed a Restricting indication. This is assuming that my track diagram is correct and that there were no other signals between the control point (which is, by the way, controlled by Metra) and the accident site (and also assumes that signals were working properly, as is stated by the NTSB report). Speed should, as has been pointed out, never have been increased beyond 15 m.p.h., if that high.
This is Rule 261 Terrtory (NORAC rules)--Track signaled in both directions. The Amtrak train crossed over from Track 1 to Track 2 to clear for an eastbound train on Track 1 (which started moving before the collision).
I doubt that the dispatcher said anything like "slow down" or "proceed with caution". They are usually much more precise in what they say, to prevent any misunderstandings. (S)he might have told them to proceed at Restricted Speed, but more likely just informed them that they would be crossing over at Englewood (a courtesy remark, since the signals would have told them that anyway), and would have expected them to be governed by the timetable speed for the crossover and by signal indication for proper speed beyond the crossover.
"Federal investigator Robert Sumwalt said the speed limit on the stretch of track where Friday's accident occured was 15 miles per hour.
Sumwalt says the Amtrak train was going 40 miles per hour when the engineer saw the freight train and applied his brakes. He says the Amtrak train was going about 35 miles per hour when the crash occurred."
(Source: http://www.wzzm13.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=84462)
It seems that this would confirm that NTSB has already determined that the signal governing Pere Marquette was displaying proceed at restricted, not approach, speed.
And, if so, this would appear to be a repeat of:
RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT
PB2001-916304
NTSB/RAR-01/04
REAR-END COLLISION OF NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK) TRAIN P286
WITH CSXT FREIGHT TRAIN Q620 ON THE CSX
RAILROAD AT SYRACUSE, NEW YORK
FEBRUARY 5, 2001
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2001/RAR0104.pdf
Accident Synopsis
At about 11:40 a.m., eastern standard time, on February 5, 2001, eastbound
Amtrak train 286, with 100 passengers and 4 crewmembers, struck the rear of eastbound
CSX Transportation (CSXT) freight train Q620 on the CSXT Railroad near Syracuse,
New York. On impact, the lead Amtrak locomotive unit and four of the train.s five cars
derailed. The rear truck of the last car of the 92-car CSXT freight train derailed, and the
car lost a portion of its load of lumber. At the time of impact, the passenger train was
traveling 35 mph; the freight train was traveling 7 mph. The accident resulted in injuries to
all 4 crewmembers and 58 of the passengers aboard the Amtrak train. No CSXT
crewmember was injured. A small amount of diesel fuel spilled from the fuel tank on the
lead Amtrak locomotive unit, but no fire resulted. Total damages were estimated to be
about $280,600.
According to the signal computer memory log, signal 6E at the time Amtrak train
286 approached displayed a .solid,. or steady, red light over a solid yellow light. The solid
red-over-yellow aspect of this signal display is called restricting, and indicates to the
engineer that he is to proceed at restricted speed. (See table 1.) During postaccident
interviews, the engineer stated that when he saw signal 6E, he believed it displayed a solid
red light over a flashing yellow light, indicating medium approach. This signal aspect
would have required him to not exceed 30 mph and be prepared to stop at the next signal
(which was about 2.7 miles past the interlocking, at milepost [MP] 288). According to
locomotive event recorder data, the train went past signal 6E at about 28 mph.
locomotive event recorder data, the train went past signal 6E at about 28 mph."
The NTSB in 1995 identified what might be a simple solution to these repeat errors:
(http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/1995/R95_40.pdf):
"The Safety Board also determined that other railroads either do not use a restricted proceed signal indication or have stopped using it after experiencing several rear-end collisions. For example, CSX Transportation used restricted proceed from 1989 to 1992 and on January 4, 1993 changed to a stop and proceed signal indication after experiencing several rear-end collisions? Other railroads have replaced the restricted proceed with a stop and proceed signal indication, which requires that an engineer bring his train to a stop before entering the track area controlled by the signal. The companys have found that using the stop and proceed signal serves to enhance the engineers awareness of the train's location, the circumstances of the signal indication, and create an environment in which his response to the unexpected would be improved. The FRA has advised the Safety Board that it is aware of only four major class 1 carriers using the restricted proceed signal indication such as BN did before this accident: Illiiois Central Railroad Company, Kansas City Southem Railway Company, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, and Soo Line (CP Rail System Heavy Haul-US). Based on the circumstances of this accident, the Safety Board concludes that the use of the restricted proceed signal indication may he a less safe operating practice than use of a stop and proceed signal indication and should not be used in general applications to control train movement. However, the Safety Board is aware that under certain applications, such as requiring a heavy tonnage train to stop on a grade, the elimination of the restricted proceed signal indication could present unreasonable operating difficulties."
Not knowing the meaning of every signal arrangement used by the railroads, the discussion of the red over yellow "restricted speed" aspect adds some light to my ideas about the accident.
I am not going to get into who might be at fault, but I have to go along with the NTSB's suggestion that the signal can be misunderstood. Consider that in a single aspect signal, yellow usually means that the block controled by that signal is unoccupied, but it orders a reduction in speed and also indicates that the following block may be occupied. Accordingly, the engineer must be prepared to stop at the following signal.
Of course, I understand that a double aspect or triple aspect signal is most often a "positive" signal meaning that red over red, or red over red over red will mean stop and don't proceed. That complicates the process when such signals are a home signal for an interlocking plant. There needs to be a proceed aspect using a green or yellow to let the train through the interlocking while at the same time provide an indication of the occupancy status of the block that the signal governs. There is a partial solution to that problem in that a signal can be located a short distance past the limit of the interlocking to to indicate the status of the block it governs.
Quote from NTSB report:
Investigators confirmed that a signal at the crossover in Englewood, 1.7 miles south of the crash site, showed what's called a restrictive red over yellow light signal, meaning the train should have been going less than 15 miles an hour.
Now I'm scratching my head and I'm a little confused. So, according to the NTSB report the last signal was 1.7 miles (@8,900 ft.) behind the stopped freight that was struck by the Amtrak train and the signal aspect was red over yellow restrictive diverging for an occupied block?? My understanding is that yellow leads to red, not to a stopped train. We know that the stopped freight that was rear-ended was approximately twenty cars in lenght and that it was stopped at a signal. So, figure the block lenght to be @eleven-thousand feet, or just over two miles. Add to this the slight left-hand curve (westbound (direction north)) and the congestion of a nearby freight yard that reduced visibility. I'm thinking, guessing, whatever that the signal at Englewood should have been all red for Amtrak 325 requiring the passenger train to come to a complete stop and wait for the requested route/block to become unoccupied. Only after the freight train ahead had restarted and cleared the plant that it had stopped at should Amtrak 325 have been given a red over yellow restricted diverging signal to follow at 15 mph, or less. Of course, the signal aspect doesn't change the fact the Amtrak engineer didn't follow the restricted speed set by the restrictive signal.
Any thoughts on this??
Chris30 wrote: Quote from NTSB report:Investigators confirmed that a signal at the crossover in Englewood, 1.7 miles south of the crash site, showed what's called a restrictive red over yellow light signal, meaning the train should have been going less than 15 miles an hour. Now I'm scratching my head and I'm a little confused. So, according to the NTSB report the last signal was 1.7 miles (@8,900 ft.) behind the stopped freight that was struck by the Amtrak train and the signal aspect was red over yellow restrictive diverging for an occupied block?? My understanding is that yellow leads to red, not to a stopped train. We know that the stopped freight that was rear-ended was approximately twenty cars in lenght and that it was stopped at a signal. So, figure the block lenght to be @eleven-thousand feet, or just over two miles. Add to this the slight left-hand curve (westbound (direction north)) and the congestion of a nearby freight yard that reduced visibility. I'm thinking, guessing, whatever that the signal at Englewood should have been all red for Amtrak 325 requiring the passenger train to come to a complete stop and wait for the requested route/block to become unoccupied. Only after the freight train ahead had restarted and cleared the plant that it had stopped at should Amtrak 325 have been given a red over yellow restricted diverging signal to follow at 15 mph, or less. Of course, the signal aspect doesn't change the fact the Amtrak engineer didn't follow the restricted speed set by the restrictive signal.Any thoughts on this??CC
You must think differantly about stack trains. they say its 20 cars. and this is true but 1 car may be 5 articulated cars and this train is probley much longer than you are thinking, on the ns we count each group as 1 some groups are 3 some are 5 some are 4, there is no way of telling with out the paperwork how long the ns train is. a 2 mile block is not uncommon, the crew on amtrak screwed up, and i can almost bet the crew on the ns train felt the slack adjust...
Well, I am not sure what is accurate in the above, but on Metrolink here in LA they have a lunar signal, which is sometimes used to put two trains into one siding.....usually a long siding that can fit two trains. Even sometimes one freight is dead, they will put a passenger train in behind it, let a train pass, then back it out and send it on its way. Very rare but have heard it done.
Now this case sounds like permission was given to proceed after stopping for a red, restricted speed, train ahead.
You arent going to need black box as this will be recorded and should be written down on the track warrant in the cab.
What type of signal was use?
http://www.cordovastation.ca/refrence/signals.htm
Please,
I am sure the NTSB is not talking to the press. They will gather all the data, including sending the "Black Box" to Washington. They will check and compair ALL recordings. They will interview all with knoledge of the accident. They will look at all work rules.
Then, and only then, will they make public there Full Report.
As a friend who serves on the board e-mailed me, "I really have no idea what happened and won't know until the Preliminary Investigation is finished. I learned long ago to pay little attention to the media for correctness."
I think that people who know and are familiar with railroads are qualified to offer opinions on what may have happened, and that you're more likely to get straight information from them than you are from newspapers that have to appeal to the general public, and either have an inaccurate interpretation of the facts presented to them, or feel that the public just won't understand.
Bucyrus, the NTSB reports that there were only two people in the cab: the engineer, and the deadheading engineer (who may have been totally unaware of what was going on--not his fault).
Having said all of that, I think that, starting with Jay's comment on the last page, we're probably getting to the crux of the matter. You have an engineer who was called from the Chicago extra board and brought out to New Buffalo to relieve the engineer who'd brought the train from Grand Rapids that far before his Hours of Service expired. The relieving engineer has to be familiar with, and qualified on, all routes running out of Chicago--and there are a lot of them, far more than anywhere else. You're talking rules for all six of the major railroads, with all of their subtle differences.
The Restricting signal the engineer encountered (oh, all right--probably encountered) at Engelwood was red-over-yellow. On each of the other five railroads, and also on Amtrak's own trackage in Chicago, Restricting signals have lunar white somewhere in their aspects. On most of these other railroads, Red-over-yellow is Medium Approach or Diverging Approach, at least around Chicago. Suppose this engineer came on the red-over-yellow at Englewood and thought "Diverging Approach"? He would have gone through the interlocking at the prescribed speed (10 m.p.h.), then brought his speed back up to 40 m.p.h., prepared to stop at the next signal (which would have been CP518). That's precisely what the instructions for a Diverging Approach call for! He wouldn't have expected a train between him and that signal. But on NS, and only NS (in this area), red-over-yellow is Restricting, and meant that there likely was a train ahead.
So yes, the engineer was at fault--I think we all realized that from the NTSB's statements. But why did it happen to begin with? Anyone else think that NS should start using Lunar signals to avoid future occurrances?
CShaveRR wrote: I think that people who know and are familiar with railroads arequalified to offer opinions on what may have happened, and that you're more likely to get straight information from them than you are from newspapers that have to appeal to the general public, and either have an inaccurate interpretation of the facts presented to them, or feel that the public just won't understand.Bucyrus, the NTSB reports that there were only two people in the cab: the engineer, and the deadheading engineer (who may have been totally unaware of what was going on--not his fault).Having said all of that, I think that, starting with Jay's comment on the last page, we're probably getting to the crux of the matter. You have an engineer who was called from the Chicago extra board and brought out to New Buffalo to relieve the engineer who'd brought the train from Grand Rapids that far before his Hours of Service expired. The relieving engineer has to be familiar with, and qualified on, all routes running out of Chicago--and there are a lot of them, far more than anywhere else. You're talking rules for all six of the major railroads, with all of their subtle differences.The Restricting signal the engineer encountered (oh, all right--probably encountered) at Engelwood was red-over-yellow. On each of the other five railroads, and also on Amtrak's own trackage in Chicago, Restricting signals have lunar white somewhere in their aspects. On most of these other railroads, Red-over-yellow is Approach Medium or a Diverging Approach for most of the other railroads around Chicago. Suppose this engineer came on the red-over-yellow at Englewood and thought "Diverging Approach"? He would have gone through the interlocking at the prescribed speed (10 m.p.h.), then brought his speed back up to 40 m.p.h. prepared to stop at the next signal (which would have been CP518). That's precisely what the instructions for a Diverging Approach call for! He wouldn't have expected a train between him and that signal. But on NS, and only NS (in this area), red-over-yellow is Restricting, and meant that there likely was a train ahead.Anyone else think that NS should start using Lunar signals to avoid future occurrances?
I think that people who know and are familiar with railroads arequalified to offer opinions on what may have happened, and that you're more likely to get straight information from them than you are from newspapers that have to appeal to the general public, and either have an inaccurate interpretation of the facts presented to them, or feel that the public just won't understand.
The Restricting signal the engineer encountered (oh, all right--probably encountered) at Engelwood was red-over-yellow. On each of the other five railroads, and also on Amtrak's own trackage in Chicago, Restricting signals have lunar white somewhere in their aspects. On most of these other railroads, Red-over-yellow is Approach Medium or a Diverging Approach for most of the other railroads around Chicago. Suppose this engineer came on the red-over-yellow at Englewood and thought "Diverging Approach"? He would have gone through the interlocking at the prescribed speed (10 m.p.h.), then brought his speed back up to 40 m.p.h. prepared to stop at the next signal (which would have been CP518). That's precisely what the instructions for a Diverging Approach call for! He wouldn't have expected a train between him and that signal. But on NS, and only NS (in this area), red-over-yellow is Restricting, and meant that there likely was a train ahead.
Anyone else think that NS should start using Lunar signals to avoid future occurrances?
diverging approach on the ns is not 40mph its 30 mph , also im taking it that this is a dwarf signal . and with that it would have at least 3 differant meanings on the ns also. you haft to be qualified to run and that means signals also, lunar white NO.
Yes, Wabash, Medium Speed (or slow speed) are defined on railroads that use indications with those words in them. But, if this engineer thought he had a Diverging Approach (I know, not thinking NS), the speed is specified--30 mph on BNSF, 40 on CN, CP, or UP. Medium Approach has a defined speed of 30 on Amtrak as well.
The signal encountered at Englewood is a high signal, on a bridge.
Flashing Red also works (UP) for Restricting. Is that acceptable?
Jeff
Chris
The Amtrak was operating on ex Conrail (nee PRR) trackage at the time,governed by NORAC rules. NORAC signals convey track condition and speed as opposed to track condition and direction,ie diverging. I have worked in this territory for many years as a Conrail engineer. Only knowing what I read,it appears the Amtrak engineer used restricted speed to cross over and through the limits of the interlocking,but then for some reason,increased speed afterwards. The speed should have been mainted at or below 15mph looking out for any of a number of reasons for the restrictive signal.The block he was entering is well over 3 miles in length and curvy in nature. As an engineer,if I am operating on a restrictine signal,and have a limited line of sight,I would be certain to be able to stop in an extremely short distance.
That signal is goverened under NORAC rules. A restricting signal does not convey route,only track condition and speed. The Amtrak could have received that same signal and not been lined to diverge. Those who use the term "NS operating rules" have to differeniate as to which operating rules apply to a given territory as there are two different rules applied. All ex Conrail territory,on which this incident occurred,is NORAC rules.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
tomwazy wrote: Chris The Amtrak was operating on ex Conrail (nee PRR) trackage at the time,governed by NORAC rules. NORAC signals convey track condition and speed as opposed to track condition and direction,ie diverging. I have worked in this territory for many years as a Conrail engineer. Only knowing what I read,it appears the Amtrak engineer used restricted speed to cross over and through the limits of the interlocking,but then for some reason,increased speed afterwards. The speed should have been mainted at or below 15mph looking out for any of a number of reasons for the restrictive signal.The block he was entering is well over 3 miles in length and curvy in nature. As an engineer,if I am operating on a restrictine signal,and have a limited line of sight,I would be certain to be able to stop in an extremely short distance.
You're basically agreeing with me, Tom. You're absolutely correct in what the engineer should have done under NORAC rules. But those rules are the only ones I can find in my CORA book in which a yellow light in the aspect doesn't assure one of an unobstructed block to the next signal. He apparently was going under a general (though incorrect) idea of the authority he had--I don't believe that he realized that his signal was a Restricting. I don't think he was being inattentive, as it sounds like he braked as soon as the train ahead (obscured by the curve and trains on adjacent tracks) became visible to him.
I guess he could have mistook (and I am assuming the signal displayed was a restricting,which has not fully been determinded,regardless of current statements by all involved) for a more favorable aspect,I'm just spectulating on what I have read. I think I read that the train operated at less than the 15 mph required past the the signal and through the limits of the interlocking,then accelerated. A question I would ask is..Was the train previously stopped at Englewood,then accelerated after receiving a signal? (that would account for the slower speed through the interlocking as it would take time to accelerate,thereby not giving a clue as to what signal that was belived to have been seen. On the other hand,if the train slowed from a faster speed to the speed reported as passing the signal,then accelerated again,that seems to imply interpreting the signal as one that says decrease speed.If that was the case,I would not think he misinterpreted the signal.
pic here: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22070473/
karldotcom wrote: Well, I am not sure what is accurate in the above, but on Metrolink here in LA they have a lunar signal, which is sometimes used to put two trains into one siding.....usually a long siding that can fit two trains. Even sometimes one freight is dead, they will put a passenger train in behind it, let a train pass, then back it out and send it on its way. Very rare but have heard it done.Now this case sounds like permission was given to proceed after stopping for a red, restricted speed, train ahead.You arent going to need black box as this will be recorded and should be written down on the track warrant in the cab.
what does a track warrent haft to do with it? track warrents are used on main line movements outside of yard limits, i would think this is yard limits . and permission is never written on track warrents, its a verble recorded over the radio, and one last thing ( the guys in chicago can answer this) isnt that area ctc?
CShaveRR wrote: Yes, Wabash, Medium Speed (or slow speed) are defined on railroads that use indications with those words in them. But, if this engineer thought he had a Diverging Approach (I know, not thinking NS), the speed is specified--30 mph on BNSF, 40 on CN, CP, or UP. Medium Approach has a defined speed of 30 on Amtrak as well.The signal encountered at Englewood is a high signal, on a bridge.
I have read the rest of the post now before replying, I agree that the signal was misunderstood. in that it was human error, but to change all the signal systems because of this is wrong, You are trained on the trackage you run on, and that includes signals ( as you know) there is conductors out there working the same jobs who can't tell you what the signal aspect is much less the meaning, these also are your future engineers. How long has this student engineer been working this line why was the lead engineer not paying attention? these wont be answered anytime soon, I work the old southern side of the ns, i have looked at and even run on trackage of the old n&w side, Not knowing the signal mast or the territory I can give a good guess on what it indicated, Like what was stated in the past post there can be as many as 3 meanings for that signal i can think of, as well as differant meanings for slow speed medium speed , this is why i have no problem with the southern railway signals red yellow and green.
red= stop or if number plate restricting
yellow = approach
green = go.
real simple, time table tells your speeds to run . But i still say no lunar white the light blends in to other lights in some areas makes it hard to see. flashing red works just go slow and make sure its not connected to another train.
wabash1 wrote: CShaveRR wrote: Yes, Wabash, Medium Speed (or slow speed) are defined on railroads that use indications with those words in them. But, if this engineer thought he had a Diverging Approach (I know, not thinking NS), the speed is specified--30 mph on BNSF, 40 on CN, CP, or UP. Medium Approach has a defined speed of 30 on Amtrak as well.The signal encountered at Englewood is a high signal, on a bridge.I have read the rest of the post now before replying, I agree that the signal was misunderstood. in that it was human error, but to change all the signal systems because of this is wrong, You are trained on the trackage you run on, and that includes signals ( as you know) there is conductors out there working the same jobs who can't tell you what the signal aspect is much less the meaning, these also are your future engineers. How long has this student engineer been working this line why was the lead engineer not paying attention? these wont be answered anytime soon, I work the old southern side of the ns, i have looked at and even run on trackage of the old n&w side, Not knowing the signal mast or the territory I can give a good guess on what it indicated, Like what was stated in the past post there can be as many as 3 meanings for that signal i can think of, as well as differant meanings for slow speed medium speed , this is why i have no problem with the southern railway signals red yellow and green. red= stop or if number plate restrictingyellow = approachgreen = go. real simple, time table tells your speeds to run . But i still say no lunar white the light blends in to other lights in some areas makes it hard to see. flashing red works just go slow and make sure its not connected to another train.
In my opinion we should have one signal system just like we one standard gauge track. It doesn't take a Ph.D to figure that out.
The paranoiacs at railroad.net wasted little time locking their thread on this crash. Surprise surprise.
motor
Without a timetable this thread is nothing but pure speculation. Without, NORAC rules, system special instructions, general orders, and other related paperwork for this train, this thread is nothin but pure speculation. Without having the timetable of this area no one, no one, can determine what the speed should have been, the media to get that right I highly doubt it. This signal could have a different meaning than the one that previous posters have given it, NORAC rules are God' words until they are amended by system special instructions, system general orders, or division general orders, or track warrants. (yes you will have track warrants in CTC and yard limits, you must have track warrants for every piece of mainline track you run on, the BNSF calls them general track bulletins).
Until someone says yes, this piece of track is CTC and the speed through here, and these are the conditions in this area, this thread is meaningless.
I see that the lawyers are already feeding on this. Somebody is suing both Amtrak and NS. Why NS, other than they have big money? All they did was be there. Hopefully it will be thrown PDQ.
grampaw pettibone wrote: I see that the lawyers are already feeding on this. Somebody is suing both Amtrak and NS. Why NS, other than they have big money? All they did was be there. Hopefully it will be thrown PDQ.
NS owns the tracks and they are responsible. Amtrak only pays for "trackage rights".
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mUF19acPBZA&feature=related
Check this video on a control crash in the rear of a standing freight. Look at the engine jump. Our friend is right with theory of speed.
youngengineer wrote: Without a timetable this thread is nothing but pure speculation. Without, NORAC rules, system special instructions, general orders, and other related paperwork for this train, this thread is nothin but pure speculation. Without having the timetable of this area no one, no one, can determine what the speed should have been, the media to get that right I highly doubt it. This signal could have a different meaning than the one that previous posters have given it, NORAC rules are God' words until they are amended by system special instructions, system general orders, or division general orders, or track warrants. (yes you will have track warrants in CTC and yard limits, you must have track warrants for every piece of mainline track you run on, the BNSF calls them general track bulletins). Until someone says yes, this piece of track is CTC and the speed through here, and these are the conditions in this area, this thread is meaningless.
YoungEngineer, if you look very carefully at what I wrote, you will find all of that information. The territory is NORAC Rule 261--that's CTC to most of the rest of us. Timetable speed through here is 70 (not 79, as the news reports are saying). NS's definition of Restricted Speed says you stop short (half the range of vision) and don't exceed 15 m.p.h.
I don't have a NS timetable. But as an employee of another Chicago-area railroad, I do have all of the documentation and instructions and definitions I need to make statements such as I've made about the NS, its trackage, and its signals in the area.
Now, is there anything else you'd like to know?
chefjavier wrote: grampaw pettibone wrote: I see that the lawyers are already feeding on this. Somebody is suing both Amtrak and NS. Why NS, other than they have big money? All they did was be there. Hopefully it will be thrown PDQ.NS owns the tracks and they are responsible. Amtrak only pays for "trackage rights".
No. That's not the deal that Amtrak has with the frt carriers. Amtrak carries all the liability for their trains and passengers when operated over the frt roads.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
ChuckHawkins wrote:For the amateurs among us, would somebody please clarify an issue. The statement that the aspect was red over yellow appeared in the thread, and that NORAC rules apply. What specifically was the indication? I assume Rule 286, but don't feel very confident about it.
Looking through my copy of NORAC, I believe it's rule 290 (Restricted), not 286 (Medium Approach). Rule 286 aspects almost all appear to have at least one light flashing - but that does raise another possibility for misinterpretation.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
CShaveRR wrote: youngengineer wrote: Without a timetable this thread is nothing but pure speculation. Without, NORAC rules, system special instructions, general orders, and other related paperwork for this train, this thread is nothin but pure speculation. Without having the timetable of this area no one, no one, can determine what the speed should have been, the media to get that right I highly doubt it. This signal could have a different meaning than the one that previous posters have given it, NORAC rules are God' words until they are amended by system special instructions, system general orders, or division general orders, or track warrants. (yes you will have track warrants in CTC and yard limits, you must have track warrants for every piece of mainline track you run on, the BNSF calls them general track bulletins). Until someone says yes, this piece of track is CTC and the speed through here, and these are the conditions in this area, this thread is meaningless.YoungEngineer, if you look very varefully at what I wrote, you will find all of that information. The territory is NORAC Rule 261--that's CTC to most of the rest of us. Timetable speed through here is 70 (not 79, as the news reports are saying). NS's definition of Restricted speed says you stop short (half the range of vision) and don't exceed 15 m.p.h.I don't have a NS timetable. But as an employee of another Chicago-area railroad, I do have all of the documentation and instructions and definitions I need to make statements such as I've made about the NS, its trackage, and its signals in the area. Now, is there anything else you'd like to know?
YoungEngineer, if you look very varefully at what I wrote, you will find all of that information. The territory is NORAC Rule 261--that's CTC to most of the rest of us. Timetable speed through here is 70 (not 79, as the news reports are saying). NS's definition of Restricted speed says you stop short (half the range of vision) and don't exceed 15 m.p.h.
Sorry Carl I guess I did kinda pass over what you had said, and what I said was not really meant for you, rather those making specualtion about what should have been, or could have been without, having experience with the specific rules for this area. I would still like to know if there are any territory specific instructions for this part of the NS, specifically the signal that was passed.
I do find it strange that they would use red over yellow as a restricting signal, but than again for those who havent worked west Im sure we have some strange rules and signals also.
Again sorry for what wasn' t meant as a mean spirited post, just a post to ask for clarity, calmness and less speculation of what might have happened based on media reports.
While I usually will wait for the NTSB report before commenting extensively on an accident, in this case the NTSB has already released quite a bit of information. There were direct quotes from NTSB Vice Chairman Robert Sumwalt in one of the Chicago papers confirming the signal aspect and the train speed.
as wabash1 stated above, the engineer was exceeding the speed limit, "will we ever know why?"
My guess all along here has been that the engineer interpreted red-over-yellow as a Medium Approach, because that's precisely what his actions indicate he was following. But the only person who knows that for sure is the engineer himself. It may take a while for that to come out.
Speaking of engineers, thanks, YoungEngineer, for your latest post. The information I base my statements on is the CORA (Chicago Operating Rules Association) book of October 1, 2007, which would contain any updates or revisions to timetable/special instructions up to that time. I didn't see anything affecting this particular stretch, and nothing correcting it has been issued to this date.
Here is my disclaimer up front...."not a railroader, nor an expert"
Does anyone know if the signals at Englewood is an old PRR position light signal? or the color lights?
Looking at my CORA book (very old) the PRR type signals have very similar aspects for Medium Approach, Slow Approach and Ristricting. What I am saying does not relieve the engineer of knowing the rules and abiding by them.
Listening in on the scanner chatter I often hear the dispatcher ask a crew if they are "qualified on the ________". This accident gives a whole new meaning as to why that is important. This engineer obviously was qualified and something bad happened regarding the interpratation of the rules.
BTW...what is the responsibility of the off duty engineer in this situation? Can he be punished for the accident?
Excellent discussions...
Color-light signal at Englewood, Ed. Too bad, in a way--a Restricting on a Pennsy position-light signal would have been unmistakable.
As for the deadheading engineer, he's out of the picture completely (IMO), as far as responsibility goes--his hours of service prevented him from operating, so he could have been asleep or whatever (at least that's what I'd be doing!). Talk about a rude awakening!
On the other hand, I can't imagine that if he knew what was going on, that he wouldn't have said something.
I don't know what an Amtrak engineer in his situation (having to be qualified on so many routes) would be required to carry--a CORA book (and they've probably gotten a lot bigger than your version, Ed!) is OK for the area, but it doesn't deal with lines hundreds of miles away from here, which the engineer would have to be qualified on. As I said early on, that's portions of all six major railroads, plus Amtrak's own trackage and some of Metra's as well (the old MILW to Rondout).
jeffhergert wrote: Flashing Red also works (UP) for Restricting. Is that acceptable? Jeff
Sorry I didn't say anything about this sooner, Jeff.
Flashing Red might even be better--Wabash doesn't like Lunar, and if Flashing Red is replacing Lunar in some applications on both BNSF and UP (so I've been told--I saw one on BNSF once), it could probably go universal just as easily. Just get rid of the yellow for anything but an indication meaning that the track to the next signal will be clear.
CShaveRR wrote: As for the deadheading engineer, he's out of the picture completely (IMO), as far as responsibility goes--his hours of service prevented him from operating, so he could have been asleep or whatever (at least that's what I'd be doing!). Talk about a rude awakening!
Not so fast, If person was outlawed he/she had no business in the cab, One rule violation is already that with multiple people in cab the calling of signals in mandatory, how can a outlawed person comply with such rule when he/she is no longer performing service ????
Outlawed crews are constantly being transported in the locomotives. Are you saying that this is against the rules or union agreement?
Carl: I looked at my CORA last night and the restricting indication for the PRR type signals was
--- over \
while the color light is red over yellow, which is also an aspect for Diverging Approach. I understand that the train switched tracks at Englewood. Is it possible the engineer thought the signal meant Diverging Approach rather than Ristricting?
I guess we will not know until he testifies in the hearing. It just goes to show, ya gotta know the territory.
It becomes a conflict when crews (outlawed) are transported in lead locomotives. If you and your Union can live with sucking diesel smoke in a trailing locomotive so be it.
As for the signal , enough excuses, even if this engineer got confused and thought it was a diverging aproach, how come he/she was at 40 mph and accelerating ????
Diverging Aproach is still only medium speed or 30 mph for passenger trains.
Again this person not only was ignorant of signals but on what road they were on, and in my opinion not fit to be running a locomotive.
Not quite correct...the rules require crew members to call signals...deadheading employees are not crew members.
The deadheading engineer is not required to do a thing except stay out of the way.
Because of the nature of their business, Amtrak routinely deadhead employees, engineers and conductors.
Dutchrailnut wrote: CShaveRR wrote: As for the deadheading engineer, he's out of the picture completely (IMO), as far as responsibility goes--his hours of service prevented him from operating, so he could have been asleep or whatever (at least that's what I'd be doing!). Talk about a rude awakening! Not so fast, If person was outlawed he/she had no business in the cab, One rule violation is already that with multiple people in cab the calling of signals in mandatory, how can a outlawed person comply with such rule when he/she is no longer performing service ????
23 17 46 11
Dutchrailnut wrote: It becomes a conflict when crews (outlawed) are transported in lead locomotives. If you and your Union can live with sucking diesel smoke in a trailing locomotive so be it. As for the signal , enough excuses, even if this engineer got confused and thought it was a diverging aproach, how come he/she was at 40 mph and accelerating ????Diverging Aproach is still only medium speed or 30 mph for passenger trains. Again this person not only was ignorant of signals but on what road they were on, and in my opinion not fit to be running a locomotive.
Diverging Approach on BNSF for passenger trains is now 40 mph, this was changed probably 6 months ago, so 40 may not be a rule violation for a diverging approach.
I think this may be more about a single person in the cab of Amtrak, one person to see the signals and one person to interpret the signals. Seems that the engineer became confused and was probably dealing with more than one situation at the time of the accident. There have been many times when I was glad I had a conductor and brakeman in the cab with me.
MP173 wrote: I looked at my CORA last night and the restricting indication for the PRR type signals was --- over \while the color light is red over yellow, which is also an aspect for Diverging Approach. I understand that the train switched tracks at Englewood. Is it possible the engineer thought the signal meant Diverging Approach rather than Ristricting? I guess we will not know until he testifies in the hearing. It just goes to show, ya gotta know the territory.ed
Basically, Ed, the response to your question is what I've been saying all along. The train did cross over at Englewood, and he took the crossovers at prescribed speed. He then went back up to 40, which is all right under the definition of Diverging Approach on some railroads (yes, on others it's 30).
However, I don't show a "Diverging Approach" in the NS' signals. They use "Medium Approach", which would have been red-over-flashing-yellow. This is what the signal would (should) have displayed had the freight train not been there. Another possibility for Medium Approach on the NS page is red/solid yellow/red, but I think you need all three lights for that yellow to be solid in a Medium Approach (potential confusion right there, IMO).
I have to report, though, that I've heard now that there was no deadhead engineer. The second engineer was on board (and got aboard either at New Buffalo or Hammond, depending on the report) to take over should the first engineer outlaw. So they should both have been paying attention, if this was true. Guess we'll need the full investigation after all, to figure out who was doing what, when, and why or why not.
Dutchrailnut wrote: As for the signal , enough excuses, even if this engineer got confused and thought it was a diverging aproach, how come he/she was at 40 mph and accelerating ????Diverging Aproach is still only medium speed or 30 mph for passenger trains. Again this person not only was ignorant of signals but on what road they were on, and in my opinion not fit to be running a locomotive.
That's what I don't get. He was behaving like he had a slow clear, which would be R/R/G on a high color light signal. Restricting would be R/R/Y. Wonder if he got so lost in though getting down to slow speed for the control point that he forgot about the what the signal told him about the track occupancy on the other side.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZWpeU55J3E&NR=1
see why you should ride somewhere in the middle of the train
The Englewood signal is an overhead bridge spanning 3 tracks...two main tracks and a yard track entering the main. There are two signal heads for each track. The signas and the signal bridge were replaced from the old Pennsy posistion style to the current color lights on an alumnium structure.
Under Norac signal rules,which on NS only apply in ex Conrail territory,a red over yellow is "restricting". For it to have been a medium approach,thereby allowing medium speed,it would have had to have been red over flashing yellow on a two head signal.
I have been told the engineer called the signal as "slow approach" over the radio,and that the conductor,who is back in the train,recorded it as such on his/her paperwork. A slow approach conveys a clear block ahead,prepared to stop at the next signal. That would explain to some degree his not looking for a train ahead in his block.
On a slow Approach his/her best speed should have never exceeded 30 mph , so where is excuuse for the 40 mph and accelerating ??
SLOW APPROACH
Proceed prepared to stop at next
signal. Slow Speed applies until entire
train clears switches, then Medium Speed applies.
As for Mr Blysards comment, here is actual Norac rule 94 with no exeption for off duty employees, or statement to effect of crew members only.
94. Responsibilities of Employees: Signals and Restrictions
a. General Requirements
Employees qualified on the operating rules and located on the leading engine or car must be on the lookout for signals affecting the movement of their train. They must communicate to each other in a clear manner the name of each signal as soon as it becomes clearly visible. After the name of a signal has been communicated, employees must observe it until passed. Any change in the signal must be communicated in the required manner.
When a train reaches a point 2 miles from a temporary restriction, employees qualified on physical characteristics and located on the leading engine or car must immediately communicate with the Engineer and confirm the requirements of the restriction.
If a train is not operated in accordance with the requirements of a signal indication or restriction, qualified employees located on the leading engine or car must communicate with the Engineer immediately. If necessary, they must stop the train.
chefjavier wrote: wabash1 wrote: CShaveRR wrote: Yes, Wabash, Medium Speed (or slow speed) are defined on railroads that use indications with those words in them. But, if this engineer thought he had a Diverging Approach (I know, not thinking NS), the speed is specified--30 mph on BNSF, 40 on CN, CP, or UP. Medium Approach has a defined speed of 30 on Amtrak as well.The signal encountered at Englewood is a high signal, on a bridge.I have read the rest of the post now before replying, I agree that the signal was misunderstood. in that it was human error, but to change all the signal systems because of this is wrong, You are trained on the trackage you run on, and that includes signals ( as you know) there is conductors out there working the same jobs who can't tell you what the signal aspect is much less the meaning, these also are your future engineers. How long has this student engineer been working this line why was the lead engineer not paying attention? these wont be answered anytime soon, I work the old southern side of the ns, i have looked at and even run on trackage of the old n&w side, Not knowing the signal mast or the territory I can give a good guess on what it indicated, Like what was stated in the past post there can be as many as 3 meanings for that signal i can think of, as well as differant meanings for slow speed medium speed , this is why i have no problem with the southern railway signals red yellow and green. red= stop or if number plate restrictingyellow = approachgreen = go. real simple, time table tells your speeds to run . But i still say no lunar white the light blends in to other lights in some areas makes it hard to see. flashing red works just go slow and make sure its not connected to another train.In my opinion we should have one signal system just like we one standard gauge track. It doesn't take a Ph.D to figure that out.
Make thousands of engineers memorize new signals for the benefit of a few? How many accidents might that cause during the transition?
"No soup for you!" - Yev Kassem (from Seinfeld)
oltmannd wrote: chefjavier wrote: grampaw pettibone wrote: I see that the lawyers are already feeding on this. Somebody is suing both Amtrak and NS. Why NS, other than they have big money? All they did was be there. Hopefully it will be thrown PDQ.NS owns the tracks and they are responsible. Amtrak only pays for "trackage rights". No. That's not the deal that Amtrak has with the frt carriers. Amtrak carries all the liability for their trains and passengers when operated over the frt roads.
zugmann wrote: Straight from amtrak's site (bold emphasis is mine):Train 371, the Pere Marquette - Service Disruption Near ChicagoNovember 30, 20077:30 pm CDTAmtrak is working with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and other agencies following a collision involving Amtrak Train 371, the Pere Marquette, of Friday, November 30, with a Norfolk Southern (NS) freight train on NS tracks south of Chicago. There were 187 passengers and six employees on board the Amtrak train. Most passengers and crew members were unhurt and were later transported to Amtrak Chicago Union Station and on to their destinations. Amtrak will work through the weekend, if needed, to care for affected passengers and employees. Two Amtrak employees were among the most seriously injured. Amtrak service has resumed over this route between Chicago and points east, including Michigan, subject to some delays in the affected area. The only significant service disruption on Saturday, December 1, is the operation of Train 371, which will be represented by chartered motorcoaches for the full route south and west from Grand Rapids to Chicago.Passengers should call 800-USA-RAIL or visit Amtrak.com for specific information and train status updates.This information is correct as of the date and time above and will be updated as needed.
November 30, 20077:30 pm CDT
http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2Copy/Simple_Copy_Popup&c=am2Copy&cid=1178294090161
chefjavier wrote:Check your information. It was in NS tracks but a CSX train. Check the facts.
Checking the facts is a good idea. Now if only a certain person would do that.
Hi all. Interesting discusion.
I do not have a lot of knolage about signaling here. But I still have one question about that signaling aspect. Why would you let a train run into an ocupied block anyway? What is the reason for that?
To me it would be clear and easy if a block is not empty, or clear, no other train can enter it. This way no accidents like this would happen. I hope.
Georg
georgr wrote: Why would you let a train run into an ocupied block anyway? What is the reason for that? Georg
Basically, to get the train out of the way. Two trains were approaching Englewood on Track 1: Amtrak 371, westbound, and an NS manifest freight, eastbound (the tank cars from this train were visible on the video). So they crossed the Amtrak train over. Just to do that, they had to move it across the control point and into the occupied block. And at that point, the Restricted Speed definition allowed it to proceed slowly (maximum speed 15, but always capable of stopping short, within half the range of vision).
georgr wrote: Hi all. Interesting discusion.I do not have a lot of knolage about signaling here. But I still have one question about that signaling aspect. Why would you let a train run into an ocupied block anyway? What is the reason for that?To me it would be clear and easy if a block is not empty, or clear, no other train can enter it. This way no accidents like this would happen. I hope.Georg
It can let you get a mile or more closer to where you're headed. Or, you might have to fit two trains into a single passing siding, example.
There is currently no automatic enforcement of any signal aspect, even a stop signal at an interlocking. Letting a train run at restricted speed into an occupied block probably isn't any more dangerous than letting a train run by a clear signal at track speed. You're still depending on the man to follow the rules -- and the rules don't allow for collisions....
oltmannd wrote: There is currently no automatic enforcement of any signal aspect
There is currently no automatic enforcement of any signal aspect
spokyone wrote: oltmannd wrote: There is currently no automatic enforcement of any signal aspectI don't understand this statement. Please explain.
You can run a stop signal with a train almost as easily as you can run a red light in your car. Even with cab signal or train stop equipment, all you have to do is acknowledge the signal and you can keep on truckin'. Even with LSL or suppression speed control equipment, you can still operate 15 mph all day long.
Positive train stop is still mostly just a dream for the frt RRs. Some transit operations have it and NJT is has a cab signal based scheme they are working on, and the frt RRs are playing around with various computer/communication based schemes in a very limited way, but that's about it, so far, at least.
Not automatic, as in it still depends on the guy (or gal) at the throttle to do what they are supposed to do with a given aspect.
Most interesting thread, although as a non railroader, the discussion of signal aspects confuses me a bit. Never mind- I will ask the pros I know nearby what y'all mean.
A couple of amateur questions come to mind.
1) The black box on board the locomotive- Does this also have a voice pickup, like the aviation versions do? I know from my own experience that locomotive cabs are noisy- maybe too noisy for a mike to pick up crew conversations. I also know that some railroads have put cameras in the cab which tie into the "black box"- would this Genesis have one of those as well?
2) What exactly happens with a locomotive post crash like this? The NTSB FAA crash crews tend to isolate crashed planes in a hanger for technical evaluation- does the same sort of thing happen here? Who evaluates whether the locomotive is totalled or not? I have visions of a State Farm guy standing there with a clipboard... shaking his head and contemplating whether a deductable applies.
3) Which brings up another question- does AMTRAK carry private insurance for accidents like this, or are they self insured? Given the hullabaloo over the budget... completely replacing a locomotive out of their operations budget would be a fair sized chunk of money- even assuming the manufacturer (EMD or GE?) even makes them anymore...
Thanks for the answers. I'll go back to figuring out what a lunar aspect is on my own.
Hi
Thanks for the clearing of the signalin. It is more understandable now.
To me, I am from Switzerland, makes just not much sense to run into ocupied block. It is not being done here. Sure no rules without exception!
Thanks Georg
GTWEngineer wrote:While I was at work yesterday a co-worker asked me what I thought was going to happen to the engineer . I said Amtrak will probably fire the guy . My co-worker then stated that the engineer was a female engineer who has not been a engineer too long . This is just what I heard . You know how rumors are .
Your Co-worker was patially right, but the Female engineer was the one NOT operating and outlawed.
The Male engineer was operating see:
http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2007/12/amtrak_engineer_was_new_to_job.html
Let's try one more time...
The other engineer was off duty, had hit the hours of service, was deadheading back to his or her home terminal and by law, is forbidden to perform any service for the carrier.
Any service at all, including lining switches, lacing air hoses, or calling signals.
He/she is simply the equal of a piece of baggage, and is being transported back by the company, the same as if he was riding in a crew van or private taxi.
I know about NORAC rule 94, I work under the GCOR, which has the same rule about crew members calling signals, almost word for word.
Please show me, in either NORAC or the GCOR any rule which specifically instructs any deadheading employees to call signals.
And please show me any rule, in either NORAC or GCOR that specifically prevents deadheading employees from riding in the lead locomotive.
There is none, because for all intents, deadheading employees do not exist in terms of operating rules.
Nothing in either rule book instructs a deadheading employee to perform any service to the carrier except ride, and that particular circumstance is not covered by the "rules" but rather by the national union contract, which forces carriers to provide a form of transportation, of the carriers choice, back to the on duty terminal for any T&E employee over the hours of service law who is not going to "work" their way back in service.
There is no rule in either book that prevents a deadheading employee from riding in the cab, in fact, neither book has any specific instructions about where a deadheading employee in passenger service must ride, or can not ride, it simply is not addressed.
You are assuming that a dead heading employee is required by rule to perform service for the carrier.
That is incorrect; they can not, both by union contract and by Federal law.
I suggest you read the hours of service law; it is quite specific about what an off duty employee can, and can not do.
If they are off duty, they may not perform any service for the carrier...including calling signals, period.
For Amtrak, deadheading engineers and conductors on the train, in the cab, is a normal occurrence, it happens ever single day.
I work for a freight railroad, and we routinely deadhead entire 3 man crews back in our locomotive.
I can guarantee you that not a one of them will ever call a signal, line a switch, or in any manner help with the operation of the train, they are forbidden to do so by law.
When we arrive at the terminal, they will detrain, go directly to their automobiles, and leave...they are even forbidden from tying up in the time keeping system as this is service to the carrier.
They have to wait until the next time they are on duty to enter their time claim, call in feedback to the clerks, or perform any service to the carrier.
Unless there was an on duty conductor assigned to that train present in the cab, the rules assign full responsibility for the safe operation of the train to the assigned engineer.
By rule, in the absence of the conductor, the engineer is required to operate the train in a safe manner consistent with the railroads train handling and operating rules.
The presence of a deadheading employee in the cab in no shape, form or fashion alters that.
Dutchrailnut wrote: As for Mr Blysards comment, here is actual Norac rule 94 with no exeption for off duty employees, or statement to effect of crew members only.94. Responsibilities of Employees: Signals and Restrictions a. General Requirements Employees qualified on the operating rules and located on the leading engine or car must be on the lookout for signals affecting the movement of their train. They must communicate to each other in a clear manner the name of each signal as soon as it becomes clearly visible. After the name of a signal has been communicated, employees must observe it until passed. Any change in the signal must be communicated in the required manner. When a train reaches a point 2 miles from a temporary restriction, employees qualified on physical characteristics and located on the leading engine or car must immediately communicate with the Engineer and confirm the requirements of the restriction. If a train is not operated in accordance with the requirements of a signal indication or restriction, qualified employees located on the leading engine or car must communicate with the Engineer immediately. If necessary, they must stop the train.
Let me know which part of following rule you do not understand :
Employees qualified on the operating rules and located on the leading engine or car must be on the lookout for signals affecting the movement of their train
Dutchrailnut wrote: GTWEngineer wrote:While I was at work yesterday a co-worker asked me what I thought was going to happen to the engineer . I said Amtrak will probably fire the guy . My co-worker then stated that the engineer was a female engineer who has not been a engineer too long . This is just what I heard . You know how rumors are . Your Co-worker was patially right, but the Female engineer was the one NOT operating and outlawed. The Male engineer was operating see:http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2007/12/amtrak_engineer_was_new_to_job.html
Ed, I understand the deadheading engineer had no duty to call the signal, monitor the signal or even to remain awake. However, I would think that close to the end of the run she was at least taking some interest in their arrival.
However, if I were in the cab and realized a signal had been missed or misread, I would say something cautionary. It may not be my duty, but I am riding in the cab also. From that I conclude she either did not see it or it was difficult to see correctly. I'm aware that the last few miles of that line are nearly exactly north/south but perhaps there is some factor here that makes difficult visibility at that particular signal? Certainly, I don't know, but it is one of those factors the feds are going to have to eliminate.
Perhaps, just perhaps she was dozing at the time and was not aware of the eminent situation. She certainly would have been entitled to that rest.
quote by: Edblysard
quote by: Dutchrailnut:
Let me know which part of following rule you do not understand :Employees qualified on the operating rules and located on the leading engine or car must be on the lookout for signals affecting the movement of their train.
Employees qualified on the operating rules and located on the leading engine or car must be on the lookout for signals affecting the movement of their train.
Honestly, I couldn't say who is right or wrong... But one thing I do know is that a piece of baggage has never called a signal!
I'm looking forward to finding out how involved the dispatcher(s) were in this acident. There has been some confusion regarding which railroad / dispatcher has authority at this location - NS in Michigan or Metra. I would have to believe that since it's NS owned track it would be a NS dispatcher calling the shots. Anyway, while the dispatcher isn't required to communicate situations like this to a train crew with signal indication being sufficient, I think that this type of situation would have warranted special attention / instructions considering the cargo on the Amtrak train and the congestion in the area: NS DS to Amtrak 321... (after Amtrak 321 respnds) I'm going to line you through CP Englewood two to one to get you around a freight that's eastbound approaching CP Englewood on one. Proceed on signal indication at normal switch speed then restricted speed not to exceed 15mph. I've got a westbound freight holding at CP [whatever the next control point is] so I need you pull up behind that freight and hold. The Amtrak train would then have to repeat those instructions back to the dispatcher that they acknowledge they are going to cross two to one at CP Englewood on signal indication not to exceed 15mph and that they are to hold behind the freight occupying the block.
Darkguy,
I agree...trust me, if I was deadheading and the engineer I was riding with missed a signal, especially in this situation, I would have at the least said something to him...and depending on the environment, maybe even plug the train.
But I would have no obligation to do a thing under the operating rules, in fact, by law, I would be forbidden to do any service to the carrier other than polishing the seat.
People outside the industry tend to confuse the operation rules with laws....they are not the same.
The "RULES", be they NORAC or GCOR, are nothing more that operating procedures, written by and agreed upon by the subscribing railroads, but overseen by the FRA.
The FRA doesn't write the rules, but they are empowered to force subscribing railroads to follow those rules through fines.
They can, and do make recommendations, even setting standards. Often those recommendations and standards are incorporated into the rules, and the FRA can interpret the rules as they see fit, and base new recommendations on that interpretation.
No operation rule may supersede any Federal law, which the hours of service law is.
The FRA can and does and fine railroads which violate the laws, such as the Hours of Service Law, and will fine the employee too if circumstance warrant it.
I did a quick survey at work today, including my local UTU president, several senior conductors and engineers, a trainmaster and a dispatcher, and my railroads Superintendent, (former BN Corridor and Terminal manager) and every one of them said the same thing.
They are all aware of the accident, and the unknown circumstances surrounding it.
Under no circumstance would they expect the deadheading engineer to be calling signals.
All of them offered the same opinion as to why this happened.
The on duty engineer was either confused or not quite certain where he was being routed, and or miss interpreted the last signal, made an assumption about track conditions, and realized his mistake way too late.
All of them correctly pointed out that, if this was yard tracks or a running rail, as opposed to main line, then restricted speed was the max he should have been moving at.
Obviously, he failed to heed that rule.
If this was a main line, the dispatcher should have warned him about the traffic ahead.
Not too many choices about the reasons this happened, considering the NTSB has already stated the last signal was displaying the correct aspect according to the signal computer log.
Chris30 wrote: I'm looking forward to finding out how involved the dispatcher(s) were in this acident. There has been some confusion regarding which railroad / dispatcher has authority at this location - NS in Michigan or Metra. I would have to believe that since it's NS owned track it would be a NS dispatcher calling the shots. Anyway, while the dispatcher isn't required to communicate situations like this to a train crew with signal indication being sufficient, I think that this type of situation would have warranted special attention / instructions considering the cargo on the Amtrak train and the congestion in the area: NS DS to Amtrak 321... (after Amtrak 321 respnds) I'm going to line you through CP Englewood two to one to get you around a freight that's eastbound approaching CP Englewood on one. Proceed on signal indication at normal switch speed then restricted speed not to exceed 15mph. I've got a westbound freight holding at CP [whatever the next control point is] so I need you pull up behind that freight and hold. The Amtrak train would then have to repeat those instructions back to the dispatcher that they acknowledge they are going to cross two to one at CP Englewood on signal indication not to exceed 15mph and that they are to hold behind the freight occupying the block.CC
Not required by the rules on any road I have worked for, not required by CFR 49, not necessary, and in most cases not a good idea, in fact portions of what you think should have been done are a terrible idea. Some dispatching offices have specifically forbidden all or some of the practices you think should have been used as it implies knowledge the dispatcher may not have or does not have, and the information could be used by a crew to modify the signal indication or otherwise disregard the rules. The communication you propose creates opportunities for missed repeats and misinterpretations, which decreases safety, not increase it.
If you want to prevent 99.99% of rear-end collisions like this, install CBTC, ETMS, or ATS. And in fact Metra is doing just that (CBTC overlay).
RWM
Railway Man wrote: Chris30 wrote: I'm looking forward to finding out how involved the dispatcher(s) were in this acident. There has been some confusion regarding which railroad / dispatcher has authority at this location - NS in Michigan or Metra. I would have to believe that since it's NS owned track it would be a NS dispatcher calling the shots. Anyway, while the dispatcher isn't required to communicate situations like this to a train crew with signal indication being sufficient, I think that this type of situation would have warranted special attention / instructions considering the cargo on the Amtrak train and the congestion in the area: NS DS to Amtrak 321... (after Amtrak 321 respnds) I'm going to line you through CP Englewood two to one to get you around a freight that's eastbound approaching CP Englewood on one. Proceed on signal indication at normal switch speed then restricted speed not to exceed 15mph. I've got a westbound freight holding at CP [whatever the next control point is] so I need you pull up behind that freight and hold. The Amtrak train would then have to repeat those instructions back to the dispatcher that they acknowledge they are going to cross two to one at CP Englewood on signal indication not to exceed 15mph and that they are to hold behind the freight occupying the block.CCNot required by the rules on any road I have worked for, not required by CFR 49, not necessary, and in most cases not a good idea, in fact portions of what you think should have been done are a terrible idea. Some dispatching offices have specifically forbidden all or some of the practices you think should have been used as it implies knowledge the dispatcher may not have or does not have, and the information could be used by a crew to modify the signal indication or otherwise disregard the rules. The communication you propose creates opportunities for missed repeats and misinterpretations, which decreases safety, not increase it.If you want to prevent 99.99% of rear-end collisions like this, install CBTC, ETMS, or ATS. And in fact Metra is doing just that (CBTC overlay).RWM
The freight train was southbound on Track 3 near the point where that track ends with switches and crossovers to Tracks 1 and 2. Train movements at that location were controled by positive signals (red is STOP-period). Due to fog, visability was poor. When the freight engineer reached the point where he would have to apply brakes to stop the train at the signal, he was still not able to see the signal lights. Seeking to avoid an unnecessary stop, the engineer radioed the tower operator or dispatcher controlling the switches and signals to ask if he had the signals allowing him to proceed to crossover to track 1. Either the dispatcher or the engineer misunderstood the communication and the engineer thought he had an "OK" to proceed. The signal he was approaching was displaying a STOP indication. When it became visable, it was too late to stop the train at the signal. As a result the train proceeded to a point where the engine was actually setting on Track 2 facing the Northbound passenger train. The passenger train was unable to stop in time and collided with the freight train.
I do not know about the applicable rules of the time, but the NTSB report stated that the engineer must not rely on a radio communication to determine the status of a signal. Rather, engineers must proceed in a manner so that appropriate and timely steps can be taken to comply with the signal aspect. In other words radio communication must not be used to determine the aspect of a signal or the occupancy status of track governed by signals. If such a rule was not in place at the time of the accident, it was probably added to the IC's book.
GCOR has just such a rule, and I believe NORAC has one also.
2.12 Fixed Signal Information
Employees must not use the radio to give information to a train or engine crew about the name, position, aspect, or indication displayed by a fixed signal, unless the information is given between members of the same crew or the information is needed to warn of an emergency.
What I was suggesting was that if the dispatcher was re-routing the Amtrak from its normal route, the dispatcher should have made a call to the train, warning him of traffic ahead.
I understand the signal system there and the aspect of the signals conveys both route and speed, but a simple call from the dispatcher along the lines of "Amtrak number 8, I will cross you over at control point STO 003, proceed at restricted speed looking out for traffic ahead" might have prevented this altogether.
Either way, I would hate to be in that engineers position right now.
jeaton wrote: Railway Man wrote: Chris30 wrote: I'm looking forward to finding out how involved the dispatcher(s) were in this acident. There has been some confusion regarding which railroad / dispatcher has authority at this location - NS in Michigan or Metra. I would have to believe that since it's NS owned track it would be a NS dispatcher calling the shots. Anyway, while the dispatcher isn't required to communicate situations like this to a train crew with signal indication being sufficient, I think that this type of situation would have warranted special attention / instructions considering the cargo on the Amtrak train and the congestion in the area: NS DS to Amtrak 321... (after Amtrak 321 respnds) I'm going to line you through CP Englewood two to one to get you around a freight that's eastbound approaching CP Englewood on one. Proceed on signal indication at normal switch speed then restricted speed not to exceed 15mph. I've got a westbound freight holding at CP [whatever the next control point is] so I need you pull up behind that freight and hold. The Amtrak train would then have to repeat those instructions back to the dispatcher that they acknowledge they are going to cross two to one at CP Englewood on signal indication not to exceed 15mph and that they are to hold behind the freight occupying the block.CCNot required by the rules on any road I have worked for, not required by CFR 49, not necessary, and in most cases not a good idea, in fact portions of what you think should have been done are a terrible idea. Some dispatching offices have specifically forbidden all or some of the practices you think should have been used as it implies knowledge the dispatcher may not have or does not have, and the information could be used by a crew to modify the signal indication or otherwise disregard the rules. The communication you propose creates opportunities for missed repeats and misinterpretations, which decreases safety, not increase it.If you want to prevent 99.99% of rear-end collisions like this, install CBTC, ETMS, or ATS. And in fact Metra is doing just that (CBTC overlay).RWMI am not sure that it is on line, but I recall reading an NTSB report of a collision between an Illinois Central freight and an IC passenger train south of Chicago near Monee, Illinois. The accident occured sometime in the 1960s. The freight train was southbound on Track 3 near the point where that track ends with switches and crossovers to Tracks 1 and 2. Train movements at that location were controled by positive signals (red is STOP-period). Due to fog, visability was poor. When the freight engineer reached the point where he would have to apply brakes to stop the train at the signal, he was still not able to see the signal lights. Seeking to avoid an unnecessary stop, the engineer radioed the tower operator or dispatcher controlling the switches and signals to ask if he had the signals allowing him to proceed to crossover to track 1. Either the dispatcher or the engineer misunderstood the communication and the engineer thought he had an "OK" to proceed. The signal he was approaching was displaying a STOP indication. When it became visable, it was too late to stop the train at the signal. As a result the train proceeded to a point where the engine was actually setting on Track 2 facing the Northbound passenger train. The passenger train was unable to stop in time and collided with the freight train.I do not know about the applicable rules of the time, but the NTSB report stated that the engineer must not rely on a radio communication to determine the status of a signal. Rather, engineers must proceed in a manner so that appropriate and timely steps can be taken to comply with the signal aspect. In other words radio communication must not be used to determine the aspect of a signal or the occupancy status of track governed by signals. If such a rule was not in place at the time of the accident, it was probably added to the IC's book.
edblysard wrote: GCOR has just such a rule, and I believe NORAC has one also.2.12 Fixed Signal InformationEmployees must not use the radio to give information to a train or engine crew about the name, position, aspect, or indication displayed by a fixed signal, unless the information is given between members of the same crew or the information is needed to warn of an emergency. What I was suggesting was that if the dispatcher was re-routing the Amtrak from its normal route, the dispatcher should have made a call to the train, warning him of traffic ahead.I understand the signal system there and the aspect of the signals conveys both route and speed, but a simple call from the dispatcher along the lines of "Amtrak number 8, I will cross you over at control point STO 003, proceed at restricted speed looking out for traffic ahead" might have prevented this altogether.
It might have, but why not just expect people to obey the rules? And if you don't think they can obey the rules sufficiently consistently, then overlay a positive train control system.
I'm not comfortable with the idea of going down this path of suggesting the dispatcher "ought" to have done something. The regular practice of advising trains that the track may be occupied may lead to people relying upon that information, or the absence of that information, instead of obeying the rules. And then, when the next collision happens, the train crew says "well, normally the dispatcher tells us that the track is occupied but this time he/she didn't, so we didn't think there was anything there." The train crew would have a point.
Norac's equivalent to Ed's G.C.O.R rule is :
712. Signal Indications
Dispatchers or Operators must not advise the aspect, name, or indication of any fixed signal, and crew members must not request this information. Crew members may use the radio to communicate a fixed signal to other members of the same crew.
Except as provided in Rule 241, radio communication may not be used to convey instructions that would have the effect of overriding the indication of a fixed signal. Radio communication may only be used to impose a more restrictive action than the indication of a fixed signal.
(The rule 241 exception is to being talked by a red signal)
Railway man and Dutchrailnut...
Part of my concern is that I work in essentially "dark territory" for the most part, under RTC, radio traffic control.
We do have to enter CTC on occasion, down here and working under GCOR, the dispatchers do advise trains of traffic ahead.
I believe it has to do with the fact that in the North East Corridors, the signal aspect is used both for route indication and speed, while under GCOR, timetables generally set speed, and signals advise of routing, or grant authority to occupy a given portion of the railroad.
Our dispatchers routinely ask trains for their location, and routinely advise of traffic ahead.
edblysard wrote: Railway man and Dutchrailnut...Part of my concern is that I work in essentially "dark territory" for the most part, under RTC, radio traffic control.We do have to enter CTC on occasion, down here and working under GCOR, the dispatchers do advise trains of traffic ahead. I believe it has to do with the fact that in the North East Corridors, the signal aspect is used both for route indication and speed, while under GCOR, timetables generally set speed, and signals advise of routing, or grant authority to occupy a given portion of the railroad. Our dispatchers routinely ask trains for their location, and routinely advise of traffic ahead.
Some railroads are speed signaled, some are route signaled, and thanks to mergers, most are now a hybrid of both. GCOR is silent as to route signaling vs. speed signaling, and as far as I can tell NORAC is too.
Many dispatchers advise of trains ahead when authorizing a train to pass an absolute signal (Rule 9.12.1), or advise in single-track territory to expect a meet, as a convenience to the train crew so they know that they'll have to lay off crossings. I don't have a problem with this so long as it's an experienced and cautious dispatcher who understands that this can easily cross the line from a smart practice to an unsafe practice. Where I frown is when it's suggested that the dispatcher has responsibility to do this, because it is the crew's responsibility to obey restricted speed and signal indications, and the absence of instructions by the dispatcher might lead a careless crew to make a habit of ignoring restricted speed and disregarding signal indications. It's a fine line; but I think we have to be on guard to avoid crossing it.
Quote by: Railroad Man
Where I frown is when it's suggested that the dispatcher has responsibility to do this
Responsibility depends on the situation and whether the situation can be described as an emergency situation. Now, I don't work for a railroad and I'm not going to pretend that I know the rulebook, but I do know what rule #1 is - safety. It's probably listed before the table of contents in the rule books! I think that the NTSB information and the posts on this subject regarding this crash have made it clear that it's the train crews responsibility to follow the signal indication given.
For what it's worth, I've used CTC based dispatching simulators for about ten years now. I've seen a few posts suggesting that the dispacther can't watch everything at once. That's true. Generally, in my experience using dispatching simulators the higher the priority on a train the more attention it gets. Amtrak is the top priority (maybe). If I'm the dispatcher in this situation and I make the decision to route a loaded passenger train through a congested freight yard area and into an occupied block with a stopped train ahead I'm going to give the engineer some verbal instructions to verify that the train crew understands the signal indication given. Then, I'm going to keep an eye on the situation. It's not just about responsibility, it's also about conscience. One engineer in the cab right? Who are they calling signals to? Ed already made it clear that the luggage, er, dead-heading employee can't be involved. The conductor in the passenger cars simply notes the signal indication as read over the radio by the engineer. This is why I raised the question on an earlier post about being curious to the actions of the dispatcher in regards to this accident.
Chris30 wrote:Quote by: Railroad ManWhere I frown is when it's suggested that the dispatcher has responsibility to do thisResponsibility depends on the situation and whether the situation can be described as an emergency situation. Now, I don't work for a railroad and I'm not going to pretend that I know the rulebook, but I do know what rule #1 is - safety. It's probably listed before the table of contents in the rule books! I think that the NTSB information and the posts on this subject regarding this crash have made it clear that it's the train crews responsibility to follow the signal indication given. For what it's worth, I've used CTC based dispatching simulators for about ten years now. I've seen a few posts suggesting that the dispacther can't watch everything at once. That's true. Generally, in my experience using dispatching simulators the higher the priority on a train the more attention it gets. Amtrak is the top priority (maybe). If I'm the dispatcher in this situation and I make the decision to route a loaded passenger train through a congested freight yard area and into an occupied block with a stopped train ahead I'm going to give the engineer some verbal instructions to verify that the train crew understands the signal indication given. Then, I'm going to keep an eye on the situation. It's not just about responsibility, it's also about conscience. One engineer in the cab right? Who are they calling signals to? Ed already made it clear that the luggage, er, dead-heading employee can't be involved. The conductor in the passenger cars simply notes the signal indication as read over the radio by the engineer. This is why I raised the question on an earlier post about being curious to the actions of the dispatcher in regards to this accident. CC
I give you credit for your enthusiasm and interest, and for having thought through the scenario. So don't feel bad that in taking these actions you would have committed a rules violation and an unsafe act. The dispatcher has no idea what the signal indications are in the field. Nor does the dispatcher know where the other train is, he merely has an indication on his CTC machine that there is something shunting the track in the block which might be a train. Or it might be a broken rail, who knows? The moment the dispatcher opens his mouth and "instructs" the crew or "makes sure they understand the signal indication" he's violated the rules as well as totally baffled the crew. The dispatcher doesn't run the train, the engineman does.
And I'm curious, how do you propose the dispatcher "keep on eye" on the situation? Depending on where the track cuts are located, he may not even have separate track lights in that block on his console. All he is going to see is an occupancy in the O.S. when the following train hits it and another occupancy beyond it which may already be lit by the first train! He knows not the speed of either train, the location of either train, the signal indication either train is seeing, or the sight distances. By the way, a "green signal" on a dispatching console only means the signal system will accept movement in that direction when the signal system decides it is safe to do so. The signal in the field that shows green on the dispatcher's console could well be showing red to the train crew looking at it. That's why it's called an automatic block system. All the dispatcher does is request priority of movement and route. The signal system decides what will really happen according to an internal system of logic that is designed on fail-safe principles.
Lining a train onto an occupied track is a very common, very ordinary condition; it's not special or unusual. What is unusual when the engine crew of a train being lined onto an occupied track fails to proceed at restricted speed and collides with another train. The presumption that this scenario is high-risk, unusual, requires extra attention, etc., is incorrect. Would you have the dispatcher worry that a train won't adhere to a red signal? A flashing yellow? A Y/Y? What's different about any of those? Failure to adhere to any one of them can just as easily lead to the same or worse outcome.
I think you would find real dispatching to be about as different from the simulation as the ocean is from a bathtub. I mean no put-down by that as you would have no way of knowing. The typical training regime for a new dispatcher until they have the ability to work on their own is 1,000 hours of training one-on-one with a highly experienced dispatcher at their side, plus 6-8 weeks classroom work, plus additional one-on-one time for each new console. I hope you will agree that the "learn at home version" captures only a tiny fraction of that.
RWM. You make some good points. In the event that I posted on the previous page, I do not know what the signal aspect was. As a passenger, I was happy to know that the ds advised us of an occupied siding, and that siding was barely long enough to accomodate both trains. RWM Do you work in dispatching?
spokyone wrote: RWM. You make some good points. In the event that I posted on the previous page, I do not know what the signal aspect was. As a passenger, I was happy to know that the ds advised us of an occupied siding, and that siding was barely long enough to accomodate both trains. RWM Do you work in dispatching?
No, and I thank God at least once daily.
Here is what was drummed into my head during the first year out here....
Authority to occupy a track is granted by signal indication....protection is provided through timetable and rulebook.
In other words, the dispatcher can grant you authority to occupy track, verbally or with a signal indication, but they can not provide protection, it is up to you to "go looking".
edblysard wrote: Here is what was drummed into my head during the first year out here....Authority to occupy a track is granted by signal indication....protection is provided through timetable and rulebook.In other words, the dispatcher can grant you authority to occupy track, verbally or with a signal indication, but they can not provide protection, it is up to you to "go looking".
Amen!
Krazykat112079 wrote:Did anyone happen to catch what was in the Hyundai container that got torn open? Just curious.
Lead-based paint.
Railway Man wrote: If you want to prevent 99.99% of rear-end collisions like this, install....ATS....
If you want to prevent 99.99% of rear-end collisions like this, install....ATS....
ATS is a joke and is very easy to override. Mostly useless (although it is helpful in dense fog).
zardoz wrote: Railway Man wrote: If you want to prevent 99.99% of rear-end collisions like this, install....ATS.... ATS is a joke and is very easy to override. Mostly useless (although it is helpful in dense fog).
With ATS, if the engineer had acknowledged the signal, and still misinterpreted it, the result would have been the same.
Points in favor of CBTC or ETMS, then. To defeat those you have to work very hard at it.
Railway Man wrote: Points in favor of CBTC or ETMS, then. To defeat those you have to work very hard at it.RWM
why electronics why not knowing what your doing. if this man knew his territory he would not have speeded up its obvious that he was not current on this territory( leaves amtrak resposible) and some statements earlier someone said why not have the dispatcher tell him, its not his job, I run through major hubs and run along with amtrak also, ive had dispatchers tell me the signal is comming up, and that i will be following one, its up to me to find his rear end, and at night and if its a black tank car it is hard to see with out a marker( now before you know it alls get started no you dont need a marker in yard limits as a cut of cars is not a train) and not all eot flash til moving or air is released. what is not been said if it was abs or ctc. if the signals were abs then it could have been anything displayed and been restricting, in abs in yard limits ( if this was the case) any signal other than clear is considered restricting.
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
Check back this time next year. Typical time for the NTSB report to appear is 9-24 months after the accident. For example, the most recent rail accident report released was of WMATA derailment January 7, 2007, release date October 16, 2007.
Railway Man wrote:Check back this time next year. Typical time for the NTSB report to appear is 9-24 months after the accident. For example, the most recent rail accident report released was of WMATA derailment January 7, 2007, release date October 16, 2007. RWM
Thanks!
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