More than just the ACL Baldwins had balancing problems. Contemporary reports in the magazines stated the New Haven I-5 Hudsons were rough-riding. At least one later locomotive history states the New Haven downgraded them to secondary services as soon as possible, replacing them with Diesels.
As for 100 mph running, I, too, would not expect to see that as part of scheduled services. But the locomotives were designed to regularly run at maximum track speed and would exceed that to make up time -- something no-one would try on bad track. Your last paragraph sums it up.
The duplex drive did provide less dynamic augment than a coupled locomotive. That the difference was rather thin and at the cost of a longer rigid wheelbase (with greater friction on curves) is something that should have come out in the road testing of the prototypes. Perhaps PRR considered itself in too deep, by then, to avoid a production order. Perhaps PRR felt its current K4s fleet was too war-weary and outdated to wait for another new design. PRR was certainly planning upgraded passenger services for after the war. To remain competitive with its arch-rival, PRR needed something special to pull them. Unfortunately, it also needed something more reliable. PRR gambled on the duplex and lost.
Just for the record: Up to about 60 mph, the T1's calculated drawbar HP exceeded all 4-8-4s except the N&W J. At 60 mph, the NYC S-1 passed the T1. The NYC Niagaras passed even the might J class at about 90 mph. No other 4-8-4s anywhere came close to producing 5,000 calculated DBHP like these three classes.
When I proposed my conspiracy theory, I considered BLW's attempts to interest other railroads in the duplex idea. BLW definitely approached PRR about the duplex, not the other way around. The PRR Mechanical Dept. also left it up to Baldwin to design the prototypes, apart from certain specifications (i.e. Belpaire firebox, PRR standard fittings). That is why I felt BLW was the instigator for any collusion between the two.
I can't speak to the truth of this because I have never ridden both lines, but one of the theories for NYC's greater success in the New York/Chicago overnight competition was that the heavily graded, twisty track in the mountains made sleeping more difficult for the patrons on the Broadway Limited. Apart from the possibility of being jostled in your bed, there was also the exhaust of two locomotives slogging up hill to contend with. Remember NYC's pointed slogan: "The Water Level Route -- You Can Sleep." There is no doubt the Broadway was as fine a train as the 20th Century. However, as mentioned elsewhere, the Century might run eight or more sections at holiday periods -- all full trains, all fully equipped. Mind you, I have also read it was PRR policy never to run the Broadway in sections. Perhaps someone can confirm or refute that.
It's more than 70 years since this whole process started. It's fun to sit around the hot stove (that's Canadian for "sitting around the cracker barrel") and bash ideas around. But ultimately, none of the steam locomotive designs on any railroad in the world made enough of a difference to stave off Dieselization. Pity.
To Dave K: thanks for your input on the profitability of passenger trains. We can always count on you for the "straight scoop!"
Per JPP's theory about Baldwin and the PRR as "blood relatives": I think he may just be on to something there, but of course we'll never know.
As far as BLW pushing the duplex drive concept, the thought hit me that maybe, just maybe, BLW just couldn't get the hang of producing a 4-8-4. So I hit the books and looked at the 4-8-4's Baldwin built. They built 4-8-4's for the RF&P, and they were good performers. They built 4-8-4's for the Santa Fe, and again no problems with those engines either. The R-1 4-8-4's they built for the Atlantic Coast Line had balancing problems so the ACL had to put speed restrictions on them, but that was just one instance.
Then the thought hit me: Baldwin could build a 4-8-4, but maybe the Pennsy's Juniata Shops couldn't, or maybe they had no confidence in their ability to do so. Bear in mind the Juniata Shops were going to build a lot of the 4-8-4 types if they were adopted, probably as many if not more than BLW. I can't prove this of course, but it does make me wonder. A divided drive, would certainly have been a lot easier to balance than a 4-coupled unit, but those masters of the 4-8-4 ALCO and Lima never considered it. So maybe, just maybe, the Pennsy had a lot more to do with the duplex drive than any of us think.
Again, I can't believe they were seriously thinking of 100mph running on a regular basis. The electrified main line between New York and Washington had 155 pound rail and the PRR never considered trying to push the GG-1's that fast. OK, there were curves and such to deal with but you see what I'm getting at.
Oh, there's a story from the 40's: A track maintanance superintendant was taking a cab ride on one of the companys locomotives. The engineer turned to him and said "You know, it takes a lot of nerve to run one of these things!" The super replied, "I know, but it takes a lot more nerve for me to ride up here with you!" " How's that?" said the engineer. "I know what you're running on!" said the super!
Regarding money making passenger trains. True, trains like the Broadway and the General and the Pacemaker and the Trailblazer made money on an avoidable cost basis. So did the Super Chief and the City of LA. And the Florida streamliners. But there was also the question of connectivity. The Boston - Albany Budd car connection of the Enpire State Express lost money. Train off. But then that meant less people riding the Empire State Express west of Albany, yet the number of coaches had to be maintained for the NY - Albany business. As a whole, railroad passenger service lost money. As long as the Post Office used the trains, and paid well for that usage, the loss was tolerable and could easily be justified as relatively inexpensive public relations. (I am not talking about commuter trains, another subject entirely.) Once the mail and express business left, the losses became intolerable. I credit the various sourthern railroads, the UP, and AT&SF, in particular, for doing a wonderful job on keeping up very high standards in the face of losses. They really cared about their reputations and the reputation of the industry in general. And d espite the misery inflected on most travelers by Penn Central, still the Broadway was a decent train up to and even after Amtrak.
locoi1sa The S1 was the heaviest reciprocating steam locomotive ever built. And it only had 8 drivers.
The S1 was the heaviest reciprocating steam locomotive ever built. And it only had 8 drivers.
No, the S1 was not the heaviest reciprocating steamer ever built. At 608,170 lbs it was not even the heaviest Pennsy engine.The Q2 weighed in at 619,100 lbs. If you mean it was the heaviest at the time it was built (1939), it still falls short of the D&RGW Challenger's 641,900 lbs (blt. 1937). But even if not the largest, it was possibly the most impressive engine ever built, at least in the eyes of this beholder.
You are quite right about GM and the WPB. The collusion gave EMD a lead it never reliquished. But, in fairness to GM and the WPB -- EMD was war-ready with the FT, the others were not. ALCo's 241 was still on the test stand. All it had was the 539T, which was NOT a road-worthy engine. Baldwin and Lima had essentially bumpkiss. As you say, the inability to put in the R&D to catch up with EMD cost ALCo the race. But that is a separate topic from the T1.
GM, then as now, was one of the companies that got Presidents elected. And it was much more powerful then. You are no doubt aware of the famous quote from the time: "What's good for General Motors is good for America."
JPP.
The conspiracy is no theory at all. It was not between the PRR and BLW as you think. The true conspiracy was between the war production board and EMD. Even though BLW and Alco had diesel locomotives before the war. The WPD forbid anyone but EMD to build and develop diesel locomotives while Alco and BLW was forced to drop it diesel locomotive building and R&D to build already designed steam locomotives. This gave EMD a great advantage that is overlooked by a lot of scholars of early diesel locos. One of the persons on the board of directors of GM at the time Alco closed shop and moved to Canada was quoted in an article of the New Yorker that that was the best thing that ever happened to the division of GM. BLW and ALCO could not catch up in R&D to compete with EMD after the war. Every time an EMD salesman talked to the PRR they got the same answer. The railroad will be glad to buy them if they could be built in Altoona. EMD declined each time.
And you can not escape the fact that ALCO, BLW and PRR collaborated with each other on the S1 Duplex. At the 39 worlds fair it was lettered Americas Rail Roads and not PRR. Being so big and heavy was its downfall. Lasting only ten years. Turning the monster at each end of its run was a chore for the road and a spectacle for the towns people. The S1 was the heaviest reciprocating steam locomotive ever built. And it only had 8 drivers.
http://crestlineprr.com/duplexexperimentals.html Crestline was the home of the duplex drive.
Pete
I pray every day I break even, Cause I can really use the money!
I started with nothing and still have most of it left!
I admit to having read very little about the coal industry, or the underground mining industry in general in that period. Most of what I have learned is from visits to mining museums or from reading about their railways. I intended no criticism of John L. Lewis in his defence of his mine workers. However, the UMW strikes and resulting price increases were a large stone in the pond, sending ripples that greatly eroded the coal industry's place as a supplier of fuel, both industrial and household.
TRAINS and RAILROAD both reported on Congressional concerns about the railroads' conversion to oil in the late 1940s. Their concern: The amount of oil that would be needed for fuel by the railroads might end the United States' self-sufficiency in petroleum!
I prefer not to get into esthetics. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. I grew up in Toronto in the latter days of the steam era. My ideas of what makes a good-looking steam locomotive are conditioned by childhood exposure to the best of CN and CP steam with some NYC sprinkled in.
That still leaves a problem with the logic in the decision to build the T1 and Q2 classes.
First, if the concern was dynamic augment, the first locomotives that PRR needed to replace were the I1s Decapods. The Q2 was obviously not a replacement for them.
Two, Diesels have no dynamic augment. Why build steam at all?
Three, if the deferred maintenance on the track structure was such a big concern, building a 100 mph passenger locomotive moves from the category of ignorance to criminal negligence. You can't run 100 mph on anything but the very best-manicured track, especially with steam.
Fourth, why not put all that money into fixing the track, rather than going through an agonizing experimentation and teething with a complex, untried design? There could have been no doubt by February 1945, when the production orders were made, that passenger service, at least, would go Diesel.
I have my own conspiracy theory. It is pure speculation but, having spent my working life dealing with corporate politics, I consider it possible if not plausible. So -- WARNING: PURE SPECULATION FROM THIS POINT.
First, PRR and BLW owned a piece of each other. I do not have a list of directors for both at the time the duplex idea was being mooted but I know, at various times, PRR had directors on the BLW Board. PRR and BLW were not just good friends, they were blood relatives. Second, BLW had failed to sell its duplex idea to other railroads (except B&O, then controlled by PRR). What better way to promote it than to have the "Standard Railroad of the World" buy a fleet that would demonstrate the duplex's superiority? In one fell swoop, BLW would be saved from its continuing embarrassments and would leap to the forefront of steam technology. If such a decision was made at the highest levels, it could be imposed on the Mechanical Dept. despite contrary recommendations.
That the duplexii turned out to be one swell foop hastened the inevitable triumph of the Diesel.
Hi Selector! Well, not ALL passenger service was a loss-leader, from what I've read (and please remember, what I get is what the books tell me, I wasn't THERE ya know!) The NYC, the PRR, and other big roads DID make money on the long-distance passenger trains. The local commuter runs, ah, now THAT'S another story!
As has been said by others, the long distance runs died from lack of interest and in the end were money losers, but in the glory days, not at all.
I think Daveklepper should sound off on this one, that fine gentleman WAS there!
A cynic would say that since passenger service was a loss leader to the railroads, and since the public seemed to favour burdening the NYC with their patronage, the reason for the NYC closing down that service sooner stands to reason.
Crandell
Per DaveK's comment about never seeing a second section of the "Broadway": I was re-reading a history of classic streamliner/ luxury trains and it seems the "20th Century" was always the more popular of the two, frequently needing two or sometimes more sections. That was never the case with the "Broadway", to the Pennsy's mystification. Both trains were equals in luxury and running times, but the "Century" always got more business. In the end though, the "Century" died before the "Broadway" did.
On the PRR trains in and out of Chicago issue . In the summer of 1952 I worked at LaGrange, and spent some evening time train watching at Englewood. In 1952 the PRR was running 2nd sections of several east coasr bound trains, the General in particular, as well as extras. In 1948 this would have been even more prevelant. I never saw a second section of the Broadway, however.
I may be repeating the Baldwin sales pitch for duplex drive but that is the reason for trying duplex drive. Sure other roads had super powered locomotives but that is not what the point is. They may have been better with dynamic augment but they still pounded the rails just the same. The other roads did not have as much mainline rail to protect as the P co did. You have to understand that if they could save $3 billion in track repair over 5 years by running high speed duplex drive locos that cost 1 billion then they would have saved 2 billion to be used elsewhere. I can understand why they tried it. Like a lot of things in life it looked better on paper.
jpp, I have to agree with you that "were the Pennsy men so sure of themselves because they were the mighty Pennsylvania Railroad?" Why did they ignore the fact that other roads were succesfully using 4-8-4's, that duplex drive (even if they did make it work) was really unecessary? They could have copied an N&W "J" , a UP 4-8-4, or any other Nothern type. I don't know, sometimes we see organizations, whether business or governmental, just go delusional and refuse to see what's going on around them. Too many examples go go into here.
Oh, and I can't blame John L Lewis for the coal strikes starting in the years after World War Two, not at all. If there was ever a category of American worker so shamefully and disgustingly mistreated by management than the American coal miner I can't think of one. In trying to negotiate an end to a coal strike that occurred during his administration President Theodore Roosevelt found one mine company president so smug and insufferable he wanted to pick him up and throw him out the nearest window! Maybe Teddy should have! Would have certainly gotten the attention of the other mine owners!
Conversely, anyone ever hear of a strike in the oil industry? Maybe there were, but I can't think of one.
Oh, and there's a bit of a corollary discussion going on over on the "Trains" Forum under "Locomotive Esthetics" concerning the T-1, the last few pages anyway. Check it out.
Thank you re both corrections. Obviously, I relied on out-dated and incorrect source material. I note the articles you have listed and will take a look.
jpp452on the 283-mile Chicago-Crestline division, K4s were expected to rack up at least 25,000 miles per month.
At least 44 round trips a month-- that would be a good trick. Anybody got a Fort Wayne Div timetable from circa 1940? How many trains were scheduled out of Chicago between 0001 and ... 1400, say?
(The public TT for 29 Sept 1940 shows 10 trains out of Chicago from 1100 to 2300, then two between 2301 to 1059. Westward, nine arrivals between 0030 and 1220, then two the rest of the day.)
Couple of details first re:jpp452's post.
K4 mileage
AFAIK, no K4 ever made 25,000 miles per month. This would have put them in the same class as the NYC Niagaras. They were good, but not that good.
In regular service the entire Niagara fleet racked up substantial mileages (16,000 miles per month from 1945-1948, maximum of about 20,000 miles per month). But when Central decided to give six of them priority treatment, they managed the frequently-cited 26,200 miles per month for two months. Oct-Nov 1946. (see, Road Testing of the Niagaras by Dick Dawson in The Central Headlight, August 1975, pg23).
T1 mileage
Monthly mileage reports from the Hagley Library indicate that the T1 was posting the highest systemwide monthly mileage as a class of any PRR steam loco using either of two methods (e.g., October 1946):K4s - 8,630 miles/mo/active locomotiveT1 - 10,089 miles/mo/active locomotive (17% more)Or a more conservative measurement -424 K4s - 6,227 miles/mo/all locos52 T1 - 7,247 miles/mo/all locos (16% more)This latter measurement is comparable to a fleet average. Neither T1 monthly mileage figure is very spectacular, but it is consistently better than the K4.
Individual T1's fared better. According to mileage reports I have which were internal correspondence from PRR Chief of Motive Power’s office, 5504 was the highest mileage T1 from Sept 1945 through April 1946, posting 40,642 miles since its in-service date of 12/5/45. This is an average of about 8,294 miles/month. For the month of April 1946, it posted 10,793 miles, only slightly less than the E7's that were running tests at that time. Also during April, 5512 posted 11,442 miles and 5508 posted 10,942 miles, also about the same as the E7's. Maximum mileage figures for the T1 fleet stayed in this range until March 1947.
T1 on C&O
The PRR T1 stalled at Waynesboro, VA, on the Mountain Subdivision. This was at the foot of a 1.3% grade and on a curve at the station. A pusher assisted in getting train started and oddly enough, the T1 accelerated up the grade to the summit. C&O's J3/J3a 4-8-2's and 4-8-4's were assigned to this line. The 4-6-4's were not. In addition, the J3s were equipped with boosters, which gave them a much higher starting TE than the T1. By any estimate, the T1 was overloaded by about two cars on the Mtn Sub..
If you're referring to the frequently cited stall at Cotton Hill, it never happened. Strictly an urban legend. The test report shows a 30-second stop there and the train was on its way. The entire C&O test report survives at C&OHS archives in Clifton Forge. PRR correspondence regarding the test is at the Hagley Library.
FWIW, detailed coverage of the C&O tests is in the Summer 2009 issue of The Keystone (Vol.42, #2, pp 35-66). See a list of T1 articles I posted on this thread, back in 6/4/10.
For the most part, I tend to agree with jpp452. IMO, PRR should have never built any T1's following the original two. If PRR wanted to stick with steam, the company needed a simple, reliable, conventional 4-8-4, one that was tolerant enough to work within the road's less-than-perfect operations (maybe like UP’s FEF-3). What PRR got was something entirely different. It was not the right company to deal with the Ferrari-like aspects of the T1 (mechanical complexity, touchy handling, exacting maintenance). With the diesel inside the house at PRR and on the doorstep of all railroads, likely no company was. It was all over but the shouting.
Pete, you are repeating the Baldwin sales pitch. The divided drive was indeed advertised to reduce dynamic augment and piston loads. But the dynamic augment could be, and was, reduced to virtually the same level in several 4-8-4s of the time by use of lightweight rods. The piston load argument proved a non-factor. The top horsepower 4-8-4s of the time worked hard, but they did so well within maximum design limits.
Having four cylinders, in fact, was counter-productive to starting heavy trains because of the slippery divided drive. Three or four cylinders on a coupled locomotive would have worked much better, but crank axles would have been inadvisiable on such a high-horsepower locomotive. Besides, crank axles had been anathema to American railroads since the 1860s.
As for the evidence the T1s racked up 10,000 miles per month, I do not know if this refers to an average or a maximum. However, on the 283-mile Chicago-Crestline division, K4s were expected to rack up at least 25,000 miles per month. If you look at the 713-mile Harrisburg-St. Louis run, this represents only 14 one-way trips per month, less than 50% availability.
By the way, I don't think the C&O was all that impressed with the T1, especially when it stalled with a train normally handled by a 4-6-4.
I believe it is a false assumption that PRR had highly competent "steam men" in their engineering department at the time of the duplexii. The last new steam passenger locomotive worthy of the PRR was the K4s of 1914 -- itself based on an ALCo prototype. After the retirement of Axel Vogt in 1919 and the death of A. W. Gibbs in 1922, the long tradition of advanced design came to an end. W. F. Kiesel, their successor, is responsible for the M1, a worthy fast freight locomotive. C&O is responsible for the J1, the best thing ever to run on PRR rails -- according to the PRR men I've read. Keissel oversaw a department whose primary task was to electrify the PRR to Pittsburgh (depression and war ended that). As a result, PRR gave Baldwin a free hand with the T1 prototypes. And, as I've said elsewhere, Baldwin had a notoriously bad time designing high end steam locomotives.
With regard to the advancing monster. there is good reason to believe railroads would have started Dieselization in the 1930s if not for depression and war. The early Diesels had already proved their economy beyond doubt. GM produced the FT at exactly the right time, as pre-war militarization put enough change in the railroads' pockets to buy. I remember seeing AAR figures of locomotives ordered during the 1930-1950 broken down year by year. Unfortunately, I can't find the list right at the moment. My recollection -- and my brain is getting pretty old -- is there was only one year (perhaps two) after 1934 that total steam locomotives ordered in the U.S. outnumbered Diesels ordered.
You have to wonder, with the Diesel firmly on its way, why PRR men would risk so much on such an unproven design. Were they so sure of themselves, because they were the Mighty Pennsylvania Railroad, that everything they touched would turn to gold? I doubt anybody living can ever answer that question. PRR certainly lost its aged-old smugness when, a year after celebrating its centenary, it failed to pay a dividend for the first time in its history.
According to David P. Morgan in an editorial in Trains c1948 (I'll check the exact date if you like), John L. Lewis, the chief of the United Mine Workers, was more responsible for Dieselization than any other single individual. The repeated, lengthy, costly coal strikes which plagued the coal industry after WW2 not only upped the price of coal exponentially, it so interrupted the supply of fuel the railroads could not maintain services. To give one example, the CNJ publicly advertised that it was converting to Diesel so its customers wouldn't be inconvenienced.
This has been a great discussion. I've learned a lot from all of you. I admit I have been the devil's advocate, but I have also had plenty of ammunition to work with.
I understand. I volunteer at a local archive to help them catalogue and put online a small part of their collection. I get a 100% raise every year -- from $0 to $0.
I don't think there is any doubt the PRR's boilers were superb. I would never argue otherwise. And, thanks to larger than usual steam passages, the cylinders could get all the steam they needed -- and, unfortunately, more than they could cope with.
The Q2s were not without bugs. They would have been retired early in any case.
You are absolutely correct. I did not make the point earlier because I was responding essentially to different arguments.
There is only ONE measure of a good locomotive. And there is only one way of judging the "best" locomotive. The best locomotive is the one that provides the greatest return on investment.
Many years ago, Brian Reed, a professional mechanical engineer, with no axe to grind for or against the duplexii, wrote this at the beginning of his monograph on the subject:
"If the investment of some $73 million in 76 extremely large locomotives with working lives of four to seven years full of fristration, disappointment, maintenance work, and exasperating performance can be deemed economic, then the Pennsylvania's T1 and Q2 'production' duplex steam locomotives were successful; but not otherwise.
They could well be regarded as the counterpart of the English Bulleid Pacifics, and the two grouped together as the most expensive steam locomotive failures in the two continents during the 20th Century. Each could put up on occasion astounding feats of haulage and speed; each had several promising novelties; each had a band of vociferous devotees; neither passed elementary tests of engineering judgement. "
Selector.
You have to look at the whole picture from an operations standpoint. The main reason for duplex drive was to reduce counterbalance and track pounding that had pretty much destroyed the railroad from end to end during the war years. While the J1 was a fantastic machine that was capable of the work required it did pound the roadbed like any other reciprocating locomotive. Splitting up the drive was thought to have a greater reduction in rail pounding while keeping the maximum amount of weight on drivers. Larger diameter of drive wheels allowed for better counterbalancing and speed. Having four cylinders allowed the locomotive to start heavy trains. They tried to get an equal balance to offset the maintenance required to keep the whole railroad in good repair. If the duplex drive was a success (it really was to a point) then the railroad would have saved millions in reduced track repair work not to mention their coal customers would have been happy. Perhaps coal would still be king and oil would be a secondary player? Maybe not. We will never know. If the board of directors had it their way the whole road would have been wired and fleets of Altoona built electrics would have been king of the road. Stringing wire and costs of power transmission was too great. I believe there was talk and even plans to wire the road into Pittsburgh as early as 1920.
I give them credit. They did try to hold off the advancing monster known as diesel electric as long as they could. Would it have been money wasted if it worked? Maybe they should have tried to develop their own diesel to be built in their own shops. The leadership was men that knew steam locomotives because that is where they came from. We all tend to stick with what we know and shy away from things we don't know.
Indeed, we are both flitting around the same lamp. I just try to state what I've found after years of research. I leave the black-and-white, success-vs-failure calls to others.
If you haven't already, you should read the extensive T1, Q1, q2, T1 vs J articles that have been published either in PRRT&HS magazine, The Keystone or N&WHS magazine, The Arrow. There are well over 100 pages worth of facts and analysis there, all of it based on primary research. Both societies have a back-issues program.
Disclaimer: I wrote some of the articles, but Neil Burnell wrote most of them. We've coordinated our efforts and research for over 15 years
You both seem to be flitting around the same lamp. You both contend that mechanical difficulties meant the engines were not easy to use or to keep running. Yet only one of you maintains that this constitutes an essential failure in engineering and construction.
Seems to me that a locomotive that costs so much to keep operational is an essential failure. And for it to have been accepted as a rostered unit worth paying for in the first place is also a failure on the part of the chief of locomotive development and acquisition. And at the very top, where the buck stops, was a leader whose bared backside should have been held down to a very hot group of embers over that decision.
My humble opinion, of course.
Most of the information I have was purchased from the Hagley Museum and Library in Wilmington, DE. Like most archives, they are bricks and mortar organization with a full time and very knowledgeable staff. So their information is not yet available on the internet free. Their rates used to be $15 for the first 20 pages, and $0.50 for each additional page plus shipping. I had more than one shipment over $100 when I was gathering info on the T1 . All archival organizations are wrestling with this problem. It cost money (lots and lots) to house, cool, heat, sort, catalog and otherwise feed all of the paper that the information is inscribed upon. The only way it becomes free is if someone endows the organization so it no longer depends on an external revenue stream for its existence. Some of the T1 info is under the authority of the state of Pennsylvania. Who knows what will happen there, if money runs out.
The Q2 was perhaps a better design than the T1, but it was equally useless on PRR in the postwar era. It was essentially a 60 mph freight locomotive on a 50 mph freight railroad. The much simpler J1/J1a 2-10-4's were more than adequate to run at 40-50 mph in regular service. The Q2 only came into its own above PRR's freight speed limit. That was the main reason they were retired early. Their higher maintenance and operating costs weren't worth it. There were plenty of simpler, more reliable J1's to do the final jobs as the diesels took over. Too bad, they were great looking locos. Even N&W thought the Q2 may have had a better boiler than the A's. That's quite a complement. Unfortunately, they didn't fare at all well in N&W's service when tested there in 1948. Poor condition on receipt (PRR's maintenance must have been really lax), malfunctioning equipment (replacement of some of the auxiliaries before tests could be run), front engine slippage (even on sand).... Same old same old..... The duplexes were fussy and never had a chance on a railroad that was used to the likes of the K4, L1, I1, M1 and other non-fussy designs. Use some bailing wire and duct tape, and they'll get over the road one more time. Not good enough for a T1 adn Q2
JPP452.
I can think of one successful duplex drive. The Q2 4-4-6-4 was a very powerful locomotive that the crews loved to run and fire. It was the maintenance costs that put them on the scrap list while steam finished up using 2 cylinder power on the end. If steam could have had the economies of ownership as diesels I believe that duplex drive would have been more prevalent and problems of slipping and other difficulties would have been solved. Maintenance on steam was too labor intensive for the railroads. Daily inspections of safety valves to monthly boiler washes to three year boiler tube replacements was not as cost effective as a start and run until it does not run anymore diesel electric.
Pete.
BTW
Thanks for this. There is good information here. Are these reports available online?
First of all, I am not a SPF (Slobbering Pennsy Freak). Secondly, I admit bias against the duplex drive idea, not only Baldwin's design as used on the Pennsy, but everywhere it was tried. I can't think of one class of duplex drive locomotives in the world that were not a failure, to a greater or lesser extent. Look at the classes built by Webb on the LNWR -- they were all very slippery. B&O discovered the error of their ways with the George Emerson, and disposed of it as soon as they could. Baldwin tried to sell the duplex drive to NYC, T&P and ATSF. BLW even put an announcement into The Railway Age (19 May 1945) that NYC and T&P were "enquiring" for 4-4-4-4s -- something both railroads had rejected outright. ATSF briefly, but not seriously, considered an oil-fired cab-forward 6-4-4-4. Enough said.
To address your point, I do not deny there were good and bad engineman in service. Of course there were. There are wide ranges of skill and competence in all professions. The point I wanted to make clear is that I do not accept the idea of a conspiracy theory to destroy the locomotives. The fact is they were, mechanically, fundamentally a bad design. And a bad design is a bad design, no matter who runs it. Let's accept that and move on.
By the way, have you ever noticed that Baldwin was responsible for most of the failed steam locomotive designs in the U.S. in the 20th Century?
To respond to jpp452's comments regarding T1 handling problems and skills of enginemen, here's a quote from a PRR internal memo dated 9/29/45 (from Hagley Library):“After we had taken sand at Conemaugh the engineman had the train moving and if he had left the throttle in its position, the locomotive would have hauled the train away, but he jerked it open, the locomotive slipped, the train stalled and we had to put a pusher on to get the train away.”This quote was take from a report by Asst. ME Decker who was riding the locomotive during an extensive over-the-road test period where 6110 and 6111 were being used on regularly scheduled trains.Previous paragraphs in the same memo describe this engineman's insistence on using a heavy throttle during poor rail conditions east of Pittsburgh, where he allowed the locomotive to slip so badly that Decker stated:“...I was afraid we would do some damage to the locomotive before the engineman noticed the slip and closed the throttle.”On the other hand, given one of the best crews, things were different. Just three days before the above run, #6110 took a 21-car passenger train over the Middle Division, rain and fog the whole way, with two slips recorded between Harrisburg and Altoona. They left Harrisburg six minutes late and arrived two minutes early at Altoona. There were at least three intermediate stops and no difficulties were encountered at any of them. This run is described in PRR memo dated 9/24/45. It is based on a report by a Special Duty Engineman who was riding 6110 during the run.The above contrasting operations were recorded during a two month test period during Sept and Oct 1945. Most or all of the reports of runs during this period have survived. How the crews operated the T1's had a major impact on their performance. It also seems that having a company officer in the cab didn't make a lot of difference. Keep in mind that the railroad unions were extremely powerful in the 1940's, and proving abuse of a locomotive, particularly one with a questionable reputation like the T1, was hard to do.
In another example, also during the test period with 6110 and 6111, one of the T1s was placed on the ready track with several faults (e.g., non working sanders and inadequately lubricated suspension being two, IIRC) and the only way the PRR official riding the locomotive could get the roundhouse to do anything was threaten to reject the locomotive for service. This would have reflected poorly on the roundhouse and its management, and repairs were made at once.
All was not so rosy in the far flung PRR empire as far as individual discipline was concerned. Sure there were good men on both sides (labor and management), and they got the best for the company and themselves. There were also those who had no personal pride in their work, and they caused problems. Contrasts, just like today......
jpp452 - Welcome to trains.com!
Darren (BLHS & CRRM Lifetime Member)
Delaware and Hudson Virtual Museum (DHVM), Railroad Adventures (RRAdventures)
My Blog
Pete and Joe, let's get this theory out of the way right now. The men in top-link passenger service were not the type to abuse their locomotives. For one thing, spinning the drivers at high speed is a fast route to an early grave. Secondly, any underperforming engineer got a visit from the road foreman of engines, who would ride with the engineer until satisfied the engineer knew how to handle the locomotive. Thirdly, notwithstanding the usual supervision in the Mechanical Dept., all the men would have known the T1s were under intense scrutiny.
if it was merely a problem with opening the throttle too much, too soon, BOTH sets of drivers would slip. Further, this theory does not account for the high-speed slippage when the throttle and cut-off was unchanged.
As has been remarked, it was almost always the front set that went up first. The problem was related to weight shift but, to my knowledge, the PRR mechanical engineers never did solve it.
As for the idea of "saving jobs", an engineer would be more concerned about saving his own. Intentional abuse of a locomotive was a firing offence. The helper crews on doubleheaders were usually extra board men in the passenger and freight pools. They were in no immediate danger of losing their jobs.
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