"Steam Glory 3" does sound like something to look forward to, especially the T-1 article. Hopefully it'll be a serious appraisal of the locomotive as opposed to a collection of "old husbands tales".
At any rate, all the "Steam Glory" issues have been great!
It looks like the T1 will be the subject of an article in the upcoming, recently announced, "Steam Glory 3" special issue. Looking forward to it.
--Reed
I ahve to agree that the Milwaukee's A's were a more succesfful locomotive than the CPR's 4-4-4's, but I guess I just liked the looks of the Jubalees a lot better! The A's would probably have lasted until Amtrak except for dieselization. They did their job on lightwieght trians in fairly level territory for which they were designed and would ahve been at home on a still steam Manahttan Transfer - Washington run with probably up to ten lightweight cars.
The Pennsy wasn't the only road that stuck with an "armstrong automatic stoker" longer than they should have. Those big fat 2-8-0's the Delaware and Hudson ran were also hand-fired, The roads president, Leonor F. Loree believed in a days work for a days pay, and how! Loree was good for the road for most of the years he ran it, but he got a little too conservative toward the end and quite honestly stayed around too long.
Thanks very much for your informative post, Juniatha. I am inclined to agree with you because all the evidence seems to follow to the surmises you have discussed on this and other threads.
I am glad I didn't have to hand fire a heavily-laden K4 that had to make up some lost time on a sub where the grade ran near 0.7%
Crandell
Juniatha >> Just for the sake of interest, who among us IS a mechanical engineer? And, what experience have you had in the design of steam-mechanical apparatuses? << Well , I am : Diplom-Ingenieur Maschinenbau , TU - German equivalent to Masters of Science Degree ( it has since been given up in favor of Bachelor and Masters in consequence of the Bologna reforming process , shortly after my graduating )
>> Just for the sake of interest, who among us IS a mechanical engineer? And, what experience have you had in the design of steam-mechanical apparatuses? <<
Well , I am : Diplom-Ingenieur Maschinenbau , TU - German equivalent to Masters of Science Degree
( it has since been given up in favor of Bachelor and Masters in consequence of the Bologna reforming process , shortly after my graduating )
You certainly come across as someone who has a good grasp of steam locomotive design.
While my BS degree and majority of my work experience is in electrical engineering, my MS is in nuclear engineering, with a few courses in thermal hydraulics along with the prerequisite courses in thermodynamics, heat transfer and fluid mechanics. A lot of detail in the process of boiling water, though almost zero detail in gas flow through valves on piston engines (either internal or external combustion).
- Erik
Dear Juniatha: My data is essentially consistent with yours.
The K5 had an E-Type superheater rather than the K4s's A-Type. K5 cylinder dimensions were borrowed from the M1.
The Juniata K5 had 12 in. piston valves with seven inch maximum travel, lap 1-7/8 inches, lead 1/4 inch, inside clearance 3/8 inch. These proportions gave maximum cut-off of 62 percent but special auxiliary starting ports gave cut-off of 82 percent for a few revolutions. This was an adaptation from the I1s Decapods.
The Baldwin K5 had Caprotti valve gear, of course, with normal maximum cut-off above 80 percent. The Kiesel blastpipe is described as "annular-ported with six radial openings converging towards the top" giving free exhaust. My source states Kiesel's five-poiinted blastpipe was a later development that was applied to the K4s. Nevertheless, the exhaust does not seem to have been a limiting factor on the K5.
jpp452
= J =
Hi Crandell
The way I understand it , the K5 Pacific was PRR's attempt to design & build something about competitive with the NYC Hudson - first edition . Or so they hoped . This was an effort at 'beefing up' K4s design so to speak , i e produce a more powerful locomotive while keeping closely to proven proportions and design features - just a little heftier .
Yes , incredibly enough it appears originally "there were but two shovels" on board as a means of norishing the fire of these locos - which was about as gross a misconception as DR's CME Wagner's idea of enlarging steaming capacity of boiler by increasing indirect heating surface while keeping grate area to a decent size inconspicuous of being above handling limit of hand-firing : both were clearly in contradiction to pysical laws and thus were bound to fail .
Side note : However , this was not a 'prove' to often heard belive of "Theory and practice don't necessarily match" but a prove to the fact that inproperly conceived designs based on ill concept of theory will reveal that misconception when put at work in practice !
Introducing the K5 Pacifics into K4s pool was another coffin nail to success of these engines since in contrast to the series K4s the two K5 had a much higher cylinder tractive effort ( 'lower adhesion factor' ) and therefore could not be started same as the K4s by pulling throttle fully open and waiting for the engine to start marching . Because of the higher factor of tractive effort in relation to adhesion mass , this simply had to produce excessive torque which then couldn't but result in wheel spin . The correct answer was not "The K5 is slippery" but "The K5 needs a sensible hand at the trottle" and then would produce at least an equivalent tractive effort as the K4s did at full throttle full gear . Ok , some will now comment "But how can you write that when you haven't been there !!?" Well , just by reading the respective data of adhesion mass and cylinder tractive effort I can see what the difference was in the two types and combining that with the - usual ? - complaint about 'slipperiness' by PRR drivers when an engine was not taking full throttle full gear at start I can very well imagine what happened when during a day on the road a crew that had come off a K4s was next getting on a K5 : same procedure as always and : "Wham-wha-whRRRRRRRrrrrrrhhhhh ..!°
What else would you expect ...
As I had written before : special off-series types of locomotives would have needed special treatment - which obviously they never got on PRR . And in reverse , not to forget ! this severely contained PRR locomotive development to the standards they had established .
Draughting AFAIK at least was by a Kiesel six-point star type and the chimney looked decently ok in proportion and tapering , if both , blast nozzle area and chimney cross section on the narrow side as usual . Valve gear characteristics and piston valve / sleeve port free area and form factor surely weren't nearly adequate for increased boiler capacity and enlarged cylinder volume in spite of increased boiler pressure at 250 psi instead of 200 .
So , as often in steam loco development , beefing up a sucessful design did not result in proportional increase of power output in the speed ranges most demanded with an express type of engine , since while taking great care to bring all major dimensions up to the limit , importance was ignored of passing equivalently adequate amount of combustion air through boiler by good draughting and using steam efficiently by valve gear well in command of steam distribution .
Side remark : I still think they looked great with that formidable boiler and wide integral smoke box saddle .
Regards
Juniatha
edit : six-point star ; W Kiesel exhaust see :
www.google.com/patents/US1726152.pdf
uhm - and the 'stove pipe chimney in the patent drawing was *not* a good idea - maybe just a simplification since it was not part of the patent
Dear Juniatha: OUTSTANDING! I'm very pleased to meet you.
jpp452 :
Quote :
F. W. Hankins's K5 experimentals weren't really necessary considering the additional weight they carried. Despite better draughting than the K4s, their full boiler capacity could not be used as built. Like the K4ses, the two K5s were built as hand-bombers. The boiler/firebox was too big for a human to fire to capacity. Much of the double-heading of K4ses that occurred was due to the limitations of human firemen, not of the locomotives. PRR was already aware of this possibility when the first production batch appeared in 1917. The PRR simply did not want to buy appliances from outside sources.
The K4s's 70 square feet grate area was only just possible to fire by one man at 1917 loads and speeds. It was a back-breaker by the time the last K4s was built in 1928. It became purgatory with the very fast schedules with medium and heavy train weights of the 1930s. And it wasn't until the 1930s that K4ses were fitted with power-operated firedoors to help the ashcat out a little. Of course, stokers became mandatory under an ICC ruling in 1930, but not all K4ses were fitted, even to the end of the steam era.
Many steam locomotive sources, including D. F. Crawford, Supt. of Motive Power, Lines West in the pre-1914 era considered a locomotive was not earning its keep unless burning 100 lbs. of coal per square foot of grate per hour. Alfred W. Bruce repeated this in his 1952 wrap-up to the steam era. Bruce, Baldwin Locomotives magazine and other industry sources have also stated the outside limit for human firing is about 5,500 lbs./hour. (Some say 5,000 lbs.) That would equate to a grate area of 50-55 square feet. I don't think you are likely to find many photos of portly Pennsy firemen -- at least, not those in road service.
Although Pennsy had got through the 1920s and the worst of the Depression with two or sometimes three Pacifics on the front end up to Gallitzin, the speed-up of the 1930s disclosed some real concerns at high speeds. On the Altoona test plant In 1937, 5341, fitted with all modifications made to K4ses up to that time, showed the insufficient internal steam passages choked the engine at higher speeds. Road testing in 1938 on Lines West confirmed the Altoona test.
The next step was to make some radical alterations to a K4s. 5399, experimintally fitted with Frankllin oscillating-cam poppet valves, improved Kiesel exhaust, larger steam pipes, sine-waved superheater elements and multiple-valve throttle demonstrated a 25 per cent increase in capacity. But now the boiler, although stoker-equipped, began to be a limiting factor. So now we return to the duplexii, the topic of this thread, as PRR decides it needs something entirely new.
BTW, I wouldn't compare any "super-Atlantic" to the CPR F-2-a Jubilee (3000-3004). These "large" Jubilees only had 60 tons total adhesion weight. (They also had a reputation for bending side rods when backing up with more than four cars.) The Hiawatha Atlantics, with an adhesion weight of 70 tons -- slightly less than an E6s -- would be the true comparison.
The only technical history of the K5 (AFAIK) was in the Winter 1995 issue of The Keystone, published by the PRRT&HS. The basic problem with the K5's were poor drafting and water carryover. They were assigned to the PRR's Northern Central line from Baltimore to Harrisburg, 83 miles worth of curves and grades, and worked out their lives there.
The K5's were not failures. They lasted until they began scrapping T1's. More were not built because of Electrification, and the PRR policy not to buy any new locomotives until the S-1` and the tour=de=force for the 1939 World's Fair. But then the need for more modern power set in during WWII, with the PRR still running quaint old American type D-16's on branches with light rail and lots of obsolite when new 2-10-0s, and then they made the wrong decision not to deiselize as quickly as possible. The K5's were good locomotives. Lilke any prototype, they had iniitial problems, which were straightened out and then they put into the pool with K-4's and not favored, except that they could handle an extra car or two without double heading. I would put them up against a NYC J1 Hudson any day. But not of course a J3.
Also stillborn was a design for a super Atlantic to handle lighweight trains Manhattan Transfer - Washington. Never built. It would have been to the CP's Jubalee what the K5 was to NYC's J1.
I forgot to mention in my previous post that in the Keystone volume 39 #2 is another look at the Q1. Why it was built, and was it really a failure? The article is titled, An Alternative look. This will bring us back to the topic of duplex drive and the T1 itself. Even though it only logged 166,000 miles in its short life it turned out to be an important test bed for future locomotive development. This was done while there was a great shortage of motive power and the onset of WW2. It also proved that running reciprocating locomotives in a reverse position did not induce excessive wear of crossheads and bearing surfaces as was thought. Steam distribution was adjusted to limit the 4 wheeled engine from slipping at speed. Spring rates were changed to put more weight on the engine that that was more prone to slipping and a starting booster was tried. Ash build up in the smokebox seamed to be a problem until baffles were installed and openings in the ash pan was opened to give better drafting. The problems faced by the Q1 helped develop the Q2 and the T1. It also proved that a large diameter driver could also start a heavy freight train and pull it up hill.
Pete
I pray every day I break even, Cause I can really use the money!
I started with nothing and still have most of it left!
selector Why did the Pennsy develop and produce the K5? It was intended/hoped to be an improved K4, but I understand that it was not a success. So, if the K5 was a flop, and the corporation was flopping around trying to create multiple other experimental and service steamers, doesn't that suggest something about the culture of the organization at the time? Crandell
Why did the Pennsy develop and produce the K5? It was intended/hoped to be an improved K4, but I understand that it was not a success. So, if the K5 was a flop, and the corporation was flopping around trying to create multiple other experimental and service steamers, doesn't that suggest something about the culture of the organization at the time?
The K5 was an experimental engine that was being tried in hopes to challenge the NYC Hudson. Two K5 were built, one in Altoona the other at Baldwin, each having different valve types, valve gear and the Altoona version had a one piece cast underframe. Despite being classed the same they were quite different. It was big, and the problem, too powerful for the weight of the locomotive. It was like having a GTO 389 with tri-power and Hurst four speed mounted in a Volkswagen.
It did not work but it did open the door for some future considerations in motive power. About one year later the dual service M1 came about using the single cast underframe and other gadgets tried in the K5. So did it suggest something about the organization, yes. They learned some things and moved forward developing the sucessful M1.
"....pencil pushers think you have to save money to make money....." True then, true now. Next time that great movie "Executive Suite" with William Holden and Frederick March is on, watch it. Nothing's changed in 50-plus years. Just as true today as it was then.
To daveklepper:
I agree with the gist of your comments. The only sand in the gears was that EMD was so overwhelmed with orders that LaGrange could not supply Diesels fast enough. That Baldwin and FM were able to get the share of the market they did is more a matter of EMD's overload than any intrinsic advantages to their product. When Dieselization was nearing completion, and after expansions to the plant at LaGrange, BLH and FM were no longer needed to complete the First Generation conversion and fell by the wayside. On the railways I have studied, FMs were the first to go, followed by the Baldwins and finally the ALCos.
ALCo was a strong competitor until "244-itis" started to set in. After long usage, the wear in the crankshaft bearings left too little support and 244-engined locomotives began to suffer an epidemic of crankshaft failures ("244-itis"). ALCo redesigned the 244 into the 251 to eliminate this problem. ALCo, which had already started at a competitive disadvantage in 1945, had no chance to recover. GE, not wanting to go down with ALCo, decided to go its own way. Too bad. I've spoken to many enginemen who consider the RS18 (the MLW version of the RS11) one of the best locomotives they've ever run.
You're right, Pete, we have beat it beyond recognition.
The HC1s was a remarkable locomotive and what you say is consistent with what I have read about it. It was also remarkably heavy for its time.
If, by superpower, you mean a locomotive with a big boiler with plenty of reserve capacity, ALCo 50000 preceded it. Francis Cole put his theories on boiler design into practice in this demonstrator. Even in old age on the Erie, it could pinch-hit for one of their massive K-5 Pacifics on the heavy Erie Limited without running out of steam. As to whether the 50000 was the "first superpower locomotive", that's a discussion I WON'T enter!
You guys are beating a dead horse. Get the 2 Keystone magazines and read a great article or 2. The first I recommend is All Roads lead to the I1sa in volume 39 #1 and 2. You will see and understand that the chief mechanical engineer was not impressed with the compound articulated locomotives they tried and the simple locomotives were too powerful at the time. J.T.Wallis in 1918 wrote a letter to the assistant ME asking for 60 K4s and 160 HC1s locomotives for the central region. This was just one year after the first I1s and one year before the HC1 was even built! This was while under USRA control. Remember the first I1s never left the test plant for almost 2 years and in that time no others were built. The HC1s was a locomotive that sealed the fate for articulated locos on the central division. The HC1s was in my opinion the first super powered locomotive.Remember the object was to replace double headed H6 freights with one locomotive and do it with the costs of one H6. They almost got it with the I1sa. Articulated locomotives would have cost too much in construction and upgrade of supporting structures and services. The I1s when built could fit a 75 foot turntable.
After Axel Vogt retired and A.W. Gibbs died the railroad was without anyone with steam locomotive design science and knowledge. The next person in line was an electrical engineer that oversaw the electrification of the eastern end. The board of directors voted in 1910 to electrify the central region and in 1917 was allocating funds for such a project until WW1 and USRA and it turned out Big Liz (FF1)was not what it was hoped to be. The FF1 would still have to double head a 3,900 ton train up the eastern slope.
If you ask me the PRR was doing well until non railroad men took charge. Railroad men knew you had to spend money to make money where the pencil pushers think you have to save money to make money. They saved money by deferring maintenance on track, rolling stock, and the entire road until there was nothing to save.
If the Pennsylvania RR had been wise, management wise, with conditions and traffic vast;y different than the N&W, but very sijmilar, just larger, than the B&O and Southern, they would have started diesilizaton right after WWII as the B&O did, not invested in a fleet of T-1's or Q's, and run the pants of their wartime J's. They would have tested prototypes from the builders ordered right after the FT national tour, obtained them as soon as possible, evaluated them fairly, and then decided to stick with either EMD or Alco, probablyi EMD, but only one builder. Then they would have had money to take to the bank. The corporate culter of the Southern and the N&W were similar. But the Southern decided to dieselize right away, as ooon as possible. The N&W did the right thing for their situation, and the Southern and the B&O for theirs. The GP9 was a far better and more versitile locomotive than the FT or F2 or F3. And then the N&W had a reason to dieslize.
1. At no time did I complain about the ethics of the PRR. I made it plain I was speculating what could happen within the corporate culture of such a big organization. Been there, done that. How can you complain about an historical event?
2. The N&W could build steam locomotives a lot cheaper than they could buy Diesels. In the late 1940s, the price of a new steam locomotive was about half as much per horsepower as the Diesel. The availability N&W built into their locomotives was close enough to the Diesel, for their purposes. The decision to abandon steam almost overnight was made by a new president parachuted in by the PRR -- one Stuart T. Saunders. Does the name sound familiar? Yes, it's the same Saunders who presided over the stunning decline of the PRR and the collapse of the Penn Central.
3. As I also wrote quite clearly, I would like to see the figures concerning return on investment for the N&W locomotives vs. the PRR duplexii which are the subject of this thread -- if such figures were ever calculated.
Scrapping of the T1s began as soon as their equipment trust expired. All T1s were gone by the end of December 1953 with a depreciation rate of 20 to 30 per cent standing against them in the books. This is up to three times the rate Baldwin's Ralph P. Johnson put upon new steam locomotives in 1942. And Johnson's rate was about 30 per cent more than the economic depreciation of many 4-8-4s.
And let's look at another example of what I consider PRR's foolish conservatism or lack of imagination, whatever you want to call it.
The K-4 Pacific was a great engine, no doubt about it. For 1914. Yet the PRR made no effort to improve it at any time during the years it was in service, especially retro-fitting with roller bearings after 1931, and only installing automatic stokers when an ICC regulation was handed down mandating them in engines over a certain size. No attempt at improvement at all when there was plenty of opportunity to do so during heavy repairs or rebuilds. Except for cosmetics it was the same engine in 1954 it was in 1914.
Anyway, as JPP said all the Pennsy's decision makers are long dead by now, no point in beating our heads agaist the wall trying to figure out why they made the choices they did.
At any rate, let's not underestimate the effect of corporate culture here. The Pennsy had a very military-type,stifleing, "chain of command" structure, you knew your place and you stayed in it and didn't make waves. In a way, it was worse than the military. In the services, if you've got a good idea, you can always find a sympathetic ear to listen and work with you if you're right. Of course, you better be right! The New York Central on the other hand was a lot more "free-wheeling". Given the choice if I was around, say 80 years ago, I know who I would have preferred to work for!
"Why waste capital on any steam design...." Well let's remember in the mid-40's dieselization wasn't a sure thing for a lot of roads, especially a coal hauler like the N&W. They had their on-line fuel source, were certainly getting a deep discount on it, the steam engines were modern and efficient and making good money for them.
Fast-forward ten years and certainly things had changed. Coal strikes, rising labor costs, steam appliance manufacturers going out of business finally effected N&W's outlook. By the mid 50's N&W brass knew that dieselization was only a matter of time, they just weren't in any rush. Neither for that matter was the Illinois Central who ran steam until 1958 or the Grand Trunk who ran it until 1960.
jpp452 ..the Y6 would have been a much smarter investment than any other existing or anticipated steam design.
..the Y6 would have been a much smarter investment than any other existing or anticipated steam design.
Why waste capital on any steam design at that point in time? For that matter, it was a waste for the N&W to continue to built the A, J, and Y as late as they did. After all, if they were intelligent as people claim, they had to know where technology was heading by the mid-1940's, and that technology clearly wasn't steam.
jpp452 No historian EVER believes they have enough evidence, but ultimately they have to shut down the research and write something. Or starve.
No historian EVER believes they have enough evidence, but ultimately they have to shut down the research and write something. Or starve.
Yes, and wouldn't the honest (and scientific) thing to write would be to state that there simply isn't enough valid evidence to make a claim one way or another? In science and engineering, a non result is considered a valid result, and reported as such.
But the steam choo-choo writers often tend to think otherwise. When they don't have facts, it is OK in their eyes to pass off their opinions and speculations as facts, just so they can print. Whatever it takes to get paid, right? Funny how you are complaining about the ethics of the PRR. LOL.
jpp452 Do I have hard figures? No.
Do I have hard figures? No.
Thanks. That's all I need to know about your opinions and speculations.
I base my opinion on the fact the Y6 was a modern steam locomotive requiring the minimum of maintenance for the power exerted. The I1s was obsolete the moment it was born, it was VERY hard on the track (Pennsy enginemen's statements) and, having shook along for 20+ years with minimal maintenance for the previous 15, was well past the lifespan of a locomotive intended for first line service. The I1s had to be replaced, regardless of by what. It is my opinion, based on the economics reported for the Y6 in its N&W service and the PRR's need to continue to haul a lot of coal up and down hills, that the Y6 would have been a much smarter investment than any other existing or anticipated steam design.
Do I have hard figures? No. I doubt "hard figures" were ever developed. If you have them, please publish them.
Although I, too, have my doubts about the history written today about events of 70 years ago, history is all we have. None of those involved in the design to these locomotives is alive to tell us what choices they made, and the information on which they based those choices. Writing mechanical history is no different than writing any other history. It consists of careful research, double and triple checking of sources, especially if they are not primary sources, and ultimately coming to conclusions based only on the reliable evidence. It is also important not to go beyond the evidence, at least without indicating the speculative nature of the additional theories. No historian EVER believes they have enough evidence, but ultimately they have to shut down the research and write something. Or starve.
When impartial professionals examine the work done those many years ago and state clearly they cannot comprehend how supposedly knowledgeable people made some of the mistakes they made, doesn't that suggest something to you?
Here's further speculation on my part, but possible even if you don't accept it as plausible: If there were men in the PRR's mechanical dept. that thought the N&W designs should be used as the basis of new designs for the PRR, their opinions would have been suppressed at the corporate level. They would have been told to shut up. They would have done so to protect their careers. That's how large corporations with their deparmental empire-building work. We will never know, one way or the other.
You realize you are talking about the same management that, despite record earnings in wartime, drove the Pennsy into financial disaster, missing its first dividend in its history within a couple of years of the war's end. If you are basing your argument on the "intelligence" of PRR management, you have a thin argument, indeed.
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