A federal investigation found an engineer was unqualified to operate the train involved in a derailment in Williams last summer.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7F36vRS0_pw&ab_channel=AZFamily%7CArizonaNews
I checked my FRA Certificate, my engineer's license. It says I'm qualified as a #1 train service engineer, #6 remote control operator (It's been years since I've touched the box) and #8 conductor.
Nowhere does it say anything about type or length of train.
I think the SMART-TD representative was referring to training provided new-hire trainmen/switchmen. Not those going into engine service.
On another note. All those autoracks, and everyone that has as much as a wheel off the track will have the load scrapped.
Jeff
Had a Engineer that ran from A to C for years tell me he wasn't qualified to operate at train from C to A.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Nobody else paused the video to read the page the excerpt was from?
FRA took issue with the engineer's certification simulator ride being a simulated IM train with 4,000 tons and 5600 feet. Also the lack of any type of equipment inspection which was left blank on the score sheet. I mean, I guess you could walk around the computer monitor?
I wouldn't be surprised if FRA severely limits or bans the use of simulators for re-cert. When I last did a recert, the RFE told me they were going back to in-person rides. We'll see if it happens, either by choice or force.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
My cards say I'm qualified as an engineer and as a conductor, and my territory sheet tells what territories I'm qualified on. And the back side of the cards shows my check rides, not to mention files at "the office."
Nowhere does it get any more detailed than that - like train length.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
zugmann Nobody else paused the video to read the page the excerpt was from? FRA took issue with the engineer's certification simulator ride being a simulated IM train with 4,000 tons and 5600 feet. Also the lack of any type of equipment inspection which was left blank on the score sheet. I mean, I guess you could walk around the computer monitor? I wouldn't be surprised if FRA severely limits or bans the use of simulators for re-cert. When I last did a recert, the RFE told me they were going back to in-person rides. We'll see if it happens, either by choice or force.
My last cert ride was on the simulator. Normal sized train and on a fictional subdivision based kinda on one in Kansas.
Of course they give easy trains for the cert ride, they want you to pass. They'll wait for another day to fire you on a slopped together 20k ton, 16k foot manifest with 75% of the cars equipped with cushioned drawbars.
jeffhergertOf course they give easy trains for the cert ride, they want you to pass. They'll wait for another day to fire you on a slopped together 20k ton, 16k foot manifest with 75% of the cars equipped with cushioned drawbars.
Which I think the FRA is starting to take issue with.
Training as a whole is so not great anymore.
zugmann jeffhergert Of course they give easy trains for the cert ride, they want you to pass. They'll wait for another day to fire you on a slopped together 20k ton, 16k foot manifest with 75% of the cars equipped with cushioned drawbars. Which I think the FRA is starting to take issue with. Training as a whole is so not great anymore.
jeffhergert Of course they give easy trains for the cert ride, they want you to pass. They'll wait for another day to fire you on a slopped together 20k ton, 16k foot manifest with 75% of the cars equipped with cushioned drawbars.
Feature the carriers are using simulators to fast track and short cut the efforts required for signing off 'Check Rides', rather than as a training aid to improve the skills of parctitioners of the craft.
When I was working, CSX would take the downloads from locomotives and the train consist of a derailed train that was suspected of being a Train Handling derailment and run them through their simulators - to assess if train handling was causative, and if so how the train handling could have been changed to prevent the derailment.
Train handling is unique to each territory as the grades, curvature, signal locations and speed restriction location are unique to each territory. Humps and sags and curves all impart elements to the slack action that exists in a train, the longer the train the more slack action that needs to be controlled - and the engineer must control slack action within his train.
I'm probably late to this party, but does anybody know the cause of this accident? Was it train handling or mechanical failure or something else? And are the media and the union rep oversensationalizing when they raise the spectre East Palestine?
Erie LimitedAnd are the media and the union rep oversensationalizing when they raise the spectre East Palestine?
Inasmuch as East Palestine had nothing to do with train handling, as such, I'd go with oversensationalizing, which is the impression I got when I watched the video.
I suppose it could be concluded that poor train handling could cause such a disaster. Nonetheless...
Erie Limited I'm probably late to this party, but does anybody know the cause of this accident? Was it train handling or mechanical failure or something else? And are the media and the union rep oversensationalizing when they raise the spectre East Palestine?
An answer to your question: " What caused E. Palestine,Oh. Train Wreck ?" Is contsined in the NTSB Report at the following linked site:
@ https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20230214.aspx
Drilling down past the other questions mentioned, is the answer. {over heated bearing...etc.}
I believe he's asking about the Williams incident.
Every train, repeat EVERY TRAIN, is unique from all other trains the moment it is created. No two cars, nor two engines respond EXACTLY the same every time they are used singlely or in concert with more equipment, especially merchandise (non-unit train) trains. In merchandise trains various cars have different types of draft gear that create situations in train handling as that draft gear does what it is designed to do but in concert with the hundreds of other cars that all have differing draft gear actions.
At its most basic level, Train Handling is operating the train within the speed characteristics of the territory including both permanent, temporary and signal induced speed restriction and to control the slack in the train while complying with those changes in speed. In general, increasing speed develops Draft Forces in the train; reducing speed develops Buff Forces in the train. The lay of the land and the track upon the land can creat both Buff and Draft forces within the train at the same time as the train traverses the territory.
Even in handling Unit Trains, where the car make up of the train remains constant, individual cars can develop mechanical conditions that can affect the handling characteristics of the train, even as the train moves from one train handling situation to the next - thus not allowing, for whatever the reason, the anticipated train handling action(s). Each piece of railroad equipment is constructed of thousands of unique pieces, each of which can fail and cause issues.
Backshop I believe he's asking about the Williams incident.
Oversensationalizing? I'm sure to a point. Media seems to like to sensationalize things anyway. The trainmen's union spokesman is using it to reveal how training, although not directly stated, for new hires is being shorted. (Our new hires aren't getting as much on the job training has I did 25 years ago. I had a new hire conductor who had been on his own for a couple of weeks who asked me how to release a wheel type hand brake when there was no release lever.) While training for trainmen and switchmen is different from engineers, to the general public all railroad crafts are the same. The incident is a vehicle to expose what the companies are doing training wise.
Just saying they're cutting back on training, maintenance of way, maintenance of equipment, maintenance of signals, just doesn't grab the public's attention. Bringing up East Palestine does. A lot of companies are cutting back where they can, cheapening their product or services to save a buck. So your meal at your favorite restaurant doesn't seem as good as it used to. So your bag or box of some consummable has shrunk in volume for the same price. No big deal. Railroad cuts back and wipes out a town, bigger deal.
As to who's fault for the derailment? There's no doubt that bad train handling can cause a derailment. However, if the engineer did something wrong, even if it didn't cause or contribute to the severity of the derailment, they will do their utmost to blame him/her rather than equipment or infrastructure.
About 2005 or 2006 we had a rear end collision near Blairstown IA. The lead engine of the train that ran into the end of the preceding train had a defective automatic brake valve. The crew, with a fireman running the train, didn't catch on immediately that the train wasn't slowing as it should when the automatic brake valve was placed in suppression.
Because the crew didn't realize the train wasn't slowing as it should the railroad, and the FRA, held the primary cause was the train crew's fault. The defective valve was mentioned, but I don't recall it was mentioned as a contributing fault. It was probably lucky that it was mentioned at all.
The engine had been written up as to brake problems, but had been allowed to remain into service. It was later determined that a spring within the valve had become worn. It was what was keeping the equalizing reservoir, controlled by the valve handle, from properly reducing pressure when the handle was placed in either a full service or suppression position.
jeffhergert...to the general public all railroad crafts are the same.
If I had five bucks for every time I've been asked (while onboard in uniform as conductor) "If you're here, who's driving the train..."
samfp1943 Erie Limited I'm probably late to this party, but does anybody know the cause of this accident? Was it train handling or mechanical failure or something else? And are the media and the union rep oversensationalizing when they raise the spectre East Palestine? An answer to your question: " What caused E. Palestine,Oh. Train Wreck ?" Is contsined in the NTSB Report at the following linked site: @ https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20230214.aspx Drilling down past the other questions mentioned, is the answer. {over heated bearing...etc.}
The news report re Williams makes it sound like the engineer hadn't passed some test, like it was an automobile accident caused by someone who didn't have a driver's license. From what I gather, the engineer was in fact certified to run trains, but that some now believe his training should have been better - that a higher standard needs to be set re today's much longer / heavier trains.
You'll never get much of anywhere until you understand the actual mechanics and consequences of bearing failure in three-piece freight trucks, and what was observed during the East Palestine accident.
There are two tapered roller bearings on the axle end: one 'inner' and one 'outer'. These are often mounted as a 'package' and grease-lubricated (AAR spec) for supposed long life without 'breaking' for maintenance.
The inner bearing is, relatively, the more important of the two, as its failure will be more likely to progress to axle breakage, or seizure causing wheel failure, than the outer.
But the outer is the only one whose failure would be readily detected by the usual kinds of 'hot bearing detector', which are IR scanning to distinguish the relatively 'point' source of a hot end cap from the larger signature of an overheated wheel (for example due to a sticking manual brake).
Any catastrophic failure of the inner bearing (you will find reports online describing what causes these, and how rapidly they can develop) easily proceeds to axle-damaging temperature before enough heat passes out to the endcap to show the temperature rise that triggers current response.
The source of all the fire in the camera records leading up to the East Palestine derailment was NOT A HOT BEARING. You can even see on the doorbell-camera footage that the truck itself has skewed and is dragging, producing sparks and flame between the rails.
The crew, not being fools or trained poorly, thought they understood the best way to stop a long train in the presence of an overheating bearing -- not realizing what was actually happening back there. The sensible thing is precisely what they did: put the train in dynamic to slow it without additional heat, drag. or risk of seizure from brakeshoe application. Now, you of all people should be sensitive to the issue of what followed:
The train was kept from prompt derailing by the tension of draft holding the cars in line. Going to heavy dynamic ran the slack on the (relatively) unbraked cars in, and by the time the effective "node" got back to the affected car, upset was as immediate and catastrophic as all the scenarios you were noting back a few years ago in the differential-braking threads.
One thing I'm watching with interest is whether the NTSB has a way to determine just how quickly, and to what degree, the 'heavy dynamic' was actually applied after the crew received notification of the critically-hot bearing detection event. Personally I don't see any way that particular train could have been stopped, either with air or dynamics, except by differential braking of some sort (proportional and gentle) on the portion of the train behind the deflicted car.
Cynically, I'll add that a great many "players" have vested interests of one sort or another in finding blame for the accident without involving their pet concerns. Much the same in many respects as the events so far in the current Williams thread. As Steve Cohen, one of the policy professors at Columbia, noted: "where you stand is where you sit."
Cynically, I'll add that a great many "players" have vested interests of one sort or another in finding blame for the accident without involving their pet concerns. Much the same in many respects as the events so far in the current Williams accident. As Steve Cohen, one of the policy professors at Columbia, noted: "where you stand is where you sit."
wjstix The news report re Williams makes it sound like the engineer hadn't passed some test, like it was an automobile accident caused by someone who didn't have a driver's license. From what I gather, the engineer was in fact certified to run trains, but that some now believe his training should have been better - that a higher standard needs to be set re today's much longer / heavier trains.
I would opine that an automotive analogy would be someone with a CDL-B (ie, straight frame) driving a truck which requires a CDL-A (bends in the middle).
The CDL-B driver is certainly certified to drive a truck, just not a semi.
In the railroad world, such a distinction does not exist. If you're qualified as a road engineer, you're qualified for anything from one car to 200+.
Overmod You'll never get much of anywhere until you understand the actual mechanics and consequences of bearing failure in three-piece freight trucks, and what was observed during the East Palestine accident. There are two tapered roller bearings on the axle end: one 'inner' and one 'outer'. These are often mounted as a 'package' and grease-lubricated (AAR spec) for supposed long life without 'breaking' for maintenance. The inner bearing is, relatively, the more important of the two, as its failure will be more likely to progress to axle breakage, or seizure causing wheel failure, than the outer. But the outer is the only one whose failure would be readily detected by the usual kinds of 'hot bearing detector', which are IR scanning to distinguish the relatively 'point' source of a hot end cap from the larger signature of an overheated wheel (for example due to a sticking manual brake). Any catastrophic failure of the inner bearing (you will find reports online describing what causes these, and how rapidly they can develop) easily proceeds to axle-damaging temperature before enough heat passes out to the endcap to show the temperature rise that triggers current response. The source of all the fire in the camera records leading up to the East Palestine derailment was NOT A HOT BEARING. You can even see on the doorbell-camera footage that the truck itself has skewed and is dragging, producing sparks and flame between the rails. The crew, not being fools or trained poorly, thought they understood the best way to stop a long train in the presence of an overheating bearing -- not realizing what was actually happening back there. The sensible thing is precisely what they did: put the train in dynamic to slow it without additional heat, drag. or risk of seizure from brakeshoe application. Now, you of all people should be sensitive to the issue of what followed: The train was kept from prompt derailing by the tension of draft holding the cars in line. Going to heavy dynamic ran the slack on the (relatively) unbraked cars in, and by the time the effective "node" got back to the affected car, upset was as immediate and catastrophic as all the scenarios you were noting back a few years ago in the differential-braking threads. One thing I'm watching with interest is whether the NTSB has a way to determine just how quickly, and to what degree, the 'heavy dynamic' was actually applied after the crew received notification of the critically-hot bearing detection event. Personally I don't see any way that particular train could have been stopped, either with air or dynamics, except by differential braking of some sort (proportional and gentle) on the portion of the train behind the deflicted car. Cynically, I'll add that a great many "players" have vested interests of one sort or another in finding blame for the accident without involving their pet concerns. Much the same in many respects as the events so far in the current Williams accident. As Steve Cohen, one of the policy professors at Columbia, noted: "where you stand is where you sit."
Almost all hot bearing detector locations also include a dragging equipment detector. If the East Palestine detector had one it should have alarmed for a dragging truck.
If the engineer knew exactly what the situation in the train was he probably could have reduced the severity of, or maybe even prevented the pileup by making an emergency application of the brakes from the rear end using the end of train device.
mvlandsw Almost all hot bearing detector locations also include a dragging equipment detector. If the East Palestine detector had one it should have alarmed for a dragging truck. If the engineer knew exactly what the situation in the train was he probably could have reduced the severity of, or maybe even prevented the pileup by making an emergency application of the brakes from the rear end using the end of train device.
Euclid mvlandsw Almost all hot bearing detector locations also include a dragging equipment detector. If the East Palestine detector had one it should have alarmed for a dragging truck. If the engineer knew exactly what the situation in the train was he probably could have reduced the severity of, or maybe even prevented the pileup by making an emergency application of the brakes from the rear end using the end of train device. Thank you for that information. I understand your point about stopping the train with slack stretched by initiating an emergency application from the rear end. In so doing, even if the truck had broken up, the stretched train might have ridden it out without buckling. It could have prevented the entire pileup and spills. But apparently, the engineer relied exclusively on dynamic braking. In any case, rather than the alternative of initiating an emergency air brake application starting at the rear of the train; is it possible to initiate dynamic braking only on the rear DPU, if there is one? If that is not possible, and DPU provides only equal dynamic braking on all units; how much dynamic braking force is possible or allowed? How is that controlled? Is it just a matter of the engineer’s discretion; or is there some type of automatic control that factors train makeup, tonnage, speed, and DPU location, in order to prevent excess buff force? Or is the safe level of dynamic braking just controlled by rules? Besides the doorbell video near or at East Palestine showing fire and sparks, there was a similar display of fire and sparks shown at the surveillance video taken earlier, maybe 20-30 miles before reaching East Palestine. To my eye, the fire/sparks at that location is identical to what is shown at or very near to East Palestine. That suggests that if the cause was a derailed dragging car truck, it dragged 30 miles. It would be amazing if that did occur without any mention of it in the news or by the NTSB. With 30 miles of busted up track and grade crossings, I don’t see how such an event could be kept quiet.
To the best of my knowledge, Initiating an Emergency Brake Application has never been a APPROVED braking method when responding to Dragging Equipment indication from a Defect Detector.
EuclidYou say there was no overheated bearing and that the derailment was caused the car truck derailing for some unknown reason.
In my opinion, the original cause of the accident was likely an inside roller bearing, failing in one of the catastrophic ways that result in rapid degradation. This was not 'picked up' for the reasons others, and I, have already discussed. In all likelihood this resulted in the axle end overheating and shearing off, which would drop the end of the sideframe down and 'cock' the wheelset laterally with respect to both rails. The amount of fire appears consistent with wheels against rails in this type of situation, and it is not surprising to me that it might persist past a couple of sets of outside bearing detectors with only a nominal temperature rise from 'outer bearing' overheating being reported. I also suspect, but haven't rigorously considered as I haven't seen the detail data, that the rate of rise in detected temperature was out of all proportion to the "heat" evidenced on the cameras.
Yes, the proximate cause of the derailment was likely putting the locomotives "too quickly" into heavy dynamic braking, resulting in progressive run-in that would normally just cause audible slack action. The shock to the front of the car with the damaged truck would have caused the prompt lateral deflection that would resuit in accordioning.
On this topic:
Always entertained by what I see on Facebook and other social media. My favorite was a youtube clip sent to my facebook account of a Locomotive Engineer at a small museum (my guess), have problems believing it was part of the frieght carrying rail network. Backing up a locomotive to couple onto a snowplow, the camera inadvertently caught a pinneapple bong set up next to the control stand on the dash. It was pointed out by one of the posters in the comments section. Now granted it could have been there for decorative purposes but look at the public image that conveys and the suspicions it would raise by a visiting inspector.
CMStPnP It was pointed out by one of the posters in the comments section. Now granted it could have been there for decorative purposes but look at the public image that conveys and the suspicions it would raise by a visiting inspector.
Those stupid over-edited garbage shorts are made for reactions (ooh.. so edgy!). I don't think an engine ever actually moves in any of them.
Overmod Euclid You say there was no overheated bearing and that the derailment was caused the car truck derailing for some unknown reason. I have said no such thing, and from someone who is repeatedly touchy about allegedly being misquoted, I find it verging on insulting that you claim so. In my opinion, the original cause of the accident was likely an inside roller bearing, failing in one of the catastrophic ways that result in rapid degradation. This was not 'picked up' for the reasons others, and I, have already discussed. In all likelihood this resulted in the axle end overheating and shearing off, which would drop the end of the sideframe down and 'cock' the wheelset laterally with respect to both rails. The amount of fire appears consistent with wheels against rails in this type of situation, and it is not surprising to me that it might persist past a couple of sets of outside bearing detectors with only a nominal temperature rise from 'outer bearing' overheating being reported. I also suspect, but haven't rigorously considered as I haven't seen the detail data, that the rate of rise in detected temperature was out of all proportion to the "heat" evidenced on the cameras. Yes, the proximate cause of the derailment was likely putting the locomotives "too quickly" into heavy dynamic braking, resulting in progressive run-in that would normally just cause audible slack action. The shock to the front of the car with the damaged truck would have caused the prompt lateral deflection that would resuit in accordioning.
Euclid You say there was no overheated bearing and that the derailment was caused the car truck derailing for some unknown reason.
I have said no such thing, and from someone who is repeatedly touchy about allegedly being misquoted, I find it verging on insulting that you claim so.
Has ANY official report identified the Initial Point of Derailment.
Until that is made public, everything else is hot air.
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