zugmann jeffhergert The same reason that movements with less than a certain number of axles need to approach highway grade crossings with lights and gates prepared to stop until they are seen to activate. still-- there were 92! intermodal cars. That's a lot of wheels. Something isn't adding up here.
jeffhergert The same reason that movements with less than a certain number of axles need to approach highway grade crossings with lights and gates prepared to stop until they are seen to activate.
still-- there were 92! intermodal cars. That's a lot of wheels. Something isn't adding up here.
Agreed. Plus would rust form between the (albeit small) contact area between wheel and rail? The circuits are designed to fail safe, that is to show an occupancy if it's occupied, a rail breaks, etc. I would almost think at some point there were signal problems and a signal maintainer did a fix that had unintended consequences. That's happened before.
The equipment riding up and through the cab has happened in the past. Incidents at Clinton on the then IMRL (now CP System again) and near Red Oak on the BNSF, both in Iowa were similar.
Jeff
BaltACD ns145 Even IF the intermodal cars on passing siding had been removed, shouldn't there have been a rusty rail restriction put in place for the siding? You can't let a piece of signaled track sit dormant for close to a year and not expect things to be a bit wonky with the signaling system. The proximity to the Salton Sea should have heightened the expectation of problems. My understanding never having been there, the term Salton Sea is more historical than actual in the present day. The draught and evaporation have shrunk the size of the 'sea' to be misnomer of the term.
ns145 Even IF the intermodal cars on passing siding had been removed, shouldn't there have been a rusty rail restriction put in place for the siding? You can't let a piece of signaled track sit dormant for close to a year and not expect things to be a bit wonky with the signaling system. The proximity to the Salton Sea should have heightened the expectation of problems.
My understanding never having been there, the term Salton Sea is more historical than actual in the present day. The draught and evaporation have shrunk the size of the 'sea' to be misnomer of the term.
The Salton Sea is still there about 1800 feet away from the right of way.
https://www.railpictures.net/photo/316007/
It does sound like everything that could go wrong did go wrong. If I had been the original head end engineer, I would have insisted on entering the siding at restricted speed "just in case" my CO and I had been right about cars occupying the siding. Of course, in the modern P$R world of railroading that would probably have been seen as an act of insubordination.
Whoever released that siding back to the dispatcher is going to have a lot of explaining to do. Best I can tell from FRA regs, passing sidings are supposed to be inspected by hyrail vehicle or on foot at least once a month. Even IF the intermodal cars had been removed, additonal steps should have been required by MOW forces to return the siding back to service. Those steps, had they been taken, undoubtedly would have discovered that the intermodal cars had not been removed.
JayBeeThe Helper crew was attached 35 miles west of Bertram siding at a crossover for the shove over San Gorgonio Pass a 1.99% grade into the Los Angeles Basin. The helper crew originated at West Colton Yard and did not pass the siding. The Dispatcher was informed that Long Beach had no room for the train, with Amtrak due shortly the Dispatcher made the decision to have the Helper Crew pull the loaded stack train the 35 miles EAST to Bertram Siding which according to his CTC panel was not occupied. The Headend Crew told the Dispatcher that they thought that they had seen cars in the siding when they passed it earlier, it appears that the Helper Crew did not hear the exchange between the Headend Crew and the Dispatcher. The switch leading into the siding is good for 30 mph. An expelitive is heard over the radio and the train went into Emergency. One of the Intermodal Well Cars stored in the siding overrode the nose of the GE leading the helper set and sheared off the top of the cab before travelling over both helper locomotives and striking an upper container.
Which leads to a 2nd question. What was the 'job briefing' between the head end crew and the helper crew when the move was changed to take the train to the siding. Did the original head end crew mention to the helper crew that the 'thought' they had seen cars in the siding when they passed it?
This incident has so many communications failures involving so many parties. What a way to run a railroad!
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
The Helper crew was attached 35 miles west of Bertram siding at a crossover for the shove over San Gorgonio Pass a 1.99% grade into the Los Angeles Basin. The helper crew originated at West Colton Yard and did not pass the siding. The Dispatcher was informed that Long Beach had no room for the train, with Amtrak due shortly the Dispatcher made the decision to have the Helper Crew pull the loaded stack train the 35 miles EAST to Bertram Siding which according to his CTC panel was not occupied. The Headend Crew told the Dispatcher that they thought that they had seen cars in the siding when they passed it earlier, it appears that the Helper Crew did not hear the exchange between the Headend Crew and the Dispatcher. The switch leading into the siding is good for 30 mph. An expelitive is heard over the radio and the train went into Emergency. One of the Intermodal Well Cars stored in the siding overrode the nose of the GE leading the helper set and sheared off the top of the cab before travelling over both helper locomotives and striking an upper container.
ns145Even IF the intermodal cars on passing siding had been removed, shouldn't there have been a rusty rail restriction put in place for the siding? You can't let a piece of signaled track sit dormant for close to a year and not expect things to be a bit wonky with the signaling system. The proximity to the Salton Sea should have heightened the expectation of problems.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
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Even IF the intermodal cars on passing siding had been removed, shouldn't there have been a rusty rail restriction put in place for the siding? You can't let a piece of signaled track sit dormant for close to a year and not expect things to be a bit wonky with the signaling system. The proximity to the Salton Sea should have heightened the expectation of problems.
jeffhergert... I'm sure the focus is going to be, by almost everyone involved, is who removed the block to the CTC system. I think what's more important and I'm expecting to be obscured and downplayed is that the signal system and the PTC overlay failed. This is one of those incidents that PTC should, or as the NTSB would say, "would" prevent. Clearly, it did not. Although I will note, it failed because the signal system failed to detect the occupancy and PTC works with the signal system. Jeff
I'm sure the focus is going to be, by almost everyone involved, is who removed the block to the CTC system. I think what's more important and I'm expecting to be obscured and downplayed is that the signal system and the PTC overlay failed. This is one of those incidents that PTC should, or as the NTSB would say, "would" prevent. Clearly, it did not. Although I will note, it failed because the signal system failed to detect the occupancy and PTC works with the signal system.
I am certain the UP's CADS will indicate who removed the block on the siding - down to the second of its removal. CADS keep records on every change of state that happens. When blocks are applied and/or removed, when signals are lined and knocked down and who or what knocked them down, when authorities are issued and when the authorities are released as well as who/what obtained the authority, what was authorized and who and when the authority was released as well as any changes to the authority while it was in effect.
If the train was being moved in the reverse of its intended direction - didn't it pass the siding during its original movement and didn't the crew observe that there were intermodal cars on the siding?
Unofficial, heard 2nd hand from a dispatcher, but not one working that territory.
The train had manned helpers on the rear end. It was unable to be taken into the next yard, so it was decided to reverse the train and place it in a siding. There had been a block placed on the siding because of the cars stored on it, but it had been removed by someone. One of the crewmembers on the train's lead engine, not the helpers, talked to the dispatcher and said they remembered cars being in that siding. The dispatcher said the screen did not an occupancy on the siding.
Reversing the train placed the helpers in the lead position. They had PTC cut in and functioning. The siding is bonded and the governing signal indicated an Diverging Approach. If the siding was not bonded, or if the signal system had picked up the occupancy, the best signal indication should've been Restricting.
It has been speculated that the siding's close proximity to the Salton Sea had led to unusual oxidation of the rails to the point that the relatively light intermodal cars didn't shunt the track circuit. The same reason that movements with less than a certain number of axles need to approach highway grade crossings with lights and gates prepared to stop until they are seen to activate.
ns145The intermodal cars sheared the safety cab of the lead unit off at the frame.
Here are some BLE links with employee timetable info for the line in question:
https://blet5.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/la-timetable.pdf
https://blet5.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/2013-signal-sheets.pdf
Overmod I'll be watching to see how they killed the crew on the engine running at 28mph into empty intermodal equipment. Does not look from the one picture I have seen that the flats overrode the safety cab... For this to be possible at all is a massive failure of the Government-mandated implementation of PTC.
I'll be watching to see how they killed the crew on the engine running at 28mph into empty intermodal equipment. Does not look from the one picture I have seen that the flats overrode the safety cab...
For this to be possible at all is a massive failure of the Government-mandated implementation of PTC.
Take another good look at the linked photo. Here is another link with ground level photos: https://nbcpalmsprings.com/2022/09/08/train-derailment-kills-two-union-pacific-workers/. The intermodal cars sheared the safety cab of the lead unit off at the frame.
You store cars in sidings when you don't have any better options. Either all the other storage tracks are full, PSR or some other 'rationalization' plan ripped most of them up, or perhaps this siding was not used much for meets anymore so it unofficially evolved into just another storage track. CN and CP also do this with the remaining sidings on the directional running running zone in British Columbia.
If the siding actually was signalled then the cars should have occupied the circuit just like any other signal block and the dispatcher should not have been able to request a permissive signal for another movement to enter the siding. The train would have had to copy a 'Pass Stop' authority or perhaps enter on a 'Restricting' indication if the CTC system allowed this, but either way the train would have had to enter the siding doing restricted speed.
This reminds me more of what is called 'Siding Control Territory' in Canada, where a siding in CTC has power switches and controlled signals at both ends but the siding itself is not bonded. The siding is considered 'known to be clear' unless you are told otherwise, so you do not need to obey restricted speed and can head in at whatever speed the timetable allows (often 25 mph for us). If cars are left on a SCT siding the dispatcher will manually enter blocking in the computer to show that the siding is occupied, and a signal cannot be requested into the occupied siding unless the dispatcher first informs the crew that it is not clear.
If the blocking was removed in error then there would be nothing to prevent the dispatcher from lighting the train into the siding with no advance warning about the cars.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
You might add signal maintainer(s) on both ends of that list. Kinda sounds like the switches and sidings were NOT o/s during that 9 month period and NOT clamped.
Also would like to understand the weirdness/ dumb move of the operating bubbas storing cars in a CTC siding (passing sidings often lack derails) when there are other places out there to store cars for nine months, taking away DS options.
BaltACD Rail News - NTSB investigating deadly collision between train, stored rail cars. For Railroad Career Professionals (progressiverailroading.com) blue streak 1 NTSB announced dispatcher routed freight onto a signaled siding. NTSB investigators reported the train was traveling eastbound at about 28 mph on Mainline 2 when a UP dispatcher routed it into the west end of the signal-controlled siding (Bertram siding) on the Yuma subdivision. The train then collided with 92 empty intermodal rail cars that had been stored at the site since December 2021. First question I have - WHO removed the Blocking for the siding that would have been created when the cars were stored in December 2021? CADS will not permit a signal to be lined into a track segment that has blocking applied - without taking extra procedures.
Rail News - NTSB investigating deadly collision between train, stored rail cars. For Railroad Career Professionals (progressiverailroading.com)
blue streak 1
NTSB announced dispatcher routed freight onto a signaled siding. NTSB investigators reported the train was traveling eastbound at about 28 mph on Mainline 2 when a UP dispatcher routed it into the west end of the signal-controlled siding (Bertram siding) on the Yuma subdivision. The train then collided with 92 empty intermodal rail cars that had been stored at the site since December 2021.
NTSB announced dispatcher routed freight onto a signaled siding.
NTSB investigators reported the train was traveling eastbound at about 28 mph on Mainline 2 when a UP dispatcher routed it into the west end of the signal-controlled siding (Bertram siding) on the Yuma subdivision. The train then collided with 92 empty intermodal rail cars that had been stored at the site since December 2021.
First question I have - WHO removed the Blocking for the siding that would have been created when the cars were stored in December 2021? CADS will not permit a signal to be lined into a track segment that has blocking applied - without taking extra procedures.
UP might go to archives to find out dispatcher personnel involved ? Wonder if NTSB can find when track light no longer working ? Would that have been actived by signal bungaloes on both ends of siding ?
blue streak 1 NTSB announceddispatcher routed freigh onto a signaled siding. Wonder if siding ocupancy cicuits not working for whatever reason. The accident might cover up reason? NTSB investigators reported the train was traveling eastbound at about 28 mph on Mainline 2 when a UP dispatcher routed it into the west end of the signal-controlled siding (Bertram siding) on the Yuma subdivision. The train then collided with 92 empty intermodal rail cars that had been stored at the site since December 2021.
NTSB announceddispatcher routed freigh onto a signaled siding. Wonder if siding ocupancy cicuits not working for whatever reason. The accident might cover up reason?
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