BaltACD ...until the train gets close enough for the headlight to illuminate the semaphore blades.
And semaphores were generally out of use by the time reflective materials (ie, Scotchlite) became common. Yes, there were some reflective technologies (cat's eyes, etc), but as far as I know, they were never applied to semaphores.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Gramp BaltACD mvlandsw CSX created a problem when they installed their new signals. The restricting indication is given with a lunar white light. Under the right lighting or atmospheric conditions the lunar white can look very similiar to the green color lense that indicates clear. Then to make the situation worse they dislay the lunar white at any position on multi-head signals. Although it wouldn't completely solve the problem, if they would require the lunar white to be on the bottom head of a signal at least it could only be mistaken for a lower speed indication. I know of two rear end collisons that were caused by confusing the lunar white for a green; one in Williard and one in Cumberland. Moving away from B&O's CPL's makes it much easier for a signal indication to be misread. Color Light is no substiture for Color Position Light. Were there similar misreadings when semaphores were replaced by color lights on railroads that had semaphores?
BaltACD mvlandsw CSX created a problem when they installed their new signals. The restricting indication is given with a lunar white light. Under the right lighting or atmospheric conditions the lunar white can look very similiar to the green color lense that indicates clear. Then to make the situation worse they dislay the lunar white at any position on multi-head signals. Although it wouldn't completely solve the problem, if they would require the lunar white to be on the bottom head of a signal at least it could only be mistaken for a lower speed indication. I know of two rear end collisons that were caused by confusing the lunar white for a green; one in Williard and one in Cumberland. Moving away from B&O's CPL's makes it much easier for a signal indication to be misread. Color Light is no substiture for Color Position Light.
mvlandsw CSX created a problem when they installed their new signals. The restricting indication is given with a lunar white light. Under the right lighting or atmospheric conditions the lunar white can look very similiar to the green color lense that indicates clear. Then to make the situation worse they dislay the lunar white at any position on multi-head signals. Although it wouldn't completely solve the problem, if they would require the lunar white to be on the bottom head of a signal at least it could only be mistaken for a lower speed indication. I know of two rear end collisons that were caused by confusing the lunar white for a green; one in Williard and one in Cumberland.
Then to make the situation worse they dislay the lunar white at any position on multi-head signals.
Although it wouldn't completely solve the problem, if they would require the lunar white to be on the bottom head of a signal at least it could only be mistaken for a lower speed indication.
I know of two rear end collisons that were caused by confusing the lunar white for a green; one in Williard and one in Cumberland.
Moving away from B&O's CPL's makes it much easier for a signal indication to be misread. Color Light is no substiture for Color Position Light.
Were there similar misreadings when semaphores were replaced by color lights on railroads that had semaphores?
At night one could not see the position of the semaphore blades - only the color of the light that was being displayed for the train - in the dark, semaphores are just color light signals until the train gets close enough for the headlight to illuminate the semaphore blades.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
According to this report, gates were down, truck hits gate and train and truck driver died. No one on train was injured. Looks like a pick up truck.
https://whdh.com/news/officials-investigating-after-deadly-crash-between-amtrak-train-truck-in-haverhill/
https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/amtrak-train-vehicle-incident-near-haverhill/2599769/
vJust heard Downeaster had an accident with a car. Just saw video of another Downeaster approaching colision train. Collision is on a portion of what appears as 2 main tracks.
mvlandswCSX created a problem when they installed their new signals. The restricting indication is given with a lunar white light. Under the right lighting or atmospheric conditions the lunar white can look very similiar to the green color lense that indicates clear. Then to make the situation worse they dislay the lunar white at any position on multi-head signals. Although it wouldn't completely solve the problem, if they would require the lunar white to be on the bottom head of a signal at least it could only be mistaken for a lower speed indication. I know of two rear end collisons that were caused by confusing the lunar white for a green; one in Williard and one in Cumberland.
CSX created a problem when they installed their new signals. The restricting indication is given with a lunar white light. Under the right lighting or atmospheric conditions the lunar white can look very similiar to the green color lense that indicates clear.
And was anything done to correct answer obvious problem?
From http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2012/r12t0038/r12t0038.html
Telling statistic.
Since 2002, a signal indication was misidentified, misinterpreted or not immediately recognized on average of 11 times a year.
blue streak 1Didn't the FRA after this accident require any passenger train leaving a station to operate at restricted speeds until next signal is passed and operate at that's aspect ? Or is it until next signal observed ?
That is what the Delayed In Block is all about. Leave scheduled station stop at a speed that will permit stopping at next signal - until such signal is observed and is displaying a indication other than STOP.
In SOME station locations, signals are being placed right where the engine would be after the train makes its scheduled stop - the NEXT signal is in immediate view.
BaltACD blue streak 1 I would expect that a lot of delayed in block trains would be oversized loads. Observed one the other day doing just about 5 MPH with a 32 axel load. Also could MOW equipment also be delayed in block ? DIB was raised to a issue in the MARC vs. Capitol Limited collision at control point Georgetown Jct near Silver Spring, MD on February 16, 1996. In the preceeding months CSX had performed a signal respacing project along the Metropolitan Sub to improve safety with the size freight trains that were being operated on the territory. A Eastbound MARC commuter train after accepting a 'Approach' signal indication made a station stop to pick up/discharge passengers. The engineer on the MARC train (that was being operated in push mode) left the station stop as if he had a Clear signal upon entering the station. The MARC train accelerated toward track speed and came around the curve at Georgetown Jct. to see Amtrak P029 crossing over from #2 track to #1 track ahead and the Absolute signal for the control point displaying STOP. 8 dead on the MARC train. Afterwards, the FRA came out with enhanced Delay In Block regulations that included passenger trains making scheduled station stops. MofW Equipment operates on track authorities - they DO NOT operate on signal indication.
blue streak 1 I would expect that a lot of delayed in block trains would be oversized loads. Observed one the other day doing just about 5 MPH with a 32 axel load. Also could MOW equipment also be delayed in block ?
DIB was raised to a issue in the MARC vs. Capitol Limited collision at control point Georgetown Jct near Silver Spring, MD on February 16, 1996.
In the preceeding months CSX had performed a signal respacing project along the Metropolitan Sub to improve safety with the size freight trains that were being operated on the territory. A Eastbound MARC commuter train after accepting a 'Approach' signal indication made a station stop to pick up/discharge passengers. The engineer on the MARC train (that was being operated in push mode) left the station stop as if he had a Clear signal upon entering the station. The MARC train accelerated toward track speed and came around the curve at Georgetown Jct. to see Amtrak P029 crossing over from #2 track to #1 track ahead and the Absolute signal for the control point displaying STOP. 8 dead on the MARC train.
Afterwards, the FRA came out with enhanced Delay In Block regulations that included passenger trains making scheduled station stops.
MofW Equipment operates on track authorities - they DO NOT operate on signal indication.
BaltACDMofW Equipment operates on track authorities - they DO NOT operate on signal indication.
NORAC exception being interlocking rules. But they still have to report clear of the interlocking.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
BaltACDAfterwards, the FRA came out with enhanced Delay In Block regulations that included passenger trains making scheduled station stops.
When I'm listening in Utica I regularly hear Amtrak engineers announce "[train] departing Utica, in on a [name your aspect].
VIA had a similar crash in 2012. As the entire head end crew was killed and the locomotive was not equipped with any cameras there is no absolute proof of what actually went on in the cab and what signals the crew saw (or thought they saw), but the most likely explanation based on available evidence is that they forgot what signal indication they came in on before making a station stop, and thought they would be routed down a straight main track (like normal) instead of through a 15 mph turnout.
http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2012/r12t0038/r12t0038.html
As it turned out this incident eventually led to inward-facing cameras and cab voice recorders becoming legal in Canada, with the railway companies having access to the footage and recordings.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
blue streak 1I would expect that a lot of delayed in block trains would be oversized loads. Observed one the other day doing just about 5 MPH with a 32 axel load. Also could MOW equipment also be delayed in block ?
I would expect that a lot of delayed in block trains would be oversized loads. Observed one the other day doing just about 5 MPH with a 32 axel load. Also could MOW equipment also be delayed in block ?
Sometimes MOW equipment moves as a train, using signal indications or "proceed from" track warrants. An example would be things like the Herzog MPM, which in travel mode can move at normal train speeds. But your typical on-track equipment gets special verbal authorities in CTC territory and interlockings, and "work between" warrants in track warranty territory. It must always be prepared to stop in half the range of vision, and must approach every road crossing prepared to yield to road traffic. These movements are made without any regard to the wayside signals, so DIB is not an issue. Aso: the signal system doesn't protect work equipment. Even in CTC a single dispatcher error CAN lead to a train v. MOW collision all by itself.
And to oversimplify things a bit: just like certain kinds of work equipment sometimes move as trains, work trains sometimes move as if they were work equipment.
Dan
No. MOW equipment isn't governed by signal indications.
Delayed in the Block happens when the speed drops below 10 mph. The GCOR rule number is 9.9, which is any easy way to remember it. If your speed drops to 9.9, you're delayed in the block.
If you are in continuous cab signal territory, you're never delayed in the block, even if you stop. The cab signal indicates the condition of the block you are in.
Jeff
Most MOW equipment does not operate on signal indications, most smaller equipment will not reliably shunt track circuits and a lot of equipment has insulated wheels/axles so they cannot activate crossings or the signal system.
Such equipment normally operates under written work authorities from the RTC, in Canada it's called a Track Occupancy Permit (TOP) in CTC territory.
Delayed in the block would more likely apply to trains that have stopped to perform switching or due to an emergency brake application (perhaps caused by a train separation).
A speed restricted movement handling a dimensional load would easily be able to comply with this particular rule.
Jeff - you corrected two things I said wrong (the speeds at which electric locks are required, and the DIB rule). Thanks you for that. I corrected my previous post.
dpeltier Lithonia Operator But I don't get why it's okay for a train in a controlled siding to go twice as fast as the train on the main? Could you give an example that illustrates why this is. No, I don't really know the answer to this one. It may be a cost / benefit calculation given that sidings have a higher density of hand-throw switches, and that it's still going to be safer to install CTC on that low-speed siding than to leave it "uncontrolled" (see below). Lithonia Operator And what is a controlled siding? Any siding entered by a remotely-controlled switch? Traditionally, under T & TO operation, sidings were not under the dispatcher's control, i.e. a train didn't need to have any authority to be on a siding. The same is still true today in track warrant territory. But in CTC, sidings are usually operated just like the main track. Trains get authority to enter the siding from the controlled signals at either end; or, if they're entering via a hand-throw switch in the middle of the siding, they have to get verbal authority from the dispatcher. The same rules apply to maintenance-of-way work groups. To work on a siding in track warranty territory, they must set up derails or line and lock switches away from their route, whereas in CTC territory they would need to get an autority from the dispatcher. So generally speaking, a siding in CTC territory is "controlled siding", while a siding in track warranty territory is not. However, the rules books tend to use the phrase "controlled siding" rather than "CTC siding". I assume this is because it's always possible for the division timetable to designate a CTC siding to be uncontrolled, or for a track warrant siding to be controlled. In the original ETMS (the predecessor to the PTC system used by all the big freight railroads), which was only ever deployed on a track warrant line, it was possible to designate sidings as being "controlled". But that appears to have gone away. Other than that I've never encountered sidings where "controlled" vs "uncontrolled" doesn't correspond to CTC vs track warrant, but it's a wide world out there. I edited my previous post to remove the term "controlled siding" when discussing speeds and electric lock requirements, because it's redundant. The electric lock is only required if the switch is on a CTC track. Dan
Lithonia Operator But I don't get why it's okay for a train in a controlled siding to go twice as fast as the train on the main? Could you give an example that illustrates why this is.
But I don't get why it's okay for a train in a controlled siding to go twice as fast as the train on the main? Could you give an example that illustrates why this is.
No, I don't really know the answer to this one. It may be a cost / benefit calculation given that sidings have a higher density of hand-throw switches, and that it's still going to be safer to install CTC on that low-speed siding than to leave it "uncontrolled" (see below).
Lithonia Operator And what is a controlled siding? Any siding entered by a remotely-controlled switch?
And what is a controlled siding? Any siding entered by a remotely-controlled switch?
Traditionally, under T & TO operation, sidings were not under the dispatcher's control, i.e. a train didn't need to have any authority to be on a siding. The same is still true today in track warrant territory. But in CTC, sidings are usually operated just like the main track. Trains get authority to enter the siding from the controlled signals at either end; or, if they're entering via a hand-throw switch in the middle of the siding, they have to get verbal authority from the dispatcher.
The same rules apply to maintenance-of-way work groups. To work on a siding in track warranty territory, they must set up derails or line and lock switches away from their route, whereas in CTC territory they would need to get an autority from the dispatcher.
So generally speaking, a siding in CTC territory is "controlled siding", while a siding in track warranty territory is not.
However, the rules books tend to use the phrase "controlled siding" rather than "CTC siding". I assume this is because it's always possible for the division timetable to designate a CTC siding to be uncontrolled, or for a track warrant siding to be controlled.
In the original ETMS (the predecessor to the PTC system used by all the big freight railroads), which was only ever deployed on a track warrant line, it was possible to designate sidings as being "controlled". But that appears to have gone away. Other than that I've never encountered sidings where "controlled" vs "uncontrolled" doesn't correspond to CTC vs track warrant, but it's a wide world out there.
I edited my previous post to remove the term "controlled siding" when discussing speeds and electric lock requirements, because it's redundant. The electric lock is only required if the switch is on a CTC track.
We have had cases where an engine was set out in a track not properly equipped for allowing a train or engine to clear. Instead of another train picking it up, it was decided to run it light power to another station where they were assembling a grain train. The crew called for the move said they thought they couldn't "legally" enter the main track at this location. It was decided they were right and another train was required to stop and "reach in" and pull the engine out.
BTW, Delayed in the Block in CTC territory doesn't require restricted speed. Only that a train be prepared to stop at the next signal.
We have a variation called Siding Control Territory in Canada, where the siding itself is dark (unbonded) but has power switches and signals at both ends. The siding is to be considered "known to be clear" unless told otherwise, so trains can head in at the permissible speed (usually 15 or 25 mph) without needing to comply with the requirements of reduced or restricted speed.
Verbal permission from the RTC is all that is required to occupy a SCT siding if you are entering somewhere along it, such as from a spur or a foreman putting on at a crossing.
This arrangement also allows one train to follow another into the siding on signal indication without needing to copy a pass stop authority, in this case the RTC is required to inform the second train that the siding is not clear before requesting the signal into the siding.
Lithonia Operator "Rail Traffic Controller" seems like a modern term. Back in the day, did Canadian roads also use the term "dispatcher?"
"Rail Traffic Controller" seems like a modern term. Back in the day, did Canadian roads also use the term "dispatcher?"
Yes. I'm not sure when the change happened. Probably around the time the UCOR was replaced with the CROR.
Lithonia Operator In the case of this accident, will the RTC almost certainly get fired?
In the case of this accident, will the RTC almost certainly get fired?
The RTC will almost certainly face severe discipline, but may or may not be dismissed. This sort of error is akin to a train crew passing a stop signal or otherwise occupying the main track without proper authority. These offences normally warrant a lengthy suspension and/or a lot of demerits, but whether or not you get fired depends on the particulars of the individual incident.
tree68I would opine that a controlled siding would be one that will be in regular use for things like meets and passes, whereas an uncontrolled siding would be one used to access industries, etc.
From the 2014 CSX Rule Book
503.3 Sidings are designated in special instructions and are used for the purpose of meeting and passing trains. The following siding designations apply: a. Controlled Siding: A track designated in special instructions as a controlled siding. In signal territory, signals do not govern movement on the siding. Entrance and exit signals only authorize trains to enter or leave the siding, or b. Signaled Siding: A track designated in special instructions as a signaled siding where movement on the siding is authorized by block signals and signal rules apply to movement on the siding.
a. Controlled Siding: A track designated in special instructions as a controlled siding. In signal territory, signals do not govern movement on the siding. Entrance and exit signals only authorize trains to enter or leave the siding, or
b. Signaled Siding: A track designated in special instructions as a signaled siding where movement on the siding is authorized by block signals and signal rules apply to movement on the siding.
Here is the definition of a controlled siding from NORAC. I suspect GCOR and Canadian rule books have similar defintions:
CONTROLLED SIDING (CS): A circuited siding in which both ends are controlled and governed by signals under the control of a Dispatcher or Operator.
If the siding is "circuited", I expect that means the dispatcher can see when the siding is occupied by equipment that can shunt the track circuit. An industry siding is unlikely to be circuited, and so once a train goes on one, it disappears off the dispatchers "radar". But whatever switch allows the train out of the uncontrolled siding and back onto controlled track will need to be tied into whatever signalling system exists. It is at those locations where I imagine the switch timers most often come into play.
I would opine that a controlled siding would be one that will be in regular use for things like meets and passes, whereas an uncontrolled siding would be one used to access industries, etc.
Thanks, Dan! I learned a lot from your great explanations. Nicely written.
Still in training.
There have been a number of useful posts describing electric locks. I'm not sure I'm going to add anything that hasn't already been said, but I thought that for people not familiar with the concept a summary might be nice.
An electric lock is a device that is placed on a hand-throw switch for the sole and express purpose of preventing exactly the kind of incident described by SD70Dude, where a train enters main track at a hand-throw switch and collides with a train that was proceeding on the main line following signal indications. In the US they are required in the circumstances where that scenario is most likely to happen, namely when the hand-throw switch meets all of the following criteria:
1.) Switch is in CTC territory.
2.) Trains are allowed to clear mainline at this switch (as opposed to, say, a short setout track). If a train can't clear the main track at the switch, then generally there is no possibility of a train entering the main track here either.
3.) Main track speed is high enough that people wouldn't be able to see and react to the situation in time to prevent a collision. (FRA defimes "high enough" as > 20 MPH for a mainline track and > 30 MPH for a siding.)
An electric lock, as the name suggests, is a switch lock. It prevents the points of the switch from moving. To unlock the switch, one of two things has to happen. The simpler but less interesting case is when a train is on the mainline and wants to make a facing point move through the diverging route. In this situation, the crew must stop the train directly in front of the switch, and then turn a toggle to unlock the switch. There is a short (~200') track circuit in front of the switch point - if this circuit is shunted when the toggle is thrown, the machine will unlock immediately.
On the other hand, if there is nothing immediately in front of the switch when someone toggles the the toggle, the machine assumes that a train is seeking to ENTER the main line. So, the first thing it does is turn the status of the block to occupied - just like an actual open switch would. That sets the signals protecting the block to their most restrictive aspect (like STOP or RESTRICTING). But the switch point lock does not release immediately. Instead, it starts running a timer. Once the timer has run all the way down, THEN the switch unlocks.
The principle is that, if a train tries to enter the main line while another train has already been lined through on the main, that mainline train should show up BEFORE the switch unlocks; or, the mainline train should be far enough away that it can comply with the restrictive signals at either end of the block. In either event one or both crews have a chance to see that something is wrong, the trains can stop without colliding, and the trainmaster and chief dispatchers can start getting hold of the drug testing company.
The length of the timer is set based on the following: take the distance from the switch to the farthest signal that will display a non-CLEAR aspect when the timer starts. Remember, when the timer starts, the signals for the block that the switch is in turn "red". That's going to cause Approach and probably Advance Approach signals further out, so the distance can easily be almost 3 blocks long. Now, figure out the maximum length of time that a train can take to cover that distance without triggering the Delayed In Block rule. That time, probably with some adjustments or buffers, is how long the timer will run for to ensure that any other trains out there have either passed by or stopped at the red signals. My impression was that the timer is typically much longer than 5 minutes, with 10-20 minutes being the more common range.
The same principle applies at control points and interlockings, too. If a dispatcher has signals displayed for one route, and then he changes his mind and takes those signals away so that he can line a different route instead, that second route won't line until a timer has run. Any train that was already proceeding based on the first set of signals has either arrived at the control point and taken the original route (which was clear when it was lined and should still be safe now), or has stopped short of the control point, by the time the first route unlocks.
This is all part of the principle that says that the signal system should make it more or less impossible for dispatcher error alone to cause a train collision in CTC territory. The signal system is supposed to provide that protection autonomously.
Compliance with the Delayed In Block rule and the Restricted Speed rules are a critical part of that safety scheme, and are probably the part where there is the most room for human error. (Delayed In Block says - basically - that a train that takes a long time to get through a signal block has to proceed ready to stop at the next signal - just in case changes up ahead have made that signal more restrictive that they otherwise would have expected based on what they entered the block.)
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