Here is one example of this type of accident:
I have notes on a newspaper article I found that was published circa 1886. It focuses on the Lehigh Valley Railroad where a large group of track workers were engaged in their work on a double track mainline with a grade in mountainous territory. Suddenly a slow moving milk train appeared heading up the grade. It was making a lot of noise and it drew everyone’s attention. The crew leader blew his whistle and waved for all the workers to clear the milk train. They acknowledged by the whole group simultaneously stepping back to clear the milk train. They stepped back off of the track they were working on, and onto the other mainline track without looking to see if it was clear.
At that moment one of the so-called, “Lightning Express Trains” was coming down the grade and moving fast. So as the gang stepped back out of the path of the milk train, they stepped directly into the path of the express train. I would have to look this up for more details, but I recall that something like 10-15 people were killed and many more were injured. The express train stopped, and the remainder of the gang ran toward its engine bent on revenge. The crew saw this developing, and they highballed to get away from the rioting track gang.
All of the elements of this type of distraction accident were present in this Lehigh Valley disaster. There were two trains simultaneously converging on a group of people. The sound of the milk train got their attention first because it was the loudest sound. Once it got their attention, they failed to look at the other track to see if it was clear. They saw and heard only one train, no doubt believing that they were completely alert for trains.
243129 charlie hebdo More rules? More and better training and supervision? Seems to me even an untrained person with an ounce of street smarts would NOT walk with his back to traffic on a busy RoW with trains running at over 100 mph. With proper vetting by experienced employees, not HR folks who read the job description, one can determine if the candidate possesses the acumen for a position in railroad operations.
charlie hebdo More rules? More and better training and supervision? Seems to me even an untrained person with an ounce of street smarts would NOT walk with his back to traffic on a busy RoW with trains running at over 100 mph.
More rules? More and better training and supervision? Seems to me even an untrained person with an ounce of street smarts would NOT walk with his back to traffic on a busy RoW with trains running at over 100 mph.
With proper vetting by experienced employees, not HR folks who read the job description, one can determine if the candidate possesses the acumen for a position in railroad operations.
Sorry Charlie, your tuna has passed its sell by date. Conductor lost situational awareness and he and his trainee paid the ultimate price. All the vetting in the world does not ELIMINATE the loss of situational awareness, it may decrease the occurence but it will not ELIMINATE it.
Professional race drivers have the most serious and strenuous vetting process of any the world in place - every time they buckle into a race car, from the time they are children to the time they have attained such skills and proficiency in handling high powered 'land missles' they are judged on their abilities - and they make mistakes - mistakes that have the ability to claim their lives.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Euclid So back in the days when crewmembers used to get on and off moving equipment, what did the people with street smarts do? I suppose they said "Nothing doing, I will take the safest course and get on and off only when the equipment is standing still."
So back in the days when crewmembers used to get on and off moving equipment, what did the people with street smarts do? I suppose they said "Nothing doing, I will take the safest course and get on and off only when the equipment is standing still."
No, I did not count the cars that night, but 55 or so years ago that was what I saw running regularly.
Johnny
Maybe. At least on this issue, it shouldn't be hard to figure out if they have the street smarts and aren't reckless.
People with lots of street smarts lost fingers and hands with link and pin couplings.
Up to a point, the Harpers Ferry video, previously posted by Overmod, is a perfect example of what happened at Ivy City. The only difference is that the two trains did not converge on the potential victim at the same time. If they had, I estimate a 90% chance that he would have been struck.
That guy is clearly inside of the foul zone of the track he is standing next to. The guy is mesmerized with all attention focused on the first train. The mechanical sound of the first train is blending with any perceptible mechanical sound of the second train. The guy does have his head on a swivel, but the swivel frequency is set too low, even though his last swivel is just in the nick of time. Actually, it appears that he hears the horn of the second train just in time.
Unlike the Ivy City accident, this Harpers Ferry incident did not have two trains simultaneously converging on the person (s). In the Harpers Ferry incident, the second train blew the horn because they saw the danger of the person in their path.
If the first train had been approaching the person at the same instant, would they too have blown the horn in order to make the warning stronger even though the guy was not in their path? I suspect they would have. If so, there would have been the two trains sounding the horn at the same time, and sounding like one horn instead of two. If that happened, I suspect the guy would have been struck by the second train.
So situational awareness, head on a swivel, expecting trains, etc. all work well for the average conditions of one train approaching. In that case, there is also the engineer ready to warn the unwary with the horn; free of any confusion over two different horns blowing at the same time.
But the simultaneous, two-train approach has added dangers that threaten the effectiveness of the normal situational awareness. In the simultaneous, two-train approach, I believe that it is only the rarity of the event that is the main prevention of an accident, and not the admonitions about situational awareness. As we see in the video, the two-train even is a sort of trap that sneaks up on a person. In this case it is fortunate that the two-train trap lacked the third, essential component of simultaneity in the approach of the two trains. That component would have made the trap complete, and thus caused the person to be struck by the second train.
So I think it is a mistake to lump this type of two-train accident into the general mishap of being struck by a train due to lack of situational awareness, etc. It is easy to conclude that the existing rules should have prevented the Ivy City accident, but I believe those existing rules are not sufficient for that type of accident.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pd6maEpbzDg
EuclidThe safer course is not working in train service. Hindsight is always 20/20. Every accident could have been prevented if only a safer course had been taken.
For some reason the site will not let me respond tp your PM. Point taken however. Point made also.
tree68 Yeah - hard to figure how anyone can not understand that walking on the tracks of a 95 MPH mainline is not taking the safe course.
The safer course is not working in train service. Hindsight is always 20/20. Every accident could have been prevented if only a safer course had been taken.
rrnut282 My opinion is mine, and I choose not to share. After wasting an hour reading through this pointless back and forth, I also choose to go to another web-site. Good Day.
My opinion is mine, and I choose not to share. After wasting an hour reading through this pointless back and forth, I also choose to go to another web-site. Good Day.
Yeah - hard to figure how anyone can not understand that walking on the tracks of a 95 MPH mainline is not taking the safe course.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
+1
rrnut282 Mr. Numbers Are you a politician? Your pontifications add nothing to the discussion and are pedantic and tiresome.
Mr. Numbers
Are you a politician? Your pontifications add nothing to the discussion and are pedantic and tiresome.
So tell us what is your position on the ivy City tragedy?
Here is the Operations Factual Report. On page 6, it shows a head-on view of the CSX train. On your right side as viewing the picture, the next track is the Amtrak track where the two conductors were walking. Previously, I had calculated that there was 5 feet of space between the CSX track and the nearest Amtrak track without fouling either one. But in reviewing this photo again, I am not so sure if there is 5 feet available there. You can see the fouling point on the CSX locomotive. If you placed a similar locomotive on the Amtrak track, there may be more like 3.5 ft. or 4 ft. from the side of the CSX train to the foul line of the Amtrak track.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=470783&docketID=62103&mkey=95451
charlie hebdo Joe. Most folks on here, including those with years of rail experience, don't choose to respond to your tantrums and perseverations because you are boring, rude and incapable of an intelligent discussion.
Joe. Most folks on here, including those with years of rail experience, don't choose to respond to your tantrums and perseverations because you are boring, rude and incapable of an intelligent discussion.
This is your way of dodging the questions I'm asking you. When cornered you run that is part of your modus operandi. This post is an obvious dodge. Point out where my discussions are unintelligent in your estimation. You will avoid answering that by posting some more blather.
Yeah, whatever. It's quite clear that you believe that the crew did nothing wrong and that CSX was solely responsible for their deaths because they didn't have a rule.
tree68 General Safety Rule 10, in this document, states in part, “…be alert for and keep clear of the movement of cars, locomotives, or equipment at any time, in either direction, on any track.” I'm not sure how you can interpret that other than "stay the heck off the tracks unless you absolutely need to be there.
I'm not sure how you can interpret that other than "stay the heck off the tracks unless you absolutely need to be there.
EuclidAny claim that the two conductors were careless for walking on the track, or had no right to be there prior to the approach of #175 is nothing more than an opinion that the level of risk was unacceptable.
A claim and opinion proven by the fact that they lost their lives.
Just because there is no rule specifically preventing walking on the Amtrak track does not mean that they should do it. You seem to be stuck on "there was no rule," yet you cite the following from the report:
General Safety Rule 10, in this document, states in part, “…be alert for and keep clear of the movement of cars, locomotives, or equipment at any time, in either direction, on any track.”
Euclid If the two conductors had stayed within the non-foul zone, they would not have been struck by #175.
And that's all that really needs to be said.
Lithonia Operator Those trainmen were only 25 and 20 years old.
Those trainmen were only 25 and 20 years old.
Inexperience to go along with their poor training, poor supervision and poor vetting. The unknowing teaching the unknowing.
243129 243129 BaltACD tree68 NORAC already has a rule in place that would apply in this situation: V. Fouling Tracks Fouling a track may be necessary in the performance of railroad work. Employees must expect the movement of trains, locomotives, or other on-track equipment at any time, on any track, in either direction. Employees must maintain a vigilant lookout for and detect the approach of a train, locomotive or other railroad equipment moving in either direction. Proper safeguards for the job classification needing protection must be in place before fouling any track. Direct copy and paste from NORAC, 11th Edition. I have no reason to doubt that CSX has the same, or a very similar, rule. Amtrak uses NORAC. In addition, there are specific rules about fouling track: 140. Foul Time Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher. A. Action Required Prior to Issuance Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track. B. Permission to Foul Permission to foul the track must include the following information: 1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time 2. Track designation 3. Track limits (between/at) 4. Time limits The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective. C. Releasing Foul Time Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The employee who was granted Foul Time must not release the Foul Time until they have ensured that all fouling activity under their authority has been cleared. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed. NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018 To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not. "Just that it is not" seems to indicate that you purport to have knowledge of Amtrak rules. You do not and you have disappointed your cheerleader. You say "those rules" which are in direct reference tree 68's post which contains the NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018 rules and you are now trying to say that you are referring to B&O rules??? Nice try at damage control.
243129 BaltACD tree68 NORAC already has a rule in place that would apply in this situation: V. Fouling Tracks Fouling a track may be necessary in the performance of railroad work. Employees must expect the movement of trains, locomotives, or other on-track equipment at any time, on any track, in either direction. Employees must maintain a vigilant lookout for and detect the approach of a train, locomotive or other railroad equipment moving in either direction. Proper safeguards for the job classification needing protection must be in place before fouling any track. Direct copy and paste from NORAC, 11th Edition. I have no reason to doubt that CSX has the same, or a very similar, rule. Amtrak uses NORAC. In addition, there are specific rules about fouling track: 140. Foul Time Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher. A. Action Required Prior to Issuance Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track. B. Permission to Foul Permission to foul the track must include the following information: 1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time 2. Track designation 3. Track limits (between/at) 4. Time limits The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective. C. Releasing Foul Time Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The employee who was granted Foul Time must not release the Foul Time until they have ensured that all fouling activity under their authority has been cleared. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed. NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018 To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not. "Just that it is not" seems to indicate that you purport to have knowledge of Amtrak rules. You do not and you have disappointed your cheerleader.
BaltACD tree68 NORAC already has a rule in place that would apply in this situation: V. Fouling Tracks Fouling a track may be necessary in the performance of railroad work. Employees must expect the movement of trains, locomotives, or other on-track equipment at any time, on any track, in either direction. Employees must maintain a vigilant lookout for and detect the approach of a train, locomotive or other railroad equipment moving in either direction. Proper safeguards for the job classification needing protection must be in place before fouling any track. Direct copy and paste from NORAC, 11th Edition. I have no reason to doubt that CSX has the same, or a very similar, rule. Amtrak uses NORAC. In addition, there are specific rules about fouling track: 140. Foul Time Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher. A. Action Required Prior to Issuance Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track. B. Permission to Foul Permission to foul the track must include the following information: 1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time 2. Track designation 3. Track limits (between/at) 4. Time limits The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective. C. Releasing Foul Time Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The employee who was granted Foul Time must not release the Foul Time until they have ensured that all fouling activity under their authority has been cleared. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed. NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018 To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not.
tree68 NORAC already has a rule in place that would apply in this situation: V. Fouling Tracks Fouling a track may be necessary in the performance of railroad work. Employees must expect the movement of trains, locomotives, or other on-track equipment at any time, on any track, in either direction. Employees must maintain a vigilant lookout for and detect the approach of a train, locomotive or other railroad equipment moving in either direction. Proper safeguards for the job classification needing protection must be in place before fouling any track. Direct copy and paste from NORAC, 11th Edition. I have no reason to doubt that CSX has the same, or a very similar, rule. Amtrak uses NORAC. In addition, there are specific rules about fouling track: 140. Foul Time Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher. A. Action Required Prior to Issuance Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track. B. Permission to Foul Permission to foul the track must include the following information: 1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time 2. Track designation 3. Track limits (between/at) 4. Time limits The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective. C. Releasing Foul Time Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The employee who was granted Foul Time must not release the Foul Time until they have ensured that all fouling activity under their authority has been cleared. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed. NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018
V. Fouling Tracks Fouling a track may be necessary in the performance of railroad work. Employees must expect the movement of trains, locomotives, or other on-track equipment at any time, on any track, in either direction. Employees must maintain a vigilant lookout for and detect the approach of a train, locomotive or other railroad equipment moving in either direction. Proper safeguards for the job classification needing protection must be in place before fouling any track.
Direct copy and paste from NORAC, 11th Edition.
I have no reason to doubt that CSX has the same, or a very similar, rule. Amtrak uses NORAC.
In addition, there are specific rules about fouling track:
140. Foul Time Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher.
A. Action Required Prior to Issuance Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track.
B. Permission to Foul Permission to foul the track must include the following information:
1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time
2. Track designation
3. Track limits (between/at)
4. Time limits
The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective.
C. Releasing Foul Time Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The employee who was granted Foul Time must not release the Foul Time until they have ensured that all fouling activity under their authority has been cleared. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed.
NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018
To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not.
"Just that it is not" seems to indicate that you purport to have knowledge of Amtrak rules. You do not and you have disappointed your cheerleader.
You say "those rules" which are in direct reference tree 68's post which contains the NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018 rules and you are now trying to say that you are referring to B&O rules??? Nice try at damage control.
Your statement, enlarged and highlighted above, is in response to tre68's post about NORAC rules. Where does it say:
"My statement about the rules Tree68 mentions was that CSX had similar rules and those rules were emphasised in MofW Rules Classes and not so much in T&E Rules Classes. All rules apply to all employees, rules classes emphasize the rules each craft of employees are 'most likely' to be using"
You said nothing of the kind.
Your statement to tree68 is in direct response to NORAC rules procedures.
Your attempt at damage control is feeble and your cheering section seems to have gone silent.
Lithonia Operator Being on the "Amtrak side" of their train does not equate with walking on the ties of Amtrak's track.
Being on the "Amtrak side" of their train does not equate with walking on the ties of Amtrak's track.
You are right that there is a difference between being out of the foul zone of the Amtrak track and within the non-foul zone between the CSX track and the Amtrak track. I estimate the non-foul zone to be 4 feet wide. If the two conductors had stayed within the non-foul zone, they would not have been struck by #175.
From the NTSB report:
“The operating crews were not prohibited from walking either on or near the Amtrak tracks.”
All we know is that the two conductors disregarded the approach of #175 during the ten seconds between the time the train was in sight and the time it stuck them. This was the total extent of their rules violation that we know of. They had the right to walk on that track, except for the requirement to get clear of #175.
Any claim that the two conductors were careless for walking on the track, or had no right to be there prior to the approach of #175 is nothing more than an opinion that the level of risk was unacceptable.
BaltACD 243129 Here ya go BaltACD it's all here show me where I'm wrong. CSX and I feel certain most all railroads have a similar segment of rules. How Amtrak conducts their rules classes and how CSX conducts their rules classes are most likely similar but different.
243129 Here ya go BaltACD it's all here show me where I'm wrong.
CSX and I feel certain most all railroads have a similar segment of rules. How Amtrak conducts their rules classes and how CSX conducts their rules classes are most likely similar but different.
What is the relevance of the rules on the procedure of protection or foul time if there is no rule that required it to be used at Ivy City or anywhere else?
Lithonia Operator I give up.
I give up.
The most sane decision you can make with some of the characters on here, sir.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
243129Here ya go BaltACD it's all here show me where I'm wrong.
CSX and I feel certain most all railroads have a similar segment of rules. How Amtrak conducts their rules classes and how CSX conducts their rules classes are most likely similar but different. Each carrier most likley will concentrate and emphasise the rules that have been demonstrated by previous incidents that employees are having troulbe getting 'correct' from the company's point of view.
Every railroad has thier own rules - the rules may be similar, but not identical. My statement about the rules Tree68 mentions was that CSX had similar rules and those rules were emphasised in MofW Rules Classes and not so much in T&E Rules Classes. All rules apply to all employees, rules classes emphasize the rules each craft of employees are 'most likely' to be using.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.