Tragic news.
Hope for the missing man to be found alive, thoughts and prayers for the dead man's family.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Is it dark at 7:45 PM local time there?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Rear-end crashes aren't often fatal, but this one appears to have occured at a fairly high rate of speed (given the number of cars that derailed). After looking up the sunset times for Cheyenne, it was either twilight or dark at the time this crash happened.
Causes? Dispatcher? Engineer? Signal failure? Equipment?
BaltACD Is it dark at 7:45 PM local time there?
Johnny
Is PTC not yet active on this line segment?
The line has PTC and cab signals. For now trains run either PTC or cab signals, but not both at the same time. I've heard that neither system was in use on the moving train.
For the time being, if an engine isn't equipped for PTC it can still lead in PTC territory. In cab signal territory the leader has to be cab signal equipped. If an engine has working PTC, they will use PTC and shut off the cab signals. If it doesn't have PTC or it fails, then they run on cab signals. If the cab signal fails, then they run with an absolute block ahead of them.
Jeff
Holy crap I have seen the pictures of a multiple vechile MVA before and dang near puked. This however looks like a 2K lb Mk 84 bomb blew up in that wreckage. The only I pray is that crewmember that died did not feel anything when he passed. I am also praying that the other one the MIA one is still alive but from the looks of the wreckage I have my doubts.
There's nothing I can say or do to ease the pain and sorrow caused by the two fatalities. May the two crewmembers rest in eternal peace and may those they left behind find the strength and comfort they need to go on.
It will be interesting (there is no point to any speculation here) to find out, if possible, how this happened on a PTC/cab singnal equipped line.
The views of the impact and damages would leave one to believe that the striking train was operating at or near the maximum allowed track speed. The question becomes why.
BaltACD The views of the impact and damages would leave one to believe that the striking train was operating at or near the maximum allowed track speed. "The question becomes why."
The views of the impact and damages would leave one to believe that the striking train was operating at or near the maximum allowed track speed. "The question becomes why."
A couple of questions come to mind: Even in this time when there is PTC and In-cab signals;
A.)Is there no radio communication [direct or in-direct] between train crews ?
When I was in an area of Memphis,Tn. (primarily ICRR, pre-CNR ownership) There was some 'light conversation' between cab crews, mostly, it was referenced to engineer's nick-names.
2.) Would not train crews operating trains in close proximity, be aware that there might be a train 'trailing their's' seperated by distance, or time(?).
It would seem to be particularly useful, if the leading train suffered some sort of an 'emergency stop'; such an event, as what happened there, in Wyoming, or others that have been reported in this Forum's Threads.
It would seem to be adjunct function to the 'situational awareness' of operations in an arera. Does not the Dispatch Desk not have a way of identifying 'Block Occupancy' of a District?
Thanks!
samfp1943A.)Is there no radio communication [direct or in-direct] between train crews ?
There is, but its informal as you described. Plus if two crews are just talking that doesn't necessarily give any information on where they are and just hearing two crews talking means the trains are within 5-25 miles of each other.
samfp19432.) Would not train crews operating trains in close proximity, be aware that there might be a train 'trailing their's' seperated by distance, or time(?).
Its the UP's E-W main route. It probably has over two trains an hour, so you can pretty much know there is always somebody ahead of or behind you. Its also not the leading train's problem to look out for following trains, its the following trains that are looking out for the trains ahead (using signal indications).
samfp1943Does not the Dispatch Desk not have a way of identifying 'Block Occupancy' of a District?
Sure, its CTC so the dispatcher has a visual display of where the trains are, that is which block they are in, a block can be 1-10 miles long, so they know the train is somewhere in that block. The dispatching system can fleet the trains one after another across the railroad and the signal system displays the appropriate signals.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Some question come to mind that the NTSB will be asking.
1. Was the PTC operating on that section on track since its PTC equipped?
2. Was the >PTC working on the lead locomotive at the ime of the accident.?
2. Were the signals working in the direction of travel for the track on which the trains were running?
3. What was the speed of the train that impacted the stopped train?
4. What was the signal indication for the signal behind the stopped train?
5. If the signal was red, and the PTC was workingon the lead locomotive, why di'nt it stop the train before impact?
6. Do toxicology tests on the engineer and conductor show any indication od frug of achohol use?
Immediately, we have cast guilt on the following train's crew.
Until we know the signal indications they were seeing we cannot make that assessment.
If the following train was operating with both PTC and ATC inoperative, why was it permitted by a control point into a track segment that was occupied by a train?
Those two questions involve two different crafts - the answer to those questions need to be ascertained before we go attacking the following train's crew.
Some chatter more than others, more often when meeting trains. Some will talk to others in the same direction to let them know they may be stopping. Especially if one is a train that needs plenty of advance planning to stay off crossings. Many of us r,print out an on-duty train list and board line-ups so we have an idea of who's where and what's coming at us. Just listening to the radio, either train to train or dispatcher to train, can give one an idea of what's going on.
This line also has wayside signals, so even if the engine didn't have PTC or it failed, and the cab signals had failed, there were still waysides. Some old heads didn't care for all the radio chatter and would say, "You have signals, just follow them."
Dispatchers don't always have the time (some don't have the inclination) to tell trains what's coming up ahead of them.
At track speed, if the moving crew fell asleep, there is nothing to stop them from hitting the train ahead. They missed cab signals, wayside signals, and any PTC warnings that might have cropped up. It is dark and most likely the crew has been awake since early morning. Our prayers go out to the victims. This railroading is a dangerous business.
BaltACD Immediately, we have cast guilt on the following train's crew. Until we know the signal indications they were seeing we cannot make that assessment. If the following train was operating with both PTC and ATC inoperative, why was it permitted by a control point into a track segment that was occupied by a train? Those two questions involve two different crafts - the answer to those questions need to be ascertained before we go attacking the following train's crew.
Generally, they can be a 'tool' in certain times of the day, early AM or at Dusk; to take the 'edge' off of someone who has been at their task for a long period of work.
As I had mentioned, I was previously, aware that in some areas the 'radio chatter' could be used to exchange work informaton, and at times 'gossip', and have a limitied ability to relieve some 'stress'.
An incident such as this one on the UPRR is very hard on all who either knew, or worked with the crewmen who were involved. Some time back, there was a UPRR incident(2012) in western OKlahoma[Panhandle], that had an effect on a lot of the 'UPRR Family' in this area. In about 2016(?) there was a BNSF wreck that killed three on-board crew on the Avard sub. One only has to be human to understand that the loss of friends and coworkers has effects, up and down the employment ladder. It is up to the trained investigators to afix the cause or blame?
Does UP train crews "call signals" on the radio?
The one report indicated the crew of the stopped train had left their locomotive...if correct, they were aware of something bad was about to occur.
Ed
MP173Does UP train crews "call signals" on the radio? The one report indicated the crew of the stopped train had left their locomotive...if correct, they were aware of something bad was about to occur. Ed
How long was the lead train? Somewhere I heard that the combined trains amounted to 362 cars.
The safest place for the crew of the lead train is staying on the locomotives - all that steel around them provides much more protection than their work clothes and boots. Or had the crew of the lead train been removed from the train that was still waiting for track(s) or crew for it's ultimate handling. Cheyenne is one of UP's major terminals isn't it?
petitnj At track speed, if the moving crew fell asleep, there is nothing to stop them from hitting the train ahead. They missed cab signals, wayside signals, and any PTC warnings that might have cropped up.
At track speed, if the moving crew fell asleep, there is nothing to stop them from hitting the train ahead. They missed cab signals, wayside signals, and any PTC warnings that might have cropped up.
Not true. Cab signals have to be acknowledged. If they are not a penalty brake application will occur. PTC will automatically stop the train ”before“ passing a red absolute signal. At a red intermediate signal PTC will enforce restricted speed. You must be below 16mph to enter a restricted speed block and braking enforcement happens at 21mph.
The answers to those questions could also absolve the crew. It just depends.
BaltACD Immediately, we have cast guilt on the following train's crew......
Immediately, we have cast guilt on the following train's crew......
BaltACD The safest place for the crew of the lead train is staying on the locomotives - all that steel around them provides much more protection than their work clothes and boots. Or had the crew of the lead train been removed from the train that was still waiting for track(s) or crew for it's ultimate handling. Cheyenne is one of UP's major terminals isn't it?
1. If you’re about to be rear-ended the slack run-in could be severe. If you’re stopped it would be best to get off of the locomotive and move to safe location, that is only if you have been warned in advance.
2. “All that steel” can be bent, torn, and mashed in an accident.
3. Cheyenne isn’t considered a “major” terminal.
UPENG95 petitnj At track speed, if the moving crew fell asleep, there is nothing to stop them from hitting the train ahead. They missed cab signals, wayside signals, and any PTC warnings that might have cropped up. Not true. Cab signals have to be acknowledged. If they are not a penalty brake application will occur. PTC will automatically stop the train ”before“ passing a red absolute signal. At a red intermediate signal PTC will enforce restricted speed. You must be below 16mph to enter a restricted speed block and braking enforcement happens at 21mph.
And when both systems are 'cut out', nothing happens.
UPENG95 petitnj At track speed, if the moving crew fell asleep, there is nothing to stop them from hitting the train ahead. They missed cab signals, wayside signals, and any PTC warnings that might have cropped up. Not true. Cab signals have to be acknowledge. If they are not a penalty brake application will happen. PTC will automatically stop the train ”before“ passing a red absolute signal. At a red intermediate signal PTC will enforce restricted speed. You must be below 16mph to enter a restricted speed block and braking enforcement happens at 21mph.
Not true. Cab signals have to be acknowledge. If they are not a penalty brake application will happen. PTC will automatically stop the train ”before“ passing a red absolute signal. At a red intermediate signal PTC will enforce restricted speed. You must be below 16mph to enter a restricted speed block and braking enforcement happens at 21mph.
From what a local manager said, the train - for whatever reason - didn't have either system active. Just running on wayside block signal indications. In that event, UP usually requires an absolute block in advance of movement, even with wayside signals. (With an inoperative cab signal the rules allow running on wayside indications without an absolute block, not exceeding 40mph. But they don't like to run that way.)
Simply put, it's going to come down to either a failure of the crew or the signal system. Even if there was some contributing mechanical issue that the crew failed to catch until it was too late, the official blame will still fall on the crew.
Jeff, you gave me a little more information concerning my last trip through Denver. We detoured because of a forest fire somewhere between Denver and Salt Lake. It took some time to arrange the detour, including calling UP pilots. I thought we would have a UP engine--but I did not see one on the point during daylight hours. We crept up to Utah Junction and then over to the Denver Pacific. Our progress to Borie was sporadic, but from there on we moved steadily (I went to sleep about Laramie and woke a little above Salt Lake City. We may have had a UP engine put on somewhere west of Laramie, for it took a little less than 12 hours from Borie (I make it to be a about 508 miles from Borie to SLC). I think we changed crews in Green River--that is where the changes were made when the detour was planned in advance.
This was on 13-14 September.
At what point does an engine crew decide to just jump out of a moving locomotive as that seems to be the least awful of the only 2 options available?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Murphy Siding At what point does an engine crew decide to just jump out of a moving locomotive as that seems to be the least awful of the only 2 options available?
Jumping has been a common practice, especially with steam locomotives because the crew riding in the articulation between the engine and tender are highly vulnerable to being crushed; and also vulnerable to being trapped and scalded to death by steam escaping from broken pipes and components. So with steam, especially if the speed is relatively low, it is easy to choose jumping. There is an historical account of a fireman stepping off of a locomotive in Colorado at around 80 mph and surviving, while others stayed in the cab and were killed.
Jumping has also been common in this diesel era. I know of three wrecks on the C&NW in Minnesota where the crewmembers jumped short of a collision. In two of them, they survived with minor injuries. In two of those cases, damage to the cab indicated that they would have been relatively uninjured if they had stayed in the cab. In one of the three wrecks, the one member of the head end crew jumped short of a head on collision. It was in deep snow and he jumped, but landed rather close to the train, in the snow cut made by passing trains. He slid down the side of the snow cut and under the train, and was killed.
Regarding how jumping might have applied to the U.P. train, I have never head of a head end crew jumping off of the engine in anticipation of being hit from behind by a following train. Does anyone know of such a case? It probably has happened, especially if the struck train was very short.
The body of the missing crew member was recovered on Saturday.
EuclidI have never head of a head end crew jumping off of the engine in anticipation of being hit from behind by a following train.
How would the head end crew even know they were going to be hit?
EuclidRegarding how jumping might have applied to the U.P. train, I have never head of a head end crew jumping off of the engine in anticipation of being hit from behind by a following train.
Indeed. There would be no reason whatsoever to jump from a locomotive of a standing train that was about to be hit, unless the striking train vastly outweighed the stopped train and was moving quickly, and the stopped train was relatively short and light.
If the above scenario was not the case, and if you had sufficient notice that you were about to be struck, your best bet would be to simply stand up and plaster yourself against the back wall of the cab. Not only would simply standing against the bulkhead take far less time than going all the way down the steps and getting away from the potential of scattering debris, you would retain the protection of the cab.
As strong as today's cabs are, jumping would rarely seem to be the best option.
dehusman Euclid I have never head of a head end crew jumping off of the engine in anticipation of being hit from behind by a following train. How would the head end crew even know they were going to be hit?
Euclid I have never head of a head end crew jumping off of the engine in anticipation of being hit from behind by a following train.
I don't know. In many cases, the crew might not know they are going to be hit, but otherwise they might be notified of the impending collision or see the following train approaching. But as I said, I have never heard of a head end crew jumping off the engine to avoid injury from being struck from behind by a following train. Whereas, jumping from an engine of a train about to run into another train is quite common. Although, I understand that railroads have advised against this in the last few decades.
In this U.P. wreck, it was reported that the crew of the lead train had gotten off their engine while they were stopped. I doubt that this means they got off to avoid the effect of the collision with the rear of their train.
In this video, you can see one of the head end crew jump just as the train with the video enters the switch points:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5wh1q3f5No
EuclidIn this U.P. wreck, it was reported that the crew of the lead train had gotten off their engine while they were stopped.
Chian is a crew change. At some point EVERY train stops and EVERY crew gets off their train.
dehusman Euclid In this U.P. wreck, it was reported that the crew of the lead train had gotten off their engine while they were stopped. Chian is a crew change. At some point EVERY train stops and EVERY crew gets off their train.
Euclid In this U.P. wreck, it was reported that the crew of the lead train had gotten off their engine while they were stopped.
Deggesty dehusman Euclid In this U.P. wreck, it was reported that the crew of the lead train had gotten off their engine while they were stopped. Chian is a crew change. At some point EVERY train stops and EVERY crew gets off their train. I am puzzled by your reference to "Chian"? Do you mean Cheyenne? This event took place 18 miles west of Cheyenne, and thus was not at a crew change point.
I am puzzled by your reference to "Chian"? Do you mean Cheyenne? This event took place 18 miles west of Cheyenne, and thus was not at a crew change point.
IF UP was having crew issues - and most carriers are having crew issues at some locations of their systems - the lead train may have been held at it's location pending the avilability of a crew with the original crew on the train having, or about to go on the Hours of Service and having been removed from the train so as not to accrew 'Limbo Time' being transported from the train after their HOS time. The size of trains being operated these days prevent, in many cases, from moving and holding the train at a crew change location account blocking road crossings.
zardoz Euclid Regarding how jumping might have applied to the U.P. train, I have never head of a head end crew jumping off of the engine in anticipation of being hit from behind by a following train. Indeed. There would be no reason whatsoever to jump from a locomotive of a standing train that was about to be hit, unless the striking train vastly outweighed the stopped train and was moving quickly, and the stopped train was relatively short and light. If the above scenario was not the case, and if you had sufficient notice that you were about to be struck, your best bet would be to simply stand up and plaster yourself against the back wall of the cab. Not only would simply standing against the bulkhead take far less time than going all the way down the steps and getting away from the potential of scattering debris, you would retain the protection of the cab. As strong as today's cabs are, jumping would rarely seem to be the best option.
Euclid Regarding how jumping might have applied to the U.P. train, I have never head of a head end crew jumping off of the engine in anticipation of being hit from behind by a following train.
Not stand up, lay down on the floor next to back wall. If something the engine hits rides up and over the front, it usually seems to go through the cab at an angle. There's been a few collisions where the least affected parts of the cab was the floor next to the back wall.
BaltACD Deggesty dehusman Euclid In this U.P. wreck, it was reported that the crew of the lead train had gotten off their engine while they were stopped. Chian is a crew change. At some point EVERY train stops and EVERY crew gets off their train. I am puzzled by your reference to "Chian"? Do you mean Cheyenne? This event took place 18 miles west of Cheyenne, and thus was not at a crew change point. IF UP was having crew issues - and most carriers are having crew issues at some locations of their systems - the lead train may have been held at it's location pending the avilability of a crew with the original crew on the train having, or about to go on the Hours of Service and having been removed from the train so as not to accrew 'Limbo Time' being transported from the train after their HOS time. The size of trains being operated these days prevent, in many cases, from moving and holding the train at a crew change location account blocking road crossings.
Deggesty BaltACD Deggesty dehusman Euclid In this U.P. wreck, it was reported that the crew of the lead train had gotten off their engine while they were stopped. Chian is a crew change. At some point EVERY train stops and EVERY crew gets off their train. I am puzzled by your reference to "Chian"? Do you mean Cheyenne? This event took place 18 miles west of Cheyenne, and thus was not at a crew change point. IF UP was having crew issues - and most carriers are having crew issues at some locations of their systems - the lead train may have been held at it's location pending the avilability of a crew with the original crew on the train having, or about to go on the Hours of Service and having been removed from the train so as not to accrew 'Limbo Time' being transported from the train after their HOS time. The size of trains being operated these days prevent, in many cases, from moving and holding the train at a crew change location account blocking road crossings. Thanks, Balt. That does make sense. I had not thought that CHeyenne would be so congested.
Thanks, Balt. That does make sense. I had not thought that CHeyenne would be so congested.
Crew issues CAN create congestion where one would otherwise never expect it. While I believe UP to be multiple tracked where this event happened, on single track railroads crew issues can easily have trains backed up 100 miles in either direction of the actual crew change point.
Yes, the collision apparently did take place in two-track territory, just west of Borie--I doubt that the two trains were descending the ten mile longer single track that was constructed in the fifties.
jeffhergert zardoz Euclid Regarding how jumping might have applied to the U.P. train, I have never head of a head end crew jumping off of the engine in anticipation of being hit from behind by a following train. Indeed. There would be no reason whatsoever to jump from a locomotive of a standing train that was about to be hit, unless the striking train vastly outweighed the stopped train and was moving quickly, and the stopped train was relatively short and light. If the above scenario was not the case, and if you had sufficient notice that you were about to be struck, your best bet would be to simply stand up and plaster yourself against the back wall of the cab. Not only would simply standing against the bulkhead take far less time than going all the way down the steps and getting away from the potential of scattering debris, you would retain the protection of the cab. As strong as today's cabs are, jumping would rarely seem to be the best option. Not stand up, lay down on the floor next to back wall. If something the engine hits rides up and over the front, it usually seems to go through the cab at an angle. There's been a few collisions where the least affected parts of the cab was the floor next to the back wall. Jeff
I think he was reffering to the crew of a parked train that was about to be rear ended (rather than the striking train). They could be at risk of whiplash (if the train suddenly moved forward), and bracing one's head could prevent that.
DeggestyI am puzzled by your reference to "Chian"?
The old head UP guys used to write "Cheyenne" as "Chian". Much less to type.
jeffhergertNot stand up, lay down on the floor next to back wall. If something the engine hits rides up and over the front, it usually seems to go through the cab at an angle. There's been a few collisions where the least affected parts of the cab was the floor next to the back wall.
(Edit) Actually, I was refering to an impact from the rear, with no specification regarding equipment in front. However, in a head-on, you are absolutely correct.
zardoz jeffhergert Not stand up, lay down on the floor next to back wall. If something the engine hits rides up and over the front, it usually seems to go through the cab at an angle. There's been a few collisions where the least affected parts of the cab was the floor next to the back wall. Good point! I sit corrected.
jeffhergert Not stand up, lay down on the floor next to back wall. If something the engine hits rides up and over the front, it usually seems to go through the cab at an angle. There's been a few collisions where the least affected parts of the cab was the floor next to the back wall.
Good point! I sit corrected.
I think he's about to go fetal.
Murphy Siding zardoz jeffhergert Not stand up, lay down on the floor next to back wall. If something the engine hits rides up and over the front, it usually seems to go through the cab at an angle. There's been a few collisions where the least affected parts of the cab was the floor next to the back wall. Wouldn't that be lay corrected?
zardoz jeffhergert Not stand up, lay down on the floor next to back wall. If something the engine hits rides up and over the front, it usually seems to go through the cab at an angle. There's been a few collisions where the least affected parts of the cab was the floor next to the back wall.
Wouldn't that be lay corrected?
In school, I was told that hens "lay" and humans "lie"! But I always thought that some lie more convincingly than others.
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
And once again, the signal/PTC/Cab/etc. system was not working. Since the crew was always awoken by these things before, now when they fall asleep, the outcome is disaster. More reason to remove the crew from driving the train and only run when PTC like systems operate.
Nothing has been officially said. There has been talk going around that the train ran away. That they had somehow lost the ability to control the train, either by piddling away their air or some problem in the air brake system.
I'm starting to wonder now if the first report I heard via a local manager about both neither PTC and CCS being used is true. It's possible if there was a problem (either crew or mechanical) and air pressure dropped low enough, even a penalty or emergency application from PTC or CCS would have no effect.
It reminds me of a rear end collision about 13 years ago where the train's locomotive had a defective air brake valve. It had been reported as having problems a few days before the collision and was allowed to stay in service. I remember my supervisor (since retired) at the time had told me on one of their conference calls that others were saying that the crew had tampered with the brake valve. When the FRA report came out, the crew took the brunt of the responsiblity for the accident. The defective brake valve was mentioned, but almost as an after thought. For that one the FRA certainly seemed to be, as some coworkers say, the railroad's lapdog.
How many locomotives now use electrically controlled air valves for the braking vs the old control stand hand operated brake valve of old? It seems like a new point of failure. While more sophisticated, more points of failure. And if the electrically controlled braking system fails, ie doen't vent the brake pipe, do the locomotives have a "back up" manually operated valve. I realalize this would not prevent a case of "pissing away" the air but not knowing what the failure was and the comments about a defective air valve mad we wonder what options the crew has. I would think that if the engineer initiated a brake pipe pressure reduction and the pressure guage didn't reflect one, he would take additional actions.
Also suspect that the electronic controls are supposdly designed to be "Fail Safe" but how that is done, I have no knowledge.
Even if the electronic brake valve fails the emergency valve will still work. It is connected directly to the brake pipe - no electronics involved. However there could still be some other problem that prevents the brakes from working.
Mark Vinski
mvlandswEven if the electronic brake valve fails the emergency valve will still work. It is connected directly to the brake pipe - no electronics involved. However there could still be some other problem that prevents the brakes from working. Mark Vinski
If the trainline pressure has been 'pissed away' an emergency application will have little power if any.
There have been several run away trains over the years. One cause is repeated applications and releases of the brakes that works the auxilirary reservoir pressures down to the point where the train speed can not be comtrolled. This is probably considered an operating error. Another cause is a blocked brake pipe. This could be a closed angle cock, ice blockage, pinched air hose, etc. There is a variety of causes for this and investigation will have to determine exact cause. DPU locos would eliminate this possibility as it allows an emergency application mid train. UP lost control of a coal train years ago due to excess piston travel on truck mounted brake cylinders. I think it is unlikely this could happen again due to design changes. Since this train was a mixed consist a similar situation does not exist.
petitnjMore reason to remove the crew from driving the train and only run when PTC like systems operate.
And yet somehow for over 100 years we were able to operate trains and get them over the road, despite the lack of either proper equipment and/or management that knew the difference between a drawbar and a crowbar.
AB brakes, brass journals, no dynamics, poor cab heaters, 39' jointed rail, 'flimsies' handed up to a train at track speed, no radio communication, 14-hour days....How did we ever do it without the miracle of PTC?
Perhaps it has something to do with the calibre of many of the new hires (in the offices, on the ground, and in the cab).
I had heard last week that there may have been a problem with the brakes, but no details on whether it was the train, the engines or the way they were operated.
zardoz petitnj More reason to remove the crew from driving the train and only run when PTC like systems operate. And yet somehow for over 100 years we were able to operate trains and get them over the road, despite the lack of either proper equipment and/or management that knew the difference between a drawbar and a crowbar. AB brakes, brass journals, no dynamics, poor cab heaters, 39' jointed rail, 'flimsies' handed up to a train at track speed, no radio communication, 14-hour days....How did we ever do it without the miracle of PTC? Perhaps it has something to do with the calibre of many of the new hires (in the offices, on the ground, and in the cab).
petitnj More reason to remove the crew from driving the train and only run when PTC like systems operate.
Tragic as it is, this accident is an anomaly. The railroad safety record today vs 25 or 50 years ago is much better, let alone 100 years ago. Look at the statistics for facts, don't rely on anecdotal evidence to drw generalizations.
zardozPerhaps it has something to do with the calibre of many of the new hires (in the offices, on the ground, and in the cab).
Or perhaps incidents didn't garner national/worldwide attention like they do in today's instant information age.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
charlie hebdoThe railroad safety record today vs 25 or 50 years ago is much better, let alone 100 years ago. Look at the statistics for facts, don't rely on anecdotal evidence to drw generalizations.
No doubt that safety is better today compared to 50+ years ago, although I'm doubtful regarding the 25-year figure. However, there was so much more to be concerned about (see above) for the railroaders of those days compared to today, and I'm not even considering the complexities of running steam locomotives.
The ability of PTC to successfully operate a train shows just how much easier it is to run a train today compared to the time frame mentioned. I'm not saying it is easy, I'm just saying it is easier.
And my observations come from not entirely 'anecdotal evidence', but also from first-hand experience.
David1005 There have been several run away trains over the years. One cause is repeated applications and releases of the brakes that works the auxilirary reservoir pressures down to the point where the train speed can not be comtrolled. This is probably considered an operating error. Another cause is a blocked brake pipe. This could be a closed angle cock, ice blockage, pinched air hose, etc. There is a variety of causes for this and investigation will have to determine exact cause. DPU locos would eliminate this possibility as it allows an emergency application mid train. UP lost control of a coal train years ago due to excess piston travel on truck mounted brake cylinders. I think it is unlikely this could happen again due to design changes. Since this train was a mixed consist a similar situation does not exist.
zardozThe ability of PTC to successfully operate a train shows just how much easier it is to run a train today compared to the time frame mentioned.
PTC does not "operate the train." There is nothing in PTC that makes a train go, it is all about stop. PTC doesn't slow the train down for speed restrictions. Its not cruise control or a "self driving" feature. As long as the train is operated below the speed limit and within its authority, PTC takes no active role in the operation of the train. PTC is purely a penalty system.
dehusman zardoz The ability of PTC to successfully operate a train shows just how much easier it is to run a train today compared to the time frame mentioned. PTC does not "operate the train." There is nothing in PTC that makes a train go, it is all about stop. PTC doesn't slow the train down for speed restrictions. Its not cruise control or a "self driving" feature. As long as the train is operated below the speed limit and within its authority, PTC takes no active role in the operation of the train. PTC is purely a penalty system.
zardoz The ability of PTC to successfully operate a train shows just how much easier it is to run a train today compared to the time frame mentioned.
He may have been thinking of Trip Optimizer, which DOES operate the train, to varying degrees of success.
TO is so good that it is not allowed to use the air brakes, and requires the Engineer to take over in numerous other situations too.
But between TO and PTC the eventual goal is to run autonomous trains. A couple of Class I's have publicly stated that.
Was the train descending a significant grade? Have there been many instances of peeing away the air on relatively flat trackage?
With the comments about a possible brake problem, what has been the underlying basis for that piece of information? Is it nothing more than one possible conclusion simply because the train did not stop?
EuclidWas the train descending a significant grade? Have there been many instances of peeing away the air on relatively flat trackage? With the comments about a possible brake problem, what has been the underlying basis for that piece of information? Is it nothing more than one possible conclusion simply because the train did not stop?
Grades don't have to be significant for 10 - 12 - 15 -18K tons or more to do horrendous damage when the train runs away. Grade and tonnage build momentun - momentum that takes increasingly more braking power to bring back under control.
That I am aware of, there has not been any published 'cause' for this incident.
NDG - Thanks for this link - not of this incident but illustrative
https://www.liveleak.com/view?t=sNzK_1539570515
BaltACD Euclid Was the train descending a significant grade? Have there been many instances of peeing away the air on relatively flat trackage? With the comments about a possible brake problem, what has been the underlying basis for that piece of information? Is it nothing more than one possible conclusion simply because the train did not stop? Grades don't have to be significant for 10 - 12 - 15 -18K tons or more to do horrendous damage when the train runs away. Grade and tonnage build momentun - momentum that takes increasingly more braking power to bring back under control. That I am aware of, there has not been any published 'cause' for this incident.
Euclid Was the train descending a significant grade? Have there been many instances of peeing away the air on relatively flat trackage? With the comments about a possible brake problem, what has been the underlying basis for that piece of information? Is it nothing more than one possible conclusion simply because the train did not stop?
I realize that no cause has been published. I was just asking those who mentioned hearing of a possible braking problem if there was any reason given for suspecting a possible braking problem.
EuclidIs it nothing more than one possible conclusion simply because the train did not stop?
Give the man a cigar!
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
BaltACD NDG - Thanks for this link - not of this incident but illustrative https://www.liveleak.com/view?t=sNzK_1539570515
You are welcome!
Thank You.
EuclidI was just asking those who mentioned hearing of a possible braking problem if there was any reason given for suspecting a possible braking problem.
Think about who mentioned it.
It looks like the area where it happened is on a mostly 1.5 % grade. One report I was shown by a coworker said the train picked up cars (I think in Laramie WY) and was 12000 tons.
One of the engines involved was a SD70m, but unknown when I was shown this info last week was if it was leading. They have a mechanical brake valve, either a 26L or the desk top equivalent, and lately some have been having pressure maintaining issues. They can have other defects where they don't work properly, but as someone has observed - you always have the "big Hole" as a last resort. Assuming the brake pressure hasn't dropped below about 45 or 50 psi. Below that pressure, emergency may not be transmitted through the brake pipe. Passenger equipment will automatically dump when pressure drops below 20 psi as a fail safe last resort. Freight equipment doesn't have that feature.
jeffhergert It looks like the area where it happened is on a mostly 1.5 % grade. One report I was shown by a coworker said the train picked up cars (I think in Laramie WY) and was 12000 tons. One of the engines involved was a SD70m, but unknown when I was shown this info last week was if it was leading. They have a mechanical brake valve, either a 26L or the desk top equivalent, and lately some have been having pressure maintaining issues. They can have other defects where they don't work properly, but as someone has observed - you always have the "big Hole" as a last resort. Assuming the brake pressure hasn't dropped below about 45 or 50 psi. Below that pressure, emergency may not be transmitted through the brake pipe. Passenger equipment will automatically dump when pressure drops below 20 psi as a fail safe last resort. Freight equipment doesn't have that feature. Jeff
Thanks Jeff. I can see how that would lead to questioning the brake response.
jeffhergert They can have other defects where they don't work properly, but as someone has observed - you always have the "big Hole" as a last resort.
I gradually opened a back-up hose once - to the point it was fully open and exhausting air from the brake line. Because I had done so gradually, the brakes never dumped, and there was now no way to make them do so.
tree68I gradually opened a back-up hose once - to the point it was fully open and exhausting air from the brake line. Because I had done so gradually, the brakes never dumped, and there was now no way to make them do so.
Used to do it all the time to cars attached to ground air.
tree68 jeffhergert They can have other defects where they don't work properly, but as someone has observed - you always have the "Big Hole" as a last resort. I gradually opened a back-up hose once - to the point it was fully open and exhausting air from the brake line. Because I had done so gradually, the brakes never dumped, and there was now no way to make them do so.
jeffhergert They can have other defects where they don't work properly, but as someone has observed - you always have the "Big Hole" as a last resort.
So this is shaping up as an attended version of Lac Megantic...
OvermodSo this is shaping up as an attended version of Lac Megantic...
Probably better to say that this is one possibility among the many already discussed. Running a signal is likely the higher percentage choice.
SD70DudeHe may have been thinking of Trip Optimizer, which DOES operate the train, to varying degrees of success. TO is so good that it is not allowed to use the air brakes, and requires the Engineer to take over in numerous other situations too. But between TO and PTC the eventual goal is to run autonomous trains. A couple of Class I's have publicly stated that.
Yeah, that what I was referring to. Please pardon my D'oh moment.
Wouldn't say that at all. Lac Megantic was a failure to properly secure a standing train. While we don't know what the cause was, we know that it wasn't that. Completely different sets of rules and procedures and possible causes.
dehusmanWouldn't say that at all. Lac Megantic was a failure to properly secure a standing train. While we don't know what the cause was, we know that it wasn't that.
The similar proximate cause was, undeniably, the leaking off of the brake air, almost precisely at the sort of rate recounted in earlier posts in this thread, resulting in the automatic brake failing to apply and hold or slow the train when the independent no longer held it. Whether the leak was through a defective valve or an air turbine, or whether there were insufficient handbrakes applied to hold the train with the airbrakes released, are not particularly germane to this discussion.
There is one thing, though. Balt said
BaltACDImmediately, we have cast guilt on the following train's crew.
It seems to me that, regardless of a 'cause' releasing the air from the car reservoirs, there would have been an indication on the head-end air gauges. Is that an erroneous conclusion, and (if so) what combination of service faults or failures would produce normal-appearing gauge readings with substantially no application pressure available at the wheel cylinders?
I'll be interested to see what the NTSB says regarding the state of the brake system.
OvermodThe similar proximate cause was, undeniably, the leaking off of the brake air
The cause of the Lac Megantic crash was a failure to set sufficient handbrakes. The air brakes had nothing to do with the cause of the accident.
Plus we don't know if the air "leaked off". It could be insufficient supply, it could be too much was used, it could be a failure of the brake valve, it could be a lot of different things that have nothing to do with a leak. For example, if the engineer used the brakes too often without allowing them to recharge, that's not a "leak", that is an intentional use of the brakes.
There are things that point to an air brake problem, but we don't know any of the details about what the crew did and and what the train did.
FRA signal worker stated it was a runaway. DS notified other trains to stop and get off. That is all known to date.
Do the automatic brake valves on UP power have "freight" and "passenger" positions, or do you only have "in" and "out"?
In my experience changing the automatic mode from "freight" to "passenger" (with the automatic released of course) usually makes the unit pressure maintain properly. Nearly all of CN's units with 26 and 30 type brake valves (except the ex-Oakway SD60's) have all 3 positions.
We discussed this problem in another thread not so long ago, and I think it was Big Jim who said that a leaky gasket somewhere inside the control stand is the most common cause of that problem.
Overmod tree68 jeffhergert They can have other defects where they don't work properly, but as someone has observed - you always have the "Big Hole" as a last resort. I gradually opened a back-up hose once - to the point it was fully open and exhausting air from the brake line. Because I had done so gradually, the brakes never dumped, and there was now no way to make them do so. So this is shaping up as an attended version of Lac Megantic...
The procedure they are describing is known as venting a train, and as long as the reduction rate exceeds 3 PSI per minute it will result in a full service brake application on the train, and a brake pipe pressure of 0 PSI.
The purpose of that procedure is to not put the train in emergency in order to save the air in the cars' emergency reservoirs, and to prevent emergency vent valves on the cars from sticking open (a real problem in cold weather).
At Lac-Megantic the auxiliary reservoir air leaked out through the brake pipe due to the very slow reduction rate and no air went to the cars' brake cylinders, which is the exact opposite result of the venting procedure Zug and Larry described.
Cycle braking too many times can indeed achieve the same end result as Lac-Megantic, but so far all we have here is rumours, no hard facts yet.
A unintentional release or blockage of the brake pipe could easily cause the same end result, if the Engineer did not catch it right away.
SD70DudeCycle braking too many times can indeed achieve the same end result as Lac-Megantic, but so far all we have here is rumours, no hard facts yet.
I believe a grade was mentioned, and that this was reported as a runaway. Cycle braking (and thus pssng away one's air) has been a factor in a number of runaways. Another possibility for the list.
SD70DudeThe procedure they are describing is known as venting a train, and as long as the reduction rate exceeds 3 PSI per minute it will result in a full service brake application on the train, and a brake pipe pressure of 0 PSI. The purpose of that procedure is to not put the train in emergency in order to save the air in the cars'
Did you mean to say, "as long as the reduction rate does not exceed 3 PSI per minute..."? My understanding of drawing off air slowly to avoid triggering an emergency application is that the rate of reduction has to be under a certain amount.
SD70DudeWe discussed this problem in another thread not so long ago, and I think it was Big Jim who said that a leaky gasket somewhere inside the control stand is the most common cause of that problem.
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BigJim SD70Dude We discussed this problem in another thread not so long ago, and I think it was Big Jim who said that a leaky gasket somewhere inside the control stand is the most common cause of that problem. What I think you are referring to is when I said that a small gasket on the back of the equalizing reservoir gauge, if damaged, can cause a leak on the equalizing reservoir side, so, that when the brake application is made, the pressure keeps leaking down on the equalizing reservoir causing the brakes to keep being applied relative to the amount of leakage.
SD70Dude We discussed this problem in another thread not so long ago, and I think it was Big Jim who said that a leaky gasket somewhere inside the control stand is the most common cause of that problem.
What I think you are referring to is when I said that a small gasket on the back of the equalizing reservoir gauge, if damaged, can cause a leak on the equalizing reservoir side, so, that when the brake application is made, the pressure keeps leaking down on the equalizing reservoir causing the brakes to keep being applied relative to the amount of leakage.
Yes that's what I was thinking of.
Euclid SD70Dude The procedure they are describing is known as venting a train, and as long as the reduction rate exceeds 3 PSI per minute it will result in a full service brake application on the train, and a brake pipe pressure of 0 PSI. The purpose of that procedure is to not put the train in emergency in order to save the air in the cars' Did you mean to say, "as long as the reduction rate does not exceed 3 PSI per minute..."? My understanding of drawing off air slowly to avoid triggering an emergency application is that the rate of reduction has to be under a certain amount.
SD70Dude The procedure they are describing is known as venting a train, and as long as the reduction rate exceeds 3 PSI per minute it will result in a full service brake application on the train, and a brake pipe pressure of 0 PSI. The purpose of that procedure is to not put the train in emergency in order to save the air in the cars'
The 3 PSI per minute reduction rate is required needed to trigger a car control valve to direct air from the auxiliary reservoir to the brake cylinder. A slower reduction/leakage rate may not result in any air brake application, as happened at Lac-Megantic.
The whole point of venting a train is to leave the air brakes applied (but not in emergency) and the angle cock fully open.
In my experience fully opening a angle cock when venting a train takes around a minute (actual results may vary depending on train length and how heavy a brake was already set on the train).
I can't remember offhand what the necessary reduction rate to trigger an emergency application is, but it is quite high.
SD70Dude Euclid SD70Dude The procedure they are describing is known as venting a train, and as long as the reduction rate exceeds 3 PSI per minute it will result in a full service brake application on the train, and a brake pipe pressure of 0 PSI. The purpose of that procedure is to not put the train in emergency in order to save the air in the cars' Did you mean to say, "as long as the reduction rate does not exceed 3 PSI per minute..."? My understanding of drawing off air slowly to avoid triggering an emergency application is that the rate of reduction has to be under a certain amount. The 3 PSI per minute reduction rate is required needed to trigger a car control valve to direct air from the auxiliary reservoir to the brake cylinder. A slower reduction/leakage rate may not result in any air brake application, as happened at Lac-Megantic. The whole point of venting a train is to leave the air brakes applied (but not in emergency) and the angle cock fully open. In my experience fully opening a angle cock when venting a train takes around a minute (actual results may vary depending on train length and how heavy a brake was already set on the train). I can't remember offhand what the necessary reduction rate to trigger an emergency application is, but it is quite high.
tree68 SD70Dude Cycle braking too many times can indeed achieve the same end result as Lac-Megantic, but so far all we have here is rumours, no hard facts yet. I believe a grade was mentioned, and that this was reported as a runaway. Cycle braking (and thus pssng away one's air) has been a factor in a number of runaways. Another possibility for the list.
SD70Dude Cycle braking too many times can indeed achieve the same end result as Lac-Megantic, but so far all we have here is rumours, no hard facts yet.
SD70Dude jeffhergert It looks like the area where it happened is on a mostly 1.5 % grade. One report I was shown by a coworker said the train picked up cars (I think in Laramie WY) and was 12000 tons. One of the engines involved was a SD70m, but unknown when I was shown this info last week was if it was leading. They have a mechanical brake valve, either a 26L or the desk top equivalent, and lately some have been having pressure maintaining issues. They can have other defects where they don't work properly, but as someone has observed - you always have the "big Hole" as a last resort. Assuming the brake pressure hasn't dropped below about 45 or 50 psi. Below that pressure, emergency may not be transmitted through the brake pipe. Passenger equipment will automatically dump when pressure drops below 20 psi as a fail safe last resort. Freight equipment doesn't have that feature. Jeff Do the automatic brake valves on UP power have "freight" and "passenger" positions, or do you only have "in" and "out"? In my experience changing the automatic mode from "freight" to "passenger" (with the automatic released of course) usually makes the unit pressure maintain properly. Nearly all of CN's units with 26 and 30 type brake valves (except the ex-Oakway SD60's) have all 3 positions. We discussed this problem in another thread not so long ago, and I think it was Big Jim who said that a leaky gasket somewhere inside the control stand is the most common cause of that problem.
The SD70m engines and I think all, like the CN, with 26 or 30 type valves have freight and passenger positions. I've used passenger before because of a leaking equalizing reservoir, but many don't know about doing that. At times they seem to not want engineers running in passenger, because of the chance of accidently releasing the brake because the handle is accidently moved. Other times you'll be told to do that. I've only seen one training video that mentioned placing it in passenger, and that was after 13 years as an engineer. (I already knew about doing that, even before I went into engine service.) The engines with the brake valves cut in through the computer screens only have in/lead or out/trail options.
If it comes out that they pissed away their air then look for regulators to say we need to find a way to stop this from happening again. Train brakes work fine as long as they have AIR Pressure. However you lose the air pressure and your screwed. La Magnetic now here in the USA. The railroads are going to have to accept that the continued loss of life is unacceptable in today's society. God forbid a train did the same thing on Cajon Pass again it has happened multiple times in the past. It is time to come up with a failsafe emergency braking system for these things. Not one that if the air pressure is gone won't work one that has a mechanical backup so even if every pound of air is gone it will work. When yarding a train I understand your industry dumps all the air out of the system. When they pull the bleeder rod that could act as the catch for the spring brake to prevent the parking brakes from coming on during the switching process. What's it going to take a full tanker car full of pressurized Cholrine gas being ruptured in another derailment from a train losing air pressure for railroads to see their brakes are not up to what is needed with todays monsters.
Shadow the Cats owner If it comes out that they pissed away their air then look for regulators to say we need to find a way to stop this from happening again. Train brakes work fine as long as they have AIR Pressure. However you lose the air pressure and your screwed. La Magnetic now here in the USA. The railroads are going to have to accept that the continued loss of life is unacceptable in today's society. God forbid a train did the same thing on Cajon Pass again it has happened multiple times in the past. It is time to come up with a failsafe emergency braking system for these things. Not one that if the air pressure is gone won't work one that has a mechanical backup so even if every pound of air is gone it will work. When yarding a train I understand your industry dumps all the air out of the system. When they pull the bleeder rod that could act as the catch for the spring brake to prevent the parking brakes from coming on during the switching process. What's it going to take a full tanker car full of pressurized Cholrine gas being ruptured in another derailment from a train losing air pressure for railroads to see their brakes are not up to what is needed with todays monsters.
The prevention of peeing away the air is provided by ECP brakes.
I don't quite follow what you are saying about the bleeder rod, spring brake catch, etc. There need not be a mechanical spring brake to achieve the fail safe element that you mention.
How much do we know so far about the cause of this accident? We're discussing everything in the world based on what? I'm still waiting for us to get around to "situational awareness."
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"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Euclid Shadow the Cats owner If it comes out that they pissed away their air then look for regulators to say we need to find a way to stop this from happening again. Train brakes work fine as long as they have AIR Pressure. However you lose the air pressure and your screwed. La Magnetic now here in the USA. The railroads are going to have to accept that the continued loss of life is unacceptable in today's society. God forbid a train did the same thing on Cajon Pass again it has happened multiple times in the past. It is time to come up with a failsafe emergency braking system for these things. Not one that if the air pressure is gone won't work one that has a mechanical backup so even if every pound of air is gone it will work. When yarding a train I understand your industry dumps all the air out of the system. When they pull the bleeder rod that could act as the catch for the spring brake to prevent the parking brakes from coming on during the switching process. What's it going to take a full tanker car full of pressurized Cholrine gas being ruptured in another derailment from a train losing air pressure for railroads to see their brakes are not up to what is needed with todays monsters. The prevention of peeing away the air is provided by ECP brakes. I don't quite follow what you are saying about the bleeder rod, spring brake catch, etc. There need not be a mechanical spring brake to achieve the fail safe element that you mention.
Even with ECP if that fails the brakes fail back to normal airbrake functions. With a spring brake used for even emergency situations only if the brake pipeline pressure gets below a certain point then the spring overcomes the air and applies the brakes. In OTR trailers and tractors they're set to apply at 40 psi our low air warning kicks on at 60 psi. They've been mandated here for 40 year's since the 121 airbrake regulations came out.
Paul of Covington How much do we know so far about the cause of this accident? We're discussing everything in the world based on what? I'm still waiting for us to get around to "situational awareness."
I think that was briefly touched on with a comment about a possible missed signal. I'd have to scour the whole thread.
We've gotten a few snippets, but as you say, nothing to give us a firm idea of what did happen.
Shadow the Cats owner In OTR trailers and tractors they're set to apply at 40 psi our low air warning kicks on at 60 psi. They've been mandated here for 40 year's since the 121 airbrake regulations came out.
In OTR trailers and tractors they're set to apply at 40 psi our low air warning kicks on at 60 psi. They've been mandated here for 40 year's since the 121 airbrake regulations came out.
tree68 Paul of Covington How much do we know so far about the cause of this accident? We're discussing everything in the world based on what? I'm still waiting for us to get around to "situational awareness." I think that was briefly touched on with a comment about a possible missed signal. I'd have to scour the whole thread. We've gotten a few snippets, but as you say, nothing to give us a firm idea of what did happen.
Other than it being some kind of braking issue, not much has leaked out. FWIW, someone on another site said the rumor going around his area was that the crew did nothing wrong. This person also pointed out it was close to a spot where a closed anglecock led to a similar collision in 1979. In that one, the crew on the caboose didn't open the emergency valve.
IMO, they have a good idea of what went wrong. They aren't going to say much until they can find a way to place as much blame as possible on the crew. It's been done before where the crew lived. Should be that much easier when the crew didn't. I won't be surprised if the images from the inward facing camera aren't retrievable.
For switching it wouldn't be hard especially for yard movements or even moving them at a customer to install a rod that overrode the spring brake when pulled. You already pull a bleeder valve to dump the air out of the tanks now when a train comes into a yard to switch. Put the new one in the same area but it captures the spring brake before the air is dumped out. A good mechaincal engineer could desgn this system in a hurry to work as needed for switching and do as needed in an emergency while applying the KISS principle.
Shadow the Cats ownerFor switching it wouldn't be hard especially for yard movements or even moving them at a customer to install a rod that overrode the spring brake when pulled. You already pull a bleeder valve to dump the air out of the tanks now when a train comes into a yard to switch. Put the new one in the same area but it captures the spring brake before the air is dumped out. A good mechaincal engineer could desgn this system in a hurry to work as needed for switching and do as needed in an emergency while applying the KISS principle.
Roadrailers had spring-type brakes. When there was a problem it would tie up the railroad until the service truck could come out.
Yeah, when air is urniated away it can cause runaways. But locked brakes on a car can cause derailments pretty quickly, too. THis may be a case of a cure worse than a disease. Never minding the whole fact that you are changing one of the core elements of a railcar.
It may be months before a preliminary NTSB report is released, but seems likely the cause will be either a signal malfunction or a human error by the crew of the moving train.
Shadow the Cats ownerFor switching it wouldn't be hard especially for yard movements or even moving them at a customer to install a rod that overrode the spring brake when pulled.
Railcars don't have anything called a "spring brake".
Retrofitting hundreds of thousands of rail cars to 'have' a spring brake would be far from KISS. Not to mention costly!
One could only imagine how crowded the beaches would be as well!! Daytona is already a mess in March/April.
rdamonOne could only imagine how crowded the beaches would be as well!! Daytona is already a mess in March/April.
Well played.
GROAN!
rdamon One could only imagine how crowded the beaches would be as well!! Daytona is already a mess in March/April.
Can't wait for the “Cars Gone Wild” DVD ads to start on late night TV.
Shadow the Cats owner Euclid Shadow the Cats owner If it comes out that they pissed away their air then look for regulators to say we need to find a way to stop this from happening again. Train brakes work fine as long as they have AIR Pressure. However you lose the air pressure and your screwed. La Magnetic now here in the USA. The railroads are going to have to accept that the continued loss of life is unacceptable in today's society. God forbid a train did the same thing on Cajon Pass again it has happened multiple times in the past. It is time to come up with a failsafe emergency braking system for these things. Not one that if the air pressure is gone won't work one that has a mechanical backup so even if every pound of air is gone it will work. When yarding a train I understand your industry dumps all the air out of the system. When they pull the bleeder rod that could act as the catch for the spring brake to prevent the parking brakes from coming on during the switching process. What's it going to take a full tanker car full of pressurized Cholrine gas being ruptured in another derailment from a train losing air pressure for railroads to see their brakes are not up to what is needed with todays monsters. The prevention of peeing away the air is provided by ECP brakes. I don't quite follow what you are saying about the bleeder rod, spring brake catch, etc. There need not be a mechanical spring brake to achieve the fail safe element that you mention. Even with ECP if that fails the brakes fail back to normal airbrake functions. With a spring brake used for even emergency situations only if the brake pipeline pressure gets below a certain point then the spring overcomes the air and applies the brakes. In OTR trailers and tractors they're set to apply at 40 psi our low air warning kicks on at 60 psi. They've been mandated here for 40 year's since the 121 airbrake regulations came out.
So, if I understand you, the trucking industry uses straight air brakes with the use of stored spring force to provide a backup brake activation in case there is a loss of the air pressure normally used for braking.
Train air brakes are not a straight air system. They have their own version of failsafe backup. I do not think the train brake system would readily translate into the spring backup used by the trucking industry. The main element that needs backup is the pressurized air delivery line of a straight air brake system. Train brakes originated as a straight air brake system, but they found they needed a backup in case the train broke in two, which was very common and still is.
When this need for backup system for train braking became obvious, they could have added springs to the cylinders and switched functions around so that the straight air caused the cylinders to release the brakes by overcoming the spring pressure. But they also needed to use the brakes for gradual stopping and not just for emergencies. For gradual stopping, braking force must be modulated, and the spring application would need additional complex mechanism to achieve and control brake force modulation.
So the railroads adopted a novel appoach of using the train line to deliver air to a working brake system on each car with its own reservoir to store the air needed to power that independent brake system on each car. Once the train line nourished all the reservoirs with air to power their individual brake systems on each car, the train line was transformed into a pneumatic control line to tell the car reservoirs when to use their air to set the brakes. The pressure of the control train line was reduced in order to cause this application of the car reservoir air to power the brake cylinders on each car.
That fundamental principle meant that if a train broke in two and parted its pressureized train line, it would cause an application of the train brakes rather than render the train brakes inoperative as would be the case with a straight air brake system and its pressurized train line.
Also, if ECP brakes do fail, they do not revert back to air brake functions of the conventional train air brake system, as you say. ECP brakes can fail in various way, but not in the manner of peeing away the air like can happen with conventional train air brakes.
Euclid, not quite how OTR air brakes work. In those the spring applies the brakes. Air releases the brakes. No air no movement.
Going off STCO comment, I agree that adding a spring wouldn't be complicated, pricey perhaps. A complete redesign could use the emergency reservoir to hold off the spring and if the reservoir runs out the spring would apply. A lockout mechanism for switching would be easy to add here.
Modeling the Cleveland and Pittsburgh during the PennCentral era starting on the Cleveland lakefront and ending in Mingo junction
ruderunnerI agree that adding a spring wouldn't be complicated, pricey perhaps. A complete redesign could use the emergency reservoir to hold off the spring and if the reservoir runs out the spring would apply. A lockout mechanism for switching would be easy to add here.
Before this goes too much further, we've had this discussion before, and like a whack-a-mole it seems to keep coming up when persistence of memory fades.
Spring brakes were a popular invention over a century ago, along with things like the Loughridge chain brake that seem attractive until you actually try them and start to see the problems. (See John White on rubber car springs, for a different example of something that keeps cropping up and then disappearing as the technology evolves).
Any spring brake powerful enough to hold a modern railroad car will be capable of causing problems if it inadvertently deploys while running. However, making it even more powerful to serve as an emergency brake is more of a disaster than those who aren't familiar with the physics are likely to know.
Then there is the issue of making a mechanism that reliably pulls the spring brake off, considering how any accumulated slack in the foundation rigging was accommodated in application, while ensuring that it re-applies when safety calls ... but doesn't fail unsafe. I think it's a reasonably safe bet that such a thing would be no less hard to pull off than a current handbrake is to apply, and there is the thought looming that you'd also have to allow the spring-brake mechanism to be cinched further down into engagement for formal car securement (in other words, positive ratcheting engagement both ways). We've also discussed the 'idea' of having motor engagement and disengagement via a dedicated trainline or power plugs of some sort, which apparently is now technically feasible (although, on reflection, I think still a lunatic idea)
My take on this is that for the price of the spring brake, especially a motorized or servo one, you can equip several cars with convertible ECP. And have something eventually useful.
The spring for our emergancy and parking brake is contained in the emergency brake chamber itself. If there is NO air pressure to overcome the spring pressure we can not move. http://www.consulab.com/products/specifications/ec12753145e.pdf
Here is how our brake chambers are arranged. We pay on average for one without the rods 80 bucks with the rods 120. They survive anything we throw at them. They handle being beat on with hammers in the winter when frozen up and if they fail they fail to the released not the applied why the springs have a pair of weak points put in that break that allow the spring to collaspe so the affected vechile can be moved to a repair shop. Time to replace is less than 30 mins normally.
Overmod ruderunner I agree that adding a spring wouldn't be complicated, pricey perhaps. A complete redesign could use the emergency reservoir to hold off the spring and if the reservoir runs out the spring would apply. A lockout mechanism for switching would be easy to add here. Before this goes too much further, we've had this discussion before, and like a whack-a-mole it seems to keep coming up when persistence of memory fades. Spring brakes were a popular invention over a century ago, along with things like the Loughridge chain brake that seem attractive until you actually try them and start to see the problems. (See John White on rubber car springs, for a different example of something that keeps cropping up and then disappearing as the technology evolves). Any spring brake powerful enough to hold a modern railroad car will be capable of causing problems if it inadvertently deploys while running. However, making it even more powerful to serve as an emergency brake is more of a disaster than those who aren't familiar with the physics are likely to know. Then there is the issue of making a mechanism that reliably pulls the spring brake off, considering how any accumulated slack in the foundation rigging was accommodated in application, while ensuring that it re-applies when safety calls ... but doesn't fail unsafe. I think it's a reasonably safe bet that such a thing would be no less hard to pull off than a current handbrake is to apply, and there is the thought looming that you'd also have to allow the spring-brake mechanism to be cinched further down into engagement for formal car securement (in other words, positive ratcheting engagement both ways). We've also discussed the 'idea' of having motor engagement and disengagement via a dedicated trainline or power plugs of some sort, which apparently is now technically feasible (although, on reflection, I think still a lunatic idea) My take on this is that for the price of the spring brake, especially a motorized or servo one, you can equip several cars with convertible ECP. And have something eventually useful.
ruderunner I agree that adding a spring wouldn't be complicated, pricey perhaps. A complete redesign could use the emergency reservoir to hold off the spring and if the reservoir runs out the spring would apply. A lockout mechanism for switching would be easy to add here.
As brakes where out on trains I am sure they adjust the brakes we do the same.
Shadow the Cats ownerAs brakes wear out on trains I am sure they adjust the brakes we do the same.
Of course they do; the key is to examine the way that is done on railroad cars and translate that into what would be required of a spring-brake mechanism. A good starting point is slack adjusters.
One consequence in the 'old days' was that the actual spring have very long travel (e.g. many turns for a coil or helical spring). If I recall correctly some designs had a spring running a significant part of the length of the car. When I was a kid and first found out about cold-gas generators in rocketry, I thought some kind of pressurized accumulator with gas generation was an answer to providing reservoir pressure or effective application quickly in emergencies; I still think that represents a "better" safety approach than mechanical springs pulled off by active service pressure. But it retains many of the objections associated with those approaches.
Shadow the Cats ownerAs brakes where out on trains I am sure they adjust the brakes we do the same.
Part of the Terminal Air Test performed by Car Inspectors is to measure Brake Piston Travel with the brakes applied (I believe in excess of 9 inches is a failure) and to replace worn out brake shoes that they observe. When a car has all new brake shoes (nominally 8 per car - 4 shoes per truck, ie. one brake shoe per wheel or two brake shoes per axle) the brake piston travel is well under 9 inches. This is how brakes get adjusted when a train is built - this will also happen when a train undergoes the required 1000 mile inspection.
jeffhergert Other than it being some kind of braking issue, not much has leaked out. FWIW, someone on another site said the rumor going around his area was that the crew did nothing wrong. This person also pointed out it was close to a spot where a closed anglecock led to a similar collision in 1979. In that one, the crew on the caboose didn't open the emergency valve. IMO, they have a good idea of what went wrong. They aren't going to say much until they can find a way to place as much blame as possible on the crew. It's been done before where the crew lived. Should be that much easier when the crew didn't. I won't be surprised if the images from the inward facing camera aren't retrievable. Jeff
NTSB preliminary report:
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RRD19FR001-preliminary-report.aspx?fbclid=IwAR1Pk0ox2CdOIhCudL1SJMCw9Eq56quQ2mkC9LgeGmTjleXi6DbcCTl_NyY
I would like to know why the EOT didn't dump the tail end.
SD70Dude NTSB preliminary report: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RRD19FR001-preliminary-report.aspx?fbclid=IwAR1Pk0ox2CdOIhCudL1SJMCw9Eq56quQ2mkC9LgeGmTjleXi6DbcCTl_NyY I would like to know why the EOT didn't dump the tail end.
Very perplexing - the head end was reading the air pressure being sent by the EOT but the EOT didn't respond to the Emergency activation from the head end. Evidence that there was at least one way communication between the EOT and the head end.
BaltACD SD70Dude NTSB preliminary report: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RRD19FR001-preliminary-report.aspx?fbclid=IwAR1Pk0ox2CdOIhCudL1SJMCw9Eq56quQ2mkC9LgeGmTjleXi6DbcCTl_NyY I would like to know why the EOT didn't dump the tail end. Very perplexing - the head end was reading the air pressure being sent by the EOT but the EOT didn't respond to the Emergency activation from the head end. Evidence that there was at least one way communication between the EOT and the head end.
Upon reading the report again, it doesn't say if the Engineer tried to use the emergency toggle switch on the HOT/IDU console.
Even though placing the automatic brake valve in emergency should have also triggered an emergency application from the EOT, in reality those systems don't always work together perfectly, especially on older locomotives.
The apparent loss of brake pipe continuity while the train was moving - quite possibly every single time the slack was bunched up - is far more disturbing. It reminds me of Jeff's story from not so long ago about an air hose being pinched by a drawbar.
If everything else was working properly, and if the engineer made an emergency application, but the end of train device failed to duplicate that emergency application at the same time the engineer made his, would not the whole train still go into emergency braking?
It sounds like they are saying that the engineer’s emergency application did not propagate to the entire train, or it may not have applied on any of the train.
Euclid If everything else was working properly, and if the engineer made an emergency application, but the end of train device failed to duplicate that emergency application at the same time the engineer made his, would not the whole train still go into emergency braking?
It should have.
Euclid It sounds like they are saying that the engineer’s emergency application did not propagate to the entire train, or it may not have applied on any of the train.
Yes, exactly.
I'm presuming the EOT had an turbine in it - how many CFM would that normally consume?
If a hose was, indeed, pinched, that would tend to explain why the pressure displayed by the EOT dropped as it did, why there was an air flow of zero, and why the reduction, as well as the emergency application, did not propogate through the entire train.
Will the investigation be able to determine the number of cars that had the emergency application ? That location should be able to determine where the apparent brake pipe pinch occurred ? Maybe it even happened on a loco ?
More important is why the loss of communication to the EOT occurred ? According to the preliminary report communication from the EOT was maintained ? That has many possible worries for operation of these extra long trains ?
I'm presuming the EOT had an turbine in it - how many CFM would that normally consume? The number will need to be compared to the volume of the trains brake pipe especially if any pinch occurred.
blue streak 1More important is why the loss of communication to the EOT occurred ? According to the preliminary report communication from the EOT was maintained ?
Communications is normally bidirectional. Can one direction fail? Loco hearing EOT but EOT not hearing Loco? Larry, you are a ham radio op, any thoughts on this.
Wherever the air flow got obstructed - the actions of the train that were described - would make it appear that the obstruction was very near the head end of the train and that little if any train braking was being had from the portion of the train that was ahead of the obstruction and would have had brakes being applied.
It is not mentioned, what if any observations that the crew may have communicated about seeing brakes applied on any portion of their train - activated brakes should have developed some level of smoke (that would have been hard to see in the dark) or what was observed of the applied brakes creating 'rings of fire' around the wheels that were being actively braked. Investigation of the scene by NTSB should be able to identify among the derailed cars, those that had wheel tread bluing from the excess heat generated from the applied brakes.
Air Turbine EOTs don't normally take enough air to cause air flow to register. That air flow was changing with the change in slack condition is not unusual. We call that a slip joint.
On another site, someone with more experience with that area said that loss of comm with the EOTs is common. You can lose comm and not know it for 16 mins 30 seconds before the head end device registers comm loss. (If you think you are out of comm, you can press the comm test key. It will come back with currents status.) An EOT not registering a pressure change after a brake application/release is usually a good indicator that you don't have comm.
Our rules call for operation of the eot emergency toggle switch, even if showing a no comm status. Just in case comm momentarily is established.
Electroliner 1935 blue streak 1 More important is why the loss of communication to the EOT occurred ? According to the preliminary report communication from the EOT was maintained ? Communications is normally bidirectional. Can one direction fail? Loco hearing EOT but EOT not hearing Loco? Larry, you are a ham radio op, any thoughts on this.
blue streak 1 More important is why the loss of communication to the EOT occurred ? According to the preliminary report communication from the EOT was maintained ?
There can be Front-Rear No Comm and Rear-Front No Comm. With Rear-Front you may lose a reading off the rear and if it lasts, usually in my experience changes to a Front-Rear No Comm status or Radio Break status.
The Front-Rear and Radio Break status require reducing speed to 30 mph on most territories until comm is restored. On mountain grade territories the train must not be operated until comm/ability to activate a rear end emergency dump is restored. Trains may move enough to clear obstructions that could be causing comm loss.
With Rear-Front No Comm, it is thought that an EOT will respond to an emergency dump command. No action is required unless the status degrades.
Electroliner 1935Larry, you are a ham radio op, any thoughts on this.
So many variables. I would suppose that the EOT would be more likely to physically fail than the locomotive end.
I wondered about, and it's been answered, how long it would take before a failure of the EOTD would be noticed by the equipment. We see variable conditions on the UHF bands, but that's usually over many miles, not the mile or two involved with an EOTD.
Variable conditions (signal blockages and other interference) would be one reason to allow a certain amount of time before sounding a loss-of-signal alarm.
The fact that the engineer saw a gradually decreasing pressure from the EOTD would suggest that at least one-way comms were in place. The question then becomes whether a command to dump the brakes was, indeed, sent to the EOTD, as has been discussed.
We'll learn more when they update the report.
How common is the problem of an air hose being blocked, but not broken or punctured when the slack runs in, and then returning to normal function when the slack runs back out?
EuclidWhen the slack ran in, the rate of air being pumped into the brake pipe to compensate for leakage dropped to zero. For the leakage to drop to zero during the slack run-in suggests to me that the run-in was causing a blockage very near the head end.
That small of CFM flow was not uncommon and certainly does not indicate any kind of blockage. On the contrary, the fluctuation of pressure as the train proceeded through the dip indicates to me a continuous trainline.
BigJimThe way the air pressure was flucuating, it tells me that it could have very easily been the very common afformentioned "Slip Joint" causing this.
Can you or someone else please explain what a slip joint is and the problem it creates?
My belief is that the air flow into the brake pipe dropped to zero cfm during the slack run-in because the run-in somehow pinched off an air hose and thus isolated a large portion of the brake pipe from the locomotive.
The small portion of brake pipe that was left connected to the locomotive did not experience much total pressure drop because there were relatively few hose joints in it to leak.
So with the compressor controls sensing no pressure drop due to leakage in that small head end section of cars, the system found no need to provide replacement air to compensate for the leakage.
So that is why the rate of air flow into the brake pipe dropped to zero cfm when the slack ran in and essentially created two brake pipes; one connected to the locomotive and one isolated from the locomotive.
Then when the slack ran back out, the blockage in the brake pipe was removed. So then the very large portion of brake pipe trailing the blockage point (with its large total amount of natural leakage and reduced pressure) was suddenly added back and sensed by the air compressor system of the locomotive, so that system began once again to deliver many cfm of compressed air to the brake pipe.
Euclidpoint (with its large total amount of natural leakage and reduced pressure) was suddenly added back and sensed by the air compressor system of the locomotive, so that system began once again to deliver many cfm of compressed air to the brake pipe.
If the pressure on the trailing portion was reduced by more than a few PSI, and the blockage is suddenly removed, your train is most likely going to go into emergency.
A "slip joint" is where two sections of trainline telescope, one into the other. These are used on some types of cushioned cars and cars with long drawheads and are positioned at the end portions of the car. There is a lot of slack on these types of cars.
Did I not say that there was no apparent blockage at the time the train was going through the dip? The only time that I have ever seen a trainline blocked internally is from ice build up. And, the only time that I have ever seen an air hose pinched shut is when the train was cut and the air hose flew back and got caught by something essentially folding it two.
AGAIN...This up & down pressure reading tells me the trainline was continuous. And, with the CFM numbers in the twenties, as was reported, this is nothing I would have any concern over.My concern is that the pressure reading on the rear didn't drop when the automatic brake was applied. Somehow something went wrong and it may be that an anglecock somehow closed. I have had that happen!
BigJimDid I not say that there was no apparent blockage at the time the train was going through the dip?
In the dip, while the slack was bunched with dynamic braking, the flow rate was zero. Isn’t the zero flow rate an anomaly? I have no idea how the slack run-in may have blocked the brake pipe and they unblocked it as it ran out. I cannot see a way that slack could have caused that. So I see no direct evidence that the brake pipe was ever blocked. It is only the air flow into the brake pipe going from something like normal to zero and then back again that fits the cause of the train line being blocked and then unblocked.
Regarding comm loss. The head end device (stand alone or integrated into computer screens) wait 16 mins and 30 seconds without comm before they register the comm loss. You could be without comm for 15 minutes, have comm reestablished for a minute and then again lose comm. The count down would restart.
For DP operation, comm loss with the DP(s) is immediately registered. There is no built in wait time. For both systems, you can operate for 16 mins and 30 seconds without the capability to intiate an emergency application from the rear of train (comm loss) before you need to take action. Slowing to 30, etc. So when the EOT head end shows Front-Rear Comm Loss, you have to take action. Your grace time is up. With the DP, you have to actually watch the clock.
My earlier post about the change in air flow had some cut and paste changes, hence the different fonts. One part that I had added, but didn't make the change was that to me, usually air flow goes up when slack is bunched and goes down when it is stretched. Just the opposite of what the report said. It does make me think that when bunched up it may have pinched a hose.
A slip joint is where the change in the position of the glad hands, possibly made worse by worn/damaged gaskets or not properly seated gaskets. It allows air to escape at the joint.
The other night I had a 14851 foot manifest with a single DP at 8500 feet back from the lead engine consist. Air flow off the headend was 0, the DP fluctuated with changes in slack between 14 and 18 cfm. Not bad for something like that.
petitnjAnd once again, the signal/PTC/Cab/etc. system was not working. Since the crew was always awoken by these things before, now when they fall asleep, the outcome is disaster. More reason to remove the crew from driving the train and only run when PTC like systems operate.
Going by the initial report, I doubt the crew was sleeping.
EuclidI have no idea how the slack run-in may have blocked the brake pipe and they unblocked it as it ran out.
Could be a trolley line on a cushion drawbar getting hung up. Sometimes made worse when people put the wrong length of hoses on them.
zugmann Euclid I have no idea how the slack run-in may have blocked the brake pipe and they unblocked it as it ran out. Could be a trolley line on a cushion drawbar getting hung up. Sometimes made worse when people put the wrong length of hoses on them.
Euclid I have no idea how the slack run-in may have blocked the brake pipe and they unblocked it as it ran out.
That's exactly what happened to me a year or two back. Someone put on the wrong (too long) hose and when the slack came in, the hose got pinched between the draft gear and the car body.
Once we were stopped, a car man came out and fixed it. He wired it in place and said we were good to go.
We were on a short grade, I had clear signals and what brakes (air and dynamics) I had were slowing us down and bringing us to a stop. Because of that I didn't pop the rear end. I held that in reserve if conditions changed. Once stopped and before the car man arrived, the conductor started walking back. He called on the radio and asked if the brake pistons should be in or out. I said out. He found the trouble spot in that way. Out of 102 cars, the head 18 were responding to the brake applications.
zugmann petitnj And once again, the signal/PTC/Cab/etc. system was not working. Since the crew was always awoken by these things before, now when they fall asleep, the outcome is disaster. More reason to remove the crew from driving the train and only run when PTC like systems operate. Going by the initial report, I doubt the crew was sleeping.
petitnj And once again, the signal/PTC/Cab/etc. system was not working. Since the crew was always awoken by these things before, now when they fall asleep, the outcome is disaster. More reason to remove the crew from driving the train and only run when PTC like systems operate.
I originally posted that I was told (by a manager) that PTC and/or cab signals were not working. I later said that I thought that might not be true. That I felt the railroad may have been throwing out things to divert as much blame as possible on the crew. The report says PTC was operative, but with the other problems it really didn't matter.
The report doesn't say whether the head end dump switch was activated. I'm inclined to think it was. If they can't prove it was operated, look for the crew to get most of the blame. Just my opinion.
zugmann Euclid point (with its large total amount of natural leakage and reduced pressure) was suddenly added back and sensed by the air compressor system of the locomotive, so that system began once again to deliver many cfm of compressed air to the brake pipe. If the pressure on the trailing portion was reduced by more than a few PSI, and the blockage is suddenly removed, your train is most likely going to go into emergency.
Euclid point (with its large total amount of natural leakage and reduced pressure) was suddenly added back and sensed by the air compressor system of the locomotive, so that system began once again to deliver many cfm of compressed air to the brake pipe.
I was wondering about that, but I have no way to draw a conclusion. If the blockage suddenly opened up, the head end would experience a sudden loss of pressure. I guess whether it dumped the air would depend on the rate of reduction on the first car ahead of the blockage. For at least the first instant, that rate of reduction would probably be quite high.
However, maybe the blockage did not instantly clear, so maybe there was enough lag to slow down the rate of reduction to be less than what it would take to cause an emergency application.
Under the circumstances of this runaway, I understand that the engineer made an emergency application while the airflow into the brake pipe was zero cfm. If the zero airflow condition was a symptom of the brake pipe being blocked, I speculate that the emergency application would have propagated to the entire train had the emergency application been made when the slack was stretched.
It seems that the failure of the EOT to make an emergency application was a problem unrelated to the cause of the head end emergency application being ineffective.
I heard this morning that they had 10 cars on the head end that were responding to the brake application. Those cars' brakes showed excessive heat build up. Allegedly, the 10th or llth car, part of a pick up in Laramie, had been recently worked on by a car man for a train line problem.
Ten cars deep fits the scenario I see as related to blockage of the brake pipe. I speculated above that it would be no deeper than 25 cars. If it were say 75 cars deep, the engineer’s emergency application would have likely piled up the train as the un-braked hind end of maybe 75 cars pushed against 75 cars in emergency.
Initially it was reported that the crew had gotten off the engine of the struck train. This raised the question in this thread as to whether a crew ever gets off of the engine to avoid injury from being struck from behind by another train.
However, it was not immediately announced whether this was the motive for the crew to get off of the train struck in this U.P. collision. They might have just gotten off for some other reason, so it was just reported merely to indicate they were not involved in the collision.
But then, we learned that the dispatcher had ordered the crew to get off their engine because they were about to be struck from behind by the runaway. So this would seem to indicate that the crew was told to get off for their own safety.
But there is one other point that needs clarification. After learning of the runaway, was the struck train already stopped for some other reason, and then the crew told to get off for their safety? Or after learning of the runaway, was the struck train moving, perhaps at track speed, ahead of the runaway; and then ordered to stop and for the crew to get off?
If the struck train was ordered to stop because of the runaway, what would be the reason for that order?
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