timz samfp1943 "By route-miles, you mean? Not ton-miles? "
samfp1943
"By route-miles, you mean? Not ton-miles? "
Yes, by size of its physical plant (route miles, and its equipment). Not sure of the exact financials(?), but obviously, UP was able to merge, by buying WP and MP.
MP's service of the the Gulf Coast areas of La, and Tx {The "Chemical Coast"?) would have been a 'plumb', not to mention its' connection from that area to Chicago, as well(?). UPRR definitely came out as a winner in that merger.
Sam: VGN was solvent to the end with the lowest OP in the east in 1959. My initial post was predicated on some western RR swooping in on SR/ACL/NW territory to get a jewell like the VGN-just FYI.
Sam: Great info on the MP; thanks. When you suggest that one 'issue' that made the VGN, an unlikely merger candidate would have been the financially strong Southern Rwy, and also the N&W, are you suggesting that was because both would have fought the SCC to NOT let that buyout happen? Otherwise, what could they have done to stop it? If the UP was smaller in 1960 than mP wouldn't UP have been interested in a coast to coast direct transcon?
samfp1943Into the 1980's MP was a bigger railroad that Union Pacific.
VGN Jess "I think, like you, that the Clinchfield met the ACL/SCL coal hauling needs. I've been surprised that no responders have thought the UP/MP/ATSF would have wanted to extend track to WV/OH and buy the VGN."
"I think, like you, that the Clinchfield met the ACL/SCL coal hauling needs. I've been surprised that no responders have thought the UP/MP/ATSF would have wanted to extend track to WV/OH and buy the VGN."
The MP was in Col., Ne.,Ark,La. and Tx.., In 1917 it was merged with St Louis and Iron Mtn. [SLSM] to become the MP RR. [ Roughly,SLSM, a line from the St. Louis area to NW Arkansas]. It had also gained control over some railroads in Tx. Prime accusition seemed to be the T&P. In the early 1930's it went again, into bankruptcy, and receivership, that ended in 1956.
Into the 1980's MP was a bigger railroad that Union Pacific. In 1961 Dowing Jenks took over the railroad as president. under his watch they locomotive fleet was built to about 1500 locomotives, and many were considered to be newer <10 years old(?). it utilized computer technologies, and inovations (ie: TOFC). was a railroad of about 11,500 miles in 11states and lines to the Gulf Coast, and into the Laredo(Tx) area. It had also reached the Chicago area and linked it with Denver, It was pretty solidly entrenched in the southern reaches of the Midwestern states(?).
With the 'big' Union Pacific merger of 1982, UPRR took in MP as well as WP; at that time MP was reported to be a larger physical plant and had more locomotives than UPRR(?). UP gained access to the Eastern half of the country, by crossing the Mississippi River at several locations, in Illinois, and Tennesse (IIRC?) I think it was somewhat interesting that within the framework of the merger, a number of MP's locomotives were painted in the UP's scheme of Armor Yellow and grey, and lettered for 'Missouri Pacific', as well I think that there was also a period in the 1980's when technically it was UPRR merged into MP(?). Not really solid on that one issue...?
I would suggest that one 'issue' that made the VGN, an unlikely merger candidate would have been the financially strong Southern Rwy, and also the N&W. Which seemed to operate in parallel with the VGN(?). VGN in the early 20th Century seems to have been a better constructed railroad, and solvent financially(?).
I think, like you, that the Clinchfield met the ACL/SCL coal hauling needs. I've been surprised that no responders have thought the UP/MP/ATSF would have wanted to extend track to WV/OH and buy the VGN.
I wonder - would the Seaboard Coast Line have been interested in acquiring the VGN had it been available in the late 1960's? This would have given the SCL a foothold in the then-still-valuable Central Appalachian coal franchise, a direct connection with PC for traffic moving from the Midwest to the Mid-Atlantic state and the Carolinas (vs a roundabout routing using the L&N through Kentucky and Tennessee), and a small, but profitable base in the Charleston WV chemical industry for traffic to and from the Southeast.Perhaps their control over Clinchfield met part of this need, but the connections and coal base would have only added to SCL benefit.
I think the UP extending a tentacle east to hook up with the VGN would have been as big a failure as the Milwaukee Road extension to the Pacific Coast, or Gould's WP to the Bay Area. They were also extensions with few feeders into areas with well-established railroads. A UP expansion of that sort to a secondary port on the Atlantic would have been lost in the overwhelming tangle of eastern railroads. As you say, the VGN was purpose built to haul coal from WV to Norfolk, with a back door at Deepwater, WV, to the Great Lakes area.
Sam, loved the speculations. Exactly the kind of "stuff" I was hoping for in my original posting. RE your: "what if it had had its own 'ambitions' to take over C&O?"--Personally, I don't think the VGN from the 1950's was imbued with risky executives; rather they picked one thing (hauling coal to Norfolk) and put all efforts in doing that efficiently. I often speculated VGN as a merger partner with one of the Western Transcons to get to Norfolk directly, but one of them would have had to extend the VGNs lines across the entire Commonwealth of KY to connect with MP/UP/SP, but all posters say that would have never happened.
MidlandMike VGN Jess That's the answer I think I was looking for. I presumed mergers were the only way. So you think since the western RRs owners never "bought into" VGN, they saw no benefit from a direct transcom from the Pacific to the Atlantic? VGN, being so relatively small would have otherwise been easy to buy. The problem was that the VGN did not connect with the western railroads. If they bought one of the railroads that closed the gap, such as the NYC or C&O, they would already have there Atlantic ports, and would not realy need the VGN.
VGN Jess
That's the answer I think I was looking for. I presumed mergers were the only way. So you think since the western RRs owners never "bought into" VGN, they saw no benefit from a direct transcom from the Pacific to the Atlantic? VGN, being so relatively small would have otherwise been easy to buy.
The problem was that the VGN did not connect with the western railroads. If they bought one of the railroads that closed the gap, such as the NYC or C&O, they would already have there Atlantic ports, and would not realy need the VGN.
Recall the earlier statements re: the VGN's financial and infrastructure strengths: " It is of some interest in the late 1920/30's era the VGN was sometime know as "...The richest little railroad in the world..." It was laid with heavy rail(for the times) and its financial strength was tied to the foundations laid with investor's Standard Oil Monies(?). Once the VGN had bridged the Kanawah River at Mullins; its connection there, would enhance its strength as a Bridge Route to Norfolk (?)
[Since we are specuating]. Rather than VGN becoming a merger traget, what if it had had its own 'ambitions' to take over C&O? Suddenly, the Big Railroad Picture, could change drastically, then, and into the future (?).
Would it have survived the energy crunch of the early 1970's (?).
What would the future hold for VGN as the nation turned 'its back' for some years on Coal(?). Could it have survived as a 'stand alone' line(?).
Or would it become a merged part of another larger system[NS, maybe?)]
What about it being m merger partner with one of the Western Transcons(?).
What would the VGN look like in this day, and time(?).
Just some speculative questions on my part.
VGN Jess That's the answer I think I was looking for. I presumed mergers were the only way. So you think since the western RRs owners never "bought into" VGN, they saw no benefit from a direct transcom from the Pacific to the Atlantic? VGN, being so relatively small would have otherwise been easy to buy.
The Federal Government investment in the transcons was not purely altruistic as quite a bit of revenue was derived from land sales. Having a nearby railroad made the land a lot more valuable.
There was also strategic interest in having the transcons, with the RR in place, troops and their supplies could be moved a lot faster to the west coast than what would be possible before. Multiple transcons made it harder cut the supply lines.
As for the VGN, the funding came from the money made off of Standard Oil and it seems appropriate than they invested in another form of energy.
VGN JessJohnny, Thanks. I did not think of the A&D (and later the N.F. & D); that answers my SOU question. The only way the MP or any other western road would have reached West Virginia was via extension of VGN tracks to the Mississippi River; I guess there just wasn't enough business to warrant a direct Pacific to Atlantic transcon. Making connections thru Chicago to the east was just less costly.
The only way the MP or any other western road would have reached West Virginia was via extension of VGN tracks to the Mississippi River; I guess there just wasn't enough business to warrant a direct Pacific to Atlantic transcon. Making connections thru Chicago to the east was just less costly.
No US railroads were envisioned by their original promoters as Transcons. The 'market' they were promoting their investment opportunities to had trouble contemplating a town 100 miles away as being a profitable project to invest in.
As rail fans we think about drawing lines on the map as being viable railroads. The promoters of their creations were looking at destinations for financial investment that they could secure to build their vision. A Transcon dream project, at that time, too big a dream to attract investment. As rail fans we tend go gloss over just how much sustained traffic volume is required to keep any rail line a viable economic concern - and if the line is not economically viable it will soon cease to exist.
The key to building railroads to the West Coast was Federal Government investment and legislation that spured on both Union Pacific and Central Pacific and their race to complete what we now view as a Transcon.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Johnny, Thanks. I did not think of the A&D (and later the N.F. & D); that answers my SOU question.
VGN Jess Johnny, What are your thoughts on why the SOU didn't merge the VGN to get access to Norfolk? Any thoughts on why MP/UP/SP didn't merge with and extend VGN tracks from WV/OH to the Mississippi River to have a true direct Transcon?
Johnny, What are your thoughts on why the SOU didn't merge the VGN to get access to Norfolk? Any thoughts on why MP/UP/SP didn't merge with and extend VGN tracks from WV/OH to the Mississippi River to have a true direct Transcon?
If a western RR wanted to reach the Atlantic they bought into existing eastern railroads, such as Harriman and Gould did. Ultimatly the ICC nixed the expansions.
Thus, the Southern had its own routes into the area, and did not need the Virginian.
I ;m not sure how the MP or any other western road would have reached West Virginia. Remember that the Virginian's western most point was Deepwater Bridge, where it connected with the NYC. Once this connection was possible, there was through service between Roanoke and Charleston, W.Va. Indeed, in 1945, there was a through day passenger train Roanoke-Charleston, and you could ride from any point between Roanoke and the junction to/from any point on the NYC--but no local traffic was permitted on the NYC.
Johnny
The Southern had access to Norfolk via the Atlantic and Danville until 1949. They apparently didn't see it being worthwhile, so they dropped the lease.
Norfolk was pretty much just a coal port for most of the VGN's existence.
Both the ACL and SAL crossed the Virginian on their ways from Richmond to the Carolinas and farther south. Also, both railroads entered the Portsmouth area; one from from Rocky Mount, N.C, and the other from Norlina, N.C.
SAL or ACL crossed the VGN as well as the SOU. I'm not familiar enough with then to know what, if any traffic would be diverted to Norfolk to go overseas.
Thanks. That's alot to think about and very on point to the type creative RR guys I knew were on this forum. I'll have the NS VGN heritage SD70ACe unit to look at for memories (at least until the 1st repaint takes it to NS B&W).
SOU RR makes alot of sense; crazy I hadn't thought of them. Their lines could have easily tied into VGN's lines in western VA and SE WV and given them direct access to Norfolk. I wonder why SOU never pursued VGN?
VGN JessNYC? Hummm..then 20 years later VGN is with Conrail.
Even the NYC of the post-proxy-fight Young years wouldn't have had the money to acquire and run VGN effectively. Its value in any case was in providing an end-connection to allow VGN to operate bridge traffic effectively, which presumably would have been preserved through both PC and Conrail. There is little presumption that VGN would have been in such parlous state by the Seventies as to be incorporated in the 3R Act planning, particularly if the modern electrification was panning out.
It may bear mentioning at this point that the last Virginian motors (which ultimately became E33s) were geared for 65mph, and presumably any follow-on units, including dual-modes, would be comparable. That leaves the prospect of effective high-speed bridge traffic without massive energy-cost penalty in the 'Trailer Jet' age ... the problem being that bridge traffic to the tidewater ports as they were then (and perhaps now) isn't exactly a major part of freight. Perhaps a coordinated effort to develop ports either in Hampton Roads or the Sewalls/Sewells Point area, after the manner of Prince Rupert BC recently, would have enhanced traffic "alternative to coal". That might have made deepwater facilities attractive to the prospective generations of very large container carriers that would have trouble, say, negotiating the Delaware all those miles to reach an effective rail connection.
At first blush thought of SOU RR acquiring VGN. Unfortunately SOU's coal traffic could not easily have gained access to Tidewater coaling ? That is unless SOU got some kind of track rights from N&W Norton to Roanoke ?
"Had it made it past 1973, it would have likely lasted to the 80's."--That's my feeling as well. Nice to have it validated. Where do you see VGN going in the 80's?
I still feel that MP/UP/SP (Maybe even BN) would have extended VGN's rails to the Mississippi River so one of them could have had a true (ie...direct) transcon from the Pacific to the Atlantic on one roads rails.
mudchicken erikem One likely outcome would have been the electric operation lasting longer. ... and then vanished faster than the PCE of the Milwaukee.
erikem One likely outcome would have been the electric operation lasting longer.
One likely outcome would have been the electric operation lasting longer.
... and then vanished faster than the PCE of the Milwaukee.
VGN's electrification was in better shape in the late 1950's than the Milwaukee's (most of the motive power was post-WW2), the electrical system was capable of handling more HP per train. VGN was also in a bit better financial shape than the Milw. Had it made it past 1973, it would have likely lasted to the 80's.
OTOH, had the N&W been told "NoWay" to the merger ca 1956, the N&W steam may have also lasted a bit longer as well.
Thanks; very familiar w/VGN Wiki site. I was curious as to what kind of creative thinkers are out there.
I'm sure electrification would have lasted longerr, too. It was an effecient and effective method of moving coal over Clarks Gap.
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