Obviously you have never been very close to a fast moving train. The windblast from the lead unit or control cab is significant and could easily lead to a momentary loss of balance. That in a situation with absolutely no margin for error can easily prove deadly. The recommendation posted earlier to "hit the dirt" is well worth remembering, since that puts you in a stable position and also with additional clearance. Of course, in 3rd rail territory, maybe not.
I do agree that it is plausible they never saw it coming. The cab video should answer that question.
We had a number of accidents on station platforms were people standing too close to the edge were killed or strollers sucked in by passing trains. These trains were traveling at around 75 to 100 mph.
Today danger zones are marked on the platforms: http://www.bahnbilder.de/1024/bahnsteig-2-3-wittlich-hbf-632108.jpgRegards, Volker
NTSB Final Report
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1901.pdf
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
That is a classic case of not seeing a train approaching from behind because of being distracted by a train observed approaching from ahead. Without being aware of it, people lose sight of the fact that their normal situational awareness is greatly diminished by a train they are already aware of. People become unaware of the fact that they are unaware. They can see and hear fine, but not realize that their hearing cannot distinguish source direction. In my opinion, this is the great hidden danger of a double track line. In a situation where no train is approaching, a person feels totally protected by their sense of hearing and sight. But if two trains are approaching, source direction detection of hearing can be easily lost.
What we need is a simple rule, or even a simple convention.
If you're approaching a perceived target 'from behind' use a series of horn blasts, or a coded signal, instead of a single long blare. I thought there was already a convention to use something like the MTA's long-short repeated combination whenever passing through a MOW or 'known restriction' zone.
The point being to disambiguate the signal used by one engine in a 'meet' from the other's, in some fashion that can be reduced to a rule.
I have long underestand that the standard warning for persons or anylive thing in danger of an approaching train is a series of short blasts. I have heard such on the Rochelle camera thread, and I saw the necessity of such while waiting for #6 in Sacramento--two or three men who were too far from me for me to shout at them were standing within the danger area on the platform and the engineer was blowing that single, which they, of course, did not comprehend.
Any railroad employee should comprehend that signal. Was the engineer of the approaching train so taken by surprise at seeing the men on the track that he failed to react as he should?
Johnny
I have long underestand that the standard warning for persons or any live thing in danger of an approaching train is a series of short blasts. I have heard such on the Rochelle camera thread, and I saw the necessity of such while waiting for #6 in Sacramento--two or three men who were too far from me for me to shout at them were standing within the danger area on the platform and the engineer was blowing that single, which they, of course, did not comprehend.
The following are my thoughts from my earlier post last year right after the accident. I also posted an example in red that occurred on June 23, 1890.
Two engineers sounded the warning at the same times, so each engineer’s warning obscured the warning of the other.
Euclid Even with a train approaching fast and close, getting into the clear would not have required more than a split second, and would have been intuitive to experienced railroaders. I doubt that air movement created by the train played a role. The fact that they did not get into the clear is evidence that they never saw the train that hit them. One good possible reason for that is that, with both trains blowing horn warnings, the warnings were heard together and not as two individual warnings from two different trains. It is reported that they were walking with their backs to the train that hit them. So they could have seen the other train approaching them, and attributed both train warnings only to the train they saw coming toward them. This type of ironic outcome from horn or whistle warnings causing the opposite of the intended effect has happened before, and I suspect quite often. If so, it actually does seem worthy of being labeled as a “perfect storm” in that it requires two trains approaching simultaneously and each giving warnings that obscure the warning of the other. Here is an historical example of this type of accident: June 1890 23rd, on New York, New Haven & Hartford, at South Lyme, Conn., butting collision between two gravel trains. The engine of one of the trains was pushing the caboose. One laborer was killed and three injured. It appears that the conductors of these trains made meeting points verbally upon their own responsibility, which a coroner’s verdict says was “without the knowledge of the railroad company.” The coroner’s verdict also says that each engineer on approaching the curve where the collision occurred blew a long blast of the whistle, and that very likely these signals were simultaneous, so that neither heard the whistle of the other.
Even with a train approaching fast and close, getting into the clear would not have required more than a split second, and would have been intuitive to experienced railroaders. I doubt that air movement created by the train played a role. The fact that they did not get into the clear is evidence that they never saw the train that hit them.
One good possible reason for that is that, with both trains blowing horn warnings, the warnings were heard together and not as two individual warnings from two different trains.
It is reported that they were walking with their backs to the train that hit them. So they could have seen the other train approaching them, and attributed both train warnings only to the train they saw coming toward them.
This type of ironic outcome from horn or whistle warnings causing the opposite of the intended effect has happened before, and I suspect quite often. If so, it actually does seem worthy of being labeled as a “perfect storm” in that it requires two trains approaching simultaneously and each giving warnings that obscure the warning of the other.
Here is an historical example of this type of accident:
June 1890
23rd, on New York, New Haven & Hartford, at South Lyme, Conn., butting collision between two gravel trains. The engine of one of the trains was pushing the caboose. One laborer was killed and three injured. It appears that the conductors of these trains made meeting points verbally upon their own responsibility, which a coroner’s verdict says was “without the knowledge of the railroad company.” The coroner’s verdict also says that each engineer on approaching the curve where the collision occurred blew a long blast of the whistle, and that very likely these signals were simultaneous, so that neither heard the whistle of the other.
The following is from the final NTSB report just released:
The conductor and conductor trainee may also have visually and audibly detected only a single train approaching them. As they walked southbound, the beam of light from the southbound locomotive, which could have illuminated a sign or object ahead of them, may have competed with or been masked by the light emanating from the northbound locomotive. As a result, they may not have perceived any visual cues from the southbound train. Additionally, given the simultaneous and similar horn and bell sounds from the two trains, the conductors may not have discerned two sources of the sounds and, consequently, concluded that the sounds originated from only one train—the one that they had detected ahead of them. As a result, it appears the conductors were unaware that a second train was approaching them from behind.
The bigger question - why did the Conductor and trainee return to their engines on the side of the train against Amtrak rather than on totally CSX property on the other side of their train.
The Conductor involved was the son of one of my supervisors before I retired. I knew him to talk to - but not as a supervisor of his work actions.
Apparently the two conductors were walking on the Amtrak track because it was easier to walk there than walking on the sloped ballast alongside of their train.
The operating crews were NOT prohibited from walking either on or near the Amtrak tracks.
Yet, the NTSB believes that operating crews should have been prohibited from walking either on or near the Amtrak tracks.
Operating crews are required to “…be alert for and keep clear of the movement of cars, locomotives, or equipment at any time, in either direction, on any track.”
So, assuming that the two conductors were not aware of the train approaching them from behind, the essence of the cause is that they failed be alert for, and keep clear of any movement of equipment approaching from behind.
This is where the essence of the unique distraction danger enters the situation. That unique danger is that a person may be prevented from being alert for equipment approaching from behind because they are not looking in that direction and their sense of hearing cannot distinguish the sound of the equipment approaching from behind because it is merged with the sound of equipment approaching from ahead.
The essential kernel of this distraction is that a person walking on the track, being confident that their sense of hearing will make them aware of equipment approaching from behind; may not realize that they have temporarily lost their hearing ability to distinguish the sound of equipment approaching from behind because that sound is merged into the sound of equipment approaching from the front. So, the essence of the danger is, “not knowing what you don’t know.” In other words, a person may believe that they are alert for any equipment approaching from behind, when actually they are not alert to that prospect.
Therefore, a person legally walking on a track cannot be alert to equipment approaching from behind if equipment is approaching from ahead, on any track nearby; unless the person legally walking on the track routinely turns their head and looks back at intervals shorter than the time it would take for a train approaching from behind to reach the person walking on the track. For example, if a person was walking with their back to the direction where the fastest trains would become become visible 20 seconds before reaching the person walking, then the person walking should turn their head and look back at regular intervals less than 20 seconds in duration. This would eliminate the need for a sense of hearing that normally plays a key role in being alert for equipment approaching from behind.
This unique distraction is the same danger that leads to trespassers to being struck from behind because they are not frequently looking back and their sense of hearing needed to distinguish one sound from another is temporarily suspended due to listing to music through ear buds.
I have never seen any railroad rule that details this unique distraction of partially losing situational awareness due to the loss of the ability to distinguish the direction of sound. Do any rules or safety instructions warn employees of this danger? Otherwise, if employees are not aware of this unique distraction danger, they most definitely should be prohibited from walking within the foul line of any active railroad track. And yet, they are not prohibited from doing so. Therefore if employees are not trained to be on guard against this unique distraction danger, they are not adequately trained to perform their duty.
EuclidThe operating crews were NOT prohibited from walking either on or near the Amtrak tracks.
I believe my rulebooks do have a rule that states one is not to foul a track except in the performance of duty.
I don't wish to speak ill of the dead, but for go sakes, don't walk on a active high speed line without proper protection.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
I always remember back in the 50's when working on the PRR, looking up the track and not having heard any sound, seeing a headlight come into sight. The passenger train was about a half mile away but with no grade crossings nearby, there was no need for any horn use. I called out HOT RAIL and everyone cleared the track in plenty of time. What impressed me was that there was no audiblle sound of the train. I just hope that I never forget the need to be aware of the rule that you can expect a train on any track at any time and if you don't, it could be fatal. My sympathies to the families of those men who were trying to do their job.
At Utica, we have no call to foul the CSX tracks, so that's not a problem for us.
On the main, however:
Westbounds have no crossings within earshot of the station, but CSX (and Amtrak) do sound their horns on approaching the station. Eastbound, there's a crossing about a mile and change from the station, and weather permitting, you'll hear that, as well as the blast for the station itself.
Most trains are cleared for 50 MPH through the station, so without that horn blast, yes, one could be surprised.
When listening in on the CSX frequency, there's a DD a couple miles west of the station, so most eastbounds will have tripped that by the time they come into sight of the station. Not so for the westbounds - the DD is out of radio range. Trains in both directions call CPs a couple of miles out, so one has that as well.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
The NTSB report says: “The operating crews were not prohibited from walking either on or near the Amtrak tracks.”
I find it incredible that employees are allowed to walk on a live track without some type of formal protection. Although I am puzzled as to why the NTSB also said that they determine “that the probable cause of the accident was the CSX Transportation train Q137 crew’s decision to walk near an active track without protection.” Can an accident be caused by doing something that is not against the rules?
In any case, there is a rule that requires: “…be alert for and keep clear of the movement of cars, locomotives, or equipment at any time, in either direction, on any track.”
There are only two senses available to fulfill the requirement to “be alert,” and those senses are vision and hearing. Both are problematic. Hearing can be unreliable because approaching trains can be nearly silent until there is very little time to react. Hearing can also be unreliable because of the sound obscuration caused by multiple sounds coming from different sources, as seems to have been the case with this accident.
Vision can only be reliable to detect approaching trains within the field of vision. When walking in a given direction, there is no field of vision in the opposite direction. So a person cannot possibly be alert to a train approaching from behind if there is no sensory input to indicate this fact. One other element to this hazard is that a person accustomed to being protected by a sense of hearing expects the absence of sound to mean they are safe. So a person can be lulled into the false complacency in that; if they hear no danger, there is no danger. But in fact, that is not always the case.
Relying only on alertness to detect movement on any track in any direction seems practical in a yard where surfaces outside of the foul line of tracks are generally flat and easily walkable; and where a person changes directions often causing their field of vision to sweep all directions and is expecting conflicting movement from any direction as they walk into and out of various foul zones. But for a person walking considerable distance in track direction, in the foul zone of an active mainline, the rule to merely be alert seems quite inadequate.
When walking adjacent to another carriers Main track - and YOU KNOW they are not protecting against you - your head needs to be on swival on virtually every step. This was not done. Why is the question, however, dead men tell no tales - to their benefit or detriment.
All trains are surprisingly quiet - especially when an employee is in the near proximity to their own trains locomotives. Electric trains, such as Amtrak in this instance are even quieter.
My undersanding of reading the NTSB report is that Q137 had pulled through the crossovers a F Tower about 7 car lengths worth - in this position Q137 is occupying both CSX #1 and #2 tracks and thus protecting itself against all movements on CSX tracks. Why the crewmen did not walk the CSX side of the train is the unanswerable question. Ballast slope has no more bearing in walking CSX tracks that it does walking on the ties of Amtrak tracks.
BaltACD When walking adjacent to another carriers Main track - and YOU KNOW they are not protecting against you - your head needs to be on swival on virtually every step. This was not done. Why is the question, however, dead men tell no tales - to their benefit or detriment.
Turn your head while walking and you've taken your eyes of the path. Would be at least a "coaching" event for us.
Jeff
BaltACDWhy the crewmen did not walk the CSX side of the train is the unanswerable question. Ballast slope has no more bearing in walking CSX tracks that it does walking on the ties of Amtrak tracks.
According to the report, some employees preferred to walk on the ends of the ties rather than on just the ballast, and that is what the two conductors were doing.
Given that information, I would assume that the two conductors had been walking forward to return to their engine, and they were doing so by walking on the ties of the CSX track that was not occupied by their standing train. But when they got to the crossover, their train was strung through the crossover and then occupied the track on which they had been walking on the ties.
So, in order to continue walking on the ends of the ties, they crossed over to walk on the empty track of the nearest Amtrak main line.
Here there should be no reason to endanger the crew and stop the train along the busy main. If it stops, declare an emergency and slow all trains to restricted or slower. Once again, the dispatchers are not keeping the crews informed of track status in the area. The job is so full of routines that there may be no time to get the big picture. The dispatcher is caught between two hard rocks: inform the crews and follow burdensom procedures. The big picture is lost when all their time is taken up with details.
CSX and Amtrak are simply two railroads with adjacent ROW's in the Ivy City area. This is little different from an Interstate highway and a frontage road - next to each other but otherwise unrelated.
As such, the CSX dispatcher may not have had any knowledge of exactly what was happening on the NEC (and vice versa). Balt will know - I'm admittedly making an assumption here.
Regardless - I would opine that the CSX crew was someplace they should not have been - trespassing, even.
tree68Regardless - I would opine that the CSX crew was someplace they should not have been - trespassing, even.
It does seem that way.
Euclid tree68 Regardless - I would opine that the CSX crew was someplace they should not have been - trespassing, even. It does seem that way.
tree68 Regardless - I would opine that the CSX crew was someplace they should not have been - trespassing, even.
They had a 'right' to be there - what they didn't have is the proper level of situational awareness for the position they placed themselves in. It was in no way trespassing.
BaltACD Euclid tree68 Regardless - I would opine that the CSX crew was someplace they should not have been - trespassing, even. It does seem that way. They had a 'right' to be there - what they didn't have is the proper level of situational awareness for the position they placed themselves in. It was in no way trespassing.
I think we need some more details to establish your position on this point (highlighted in red above). On what basis did the two conductores have a "right" to be there, as you say?
Were the two conductors working for CSX at the time, and was the Amtrak line on CSX property? If not, who owns the property of the Amtrak line? If the property of the accident site is not owned by CSX, did the two conductors have any authorization to leave CSX property and enter the property of the Amtrak line?
If the Amtrak tracks are owned by Amtrak, how do CSX employees have any more rights to be on Amtrak property than any other (non Amtrak) person, unless they had secured permission in advance for a specified time period? Seems like trespassing otherwise.
Euclid BaltACD Euclid tree68 Regardless - I would opine that the CSX crew was someplace they should not have been - trespassing, even. It does seem that way. They had a 'right' to be there - what they didn't have is the proper level of situational awareness for the position they placed themselves in. It was in no way trespassing. I think we need some more details to establish your position on this point (highlighted in red above). On what basis did the two conductores have a "right" to be there, as you say? Were the two conductors working for CSX at the time, and was the Amtrak line on CSX property? If not, who owns the property of the Amtrak line? If the property of the accident site is not owned by CSX, did the two conductors have any authorization to leave CSX property and enter the property of the Amtrak line?
NTSB recommends that employees be prohibited from fouling the tracks of another railroad without seeking protection status from that railroad. They seem to be tap dancing around the issue of trespass that would occur if employees were to foul the tracks of another railroad without protection status (as was the case in this accident). The grant of protection status would constitute permission from the property owner and thereby eliminate the issue of trespass by default.
charlie hebdoIf the Amtrak tracks are owned by Amtrak, how do CSX employees have any more rights to be on Amtrak property than any other (non Amtrak) person, unless they had secured permission in advance for a specified time period? Seems like trespassing otherwise.
Google Earth image of the area - Who's tracks are Who's.
BaltACDGoogle Earth image of the area - Who's tracks are Who's.
Whose tracks are whose? The parties in question should know. Clearly none of us (including you) know.
I would guess the bottom two tracks are Amtrak's (cat poles), while the two alongside those are CSX (no cat poles, and an interlocking which the train eas reported to be strung out through).
charlie hebdo BaltACD Google Earth image of the area - Who's tracks are Who's. Whose tracks are whose? The parties in question should know. Clearly none of us (including you) know.
BaltACD Google Earth image of the area - Who's tracks are Who's.
I know - that is why I posted the picture. I did not major in English, and what I was taught is about 50+ years in the past - so some things slip through the cracks.
BaltACD The bigger question - why did the Conductor and trainee return to their engines on the side of the train against Amtrak rather than on totally CSX property on the other side of their train.
Just a theory, I in no way wish to speak ill of the dead, may they rest in peace.
From the NTSB report it appears the freight was a intermodal train (over 9,000' with only 58 cars, had to be a lot of 5-packs).
What are CSX's rules regarding crossing over intermodal cars? On CN we are required to maintain 3-point contact at all times when riding or crossing over equipment, and while intermodal cars do have walkways they do not have handrails on the end of the car, so it is impossible to cross over them and maintain 3-point contact.
Could the Conductor have been aware of the Trainmaster's prescence on or about their train, and did not want to commit a rule violation in front of him?
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
SD70Dude BaltACD The bigger question - why did the Conductor and trainee return to their engines on the side of the train against Amtrak rather than on totally CSX property on the other side of their train. Just a theory, I in no way wish to speak ill of the dead, may they rest in peace. From the NTSB report it appears the freight was a intermodal train (over 9,000' with only 58 cars, had to be a lot of 5-packs). What are CSX's rules regarding crossing over intermodal cars? On CN we are required to maintain 3-point contact at all times when riding or crossing over equipment, and while intermodal cars do have walkways they do not have handrails on the end of the car, so it is impossible to cross over them and maintain 3-point contact. Could the Conductor have been aware of the Trainmaster's prescence on or about their train, and did not want to commit a rule violation in front of him?
I believe I read, that at the start of the inspection, the Conductor inspected one side and the Trainee inspected the other. For them to be together, one of them had to have crossed over.
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