Fascinating testimony. He was fortunate to come out of what could have been a tragedy.
I have a question on what rules apply to pay for the time spent providing testimony?
Electroliner 1935Fascinating testimony. He was fortunate to come out of what could have been a tragedy. I have a question on what rules apply to pay for the time spent providing testimony?
In 'most' cases it is viewed as a legal proceeding with employees testifying 'for the company' and such employees will be compensated at their normal rates and for any expenses incured for travel and/or lodging.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
According the report, after striking the hopper car, the engine derailed and traveled 200 feet on the ground. It appears from the video, that the engine basically turned to the right, away from the impact, and plowed its way out into deep snow roughly perpendicular to the track. Because the hopper car was fouling only the left half of the track, it would result in the engine deflecting to the right upon impact. This deflection may have done a lot to protect the engineer and conductor. A direct hit would have likely resulted in a lot more disintegration of the structure of both the hopper car and the locomotive.
Here is part of the report where the engineer of the oil train describes his experience of suddenly finding a loaded grain hopper fouling the left half of his track and knows he won’t be able to stop in time to avoid hitting the 143-ton obstacle. The engineer refers to the grain hopper as a “C-6.”
I have reformatted this to make it easier to read. The part in blue is stated by the interviewer when the engineer appears to have a difficult time thinking about the experience.
*************************************************
ENGINEER’S DESCRIPTION:
“I don't, you know, everything went so fuzzy then because within seconds, I came through the snow down and I saw a C-6 laying across my track.
And I, you know, I dumped the train. I knew though, I've been out here 9 years, I knew what was behind me. I knew we weren't stopping.
And I -- my conductor, you know, I think he's been out here almost 2 years, but newer, you know,… And I know what came out of his mouth was holy –-- what do we do? And I told him to hit the ground. And we both jumped on the cabin, the floor, and I don't know if it was, you know, an hour or 3 seconds. But I knew what was coming, and I honestly said a prayer. It was really quick. Excuse me.
[interviewer] Take your time. You need to stop? (No audible response)
[interviewer] All right. We're going to pause for a minute.
[interviewer] All right. We are going to pick up where we left off with the interview of Mr. Brian Thompson. So Brian, let's continue.
…like I said, I saw the C-6 laying in my track. And, you know, it was milliseconds, half a second, you know, I dumped the train immediately. But I -- like I said, I knew what I was hauling. I knew how long it takes to stop a train when you're hauling that much weight, especially on a day that's 20 below zero because your air doesn't work the same when it's 20 below zero than when it's 70 degrees outside.
And like I said, my conductor looked at me, he just as big as eyed as I was, and said, what? And I just told him, I said hit the ground, and we both hit the ground. And, you know, like it was seconds and bam, you know, this -- and I knew we weren't going to just, you know, I -- people would think with that much weight, you just throw that C-6, you know, toss it to the side and keep on going, and I knew that wasn't going to be the outcome of this. I had a fully loaded C-6 laying across your track, I knew we weren't blowing through that C-6.
And you know, it had crossed my mind, you know, do we jump, do we? And I thought better of that because I knew what we were hauling. I knew in my head them tanks were going to bust open, those tanks were going to come piling, you know, on top of everything.
So I knew the best, because like I said, I told him, I said get down and hold on. And it was like a thunderstorm when we hit that thing just crashing and noise and, you know, I – that part, you know what, I can't tell you what happened from the time we hit it 'til, you know, we came to a stop, just all the bang and boom and --
And we came to a stop and I looked at my conductor and obviously, you know, thought when I opened my eyes, are we alive or are we dead? And looked and looked to him, and I -- you know, are you okay? And he said yeah, and we both stood up and turned around.
And I don't know if it was him or me or whoever first one yelled that there's fire, there's a lot of fire. And I don't -- and he's, what do we do? And I think he was trying to gather stuff. I told him you get in your bag, you grab your cell phone, and you run.
And I know he, you know, it's instinct when -- at that time, I think it was him, he even said, he said, we are on fire also, our engine. And I, you know, the first action is to get away from the fire. So I know he tried to go out the front door and, obviously, you can't go off the front door, there was nothing left of the front engine.
And I, you know, he told me when he -- went running by me out the back door, he said the front door's jammed, front door's jammed, back, back, back. And, you know, that's the last place you wanted to go because ground was on fire, the engine was on fire -- but it was our only exit.
And I just, I reached in at this time. I know I grabbed my cell phone out of my bag because I know I needed to communicate with the world. I know I need to dial 9-1-1. And I don't remember this part, this comes from other guys and other trains, said, Brian, you got up and you switched the channel back to 72 and warned everybody on 70 to get out of there. And I don't -- I honestly can't remember that part. But I have talked to the engineer that was in the train in front of me, and he said Brian, you got on 70, yelled emergency out, told the dispatcher, I don't know, it's, the -- we had a crash and I don't know, it was something along the lines of we are on fire and we are a key train.
And then I -- did I say, you said something along the line, you said I got to get out of here. And I went running out the back locomotive, exit it because we were tilted a little bit to the one side, and I went out the opposite side of the locomotive and took off running eastbound.”
~~~
As I understand it, whenever a train makes an emergency application of brakes, rules require the crew to make a radio announcement of the event. I assume that since such an announcement is required, there must be some requirement for crews on other trains to react to the announcement. What is type of reaction is required of train crews hearing the announcement that a train has gone into emergency?
23 17 46 11
On my former carrier crews were required to announce over the road channel, engine number, direction, track and signal and/or block occupancy, as well as entry into work zones after receiving permission of the employee in charge and a number of other happenings. With Amtrak the Engineer would annonce the information and the Conductor (within the body of the train) would confirm that announcement. Passenger trains had to announce both their arrival and departure from scheduled station stops.
When it comes to announcing a UDE the crew is expected to announce 'EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY' Engine #, Track #, Mile Post and if it is a Key Train.
With the video of the Casselton incident, it did not sound like the Grain train crew was fully accustomed to the requirements of the rules and didn't preface any conversation with the EMERGENCY announcement and didn't announce anything until after the train came to a stop. While the Signal Maintainers conversation began before the train had the UDE, once the UDE was experienced the crew needed to have begun the EMERGENCY routine.
With all that having been said, the Oil train would have had to begun braking before the trains were visible to each other to have been able to stop short of the derailed car in the Grain train.
I don’t know if there was time to stop the oil train short of the derailed car. I see several factors in play here. The oil train appears at 1:07 on the basic clock for the running video. Then 18 seconds after that, the NTSB clock displays in the video and starts counting from 1 second. Then 75 seconds later on the NTSB clock, the oil train impacts the grain car. So the impact happened 1 min. 33 sec. after the oil train first came into view to the grain train.
However, since the grain train was moving during much of this time span, it was kicking up snow which probably obscured the derailed car from the oil train crew. The derailment had not even occurred until 20 seconds into this time span of 1 min. 33 sec.
So, the first indication of trouble was the undesired emergency application on the grain train. However, the engineer did not announce that until 31 seconds later. I do not know if he was prevented from announcing because of the signal maintainer commenting on what he had seen, as some have suggested. If not, it is unclear why the announcement was delayed 31 seconds. The engineer was accompanied by a traveling engineer, so there should have been sufficient knowledge and diligence to make a timely announcement.
In any case, the engineer of the oil train did not apply any braking when he received notice that the grain train had gone into emergency. He said that he made the emergency application of brakes when he first saw the grain hopper fouling his track. Assuming that the voice acknowledging that the grain train had gone into emergency was that of the oil train engineer, he had 18 seconds between that acknowledgement and the point where he put the oil train into emergency. From that point of seeing the obstruction and going into emergency, there was another 10 seconds until impact.
So, prior to impact, the engineer of the oil train had 28 seconds of warning that the grain train had gone into emergency. If the engineer of the grain train had not delayed the announcement of the UDE by 31 seconds, the engineer of the oil train would have had 59 seconds of total warning from the point where the grain train went into emergency.
I think there is a good chance that 59 seconds would have been enough time to stop the oil train short of the fouling car. But there was a 31 sec. delay in the announcement of the UDE, and an 18 sec. delay in reacting to the announcement which used up 49 of the 59 seconds available for stopping short of the obstruction. That left only 10 seconds to stop the oil train, and that was not enough time.
very dramatic video, can't really tell when the derail happens except speed drops, but from oil train view, looks very bad and off they go into the snow. Can hear the anxiety in engineer or conductor voice reporting the incident and dispatch calmly reporting it. A side of railroading we don't get to see and glad we don't.
I have seen rules regarding the prescribed course of action when a train goes into an emergency application of brakes while running next to an adjacent mainline. Those rules call for immediate action on the part of the crew on the train that has experienced the emergency brake application. The point of that action is to immediately drop lighted fusees on the adjacent mainline.
This is to protect any train that happens to be approaching on that track against the possibility that the emergency application has either caused, or has been the result of a derailment that might foul that adjacent track.
The rules do not allow the crew to inspect their train first to see if such a derailment or fouling actually exists, and then only flag the other mainline if they find that it is fouled. Time is of the essence just in case there is a fouling, so the adjacent track must be immediately closed by flagging. Some of these rules are in the era of cabooses, and they call for the crews to immediately place fusees on the adjacent track at the head end and hind end of their train.
There is also immediate action required by any approaching train if one is approaching on the possibly fouled track. Such an approaching train must apply sufficient braking to stop short of the burning fusees protecting the stopped train if possible. So action is required by both trains to prevent any train from proceeding past the stopped train until it is known that the track adjacent to the stopped train is clear.
I have no idea what rules like this were in place during the Casselton wreck, but I would assume that the essence which I have described above still applies in this day of radio communication. It would have required the stopped train to flag down the approaching train, and required the approaching train to stop before passing the fusee.
Those principles of urgent response would have been perfectly applicable and appropriate to this Casselton collision. An emergency application did indeed derail and foul the adjacent track, and a train was approaching on that track with just enough time available to stop short of a collision.
Yet, there was no attempt to flag down the approaching train. There was only an announcement that the grain train had experienced a UDE, coupled with the advice to the oil train engineer to, “Watch yourself.” And even that announcement was critically delayed. Then, after that action by the grain train crew, the oil train engineer failed to take any action to heed the warning.
EuclidYet, there was no attempt to flag down the approaching train. There was only an announcement that the grain train had experienced a UDE, coupled with the advice to the oil train engineer to, “Watch yourself.” And even that announcement was critically delayed. Then, after that action by the grain train crew, the oil train engineer failed to take any action to heed the warning.
There were 19 seconds between the time the video showed the Grain Train in emergency and the Oil Train was passing the head end of the Grain Train and the Grain Train was still moving at 10-12 MPH.
To my mind, the Grain Train did not follow proper procedures - with that being said, had they followed proper procedures the results would have been no different. As I have stated before, the only way for the Oil Train to have avoided imact with the Grain Train's derailed car was for the Oil Train to have started braking before they could see the Grain Train and before the car had derailed.
There was 49 seconds from the UDE of the grain train to the point where the engineer put the oil train into emergency.
There was 30 seconds from the time of meeting the oil train to the point where the engineer put the oil train into emergency.
There were 18 seconds from the time the grain train engineer announced that they had gone into emergency, and the point where the engineer put the oil into emergency.
So that first number of 49 seconds was the relevant total amount of time available to stop the oil train if the warning had been immediately given by the grain train engineer and heeded by the oil train engineer.
The 49 seconds is comprised of 31 seconds of delay in the grain train engineer's announcment of their UDE plus 18 seconds of delay in the oil train engineer's putting his train into emergency; for a total of 49 seconds.
Seconds Count @ Speed.
Thank You.
EuclidThere was 49 seconds from the UDE of the grain train to the point where the engineer put the oil train into emergency. There was 30 seconds from the time of meeting the oil train to the point where the engineer put the oil train into emergency. There were 18 seconds from the time the grain train engineer announced that they had gone into emergency, and the point where the engineer put the oil into emergency. So that first number of 49 seconds was the relevant total amount of time available to stop the oil train if the warning had been immediately given by the grain train engineer and heeded by the oil train engineer. The 49 seconds is comprised of 31 seconds of delay in the grain train engineer's announcment of their UDE plus 18 seconds of delay in the oil train engineer's putting his train into emergency; for a total of 49 seconds.
Procedure is NOT to place a train in emergency at the announcement of another train being in emergency, nor should it be with all the inspection requirements for trains that experience emergency brake applications - no matter how they are initiated. Additionally the Grain Train DID NOT specifically announce his location - the only mention of general location was done by the Signal Maintainer.
It is unknown if the Oil Train heard any of the Signal Maintainers conversation with the Grain Train was heard by the Oil Train. Even if it was heard, the information conveyed is not actionable for a train not involved in the conversation.
BaltACD Procedure is NOT to place a train in emergency at the announcement of another train being in emergency, nor should it be with all the inspection requirements for trains that experience emergency brake applications - no matter how they are initiated. Additionally the Grain Train DID NOT specifically announce his location - the only mention of general location was done by the Signal Maintainer.
The oil train engineer would have known the warning announcement pertained to his train because the grain train engineer identified the oil train in the announcement.
But let me ask you this: You say theprocedure is NOT to place a train in emergency at the announcement of another train being in emergency. If not at the moment of the announcement, when should the approaching train begin braking?
I was thinking that a requirement to put the oil train into emergency upon notification of the NDE by the grain train would be based on the required use of a fusee by the grain train to flag the oil train.
So, if there is a requirement to drop a burning fusee on the adjacent track which might be fouled, any train approaching that fusee would attempt to stop short of the fusee, and if the distance was too short to stop with a service application, they would make an emergency application.
In any case, the spirit of the rule would call for the quickest action possible. There was about 20 seconds to light a fusee and drop it in front of the approaching oil train.
Euclid wrote:
Wow, they had 20 WHOLE SECONDS to light and drop a Fusee, them Lazy SOB's must have been taking a nap, or filling their coffee cups first, 20 seconds is almost a life-time.
As a commercial driver I am Allowed/required to have my reflective triangles deployed within 10 MINUTES of having a disablement on the side of a roadway, I can sure see where 20 SECONDS would be AMPLE time for a train crew who has just experienced a UDE walk a MILE down the tracks, both AHEAD and BEHIND a disabled train to drop fusees, this is a really good example of what a great idea ONE man crews are, does the lone engineer go ahead or behind the train to drop fusees first?
On a side note, Highway flares typically come in 15, and 30 minute burn durations, what is the burn time of a RR Fusee? Are they Daisey Chained so that the second, third, fourth? are ignited by the preceeding fusee? What is the required/desired burn time for placed fusees in an UDE?
Rule 1) Bucky Knows Best.
Rule 2) Bucky may not have ANY EXPERIENCE in a topic/situation, but Bucky still Knows Best
Rule 3) Bucky may not have ANY TRAINING or CERTIFICATIONS/QUALIFICATIONS in a topic/situation, but Bucky still knows Best
Rule 4) Bucky ALWAYS KNOWS BEST.
If unsure, review Rules 1,2,3, and 4
Doug
May your flanges always stay BETWEEN the rails
EuclidIn any case, the spirit of the rule would call for the quickest action possible. There was about 20 seconds to light a fusee and drop it in front of the approaching oil train.
Actually, that is your interpretation of the rule. Unless you were instrumental in writing, or at the very least enforcement of said rule, I don't think you can speak to its spirit with any real authority.
Even interpreting rules can be risky. Better hope those higher up agree with you. You can very easily read too much into what is printed.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
Euclid ...when should the approaching train begin braking?
Railroad locomotive radios have an effective range of 10-15 miles (more under certain conditions) - why dump the brakes 15 miles out? And a UDE does not automatically mean a derailment. If I'm running that oil train, I'm probably going to begin with a service application appropriate to stopping (or at least slowing to restricted speed) the train before I reach the location of the other train. Until I have eyes on an obstruction on the tracks, I have no need to stop my train.
EuclidThere was about 20 seconds to light a fusee and drop it in front of the approaching oil train.
Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha [breathe] Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha.
OK, try this. Start your stopwatch (or kitchen timer). Get up from your computer and walk to your refrigerator. Get out a can or bottle of your favorite beverage. Open it, Now toss something into the trash can. Twenty seconds up yet? I though so. And exactly how effective is that going to be as a warning???
And do you really want to add another ignition source for all that oil?
Have you ever lit a railroad fusee? They're good for about 5 minutes, by the way.
I'm really surprised you haven't tried to sell how ECP would have prevented this disaster....
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68I'm really surprised you haven't tried to sell how ECP would have prevented this disaster....
Jeez! Don't give him any ideas.
Norm
Norm48327 tree68 I'm really surprised you haven't tried to sell how ECP would have prevented this disaster.... Jeez! Don't give him any ideas.
tree68 I'm really surprised you haven't tried to sell how ECP would have prevented this disaster....
Ditto!!! +1
tree68 Euclid ...when should the approaching train begin braking? Railroad locomotive radios have an effective range of 10-15 miles (more under certain conditions) - why dump the brakes 15 miles out? And a UDE does not automatically mean a derailment. If I'm running that oil train, I'm probably going to begin with a service application appropriate to stopping (or at least slowing to restricted speed) the train before I reach the location of the other train. Until I have eyes on an obstruction on the tracks, I have no need to stop my train. Euclid There was about 20 seconds to light a fusee and drop it in front of the approaching oil train. Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha [breathe] Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha. OK, try this. Start your stopwatch (or kitchen timer). Get up from your computer and walk to your refrigerator. Get out a can or bottle of your favorite beverage. Open it, Now toss something into the trash can. Twenty seconds up yet? I though so. And exactly how effective is that going to be as a warning??? And do you really want to add another ignition source for all that oil? Have you ever lit a railroad fusee? They're good for about 5 minutes, by the way. I'm really surprised you haven't tried to sell how ECP would have prevented this disaster....
Euclid There was about 20 seconds to light a fusee and drop it in front of the approaching oil train.
I asked, “When should the approaching train begin braking?” The context of that question was this incident in which the announcement did not come when the oil train was 15 miles away. The announcement was just at the critical moment where the warning to the oil train was most urgently needed.
Balt seemed to suggest that going into emergency at that point would be premature. So that is why I asked him when the oil train should have gone into emergency. It was an honest question, not meant to be a put-down. I never suggested dumping the air 15 miles away, as you imply. Of course, that would be absurd.
I also have never asserted that there was time to stop the oil train, but there was time to slow it down. And there was more time than the 20 seconds which you have focused on to make your case that the time was insufficient to stop the train.
The 20 seconds was from the point where the engineer of the grain train experienced the UDE to the point where he met the oil train. That 20 seconds is the span of time in which a fusee could have been put in front of the oil train to give him the warning. At 20 seconds, the oil train passed the grain train, so there was no longer any way to flag the oil train. So, 20 seconds was the opportunity to flag the oil train, not the total available stopping time before impact, as you seem to conclude.
In addition to that time span of 20 seconds, there was actually another 30 seconds to the point where the engineer put the oil train into emergency. So had the fusee been dropped as soon as possible, the oil train would have begun the emergency application 50 seconds earlier, not 20 seconds earlier as you mistakenly conclude.
I would not worry about the fusee igniting the oil train either. It might have stopped the oil train in time to prevent the collision. In that case, there would be no spilled oil for the fusee to ignite. And if there was a collision, there would be plenty of ignition potential to ignite the spilled oil regardless of the fusee.
Yes, I realize that a UDE does not necessarily mean there is a derailment. I have no idea what rules actually applied to this Casselton collision. Maybe one of the experts can post them for us. But rules I have seen that do pertain to this type of situation, require urgent action that errors on the side of assuming that the UDE has either caused a derailment or is the result of one.
So unless the rules governing the Casselton wreck have evolved to allow running past the disabled train at restricted speed before knowing the reason for the UDE, I suspect that may not be an option. In this wreck, the engineer would have stopped short because he would have seen the fouling car in time, had it not been for the obscuration of the snow being kicked up by the grain train. So as it was, the engineer of the oil train was only ten seconds away from impact when he first saw the fouling car.
Euclid But rules I have seen that do pertain to this type of situation, require urgent action that errors on the side of assuming that the UDE has either caused a derailment or is the result of one. So unless the rules governing the Casselton wreck have evolved to allow running past the disabled train at restricted speed before knowing the reason for the UDE, I suspect that may not be an option. In this wreck, the engineer would have stopped short because he would have seen the fouling car in time, had it not been for the obscuration of the snow being kicked up by the grain train. So as it was, the engineer of the oil train was only ten seconds away from impact when he first saw the fouling car.
What rules have you seen? Have you looked at GCOR?
EuclidThere may have been time to stop the oil train with the 59 seconds avaiable.
I'll just leave this here...
tree68 Euclid There may have been time to stop the oil train with the 59 seconds avaiable. I'll just leave this here...
Euclid There may have been time to stop the oil train with the 59 seconds avaiable.
Please review, Rules 1,2,3, and 4 above.
Is that just for effect or what?
zugmann Euclid But rules I have seen that do pertain to this type of situation, require urgent action that errors on the side of assuming that the UDE has either caused a derailment or is the result of one. So unless the rules governing the Casselton wreck have evolved to allow running past the disabled train at restricted speed before knowing the reason for the UDE, I suspect that may not be an option. In this wreck, the engineer would have stopped short because he would have seen the fouling car in time, had it not been for the obscuration of the snow being kicked up by the grain train. So as it was, the engineer of the oil train was only ten seconds away from impact when he first saw the fouling car. What rules have you seen? Have you looked at GCOR?
Somebody post this. I don’t know if it is relevant. But, in any case, I am not contending that there was any rules violation associated with the Casselton wreck. It is just that in reading the report, and knowing generally about rules that have been or may be associated with this scenario of passing a disable train; some questions jump out at me. I thought maybe this would be a good place to bring it up.
“For what it's worth, this is out of the GCOR and BNSF Amendments 6.23 Emergency Stop or Severe Slack Action When a train or engine is stopped by an emergency application of the brakes or severe slack action occurs while stopping, take the following actions: Obstruction of Main Track or Controlled Siding If an adjacent main track or controlled siding may be obstructed, immediately: • Warn other trains by radio, stating the exact location and status of the train and repeat as necessary. • Place lighted fusees on adjacent tracks.”
You can view GCOR online from several sources. You ought to dig around a little and see what you can find.
challenger3980Please review, Rules 1,2,3, and 4 above.
I know. Just couldn't resist that he said what he said he didn't say, and in the same thread...
I think I'll let him get back to talking to himself...
zugmannYou can view GCOR online from several sources. You ought to dig around a little and see what you can find.
Okay, I find the pertinent rule, part of which, I posted above, which I quoted from someone else posting on another forum. So does this rule apply to BNSF through Casselton?
If it does, it seems that the rule was not followed, thus contributing to the catastrophic oil train derailment. I am referring to the points I have highlighted in blue. While the grain train engineer did notify other trains by radio, he did not do so “immediately” as the rule requires. Nobody in the crew of the grain train placed a lighted fusee on the adjacent track. I don’t see anything in the BNSF Amendment that overrides these requirements in blue. However, that depends on where the BNSF Amendment ends.
The part highlighted in red does allow an engineer to pass a train that has stopped due a UDE, and pass it without stopping if it proceeds at restricted speed which would allow it to stop short of any obstructions. Is that part in red a part of the BNSF Amendment? If it is, I assume it must override the requirement to use fusees as called for in the part highlighted in blue. If it is not a part of the BNSF Amendment, it conflicts with the part in blue.
Therefore, if the part in red is part of the BNSF Amendment, then the only rules that were broken were the engineer of the grain train failing to immediately warning other trains by radio; and the engineer of the oil train failing to slow to restricted speed until seeing the obstruction and dumping the air.
6.23 Emergency Stop or Severe Slack Action
When a train or engine is stopped by an emergency application of the brakes or severe slack action occurs while stopping, take the following actions:
Obstruction of Main Track or Controlled Siding
If an adjacent main track or controlled siding may be obstructed, immediately:
• Warn other trains by radio, stating the exact location and status of the train and repeat as necessary.
• Place lighted fusees on adjacent tracks.
• Notify the train dispatcher or control operator and, when possible, foreign line railroads if necessary.
Warning to other movements is no longer necessary when:
• It is known adjacent tracks are not obstructed.
or
• The train dispatcher or control operator advises the crew that protection is provided on adjacent tracks.
Inspection of Cars and Units
• All cars, units, equipment, and track must be inspected as outlined in the:
- Special Instructions.
- Air Brake and Train Handling Rules.
BNSF Amendment—The following is added: The following trains are relieved of visual inspection required by an emergency application when it is known that the brake pipe pressure has been restored by observing the caboose gauge, end-of-train telemetry device (ETD) or distributed power telemetry before proceeding: • Solid loaded bulk commodity trains, • Any train where emergency application of the brakes occurs at a speed above 30 MPH, or • Any train that is 5000 tons or less. If physical characteristics prevent a complete visual inspection, inspect as much of the train as possible. The train may then be moved, but may not exceed 5 MPH for the distance necessary to complete the inspection, and must be stopped immediately if excessive power is required to start or keep the train moving.
Train on Adjacent Track
A train on an adjacent track that receives radio notification must pass the location specified at restricted speed and stop short of any portion of the stopped train fouling their track. When advised that the track is clear and it is safe to proceed, this restriction no longer applies.
Euclidand the engineer of the oil train failing to slow to restricted speed until seeing the obstruction and dumping the air.
Stop - you're killing me here.
The laws of physics have not been suspended.
The fact that you have absolutely no clue as to the dynamics of train handling is glaringly obvious.
Perhaps you should stop now, before you further embarrass yourself.
Euclid is the personification of principle of physics he disavows.
He is given a full service brake application and still keeps on.
He is given a Emergency brake application and still keeps on.
Like anything else - he will stop when all inertia is depleated.
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