Positive train control's 'CSI effect'

There is still a mark on my forehead where I slapped it after reading the following Wednesday morning:

"(Reuters) — Sunday's fatal Pennsylvania Amtrak accident may have exposed possible blind spots in a nationwide collision prevention system that is meant to stop crashes on U.S. railroads. ... A dilemma facing railroads is whether to spend funds expanding [positive train control] systems to service vehicles like the backhoe involved in Sunday's crash, or put money into upgrades of aging rail infrastructure."

The fatal "Amtrak accident" refers to the tragic deaths of two railroaders on the Northeast Corridor April 4. A backhoe one of the men operated fouled a track without protection and was promptly demolished by the southbound Palmetto near Philadelphia. The head slap is because of the straight-faced assumption from Reuters, a respected news organization, that PTC was ever supposed to prevent trains from smacking into backhoes — or cars, trucks, pedestrians, and trespassers, for that matter. There was no debate about it and there still isn't, so far as I know.

The 2008 Rail Safety Improvement Act Congress passed to require PTC on all railroads broadly requires systems that prevent train-to-train collisions; enforce train speed limits; keep trains from running through a misaligned switch; and that protect established work zones.

It seems clear, but not proven, that for whatever reason, the backhoe crossed near or onto a live track without protection or authorization.

In other words, the backhoe went outside of its work zone.

Granted, the backhoe operator and other track equipment were on the track directly next to the live line when the accident happened and the reason remains unclear. They might have thought they had protection from a dispatcher or a flagman, but didn't.

But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible. Why, it would be the same as arguing that all automobiles should be equipped with emergency brakes and proximity sensors to prevent car crashes at intersections or to prevent overspeeding on highways. It is possible, but impractical.

The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used.

I chalk this up as railroading's version of the "CSI effect" criminal prosecutors now worry about. That is, citizen juries see so much technology and advanced evidence gathering techniques on popular TV shows, that they expect to see it in a real-life courtroom, even when the law and logic don't require it.

In this case, people have read or heard about a technology that is supposed to prevent accidents, so they believe it is supposed to prevent all accidents. But that was never PTC’s intent, and it is beyond the practical limits of any technology to prevent every kind of accident. Particularly when one extremely fallible element  — the human being — is part of the equation.