Have we reached to point were the Democrats are the Tax and Spend party and the GOP has become the Cut Taxes and Spend even more party? Despite leaving the treasury in a ever increasing deficit position.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Or could we perhaps agree to disagree?
Probably not, but I pay you the respect of consideration even if I think you honestly wrong.
With that good night.
PJS1The combined federal, state, and local government debt is $24.1 trillion. The federal public debt is approximately $15.3 trillion. Total government debt is approximatey 124 percent of GDP; public federal debt is approximately 80 percent of GDP.
While I don't doubt your arithmetic, I submit that it's not important, certainly not to the political party that has railed against deficits and the national debt since 1896 and especially against Amtrak since its inception.
"Deficits don't matter." Remember?
And this year, to much acclaim by certain types in here, Congress passed a huge tax cut, unneeded and unfunded. The projected deficit and national debt jumped again. Did you hear any outrage from the fiscal conservatives here? I didn't, and I bet you didn't either.
So while some "railfans" here vociferously debate the miserable few million dollars of subsidy needed to operate the present skeleton LD train network and traditional, decent dining car service, many pairs of blind eyes are turned to the one trillion dollars extra the tax cut is expected to cost future taxpayers and the federal government this year alone. Somehow that is OK, but a billion or two for Amtrak is beyond the pale, Socialism, a threat to the American Way of Life, or, at the least, responsible fiscal prudence.
Remember the anecdote associated with Winston Churchill that ends, "Madam, we've already established what you are. What we are doing now is haggling over the price"?
This nation can certainly afford Amtrak and its required subsidies since there is unlimited money for tax cuts for the rich, a big military parade, and so much else.
Railvt The word nonsense is a fascinating choice as a response to your shall we say use of the term lie. I try to be thoughtful and do not recall the last time I consciously posted a lie. But in the end the carriers benefit from the superior facilities they provide as a passenger host and the good ones like the BNSF have the graciousness not to howl too loudly about their sad fate as what they always knew they were, common carriers. Carl Fowler
The word nonsense is a fascinating choice as a response to your shall we say use of the term lie. I try to be thoughtful and do not recall the last time I consciously posted a lie.
But in the end the carriers benefit from the superior facilities they provide as a passenger host and the good ones like the BNSF have the graciousness not to howl too loudly about their sad fate as what they always knew they were, common carriers.
Carl Fowler
An uncouncoius lie is still a lie. In Malcolm's second bullet point second sentence he clearly, and I beleive correctly, states "CSX must bear the entire cost of such maintenance" with such being track maintenance to passenger train standards. The rest of it, about incremental cost, is a throw away line that generally means nothing, since nobody can figure out incremental cost is. Only when ATK becomes the sole user does this come into play because all of the maintenance cost is incremental cost and thus the responsability of ATK. That is why ATK wants off the line. The blather about PTC is just to confuse the peanut gallery.
Your statement that freight carriers benefit by "providing superior facilities" is a total flight of fancy. Left to themselves the freight carriers provide the quality of facilities that make the most economic sense to them.
It is hard to believe that an agreement by which freight carriers provide ATK routes at about 5% of the fair market value of a train slot was entered into by the freight carriers without serious extortion by congress. Anyone who knows the history of ATK formation knows that is true. ATK is a leach on the freight carriers. Repeal ATK Act in its entirety. Repeal common carrier passenger obligation and give the NEC to the states.
Mac
Well finally we agree on something. Your list of communities should of course be served. But helping one does not mean hurting somewhere else.
Rio Grande Valley, CFI,CFII
You’re right, the 14% growth was over 8 years.
Railvt The V Payne; Such an analysis would be very helpful. The bus bridge alone, per bus, per day can be expected to run $1200-1500 per day times at minimum two buses. That is the minimum for one bus each way daily. That’s no less than $876,000 per year, plus costs for driver rooms and for the extra driver each way due to exceeding the hours in service law. And until ridership collapses Amtrak will actually need 3-5 buses each way to handle the 150/200 riders typically on the train. Real bus costs will be into seven figures Then there will be terminal and servicing costs for the stub trains at both Dodge City and Albuquerque. Plus for each forced train/bus/train change Amtrak will lose at least 30-30% of current ridership, balanced only by no longer providing a proper diner or sleepers on the supposedly daylight stub trains. Revenue will collapse and expenses with the bus charters will very likely climb. If Amtrak has actually done this analysis they know full well what is coming and are counting on it to justify totally closing the route. Carl Fowler
The V Payne;
Such an analysis would be very helpful. The bus bridge alone, per bus, per day can be expected to run $1200-1500 per day times at minimum two buses. That is the minimum for one bus each way daily.
That’s no less than $876,000 per year, plus costs for driver rooms and for the extra driver each way due to exceeding the hours in service law. And until ridership collapses Amtrak will actually need 3-5 buses each way to handle the 150/200 riders typically on the train. Real bus costs will be into seven figures
Then there will be terminal and servicing costs for the stub trains at both Dodge City and Albuquerque. Plus for each forced train/bus/train change Amtrak will lose at least 30-30% of current ridership, balanced only by no longer providing a proper diner or sleepers on the supposedly daylight stub trains. Revenue will collapse and expenses with the bus charters will very likely climb.
If Amtrak has actually done this analysis they know full well what is coming and are counting on it to justify totally closing the route.
Anyone doing a serious analysis of Amtrak's operations has to have access to its books. Otherwise, they are just speculating.
Highway financing, which is subject to varying interpretations, has nothing to do with how much the U.S. should invest in passenger rail.
Those who think the federal government has a pot of money to invest in passenger trains, irrespective of when, where, and in what flavor, might want to keep the following in mind.
V.Payne Back when the SWC hauled Mail & Express it was close to covering its "above-the-rail" costs. The problem then and now is that is not the goal set by the in their own eyes reform types for the National Network. They still believe that passenger trains have to finance their infrastructure, equipment, and operations from ticket revenue. Highways come no where close to self-financing their infrastructure from the fuel taxes collected only between exits let alone covering government borne accident costs. Instead the use of locally financed streets is also taxed, thus leveraging funds toward highways. It was what was needed to get modern highways at low fuel tax rates, but it is a leveraged investment that can skew markets. What is needed is an agreement on a equivalent level (to highways) of public investment in the below-the-rail infrastructure, large-loss insurance, and terminal costs of passenger rail atop which a business case is made to run a service on ticket revenue. This same situation is why of course we both have no rail service to Phoenix, AZ and why we cannot agree to reinvest in National Network equipment to cash in on the large potential for more revenue above the fixed costs of running a route. Additionally, why could two through cutoff cars not be operated accross the Kansas City transfer or the Williams Jct non-stop? The transfer times are either fairly early or late. All the infrastructure is there, with two through running station tracks at KCT and a crew base nearby in both cases. The Missouri River Rail Runners have to run with a minimum axle count of 30 axles, so they haul around old baggages. Grand Canyon Railways runs to the canyon just a bit away from the junction. I would suggest this chase to try to get the National Network trains to recover their infrastructure costs clouds the view of such easy net revenue generators as there is no case to buy new equipment or expend minimal additonal funds when a large brick is tied around their neck that no other ground transportation has to bear.
Back when the SWC hauled Mail & Express it was close to covering its "above-the-rail" costs. The problem then and now is that is not the goal set by the in their own eyes reform types for the National Network.
They still believe that passenger trains have to finance their infrastructure, equipment, and operations from ticket revenue. Highways come no where close to self-financing their infrastructure from the fuel taxes collected only between exits let alone covering government borne accident costs. Instead the use of locally financed streets is also taxed, thus leveraging funds toward highways. It was what was needed to get modern highways at low fuel tax rates, but it is a leveraged investment that can skew markets.
What is needed is an agreement on a equivalent level (to highways) of public investment in the below-the-rail infrastructure, large-loss insurance, and terminal costs of passenger rail atop which a business case is made to run a service on ticket revenue.
This same situation is why of course we both have no rail service to Phoenix, AZ and why we cannot agree to reinvest in National Network equipment to cash in on the large potential for more revenue above the fixed costs of running a route.
Additionally, why could two through cutoff cars not be operated accross the Kansas City transfer or the Williams Jct non-stop? The transfer times are either fairly early or late. All the infrastructure is there, with two through running station tracks at KCT and a crew base nearby in both cases. The Missouri River Rail Runners have to run with a minimum axle count of 30 axles, so they haul around old baggages. Grand Canyon Railways runs to the canyon just a bit away from the junction.
I would suggest this chase to try to get the National Network trains to recover their infrastructure costs clouds the view of such easy net revenue generators as there is no case to buy new equipment or expend minimal additonal funds when a large brick is tied around their neck that no other ground transportation has to bear.
They only have two through tracks at KC Union Station now but they can easily add 3-5 more stub tracks by using the underulitized parking lot where they park business cars now. KC could easily become a mini-hub of the plains states all that is missing is public support and money.
Railvt Ridership on the SW CHIEF is not declining. Over the past 5 years it grew 14%. 363,000 passengers used the train in FY 2017. Occupancy levels are better than on the ACELA EXPRESS.
Ridership on the SW CHIEF is not declining. Over the past 5 years it grew 14%. 363,000 passengers used the train in FY 2017. Occupancy levels are better than on the ACELA EXPRESS.
CMStPnP BaltACD Anderson was brought in to kill Amtrak, not save it. The Cardinal and Sunset Limited are still running and neither really should be based on any comparisons to other LD routes sanity check. No attempt to kill either of those two trains yet. So I don't see any evidence of this. Further, Amtrak has not yet publicly backed away from any proposal by states to pay for expansion yet.
BaltACD Anderson was brought in to kill Amtrak, not save it.
The Cardinal and Sunset Limited are still running and neither really should be based on any comparisons to other LD routes sanity check. No attempt to kill either of those two trains yet. So I don't see any evidence of this.
Further, Amtrak has not yet publicly backed away from any proposal by states to pay for expansion yet.
This is just Anderson's initial play, a trial baloon as it were - there will be more and the Sunset and Cardinal will be among them
I’ve read Malcolm’s column and find no basis for that view. I’ve also seen other Amtrak access agreements over my career. They were far from extortion rackets.From 1971 the requirement has been for Amtrak to pay a differential price for use of freight lines, and at an adjusted basis because the freighters were relieved of their statutory obligation to run passenger trains.All roads would like to hit Amtrak for more and Amtrak tries to get top dollar for access to the NEC. But in the end the carriers benefit from the superior facilities they provide as a passenger host and the good ones like the BNSF have the graciousness not to howl too loudly about their sad fate as what they always knew they were, common carriers.
RailvtEvery Amtrak track access contract includes reasonable payment from Amtrak for maintenance above the standards needed for freight only.
This is a flat lie. See Malcolm's contract excert blog.
In fact, ATK far far underpays for the value of train slots it uses. That is a big part of what is driving this whole SWC shreech fest. ATK will have to pay its full costs over that section. Horrors!
Of course. Thats the plan. Opposition and voices of reason mean nothing.
Makes me wonder if the better course to follow in the west would be to run a UP-like City of Everywhere train out of Chicago twice a day; to Omaha, Denver, SLC. Then split to Vegas-LA, Reno-Sacramento-Oakland, and Boise-Portland-Seattle. Run the Sunset daily as hookup to Texas Eagle at San Antonio. Either keep the Eagle via Little Rock-St Louis, or run Dallas-OkC-Wichita-KC.
In the midwest, focus on the Midwest Initiative routes.
I am exploring if the net cost to all levels of government (state and federal) would increase if the SWC was split as proposed with the 70% loss of revenue. So little variable cost is taken away and of course additional costs would be added in to start trains in the middle of the old route. This might go agains the text of the current CFR language as the intent was to reduce cost to governments.
Every Amtrak track access contract includes reasonable payment from Amtrak for maintenance above the standards needed for freight only. BNSF have been candid that they want to keep Raton as (if nothing else) a safety valve. They have not proposed outright closure. Before the Tiger Grants began the deepest threat was to go to Class Three dark territory. Of course their view could change, but they have been an enthusiastic supporter of the Tiger process.
Even after current New Mexico Governor Martinez reneged on the promise under previous governor Bill Richardson to buy the line to the Colorado state line, they kept things up very well Indeed with no Federal funds yet for New Mexico they’ve been replacing the semaphore signals still in service near Las Vegas, NM.
By the bye on snow removal, engine pilot wedge plows have sufficed in recent years. The climate could of course revert and even if it doesn’t there will I’m sure be a deep snow year eventually, but this is not an issue anything like it was decades ago. Even the Moffat Line hasn’t seen a rotary in decades.
RailvtRidership on the SW CHIEF is not declining. Over the past 5 years it grew 14%. 363,000 passengers used the train in FY 2017. Occupancy levels are better than on the ACELA EXPRESS. There was a very slight (2000 riders) decline in the last year only, caused by Amtrak's failure to restore the third coach during peak holiday seasons, despite near daily sell-outs over segments like Kansas City to Chicago. The "dramatic cost increases" that Amtrak claims are false as well. They admit that their share of the threatened section is only about $3,000,000 per year, but further ignore BNSF's repeated promise to pay for 20 years of Class Four 79mph maintenance once welded rail is fully in place over the line. A large part of that is in the Tiger Nine grant's $25,000,000 which Amtrak has effectively torpedoed by refusing to pay its $3,000,000 match that was specifically promised as part of the grant application.
Is that just to maintain the track or does it include.....
snow removal costs, dispatching costs, inspecting of the line prior to each Amtrak passenger train run, free overtime when Amtrak is not running on schedule, etc, etc. Also, say an Amtrak locomotive fails and they cannot make it up the grades, where is the nearest staffed crew change point with a spare locomotive and crew? Are all those costs covered by the BNSF agreement? What about inflation, does BNSF swallow inflation beyond what they estimated or do they pass the hat again? I have not seen the verbatium agreement itself to see exactly what BNSF agreed to pay for. However, I think your expecting a LOT if you think that agreement is all inclusive of all costs with protecting Amtraks schedule.
Most of that is irrelevant though. Amtrak is just asking for a business case for financial sustainability of the train over the next 20 years.
This superb analysis from Abe Zumwalt at the Rail Passengers Association goes into the full spectrum of reasons for supporting the SW CHIEF and debunks myths posited by Amtrak's management. Feel free to repost and use this at will!
Carl Fowler, RPA Vice Chair
Fact Checking the Amtrak Proposal to Replace the Southwest Chief with Bus Service in Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico.
The Southwest Chief would effectively cease to exist if the proposed bus bridge from Dodge City, KS or La Junta, CO to Albuquerque is implemented. While presented as a decision based in concern for passenger safety and cost reductions, the plan would make passengers less safe, dissipate the service’s economic impact across the corridor, and—given the resulting collapse of ridership and revenue—effectively save no tax dollars on operational expenses.
The plan to truncate the Southwest Chief with a bus bridge would also shift costs to states that have the most to lose from its truncation. In its presentation on the proposed bus bridge, Amtrak points to plans for service expansions in Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma as evidence of its commitment to the region.
However, the cost of these services would be borne by the states under PRIIA Sec. 209. While the continued presence of the Chief would in fact facilitate the development of these services with valuable passenger connections, the development of these urban corridor services shouldn’t come at the expense of rural communities that currently depend on Amtrak National Network service.
The bus bridge will worsen the performance metrics Amtrak is using to justify this truncation without lowering taxpayer costs.
The Chief’s ridership trends are steady: Amtrak’s earlier statement that the number of passengers using the Chief is “steadily declining” is false. Ridership volume in FY 2017 was down only 1% from its peak in FY 2015; it was up 14% from eight years ago in FY 2009.
Amtrak’s presentation highlights the fact that 96% of Amtrak trips are under 750 miles. But for the Chief’s 2,265 miles, conspicuously absent is the fact that trips on the Chief overlap along the entirety of the corridor. Having analyzed the Chief’s passenger load throughout its route, Rail Passengers estimates significant ridership and 70% of the trains’ current revenue is at risk under this proposal. The proposed bus bridge would be of a significant enough duration – 6-12 hours—to decimate high revenue sleeping car ridership. This is made more disappointing because; The Chief’s seat occupancy rate compares well even to the NEC: Amtrak’s earlier claim that the Chief operates “40% empty” fails to fully capture how busy the train is.
The reality is that passengers filled 61.5% of the Chief’s available seat miles during FY 2017. This number puts the Chief within the top 20% of all Amtrak’s routes (8th out of 48), higher than even the Acela Express service. (In assessing “occupancy,”
it’s important to recognize that trains do not operate the same as airplanes; trains do not make a single trip between a pair of end points, they make numerous stops along a single corridor. As a result, there is a constant turnover of seats.
That’s the strength of a long-distance corridor train like the Chief; by connecting 36 stations, it provides a convenient, single seat ride for passengers traveling short, medium and long distances, serving 528 unique city pairs. This allows a single corridor to generate the volumes and revenues needed to serve people in urban and rural communities. In matter of fact, on the more heavily traveled segments of the Chief’s route, the number of passengers can be 90% or more of the available seats, causing “sold out” conditions for prospective passengers.)
By using a Fully Allocated Cost methodology, Amtrak fails to fully capture the incremental cost of running the Chief. Had the railroad also employed Avoidable Cost methodology—as stipulated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (Public Law 108-447)—the cost would have been significantly lower. Rail Passengers’ estimate, developed using concepts developed by the Volpe Transportation Center for Amtrak in 2009, suggests that as much as 80% of the costs that Amtrak allocates to the Chief may represent fixed costs for shared facilities and overhead. These costs would not go away with the Chief’s elimination and would instead be allocated to other routes.
Amtrak is asking its stakeholders for more, after reneging on a partnership it has repeatedly and publicly committed to over the course of multiple grant applications. States have already invested local funds in partnership with Amtrak: Colorado, Kansas, and New Mexico have all invested over $9 million in state funds ($6 million in previous TIGER grant applications with another $3 million in the current round of TIGER grants), based upon an explicit agreement between Amtrak, Amtrak-served communities, and BNSF Railroad. For Amtrak to suddenly withdraw its support for the Chief in the middle of the preservation effort, without any opportunity for stakeholder input, constitutes a serious breach of trust.
This sudden decision by Amtrak has stalled applications for additional infrastructure grants, including plans to apply for a share of the $1.5 billion in grant funding offered through the Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development (BUILD) Transportation Discretionary Grants program. Given the BUILD program’s emphasis on supporting rural transportation systems, it’s safe to assume the Southwest Chief would have scored well.
The bus bridge will be less safe for passengers, less accessible to the public. Amtrak’s justification of forcing passengers onto busses for lack of Positive Train Control will make them less safe; Busses have 3.04 accidents per million passenger miles, while intercity passenger trains only have 1.7, over 40% fewer accidents mile for mile.
Amtrak has enjoyed considerable gains in ridership from the Accessibility Community, because Busses and trains are not equal options for these passengers. Bus Bathrooms are in no way ADA compliant, while accomodations can be made on Amtrak, a real factor for a 6-12 hour journey. Ingress and Egress issues are a significant area of risk addressed in the ADA, and multiple transfers increase the probability of injuries.
Amtrak states that the $50 million, ten year-investment in infrastructure investment “does not include positive train control (PTC) installation and implementation costs.”
The focus on safety is admirable and correct. However, the Federal Railroad Administration does not require PTC over lines with fewer than four passenger trains per day, and less than 15 Million tons of freight per year. (49 CFR 236.1019 - Main line track exceptions). Risks are limited because competing traffic is light in some places, non-existent in others. The absence of heavy axle load freight traffic should also make derailment prevention easier, given the reduced risk of rail breaks and freight braking-induced kinks. This segment should have lower overall risk, even without PTC, than most of the network.
The Raton Route in question is considered safely exempt by the FRA, save for the Rail Runner district in Albuquerque; the Rio Metro Regional Transit District is currently working with the FRA to ensure that it meets all PTC requirements in a timely fashion.
The Rail Passengers Association represents the passengers and communities that depend on this corridor, and so we feel compelled to provide a broader and more complete context to help members of Congress evaluate the proper next steps to preserve this important transportation service for residents in the 36 communities across 8 states that depend on the Southwest Chief. We are available for any further elaboration.
Ridership on the SW CHIEF is not declining. Over the past 5 years it grew 14%. 363,000 passengers used the train in FY 2017. Occupancy levels are better than on the ACELA EXPRESS. There was a very slight (2000 riders) decline in the last year only, caused by Amtrak's failure to restore the third coach during peak holiday seasons, despite near daily sell-outs over segments like Kansas City to Chicago.
The "dramatic cost increases" that Amtrak claims are false as well. They admit that their share of the threatened section is only about $3,000,000 per year, but further ignore BNSF's repeated promise to pay for 20 years of Class Four 79mph maintenance once welded rail is fully in place over the line. A large part of that is in the Tiger Nine grant's $25,000,000 which Amtrak has effectively torpedoed by refusing to pay its $3,000,000 match that was specifically promised as part of the grant application.
Railvt The view that Amtrak's attempt to shut down Raton Pass over (in)valid fears of running on PTC exempt track is a red-herring. PTC is not a panacea. It can not protect against broken rails, heat kinks, auto intrusions, tie failure, axel breakage, nor a host of other hazards. More importantly the FRA has exlicitely ruled that it is NOT needed here. An exhaustive review process led to the official FRA exemptions for trackage deemed not to need PTC. The key metrics are low volumes of freight and/or passenger traffic and the existence of good quality trackage, maintained to at minimum Class Three (59mph for passenger service w/out signals). The Raton/Glorietta Pass ex-Santa Fe/BNSF line is Class Four, 79mph, CTC-signalled territory. Most of the route from Newton, KS to la Junta does/will have PTC due to freight volumes. West of there it was not required because it was not needed. And this is hardly the only place where this matters. Here's a brief list of just a few other already exempted trackage--all at deep threat if Amtrak sticks to this SW CHIEF policy. VERMONTER: Entire route north of Springfield, MA to St. Albans, VT. ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS: Whitehall, NY to Rutland, VT and if/when service actually starts (all trackwork is done) Rutland, VT to Burlington, VT. DOWNEASTER: all track north of Haverhill, MA to Portland/Brunswick, ME. CARDINAL: Entire line on the Buckingham Branch RR Orange, VA to Clifton Forge, VA. EMPIRE BUILDER: The Minneapolis to St. Paul terminal trackage on the Minnesota Transfer RR. CALIFORNIA ZEPHYR: The former Rio Grande RR/now UP mainline from at least Grand Jct. CO to Helper, UT and possibly more. (Amtrak has already sought costing/permission from UP to consider a Denver-Salt Lake City reroute across Wyoming on the Overland Route). This reroute would remove the Colorado Rockies from the route and two of the train's most used stops--Glenwood Springs, CO and Grand Jct. CO. Ridership would be devastated. COAST STARLIGHT: Several track segments in the San Jose-Oakland area (this also could impact corridor/commuter services). Some sections of the Coast Line north of San Luis Obispo may also be impacted. TEXAS EAGLE: Ex-MP trackage in the Poplar Bluff-St. Louis area. There are many other examples. A further problem is the possibility that several commuter operators, over whose track Amtrak operates, may not be ready sufficiently to qualify for an exemption to 2020 to install their PTC. NEW MEXICO RAIL RUNNER/RIO METRO: This is the one district of the SW CHIEF where a short bus bridge might for a short time be needed--although the Rio Metro folks think they will get an extension to 2020 before the December 31, 2018 deadline. SUN RAIL: The Central Florida commuter carrier may not be ready. Their line hosts both the SILVER METEOR and the SILVER STAR and if outlawed would block the AUTO TRAIN from reaching its Sanford, FL southern terminal. Access for Amtrak to Orlando, and Disney World would be blocked. TRI RAIL: The Miami-West Palm Beach commuter carrier also may not be ready. If a blockaide occured here the SILVER METEOR/SILVER STAR could not reach the Hialeah Yards, which actually, on a cyclical basis, does heavy maintenance on all eastern long-haul Viewliner overnight trains. The current Amtrak mangement claims its Safety Management System (SMS) review process will identify needed mitigations for exempt territories (apparently not including the SW CHIEF), but they made that promise as early as April and we still await their reports. With respect to the VERMONTER/ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS routes our legislature is now in recess until January--but any needed mitigation projects need to go forward this summer. We wait for a date unknown to get our marching orders. In the case of the SW CHIEF Amtrak is refusing funds intended to directly address its purported concerns. This is not a good situation and I'm sorry, but I can not buy the argument that Amtrak is trying to save its national network by destroying the SW CHIEF. Rather trains 3 & 4 are their test case for weaponizing the PTC process as a wedge to kill all longer-distance connected National Network trains. Carl Fowler
The view that Amtrak's attempt to shut down Raton Pass over (in)valid fears of running on PTC exempt track is a red-herring. PTC is not a panacea. It can not protect against broken rails, heat kinks, auto intrusions, tie failure, axel breakage, nor a host of other hazards. More importantly the FRA has exlicitely ruled that it is NOT needed here.
An exhaustive review process led to the official FRA exemptions for trackage deemed not to need PTC. The key metrics are low volumes of freight and/or passenger traffic and the existence of good quality trackage, maintained to at minimum Class Three (59mph for passenger service w/out signals).
The Raton/Glorietta Pass ex-Santa Fe/BNSF line is Class Four, 79mph, CTC-signalled territory. Most of the route from Newton, KS to la Junta does/will have PTC due to freight volumes. West of there it was not required because it was not needed.
And this is hardly the only place where this matters. Here's a brief list of just a few other already exempted trackage--all at deep threat if Amtrak sticks to this SW CHIEF policy.
VERMONTER: Entire route north of Springfield, MA to St. Albans, VT.
ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS: Whitehall, NY to Rutland, VT and if/when service actually starts (all trackwork is done) Rutland, VT to Burlington, VT.
DOWNEASTER: all track north of Haverhill, MA to Portland/Brunswick, ME.
CARDINAL: Entire line on the Buckingham Branch RR Orange, VA to Clifton Forge, VA.
EMPIRE BUILDER: The Minneapolis to St. Paul terminal trackage on the Minnesota Transfer RR.
CALIFORNIA ZEPHYR: The former Rio Grande RR/now UP mainline from at least Grand Jct. CO to Helper, UT and possibly more. (Amtrak has already sought costing/permission from UP to consider a Denver-Salt Lake City reroute across Wyoming on the Overland Route). This reroute would remove the Colorado Rockies from the route and two of the train's most used stops--Glenwood Springs, CO and Grand Jct. CO. Ridership would be devastated.
COAST STARLIGHT: Several track segments in the San Jose-Oakland area (this also could impact corridor/commuter services). Some sections of the Coast Line north of San Luis Obispo may also be impacted.
TEXAS EAGLE: Ex-MP trackage in the Poplar Bluff-St. Louis area.
There are many other examples. A further problem is the possibility that several commuter operators, over whose track Amtrak operates, may not be ready sufficiently to qualify for an exemption to 2020 to install their PTC.
NEW MEXICO RAIL RUNNER/RIO METRO: This is the one district of the SW CHIEF where a short bus bridge might for a short time be needed--although the Rio Metro folks think they will get an extension to 2020 before the December 31, 2018 deadline.
SUN RAIL: The Central Florida commuter carrier may not be ready. Their line hosts both the SILVER METEOR and the SILVER STAR and if outlawed would block the AUTO TRAIN from reaching its Sanford, FL southern terminal. Access for Amtrak to Orlando, and Disney World would be blocked.
TRI RAIL: The Miami-West Palm Beach commuter carrier also may not be ready. If a blockaide occured here the SILVER METEOR/SILVER STAR could not reach the Hialeah Yards, which actually, on a cyclical basis, does heavy maintenance on all eastern long-haul Viewliner overnight trains.
The current Amtrak mangement claims its Safety Management System (SMS) review process will identify needed mitigations for exempt territories (apparently not including the SW CHIEF), but they made that promise as early as April and we still await their reports.
With respect to the VERMONTER/ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS routes our legislature is now in recess until January--but any needed mitigation projects need to go forward this summer. We wait for a date unknown to get our marching orders.
In the case of the SW CHIEF Amtrak is refusing funds intended to directly address its purported concerns. This is not a good situation and I'm sorry, but I can not buy the argument that Amtrak is trying to save its national network by destroying the SW CHIEF. Rather trains 3 & 4 are their test case for weaponizing the PTC process as a wedge to kill all longer-distance connected National Network trains.
Amtrak management stated they would pay their share of the money once the states involved showed the route could be financially sustained. They did not mention PTC. So to me that statement reflects that Amtrak ran a few scenarios including "what if" scenarios of what might happen along the route with Amtrak being the sole operator on the track segment. So they turned back to the states and asked them to make a business case to continue the train in light of all the money that has to be spent to continue the train along it's current route.
I think it is a fair question. What does it benefit Amtrak to continue the train with declining ridership and massively increased sustainment costs for the route? In other words what is the longer term future plan other than just keeping this one train going on it's current trajectory.
Additionally, this could also be a call for more money for the route and a stronger plan for the train. Colorado wants a Front Range passenger train from Denver to Pueblo, Kansas wants a train that connects Newton and potentially KC with the Heartland Flyer. Both states paid for studies on this. Potentially if they could demonstrate how this improves the trains finances and they both were serious about the two potentially new trains........maybe Amtrak management would relent?
BTW, Imagine keeping Chicago Union Station open just for four trains a day. That is what is happening in Kansas City with KC Union Station. Happily the ownership and function of the station has changed so it is no longer purely a train station and it is sustainable without Amtrak.
BaltACDAnderson was brought in to kill Amtrak, not save it.
PNWRMNMI do not understand your point about "little used track section". The track either meets standards or it doesn't. The probability of washout has nothing to do with traffic density, but agree that if passenger trains are the only traffic on the line, then a passenger train is more likely to find it. You are right about liability, but that attaches when you run the train and is largely independent of trafic density on a line segment. In fact, I would argue that likelyhood of an Ax and consequences increase as traffic density increases. As Balt points out in his adjacent post, every train start is a potential disaster, just like starting your automobile is. Chicken little is in charge at ATK!
Except in this case there is precedent. Amtrak tried it this way with the Phoenix line and it led to sabotage and a derailment. So it does not surprise me if when the same case occurs again elsewhere on the map they are more cautious.
Anderson was brought in to kill Amtrak, not save it.
The view that Amtrak's attempt to shut down Raton Pass over (in)valid fears of running on PTC exempt track is somehow some sort of attempt to save the National Network is a red-herring. PTC is not a panacea. It can not protect against broken rails, heat kinks, auto intrusions, tie failure, axel breakage, nor a host of other hazards. More importantly the FRA has exlicitely ruled that it is NOT needed here.
CMStPnPUnderstand his concern over this route as one train derailment on this little used track section due to washout or some other cause......will cost Amtrak probably several times what it's annual operating subsidy is for the train.
I do not understand your point about "little used track section". The track either meets standards or it doesn't. The probability of washout has nothing to do with traffic density, but agree that if passenger trains are the only traffic on the line, then a passenger train is more likely to find it.
You are right about liability, but that attaches when you run the train and is largely independent of trafic density on a line segment. In fact, I would argue that likelyhood of an Ax and consequences increase as traffic density increases.
As Balt points out in his adjacent post, every train start is a potential disaster, just like starting your automobile is. Chicken little is in charge at ATK!
CMStPnP BaltACD Anderson is on a train killing path - nothing more and nothing less - using any available excuse, real or imagined. I think he is still trying to preserve the National LD Network. Understand his concern over this route as one train derailment on this little used track section due to washout or some other cause......will cost Amtrak probably several times what it's annual operating subsidy is for the train. If that is his real concern then just yank the plug on the train West of KC or reroute via Newton and OKC to DFW and yank the Texas Eagle / Heartland Flyer both.
BaltACD Anderson is on a train killing path - nothing more and nothing less - using any available excuse, real or imagined.
Anderson is on a train killing path - nothing more and nothing less - using any available excuse, real or imagined.
I think he is still trying to preserve the National LD Network. Understand his concern over this route as one train derailment on this little used track section due to washout or some other cause......will cost Amtrak probably several times what it's annual operating subsidy is for the train.
If that is his real concern then just yank the plug on the train West of KC or reroute via Newton and OKC to DFW and yank the Texas Eagle / Heartland Flyer both.
If he is that risk averse - time for him to shut Amtrak down in it's entirety. Every wheel that rolls is a potential catastrophe.
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