The last Amtrak monthly performance report is March 2013 http://www.amtrak.com/ccurl/1009/146/Amtrak-Monthly-Performance-Report-March-2013.pdf Looking at page 50 (C-1) gives the financial performance by routes, while pages 22-24 (A-3.4-3.6) give ridership and revenue. If you were Joe Boardman, which (if any) LD routes would you seek to prune or have Congress appropriate a social service subsidy to maintain the route(s)?
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimm The last Amtrak monthly performance report is March 2013 http://www.amtrak.com/ccurl/1009/146/Amtrak-Monthly-Performance-Report-March-2013.pdf Looking at page 50 (C-1) gives the financial performance by routes, while pages 22-24 (A-3.4-3.6) give ridership and revenue. If you were Joe Boardman, which (if any) LD routes would you seek to prune or have Congress appropriate a social service subsidy to maintain the route(s)?
I wouldn't use that report at all. It assumes the service on the route is "it" - the best it can be.
I would hire a consultant to analyze the potential for traffic on the route by OD pair and then see if I couldn't come up with a train service on the route that would improve net revenue.
I suspect there are quite a few opportunities in the east, but not so many in the west.
...just for starters.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Perhaps some of the LD routes should be studied to determine which city pairs are responsible for the most passengers. Those city pairs could be developed as a corridor, with only one train a day going beyond the corridor.
Limited assets should be deployed where there is the greatest need.
Dave
Lackawanna Route of the Phoebe Snow
Phoebe VetPerhaps some of the LD routes should be studied to determine which city pairs are responsible for the most passengers.
I'd change "are responsible" to "have the potential to generate", and then I'd agree with you.
I was focusing on western routes to reduce the operating losses. The idea sam1 put forth about running the CZ and connecting to the NW and southern Cal from SLC (?), thereby eliminating the EB, SWC and SL, made a lot of sense. Examining other LD routes to find city pairs that could be developed into corridor services (multiple trains per day) is another innovative thought. Why isn't Amtrak doing this?
Except that the EB provides an essential service in winter and Texas cannot be served by a connection from Salt Lake City very well.
The idea is two-fold: 1. Let routes that serve some social service be like the EAS with the airlines -- subsidized directly for that purpose. In the case of the EB, seems to me last winter it got shut down or delayed by 24 hrs + several times, so not sure how it is very reliable in winter. 2. The ridership on the Sunset Limited is small (though to be fair, growing). And if Texas needs it so much, let TX pony up to provide a state subsidy the way other states do.
So, I was looking at the Rocky Mountaineer web site the other day. They have multi-day trips but they put you up in a hotel overnight along the way. The train is the trip - it's not really "transportation".
But, I wonder if that approach wouldn't be helpful for the western LD trains. Making sure they are in the most scenic parts of the trip in daylight by putting the travelers up hotels rather than sleepers.
Right now, some of them have some pretty "anti-scenic" schedules...
Long Distance Trains should be focused from this way in my view. For actual transportation a nationwide system of maglevs should be used for "real transportation". For current LD trains they can be turned into land cruises the parent freight railroads would operate them. Freight railroads could potentially use historic equipment or replicas of it.
Railroad to Freedom
Actually latest performance report is now April 2013.
Maybe this LD loss could be addressed this way. Congress fully fund Amtrak for the next fiscal year. Require that Amtrak disclose by Jan a detailed cost breakdown of each route - line by line. That includes all diesel costs, car mileage costs, crew costs, trackage & dispatch costs, east station costs, overhead allocation, station agents, etc. The law would require all confidential costs to be disclosed as well.segment by segment, a operating costs,
As well revenues on each line segment be disclosed.
Then Congress can decide which if any or all routes be kept ?
r
Most accountants and financial analysts believe a full year of data should be examined to determine how well an operation is functioning. Looking at just one or two months runs the risk of missing the seasonal peaks and valleys. Amtrak's fiscal year runs from October 1st to September 30th. Thus, the September 2012 Monthly Report contains data for September and for September 2012 Year to Date, which is for the fiscal year.
It is possible, of course, to take the March or April 2013 Monthly Operating Report and using the reports for the last twelve months pull together year to date data for the last twelve months, but that is getting there the hard way. Moreover, it may miss any 2013 year end adjustments.
Amtrak provides a pretty good picture of its revenues and costs per route. Missing is the amount of depreciation, interest, and miscellaneous charges per route. To require the company to report publicly revenues, operating costs, fixed costs, etc. for each segment, i.e. each segment of the Texas Eagle, for example, would be a significant cost burden. This would be especially true for the allocation of depreciation, interest, and miscellaneous charges. It would be an accountant's workfare program, to be sure, but it probably would have little public benefit.
If having segment information is important, a person can submit a Freedom of Information Act request to the Office of the Amtrak Inspector General. That might produce segment information to the extent that Amtrak has it. However, as Amtrak explains in its footnotes, which are an integral part of the operating and financial reports, it does not assign depreciation by route.
Ideally, it would be nice for us armchair critics to have such data. But just operating expenses and revenue by route tells us quite a bit. Of course the planners at Amtrak should have such data for analysis and planning. However, in light of the OIG report, i wonder if they use it.
schlimm <snip> In the case of the EB, seems to me last winter it got shut down or delayed by 24 hrs + several times, so not sure how it is very reliable in winter. <snip>
<snip> In the case of the EB, seems to me last winter it got shut down or delayed by 24 hrs + several times, so not sure how it is very reliable in winter. <snip>
Most forms of transportation experience problems in the extreme weather of the northern plains. The interstate near me closed several times last winter. It is a routine enough occurrence that we have permanent warning lights and gates. Likewise, major airports sometimes are overcome by the snowfall.
schlimm Of course the planners at Amtrak should have such data for analysis and planning. However, in light of the OIG report, i wonder if they use it.
It depends on how readily available it is and how they are at using analytic tools. It also depends on whether the folks with the access to data and analytic skill are in the planning groups (ops, mkting, mech, engr staff jobs) or tucked away elsewhere (IT, accounting, etc.)
From what I know of Amtrak's data, they are lagging the industry. They rely quite heavily on canned reports that are produced by IT staff and then fed to consumers. This is the old model for going about this business.
I do know that they are working on getting their operational data more available to end consumers within the company, but wheels on this kind of stuff turn slowly.
Getting data, arranged in business friendly form, attached to a good front-end analytic tool isn't rocket science, but it's not simple, or cheap, either.
From the outside, it appears that Gunn had quite a few canned reports developed so he could see what he needed to see - these are the backbone of the monthly reports Amtrak publishes. But, he was an "old school" guy - that is "I need a report that shows xyz!" goes down the food chain and a programmer develops it and passes it back up the food chain. The problem with this approach is that a lot of assumptions and filtering take place between the request and the production with little or no ability of anyone along the way to drill into it, "slice it and dice it," summarize or trend it differently, or combine it with other data.
Dakguy201 schlimm <snip> In the case of the EB, seems to me last winter it got shut down or delayed by 24 hrs + several times, so not sure how it is very reliable in winter. <snip> Most forms of transportation experience problems in the extreme weather of the northern plains. The interstate near me closed several times last winter. It is a routine enough occurrence that we have permanent warning lights and gates. Likewise, major airports sometimes are overcome by the snowfall.
I think, to a large extent, RRs are not any more "weather immune" than other modes anymore. Nor, are they counted on as "vital" transportation.
Two recent examples.
Sandy: The NEC was down for days even as air and highway travel was available through and around NYC. (Amtrak did work like a dog to get things going, though.) Sometimes Amtrak is available while other modes suffer, sometimes vise versa.
Track work in Alabama and Mississippi: The Crescent only runs on weekends while NS does track work every winter. This lasts several weeks. Amtrak does not provide "bustitution". Amtrak service is not "vital".
ontheBNSFa nationwide system of maglevs should be used for "real transportation".
You should try to take a stab a business plan for your maglev network. It would let you know how best to advocate for them. I'll bet you have a picture in your head what the network might look like.
You can estimate ridership using existing airline schedules that connect similar cities and industry avg load factors. You can estimate fares using airline fares, bumping them up or down based on curbside to curbside trip times, comfort and convenience.
You can estimate capital costs from the Shanghai line and interstate highway construction costs assuming some economy of scale, and that the whole line need not be elevated.
You can estimate operating costs based on airline crew costs and overhead per passenger mile, plus something for ROW maintenance.
You can even take a crack at the "soft" benefits of reduction in urban air pollution, carbon emissions, urban highway congestion mitigation, etc.
Put it all together and see what you get. Time to hang some meat on those bones!
oltmanndSo, I was looking at the Rocky Mountaineer web site the other day..
And I was just looking at the EB schedule. Perhaps, something similar would work.
Perhaps:
You move the departure time up to noon from 5 PM from Seattle and Portland. 5 PM is a business person's departure time. Leisure travelers are generally available all day long. That gives you a good view of the Cascades or Columbia River gorge in the afternoon. It puts you into Spokane at about 7 PM - enough time to go get settled in a hotel and eat.
You move the westbound departure time from Spokane back to 7 AM, so you folks who traveled up one leg can go back on the other. This puts you into Seattle and Portland in late afternoon.
Complete the loop with regular Cascade service.
Then, from Spokane, run a daylight train out to Glacier, leaving about 7 AM, arriving the Glacier NP stops in late afternoon.
People could mix and match like they do with the Rocky Mountaineer.
What to do with non-tourist traffic? This: Run the remnant of the EB east from Glacier with through cars to Spokane. Travelers can either overnight there for the next morning's train and/or there could be a Thruway bus arriving in Seattle and Portland just before midnight.
The train would operate a bit like the Alaskan trains thru Denali with cars for the tourist trade ala RM and "regular transportation" cars.
This would require not change in train frequency nor change in routes - just scheduling changes with BNSF. It would also require establishing maintenance facilities at Spokane and Glacier NP.
The EB may be shut down by winter weather for a day or two, but the nearby airports and highways have been shut down for more than three or four days at a time. Some winters, more than a week! The EB IS more reliable in winter.
The corridor is another matter entirely. We are all aware of the problem wtih 80-year-old catenary between Wilmingron and Trenton and only slightly less old elsewhere. The derailment near Westport and the weekend shut down was a very special case.
Assuming I have the power to do it, I would drop all the long distance trains. I would sell the sleepers, dinners, and baggage cars. If there were no takers, I would scrap them. I would cancel the orders for new baggage cars and sleepers. I would eat the cancellation penalties, they are a sunk cost. I would park the coaches and lounge cars.
Next, I would hire Booze, Allen Hamilton or McKinsey or a similarly high powered consulting firm(s) and have them perform a demand analysis for every paired metropolitian area(s) in the U.S. where better, market supported, passenger trains service appears to be a reasonable probability. Which ones could support multiple daily intercity trains and stand a reasonable chance of covering their operating costs within five years would be the central question(s)..
Texas is ripe for improved service. I-35 between Jarrell and Hillsboro is being rebuilt. It is a nightmare getting through the construction zones. It is just one of the reasons, I suspect, better passenger train service would appeal to many people along the I-35 corridor, which is anchored by two of the largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. and has several large intermediate markets (Austin, Temple, and Waco).
I would schedule a minimum of three trains a day (morning, noon, and evening) between DFW and San Antonio. The market would support three trains a day if they were marketed properly. I would also increase the frequency between Fort Worth and Oklahoma City.
The trains could be equipped with the high level cars from the Eagle, i.e. one of the lounge cars for food service and two or three coaches. Half of one of the coaches could be converted to business class.
Initially the trains would have to follow the current Eagle route, i.e. BNSF from Fort Worth to Temple and UP from Temple to San Antonio. Ultimately, a better route would be the old MKT line from Fort Worth to Hillsboro, Waco, Temple, Georgetown, and Round Rock, where it could go over to the existing route to San Antonio. Also, in time the routing from Dallas to Fort Worth, as well as into San Antonio would have to be improved so that the trains could cover the end point distances as quickly as Megabus runs off the distance between DFW and San Antonio.
There are heaps of other issues that would have to be dealt with, but this is enough to form a picture of what might be possible along the I-35 corridor or similar corridors in the U.S. Unfortunately, as long as Amtrak, as well as regional transportation planners, have to devote considerable resources for the long distance trains, which are used by less than one per cent of intercity travelers, they are likely to miss opportunities for improved regional passenger train service.
Megabus, however, has not missed the opportunity. It now has eight buses a day scheduled between DFW, Austin, and San Antonio. If the lines of people waiting to board the buses in Dallas, Austin and San Antonio are any indicator (I have observed them in all three cities), they are likely to be successful, as in cover their costs and earn a return for the operator.
oltmanndFrom the outside, it appears that Gunn had quite a few canned reports developed so he could see what he needed to see - these are the backbone of the monthly reports Amtrak publishes. But, he was an "old school" guy - that is "I need a report that shows xyz!" goes down the food chain and a programmer develops it and passes it back up the food chain. The problem with this approach is that a lot of assumptions and filtering take place between the request and the production with little or no ability of anyone along the way to drill into it, "slice it and dice it," summarize or trend it differently, or combine it with other data.
Amazing! So many folks in at least some fields in academia can generate their own analyses because they know statistics and have programs on their laptops that can crunch and generate, given a data base. But Amtrak folks apparently don't know how.
Sam1 Assuming I have the power to do it, I would drop all the long distance trains. I would sell the sleepers, dinners, and baggage cars. If there were no takers, I would scrap them. I would cancel the orders for new baggage cars and sleepers. I would eat the cancellation penalties, they are a sunk cost. I would park the coaches and lounge cars. Next, I would hire Booze, Allen Hamilton or McKinsey or a similarly high powered consulting firm(s) and have them perform a demand analysis for every paired metropolitian area(s) in the U.S. where better, market supported, passenger trains service appears to be a reasonable probability. Which ones could support multiple daily intercity trains and stand a reasonable chance of covering their operating costs within five years would be the central question(s)..
That is the sort of thinking we need. Ideally, that is what should be done. But if this forum is at all representative of opinion.....
Autotrain loses 14.9¢ per passenger mile. Losses on all other trains are in the single digits, many in the low single digits except for the Lakeshore Limited which breaks even. In can conceive of a case being made to cut Autotrain.
But I still regard Amtrak as a transportation system. In any system some parts perform better than others but each contributes to the system as a whole. My little toe is less important to my body than my right hand but I am not inclined to cut off my little toe. I would look to strengthen the system rather than weaken it.
On the other hand, I can see arguing that we should abandon all long distance routes. I hope that does not happen but I think that is more logical than piecemeal cuts.
As an aside, I notice the Crescent loses the second highest amount of money, 9.1¢ per passenger mile. I think that strengthens Don's argument that the Crescent should run as two daily trains each of which ends in Atlanta.
Amtrak has a wealth of data. And it makes more of its operating and financial data public than many if not most organizations. What's missing, apparently, is management's ability and willingness to tie the data analysis to its strategic planning. Boardman acknowledged as much in his response to the OIG's report on Amtrak's asset management policies, procedures, and practices. Hopefully, the relatively new Operations Research person will help fix the problem.
Amtrak has segment data re: revenues. It uses this data, amongst other things, for its Guest Rewards Program. This is just one data set that is not made directly available to the public. There may be others.
I'd keep the long distance trains because they provide a better quality of service to intermediate points (i.e. small towns) than other modes of transportation. An example is the Southwest Chief serving the Philmont Scout Ranch in New Mexico. Anyone going to Philmont has gear that they won't (knives, axes) or can't (camp stoves) check as airline baggage.
Next, I'd create an internal route analysis group. Their job would be to do the demand analysis on every reasonable city pair where improved passenger service is a reasonable possibility. As part of the demand analysis, they would determine where the stations should be to serve the traffic.
An example of station analysis would be the proposed Chicago-Milwaukee-Madison service. To serve the traffic, the Madison station should be within walking distance of the University of Wisconsin. Chicago stations should be at O'Hare Field, Union Station, and Midway Airport.
John WR Autotrain loses 14.9¢ per passenger mile. Losses on all other trains are in the single digits, many in the low single digits except for the Lakeshore Limited which breaks even. In can conceive of a case being made to cut Autotrain. But I still regard Amtrak as a transportation system. In any system some parts perform better than others but each contributes to the system as a whole. My little toe is less important to my body than my right hand but I am not inclined to cut off my little toe. I would look to strengthen the system rather than weaken it. On the other hand, I can see arguing that we should abandon all long distance routes. I hope that does not happen but I think that is more logical than piecemeal cuts. As an aside, I notice the Crescent loses the second highest amount of money, 9.1¢ per passenger mile. I think that strengthens Don's argument that the Crescent should run as two daily trains each of which ends in Atlanta.
In FY12 the Lake Shore Limited lost $33.1 million or 16.2 cents per passenger mile before depreciation, interest and miscellaneous charges. These charges probably added another $3 million to the net loss. In FY11 the Lake Shore Limited lost $37.5 million or 18.5 cents per passenger mile before depreciation, interest and miscellaneous charges.
The Auto Train lost 15.4 cents per passenger mile in FY12, up from 14.1 cents per passenger mile in FY11. The best performing long distance train in FY12, i.e. with the lowest financial loss per passenger mile, was the Palmetto at 13.3 cents. The worst performer was the Sunset Limited at 49.9 cents per passenger mile. Overall the long distance trains lost $600.9 million in FY12, up slightly from $597.7 million in FY11. These numbers are before depreciation, interest, and miscellaneous charges.
Sam1 John WR Autotrain loses 14.9¢ per passenger mile. Losses on all other trains are in the single digits, many in the low single digits except for the Lakeshore Limited which breaks even. In can conceive of a case being made to cut Autotrain. But I still regard Amtrak as a transportation system. In any system some parts perform better than others but each contributes to the system as a whole. My little toe is less important to my body than my right hand but I am not inclined to cut off my little toe. I would look to strengthen the system rather than weaken it. On the other hand, I can see arguing that we should abandon all long distance routes. I hope that does not happen but I think that is more logical than piecemeal cuts. As an aside, I notice the Crescent loses the second highest amount of money, 9.1¢ per passenger mile. I think that strengthens Don's argument that the Crescent should run as two daily trains each of which ends in Atlanta. In FY12 the Lake Shore Limited lost $33.1 million or 16.2 cents per passenger mile before depreciation, interest and miscellaneous charges. These charges probably added another $3 million to the net loss. In FY11 the Lake Shore Limited lost $37.5 million or 18.5 cents per passenger mile before depreciation, interest and miscellaneous charges. The Auto Train lost 15.4 cents per passenger mile in FY12, up from 14.1 cents per passenger mile in FY11. The best performing long distance train in FY12, i.e. with the lowest financial loss per passenger mile, was the Palmetto at 13.3 cents. The worst performer was the Sunset Limited at 49.9 cents per passenger mile. Overall the long distance trains lost $600.9 million in FY12, up slightly from $597.7 million in FY11. These numbers are before depreciation, interest, and miscellaneous charges.
It is helpful to see accurate data, without which decisions are bound to be wrong. Thanks.
Sam1The best performing long distance train in FY12, i.e. with the lowest financial loss per passenger mile, was the Palmetto at 13.3 cents.
Surprise, surprise! A day train! It's also the stronges ridership growth in the the first part of the year.
Sam,
I stand corrected. As you point out, Amtrak has a wealth of data. I looked at a table that compared information from 2012 and 2013 rather than the table that show costs per passenger mile. The title was off the top of my screen and I should have scrolled up to double check it.
However, I still believe a logical case may be made to cut all long distance routes but to cut just one makes much less sense because Amtrak is a system.
John
John WR Sam, I stand corrected. As you point out, Amtrak has a wealth of data. I looked at a table that compared information from 2012 and 2013 rather than the table that show costs per passenger mile. The title was off the top of my screen and I should have scrolled up to double check it. However, I still believe a logical case may be made to cut all long distance routes but to cut just one makes much less sense because Amtrak is a system. John
I am not advocating cutting just one long distance passenger train. They all should be dropped as per my previous post. The reference to the Texas Eagle was just an example of how the equipment could be redeployed in Texas, as well as perhaps elsewhere, to provide a better service to a burgeoning market.
Sam1 am not advocating cutting just one long distance passenger train. They all should be dropped as per my previous post. The reference to the Texas Eagle was just an example of how the equipment could be redeployed in Texas, as well as perhaps elsewhere, to provide a better service to a burgeoning market.
I don't want to go on and on arguing issues where we will never agree. And this certainly is one of those issues. But I can accept the logic of your position that we drop all long distance trains. If it does come to that far better that Amtrak should have a clear and clean ending than that it should just slowly be dismembered which would only prolong its death.
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