lOVED THE PICTURE... BROUGHT BACK A FEW MEMORIES...
NO, NEVER BEEN TO DC, BUT: DID GROW UP IN A "TROLLEYTOWN". IN CASE YA'LL HAVE FORGOTTEN, DIDN'T KNOW
OR CARE ETC: THE MOTOR CITY: "DETROIT" HAD A PRETTY GOOD
STREET CAR SCHEDULE. MY MEMORY IS OF PCC'S OF: "THE D S R"
DETROIT STREET RAILWAY. NEVER HEAR ANYTHING ABOUT "OUR"
STREETCARS/TROLLEYS. ROUTES WERE ON THE MAJOR THOROUGHFARES: JEFFERSON AVE, GRATIOT, MICHIGAN, WOODWARD & A FEW OTHERS I'VE FORGOTTEN. SADLY WERE
REPLACED BY THOSE D--- TROLLEY BUSES'... WHICH DIDN'T LAST
LONG. ALL RAN TO TERMINUS IN DOWNTOWN IF MEMORY SERVES.
USED TO BE ABLE TO PICK UP AT CITY LIMITS WITH GROSSE PTE PARK, TRANSFER, END UP AT BRIGGS STADIUM... SEE AL KALINE AND TIGERS PLAY... OR GO TO OLYMPYIA AND SEE THE WINGS AND GORDIE HOWE PLAY... ALL GONE NOW.ETC. OH WELL. JUST SIGN ME:
SOUTHEASTERN HS CLASS OF 58. CITY CHAMPS FOOTBALL 57, EAST SIDE CHAMPS BASEBALL 57 & 58. AKA:DAS ADLER!
But again, there were lines where patronage held up and only political pressure caused the bus substitution. Flatbush Avenue, Brooklyn (and a few other lines as well), much of the Manhattan and Bronx Third Avenue system (the lighter lines had been converted already), Gratiot, Michigan, and Woodward in Detroit, Canal Street, New Orleans, would have made more sense to remain rail, and the bottom line would probably have been better, not worse.
Third Avenue Transit Lines that should have remained rail include Fordham, Treemont, Webster, Southern Boulevard, Westchester Avenue, and Boston Road. These were very heavy lins, and Third Avenue had inhouse capability of building their own modern cars for less money than the price of a new bus.
In Manhattan, Third Avenue wanted to completely rebuild the Broadway - 42nd Street track in time for the World Fare of 1939-1940, during 1938, but LaGuardia would not give them permission. After WWII the track on this line was really worn out, and this was an extremely heavy line, a car in sight at all times.
Falcon48In the late 1940's, some transit companies were obviously optimistic about their future prospects and the prospects for continued streetcar operations. These were the companies which ordered postwar PCC cars. But many of of these companies apparently changed their view in the early 1950's.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
I think that different transit companies had different views of their future prospects, and those views also changed over time. In the late 1940's, some transit companies were obviously optimistic about their future prospects and the prospects for continued streetcar operations. These were the companies which ordered postwar PCC cars. But many of of these companies apparently changed their view in the early 1950's. Chicago is a good example. It bought a large fleet of new PCC cars in 1948, and then began a massive conversion program just a few years later. Twin Cities is another. There's at least one case where a city ordered postwar PCC cars and then decided to convert to bus before the cars were delivered (Louisville). The new cars were then sold to other cities. By 1951, however, the market for new streetcars had dried up. In part, this was because so many conversions were underway that a transit operator that stil wantedto operate streetcars could get modern secondhand equipment. But it also reflected the fact that many operators had become pessimistic about the prospects for continued streetcar operations.
And then there were the many streetcar propoerties which had never ordered PCC cars, either pre-war or post war. Most of these properties had probably decided in the 1930's to run their existing systems until it wore out or required additional investment and then convert (which is actually a very a rational approach). Probably the best example was Milwaukee, WI, where the transit company's intention to eventually convert to busses was known by the mid 1930's (as you might expect in this situation, Milwaukee never bought PCC's). Omaha-Council Bluffs is another - theiri newest cars were built in 1917, although parts of the system stagered on until 1955. Denver is another.
There's one final group to consider -transit companies that were so broke that they couldn't even raise the money to convert and kept on operating increasingly dilapidated streetcar systems until they were taken over by public authorities. Pittsburgh is probably one of these. Although it had a large PCC fleet (both pre and post WWII cars), which showed that it had been optimistic about its streetcars at least through the late 1940's, the system and the cars had become wrecks by the 1960's and 70's. In fact, many of the PCC's went to the scrap heap after 30+ year of service with the original paint they had when delivered
Again, the Toronto system is a well-mange dsystem in whicvh continual upgrading of track and other fixed acilities takes place and is included in the operating costs. Every year they program a particular piece of track to rebuild, with cars rerouted to parallel lines if possible, or single tracked with pancake portable crossovers. or temporary bus substitution. Most transit experts recommend buses for lines having less than 15,000 passengers a day, llihgt rial or streetcar can beocme competitive if their a cheap private right of way in the 15,000 - 25,000 per day patronage, but really starts becoming cost effective above 25,000 passengers/day. Above 80,000, bewtter go to completely grade separated rapid transit. Probalby 98% of the transit lines by mileage cary less than 15,000 passengers by day, so the bus is by far and away the vehicle of choice. But rail does have a place and always really did have a place and this definitely inlcudes on-street operation where appropriate.
Falcon48You're almost certainly right that the rental Amtrak pays for its LD trains is too low - the freight railroads have been complaining about it for years. But that's a different issue from the one I was addressing. Whether too high or too low, the rental Amtrak pays its host railroads includes compensation for the infrastructure it is using, including the host railroad's capital costs. To my knowledge, Amtrak treats the rental as an "operating cost"(there could be an exception to this where Amtrak pays for Amtrak owned improvements, but that's normally a small part of the infrastructure it is using when it's a tenant). On the corridor, by contrast, a big chunk of the money Amtrak is paying for infrastructure is treated as capital costs, not operating costs. That means, if you just compare Amtrak's "operating cost" coverage on the corridor vs the long distance services (a comparison I've seen made many times), you're comparing applies and oranges. The comparison isn't really telling you anything about the relative economic viability (or nonviability) of the two services. The reason I raised the Amtrak issue is because it's a modern example of the "operating cost" comparisons which are frequently made in discussions of streetcars vs buses. In fact, you'll see them in this thread - streetcars are said to have lower "operating costs" vs buses above a certain level of traffic. But, if the streetcar's infrastructure costs are being excluded from this comparison (because they are "capital", not "operating" costs), the comparison is meaningless. Costs are costs. From a business standpoint, if the money is being spent, it doesn't matter much what bucket they are assigned to in the accounting system. After all, when you pay for a restaurant meal, does it matter much to you whether you put your copy of the check into your right rather than your left pocket? A possible varient of this problem is that a "depreciation" element might be included in the streetcar operating costs. This would make the comparison more meaningful as an accounting exercise, but not as the basis for business or public decisionmaking. The reason is that depreciation is based on what was spent in the past, not what will be needed in the future. A streetcar system with old, nearly worn out infrastructure (a description which fits many of the U.S. streetcar operations that survived into the 1950's) may have very low annual depreciation charges (or none, if the assets have been fully depreciated from an accounting standpoint). The thing a businessman or public agency making a conversion decision wants to know is what costs WILL be incurred in each scenario - the replacement costs of the streetcar assets and how soon they will need to be incurred if the streetcar system is retained vs the costs that will be incurred if the system is converted to buses. I'm afraid that I've been singularly responsible for taking this thread way beyond a discussion of DC streetcars, which was its original purpose. Call it a weakness.
You're almost certainly right that the rental Amtrak pays for its LD trains is too low - the freight railroads have been complaining about it for years. But that's a different issue from the one I was addressing. Whether too high or too low, the rental Amtrak pays its host railroads includes compensation for the infrastructure it is using, including the host railroad's capital costs. To my knowledge, Amtrak treats the rental as an "operating cost"(there could be an exception to this where Amtrak pays for Amtrak owned improvements, but that's normally a small part of the infrastructure it is using when it's a tenant). On the corridor, by contrast, a big chunk of the money Amtrak is paying for infrastructure is treated as capital costs, not operating costs. That means, if you just compare Amtrak's "operating cost" coverage on the corridor vs the long distance services (a comparison I've seen made many times), you're comparing applies and oranges. The comparison isn't really telling you anything about the relative economic viability (or nonviability) of the two services.
The reason I raised the Amtrak issue is because it's a modern example of the "operating cost" comparisons which are frequently made in discussions of streetcars vs buses. In fact, you'll see them in this thread - streetcars are said to have lower "operating costs" vs buses above a certain level of traffic. But, if the streetcar's infrastructure costs are being excluded from this comparison (because they are "capital", not "operating" costs), the comparison is meaningless. Costs are costs. From a business standpoint, if the money is being spent, it doesn't matter much what bucket they are assigned to in the accounting system. After all, when you pay for a restaurant meal, does it matter much to you whether you put your copy of the check into your right rather than your left pocket?
A possible varient of this problem is that a "depreciation" element might be included in the streetcar operating costs. This would make the comparison more meaningful as an accounting exercise, but not as the basis for business or public decisionmaking. The reason is that depreciation is based on what was spent in the past, not what will be needed in the future. A streetcar system with old, nearly worn out infrastructure (a description which fits many of the U.S. streetcar operations that survived into the 1950's) may have very low annual depreciation charges (or none, if the assets have been fully depreciated from an accounting standpoint). The thing a businessman or public agency making a conversion decision wants to know is what costs WILL be incurred in each scenario - the replacement costs of the streetcar assets and how soon they will need to be incurred if the streetcar system is retained vs the costs that will be incurred if the system is converted to buses.
I'm afraid that I've been singularly responsible for taking this thread way beyond a discussion of DC streetcars, which was its original purpose. Call it a weakness.
I agree that Pittsburgh Railways should have bought fewer PCC streetcars, itself converted the lighter feeder lines to buses where service would not be compromised, especially some street running outer shuttle lines, some of which even got PCC's. and invested more in rebuilding downtown orginal installation track. But the tracks on Woodward and Gratiot and Michigan (only those three lines) in Detroit and on Canal in New Orleands were in good shape and cars rode smooothly, the historic and well maintained cars in New Orleans and the modern and well maintained PCC's in Detroit. Political pressure and GM was involved in both.
Tracks in Toronto have always been kept in good shape and the ride is smooth. Again, economically, the heavy lines are the lines that economically should have been kept streetcar. and where the track renewal economics make sense. Toronto has converted its lighter and feeder lines to bus and dosn't run streetcars above rapid transit on the same street. It has a balanced approach to transportation, but the easy money prevented such a solution for the Twin Cities. In New York and DC it was simple prejudice, the needs of the private auto driver having precedence over that of the transit rider. But again, even these two matters, GM was at least partly responsible, the lease purchase deal and the psychology that to be a real American, one must own an auto and public transit is for the poor and foreigners. Sure there was contorversy in Philadlephia, but what the riders wanted was streetcars. It was not the riders that objected, just those used to parking their cars where streetcars did and now again run to access the carbarn.
Under the Roy Chalk management, those DC lines that had deteriorated conduit had already been abandoned. The conduit operated systems had learne how to cope with snow and sleet and ice, and the newer conduit installtions benefited from improved technology and did not require the heavy maintenance that the older ones it. The quality of steel alloys, the alloy of the power rails, all that was studied seriously. The Manhattan lines ran reasonably reliably in winter, probably more reliably than the buses, because Third Avenue did bring out its fleet of snowplows and snow sweepers, while the bus lines were completley dependant on the City;s equipment. Huge snowstorms did tie up the lines, but tied up everything else, including some surface and above ground third rail subway lines.
Incidentally, some of the bad downtown Pittsburgh tracks never got replaced and continued to be used by the South Hills lines until the downtown subway was built replacing them. Toward the end, the streetcars moved slowly across the Smithfield Street Bridge at something like 5mph!
I guess Pittsburgh Railways was counting on someone building a subway for them. Like the New York Westchester and Boston entering Manhattan. Never happened.
Anyway, if you wish to see where there car culture has brought the world and even the USA, contact my friend Jerry Spriggs, Jerry.spings@gmail.com and ask him to attach the demographic study to his reply and listen and watch.
A few points:
(1) As I recall, the Girard streetcar reactivation in Philadelphia was actually quite controversial. It was held up some time by local opposition (probably adjoining property owners). At one point, I believe SEPTA indicated it was considering the disposal of the newly modernized PCC equipment.
(2) I question whether the Toronto "operating cost" comparisons with bus include all of the infrastructure related costs, for the reasons stated in my earlier notes. It's undoubtedly true, however, that a streetcar system capable of operating trains will likely have lower "operating costs" per passenger (or even per vehicle) than a system (streetcar or bus) that uses only single unit vehicles. But, in most U.S. cities, the problem by the 1950's wasn't capacity - it was the opposite. There wasn't enough traffic to fill even single unit cars on a regular basis (in Omaha-Council Bluffs, for example, which was once a major streetcar metro area, they removed the standee straps from the streetcars in the 1930's). An additional problem in the U.S. by the 1950's was that the population (customer) base was expanding beyond the historic limits of the streetcar system, while the areas served by the streetcar system were declining.
(3) The statement that streetcar trackage lasts 50-60 years may be true of modern construction, where the rails are fastened to concrete panels. But I seriously doubt whether it was true as to historic streetcar construction, where the tracks were built on wood ties (just like regular railroads) and then covered by the street material. The drainage issues alone wouldn't have been favorable to long life. Most streetcar systems that survived into the 1950's were rebuilt during the 1920's, and were converted before they needed to be rebuilt again. But Pittsburgh is a good test of the 50-60 year estimate. Assuming the Pittsburgh system was last renewed in the 1920's, it would have been in place roughly 40 -45 years by the late 1960's, when I started riding it as a young, eager railfan (I'm giving away how old I am). While still operational (sort of), it was absolutely wretched. Riding it was like being in an airplane caught in a storm (or a roller coaster at the nearby Kennywood Park). The operators had to know where all of the broken rails were in the street so they didn't sail off into a sidewalk or a building. There's something slightly unnerving about seeing a streetcar inch down a downtown street while the rail ahead of it lifts out of the pavement.
(4) There is no question that a modern LRV or air conditioned, reconditioned PCC car operating on good track gives a ride that is equal or superior to a bus. But the issue a trasit operator faced in the mass conversion period was whether the existing streetcar system could give that kind of service without substantial new investment. Keep in mind that, before the mass conversion process got underway, most streetcar systems didn't even use PCC's, and the ones that did still relied on standard streetcars for the majority of their services. This situation didn't change until enough lines had been converted to permit the remaining lines to be operated entirely by PCC's (1954 in Chicago).
(5) A major impetus for streetcar conversions was that many cities wanted the streetcar tracks out of the streets, regardless of what the transit company at the time might want. City opposition to street trackage was already being felt by the 1930's (see the Hilton/Due book on interurban railways). NYC's opposition is well known. Apparently, based on the some of the other posts in this thread, it was also true in DC. However, there's one aspect of the DC system I haven't seen discussed. The city portions of the DC system were conduit lines. When did they begin using salt in DC fro snow removal? Even though DC residents don't like to admit it, it does snow several times a winter in DC, sometimes heavily. I would imagine that salt would wreak havoc with a conduit system in pretty short order._
And why did PTC put streetcars back on Garrad Avenue. Public pressure. The riders wanted them back. The riders prefered streetcars over busses. Given a choice between a hard wood seat cold in winter and warm in summer noisy hard riding 40-year-old relic, and a modern bus, in 1950 or today, most riders would prefer the bus. But between any bus and a well-maintained PCC or a modern LRV, the riders will choose the rail vehicle.
Exactly. The Toronto system is well-managed, and track replacements are scheduled routinely, wiht the system kept in good shape. It comparitive operating costs on a passenger mile basis were available to me and bus passengers cost about 25% more to handle than streetcar passengers both per passenger and one a passenger mile basis. I think this information is still available at APTA. It was only specific heavy lines that should have been kept, and most of DC's lines fitted that desciption, otherwise Roy Chalk would not have wished to keep them. And at the time, the PCC's were mostly relatively new, and many did see further service in Cairo, Alexandria, and Sarajavo.
Remember that while track requires replacement after 50 or 60 years, the streetcar can also last that long, while a bus wears out in 15 years. There was a dramatic improvement in streetcar technology with the PCC. But a modernized PCC, equipped with wheel chair lift at its front door, air-conditioning, and electronic based instead of relay based controls, can hold its own in performance and passenger comfort with the latest equipment.
daveklepper Operating costs include track maintenance including eventual track replacement but do not include the initial investment. When I say that Woodward Avenue, Detroit, and Flatbush Avenue, Brookly,. regular streetcar lines, should have remained streetcar lines, I would note that the track was in good condition when lines were abandoned, and that the equipment was reasonably modern. When it comes to the vast majority of streetcar and interurban lines in the USA, of course you are right, and the swing to personal auto transportation made then good candidates for bus conversion. I am merely pointing out that there were and are exceptions. Note that Philadelphia has restored streetcar service on Garrad Avenue and that the historic F line in San Francisco (mostly PCC's, some Milan Peter Witts, and an occasional special like the Blackpool "boat" and MUNI No. 1) is the one line that comes closest to paying all its operating costs in the entire MUNI network. I think even you would agree that abandonment of Long Beach PE by the government authority that then owned it was a bad mistake. And Nortons Point in Brooklyn was similar (smaller) but much harder to restore, since much of the ROW now has buildings. But to say that GM dfid not cause the conversion of streetcars to buses is like saying that Electro Motive did not cause the dieselization of North American Railroads. But, again, it was not a conspiracy, just smart business practice.
Operating costs include track maintenance including eventual track replacement but do not include the initial investment. When I say that Woodward Avenue, Detroit, and Flatbush Avenue, Brookly,. regular streetcar lines, should have remained streetcar lines, I would note that the track was in good condition when lines were abandoned, and that the equipment was reasonably modern. When it comes to the vast majority of streetcar and interurban lines in the USA, of course you are right, and the swing to personal auto transportation made then good candidates for bus conversion. I am merely pointing out that there were and are exceptions. Note that Philadelphia has restored streetcar service on Garrad Avenue and that the historic F line in San Francisco (mostly PCC's, some Milan Peter Witts, and an occasional special like the Blackpool "boat" and MUNI No. 1) is the one line that comes closest to paying all its operating costs in the entire MUNI network.
I think even you would agree that abandonment of Long Beach PE by the government authority that then owned it was a bad mistake. And Nortons Point in Brooklyn was similar (smaller) but much harder to restore, since much of the ROW now has buildings.
But to say that GM dfid not cause the conversion of streetcars to buses is like saying that Electro Motive did not cause the dieselization of North American Railroads.
But, again, it was not a conspiracy, just smart business practice.
A few comments on the above post (not necessarily disagreements)
1. Perhaps you have seen some financial statements I have not, but I'm not aware that "operating costs" shown by transit companies included costs for "eventual replacement" of their streetcar investment. To do that, they would have had to calculate current replacement costs for the infrastructure, and then allocate that against operating income on some annual basis, something I very much doubt they would have done (particularly in the 1950's). What they may have done is include an annual depreciation charge. As I pointed out in another posting, this would understate (probably significantly) the future capital investments needed to keep the streetcar system in operation. The reason is that depreciation is based on past investment (which, in the case of a streetcar company in the 1950's, could have been made in the 1920's or before). Further, many streetcar companies probably had fully depreciated capital assets by the 1950's, in which case no depreciation charges would have been taken against operating income for these assets.
2. I don't know much about the specific Detroit or Brooklyn streetcar lines you mention. As I think you recognize, I was talking in general terms and there, of course, could have been some exceptions (although I have to wonder whether the Detroit line's ridership held up enough in the postwar period to support continued streetcar operations). One consideration in retaining individual streetcar lines in a city otherwise converted to bus is the need to retain support facilities for a technology used only on a single route or a few routes. With respect to Girard Avenue in Philadelphia, it's a mystery to me why they restored ths line as a streetar line. It doesn't go into a subway and doesn't seem to serve an area where a "historic" line would have any value. But. sometimes, the workings of government are unfathomable. I'm very familiar with the F line in San Francisco, and I agree that this route is very successful. But this route is really unique. It has huge tourist patronage and serves as an alternate "historic transit" route to the cable cars to/from Fisherman's Wharf. It simply wouldn't work as a bus line.
3. I agree that, looking at it from today's vantage point, the abandonment of the former PE Long Beach line by the government authority that then owned it (others reading this post should note that it was NOT abandoned by a company affiliated with GM or National City Lines) was a mistake from the standpoint of public transit policy. But, at the time, the service had to be funded from the farebox - public transit subsidies weren't available. So, from the standpoint of the public authority that abandoned it at the time, it was not a mistake.
4. I agree that GM "caused" the abandonment of streetcar lines and that its subsidiary EMD "caused" the dieselization of U.S. railroads in the sense that they produced products (buses and diesel locomotives) that transit operators and railroads believed were superior to the technology they were currently using and wanted to buy. That, as you recognize, is not a conspiracy. It's good, old fashioned capitalism. It's no different than what happened when Frank Sprague came out with a product (the electric streetcar) which caused the mass extinction of cable cars in most American cities.
I don't recall I said anything about the allocation of costs between two services that are using the same rail infrastructure. I was using an Amtrak example to illustrate a point about streetcars vs buses. However, with respect to your comments about capital costs being susidized, I will say that, whether the capital costs are funded from the farebox, or are funded by the government through subsidies, they are still costs of the service in question and must be taken into account in assessing economic viability, whether the issue on the table is streetcars vs buses or Amtrak. A susidy may make the economics more favorable for the party being subsidized, but it makes the economics correspondingly less favorable for the subsidizer (and, if the government is providing the subsidy, the poor taxpayers upon whose back all harebrained government schemes seem to ride). There's no free lunch.
With respect to your comments on cost allocation, there is no one "right" way to allocate costs between two services using a single rail infrastructure. The "right" answer largely depends on the question being asked. For example, if you are simply trying to compare the financial performance of two services using the same infrastructure, the most obvious way is to just allocate the joint and common costs between services on a unit basis (cars or passengers). For example, if Service A has half the cars and Service B has the other half, you allocate the costs 50-50. "But wait", the advocates of Service B might say. "The infrastructure would exist for Service A even if Service B weren't being provided". So, they would argue that the only costs Service B should be assigned are the incremental costs directly attributable to the service (presumably, in this example, less than half of the total costs). This isn't necessarily "wrong". In fact, it is "right", if the question on the table is whether Service B should be discontinued. That's because, in a discontinuance, only the avoidable (incremental) costs of the Service B will be saved. The costs that will be incurred anyway on Service A will not be saved if Service B is discontinued. This, in fact, is the way joint and common costs are handled in STB rail abandonments
This question of cost assignment between services using the same rail infrastructure is likely to rear its ugly head big time with positive train control (PTC). The statutory PTC mandate requires installation of this technology on (i) lines carrying intercity or commuter passenger trains, and (ii) lines with 5 million or more GTM which also carry TIH. Now, I don't know what freight railroads are planning to do about recovering the billions of dollars they are going to have to spend on PTC systems, but it's a pretty good bet they will seek to recover this money from the passenger operators and TIH shippers whose traffic is triggering the need to install these systems. That's pretty straighforward if a particular segment of track has to be PTC equipped just because of passenger service, or just because of TIH traffic. But what about a track segment that carries both (and many routes do)? You can bet, in this case, the passenger operators will be arguing they shouldn't pay anything because the PTC would have to be installed to support the TIH traffic even if there were no passenger trains. The TIH shippers, in turn, will argue that they shouldn't pay anything because the PTC would have to be intalled to support the passenger trains even if there were no TIH. It will be a battle royal.
Finally, as I said in an earlier post today, I am probably the person most responsible for expanding this thread far beyond its original purpose (which, as I look back at the first posting, was merely to answer an inquiry about some old conduit streetcar tracks in Georgetown). This time, however, I'm innocent.
Falcon48That means, if you just compare Amtrak's "operating cost" coverage on the corridor vs the long distance services (a comparison I've seen made many times), you're comparing applies and oranges. The comparison isn't really telling you anything about the relative economic viability (or nonviability) of the two services.
Falcon48 But, off the corridor, where Amtrak operates as a tenant rather than as the track owner, Amtrak pays its share of the owner's infrastructure costs mostly in the form of rental charges, which are treated as "operating" costs. So, if one focuses solely on "operating" financial results, you don't get a valid comparison of relative economic efficiency. Rather, the comparison is biased against the long distance service, because of the difference in the treatment of infrastructure costs.
I'm not familiar with what went on in Providence (or who got convicted for what). As to Minneapolis, there's a very good, recent book on the Twin Cities streetcar system; Isaacs "Twin Cities By Trolley", University of Minnesota Press, 2007. If you haven't seen it, I recommend it since it goes way beyond the normal picture book fare. According to the book, several former TCRT officials were charged and convicted of a sale and kickback scheme in connection with TCRT's streetcar to bus conversion. Apparently what they did was to cause TCRT to sell surplus materials (including almost new PCC cars) at discount prices and then get kickbacks from the purchasers, which they pocketed (p. 292). Nice work if you can get it. The book also has a good discussion of the "GM conspiracy" (pp. 293-97).
With respect to Toronto, I haven't been there for more than 20 years so I'm not sure what they've been doing. However, as I recall, they were running streetcar trains last time I was there. That changes the operating cost economics, probably more in favor of streetcars. Some U.S. cities also operated streetcar trains (either multiple unit or motor trailer), but these operations generally ended in the 1930's,as patronage declined. For most U.S. cities after WWII, the issue wasn't how to increase capacity by running trains, but how to fill single cars as passengers deserted the transit system for private automobies. I recognize that there were some U.S. cities that continued to have large loads, but this was a distinct minority.
With respect to comparisons between streetcar and bus "operating costs", I've dealt with railroad costing, and the first thing I ask when I see this term is what costs are included and what costs are excluded. For example, an obvious difference between streetcars and buses are the infrastructure costs of the streetcar system. Are the streetcar's infrastructure costs being treated as an "operating cost" in these comparisons, or treated as a "capital cost"? If it's the latter (and I suspect, but don't know, that it is), the streetcar vs bus "operating cost" comparison isn't telling you anything about the relative economic efficiency of the two modes. You have to look at the total costs of the two modes to get a valid comparison of economic efficiency, not just the part of the costs that happen to fall into the "operating" bucket.
By the way, the same kind of issue arises when comparing the relative profitablility (or, more accurately, the relative unprofitability) of Amtrak "corridor" routes vs long distance routes. I've often seen comparisons showing that Amtrrak's "operating" financial results on the corridor are much better than its long distance intercity routes. But this is an apples to oranges comparison due, in part, to the differing treatment of infrastructure costs Amtrak incurs for the two services. On the Amtrak owned corridor, a big chunk of the infrastructure costs are treated as "capital" costs, not "operating" costs. But, off the corridor, where Amtrak operates as a tenant rather than as the track owner, Amtrak pays its share of the owner's infrastructure costs mostly in the form of rental charges, which are treated as "operating" costs. So, if one focuses solely on "operating" financial results, you don't get a valid comparison of relative economic efficiency. Rather, the comparison is biased against the long distance service, because of the difference in the treatment of infrastructure costs.
Again, I agree with you it was not a conspiracy. It was sound business practice. I read the article some time ago and it does not disagree with what I posted.
GM developed the buses that could replace streetcars. Not in 1950 but in 1934, the 1934 Model Yellow coach with rear engine and efficient peter-witt style passenger flow. Then the economics where buses could compete with streetcars on a cost basis when diesel power replaced gas with greater fuel efficiency and far less maintenance. But again, this was a GM development. And this grew out of diesel development, just like the FT freight locomotives. So, yes, GM was largely responsible for replacement of electric railways (and many of the streetcar lines replaced were almost entirely on private right of way, Sparows POint in Baltimore, Cabin John in Washington, Columbia Road in Boston. Hodimont in St. Louis, the trolley elevated served by a number of lines in Hoboekn and Jersey City, just to name a few..
The modern streetcar system in Toronton is mostly streetcar. Sharing space with autos and general traffic. There is a trend, Spadina, Harborfront to put new lines mostly on PRW, but King and Queen and Carlton are heavy lines running in street traffic. St. Clair has moved to transit only lanes, used only by the streetcar line there and by the buses that share the street for some distance.
The economics of light rail and streetcar are similar. Very heavy lines, those carrying more than 20,000 passengers a day, are still, even now, more economically operated by streetcars or light rail where land is available, then by buses.
Of course neither bus nor streetcar/light rail transit is self-supporting from the fairbox. Which is one reason the Minneapolis and Providence abandonments took place. If the two lawyer types (and both did spend time in jail, not sure of the reasons and I do not claim conversion from streetcars to buses was the reason in either case) had tried to sell the invested value of streetcars/trolleybuses, some quite modern, to the cities to have them run a subsidized transit system, they probably would never have recovered their investments when they bought the systems from the public service minded managements through stock purchases. Instead, now they realized quick profits from the sale of scrap, of copper wire, with the good PCC's and modern trolleybuses sold to other transit systems (Boston bought Providence's modern TT's), then raise operating costs by leasing the busses from GM and upping the operating costs. but really intending to exit the business.
In Providence much of the service was provided for a while by older Pullman trolleybuses converted to diesel buses by Leyland pancake engines under the floor. They were hard to drive, interiors were full of diesel fumes. Even with leasing, not enough of the new DM's were available soon enough.
Sreetcars are still a valuable and useful form of transit, even when not light rail. The reaction of an American motorist: "Get that lumbaring slowpoke out of my way"
Has it answer by the Toronto motorist.
Great job, streetcar, without your help I would have 45 other automobiles competing for my street space.
LIght Rail is just the Politically Correct name for TROLLEY CAR OR STREETCAR
Well, let me briefly respond to this, since I want to actually go to bed tonight.
1. We need to distinguish between "streetcars" and "light rail" (a distinction usually not made by those who believe in the GM conspiracy). While the vehicles might look the same, the service is very much different. "Streetcars" are vehicles that share the street with other street vehicles and have to fight through the traffic, just like other street vehicles. The difference is that, unlike other street vehicles, streetcars operate on railroad tracks most of which are buried in the street, while other vehicles drive on the pavement. "Light rail", in contrast, is a form of rapid transit service, where the rail vehicles operate mostly on exclusive rights of way (typically, even when they operate in streets, they operate in reserved lanes).
2. With respect to streetcars, once buses were developed which were large enough to handle the number of passengers a streetcar could handle (which occurred around 1950), it is difficult to see what advantage a transit company could see in retaining streetcars. The railroad in the street (and the overhead wire) imposed large, continuing costs on the enterprise which could be avoided by conversion. These included maintenance of the tracks (as I recall, the Chicago Surface Lines had a force of 100 employees who did nothing else), and periodic track renewal (The track structure had a life of 30-35 years. Since most streetcar lines had last been renewed in the 1920's. by the 1950's they were coming up on another renewal cycle). Any railroader will tell you that tracks in pavement, such as at grade crossings, are some of the most difficult tracks to maintain and renew. A streetcar system involved many miles of tracks in pavement, not just short distances at grade crossings. Beyond the direct track costs, most streetcar operators were responsible for street paving in the track area, which could be a quarter to a half ot the surface area of the street - expenditures which didn't benefit the transit company at all but benefitted competing transport modes). Thye also had to pay taxes on all of this infrastructure (the track and overhead were typically treated the same way as a factory for property tax purposes). If the transit company had streetcar tracks on a bridge that required renewal, they were typically subject to a hefty assessment for this as well. Even if streetcars had "operating cost" advantages by the 1950's (doubtful), they would be more than offset by the infrastructure related costs of a streetcar system. Then, add to all of this the opposition of many cities (like NYC) to the continued presence of tracks in the street, and the refusal of some cities to renew franchises unless the transit operator committed to conversion .
Transit companies were in the business of moving people, not operating a particular kind of vehicle, and they would naturally select the type of vehicle that could do the job at hand for the least total cost (after all, they had switched vehicles before in the mass extinction of cable car lines in the last decade of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th). Since the tracks in the street didn't give the transit company any particular operating advantages after the development of large buses (in fact, the tracks were a disadvantage, since an entire line could be tied up by a single double parked car), there was no reason to retain rail bound vehicles once the service could be handled by vehicles that drove on the streets. At most, a transit company might decide to delay conversion until the streetcar system required significant investment, or might retain some lines with rapid transit characteristics (like lines that operated through subways). Put aside your love of streetcars (I'm actually a big streetcar fan, and I spend many weekends operating them at a railroad museum) and your dislike of GM or automobiles, and think like a businessman rather than a railfan. To a transit company in the 1950's, conversion of streetcars to buses is a no brainer. The same is true of puble transit agencies which, at the time, were financed primarily from the farebox. The only real issue is whether to do it all at once or to do it over time as the streetcar system required additional investment. As you say, no conspiracy - just economics.
3. Light rail is different. Modern light rail systems supply a service which is superior to buses operating on city streets (although some light rail systems are a lot better at this than others). And, some of the electric rail systems that were convereted in the late 1940's and 1950's had similarities to modern light rail systems (like some of the PE lines). The question here isn't whether light rail (either the old or new versions) is superior to buses on city streets, but whether these systems could be supported from farebox revenues (the only revenues available to a transit operator before transit subsides became available in the late 1960's). The answer is clearly "no", a conclusion which the Southern Pacific (which owned the PE system) appears to have reached in the 1930's when it stopped investing in PE. In fact, modern light rail systems, for all of their glitz and glamor, are big money losers. I'm not aware of any light rail operations that can even cover their operating costs from the farebox, let alone their very substantial construction costs. Now, the usual argument in favor of these systems is that they have collateral benefits beyond farebox revenues. That may well be, but a transit operator in the 1950's wouldn't have seen any of these beneifits in its farebox, which was its only source of revenue. Since private companies aren't charities, they would convert or simply sell off or discontinue their transit operations. Conspiracy proponents like to focus on the PE (which, by the way, was never controlled by National City Lines, the supposed puppet of GM in the conspiracy theory). But look east to another property that furnished a superb level of transit service, much better than PE - the North Shore Line in Chicago. There's never been a suggestion that this company had any ties to NCL or GM. But it couldn't survive either. Moreover, this company simply shut its rail system down in 1963, without any bus conversion. Again, no conspiracy - just economics.
3. There is absolutely nothing wrong with GM promoting its products, whether by sales pitches to transit companies or by lobbying cities that its buses were better than streetcars. Companies do this all the time. What do you think electric streetcar promoters like Frank Sprague were doing in the late 1880's and 1890's, or cable car promoters were doing a decade earlier? What do you think Brill did when it tried to persuade a transit company to buy its streetcars over those produced by Cincinnati Car? Streetcars had no divine right to be exempt from the normal workings of the marketplace, particularly when they were operated by private companies.
If you haven't yet done so, I suggest you read the article I mentioned in my earlier post. It's very carefully researched (in contrast to the original conspiracy theory) and approaches the subject from an economics/business point of view that railfans usually don't see.
Yet despite all the "evidence" the fact is that it was largely GMC that put the streetcars out of business. Her is how:
1. Politicking to get a law passed that money collected from state and federal highway taxes of any sort could only be used for highway purposes. This meant that one of the largest USA industries, highway transportation, did not pay real estate taxes on 95% of the property it used. This gave personal auto passenger transportation and truck freight transportation a big boost compared to competition.
This law was overturned by new legislation, needed so the funds orginally intended for a 2nd Ben Franklin Bridge, but very very inadequate for that job, could be used instead for the Camden - Lindewald Rapid Transit (for which the money was sufficient), which has made the 2nd Bridge unnecessaruy by turning auto commuters into transit commuters. The very first "crack in the concrete."
2. Developed the first practical transit bus that could really compete with the streetcar. The 1934 Yellow Coach.
3. Developed the first practical diesel transit bus in 1952. The standee-window WWII diesel, first used on military basis and then the basis for most streetcar conversions and replacement of worn out older buses after WWII.
4. Occaisonal political influence as Canal Street New Orleans.
5. Made it possible for a transit system owner to realize quick profits by selling streetcar track and copper wire scrap as income, and then leasing instead of buying buses with the leasing costs as operating expenses to justify fare increases or going out of business and dumping the whole shebang on the municipality. Twin Cities efficient streetcars and Providence's excellent trackless network followed this course.
An auto based economy is not essential to a high standard of living. The Swiss in particular use mostly public transit and rail intercity transportation and have as high or possibly higher a standard of living than the USA. Sparcely settled areas (none left for the last 20 years) were taken care of by the Postal Bus.
From economics alone, really heavy streetcar lines that were not replaced by subways or other rapid transit should have remained streetcar operated. Woodward Avenue in Detroit. Flatbush Avenue in Brooklyn, and the Long Beach interurban in LA should never have been abandoned. If you check the operating costs per passenger mile on the various website, beginning with APTA, you will find rail running 1/2 - 2/3 of bus, will all operating costs considered. That is one reason why conventional streetcar lines not replaced by subways have been kept and will continue to run in Toronto.
Sound business practice. Not a conspiracy!
See the following link for a really good article on the GM "streetcar conspiracy".
http://www.lava.net/cslater/TQOrigin.pdf
You confirmed my statement that the only "conspiracy" was not really a conspiracy but an open (but non-legal) agreement to buy from only one manufacturer. It is more than a matter of generalities. New Orleans did want to get rid of most of its streetcar for he usual reasons that you have stated (most were converted before the law mandating two-man operation was repealed, and New Orleans never ran single-truck Birney Safety cars), but did want to keep both Canal and St. Charles, especially after conversion to one-man. GM told them they would not locate a new plant in Louisiana if the Canal Line was kept. It wasn't a matter of cash but of prestige. And NOPSI nuckled under with the agreement that St. Charles would be kepot.
In New York City, Third Avenue Railway management did want to keep certain heavy streetcar lines which could still (some even with conduit) be operated more profitably with streetcars than with buses. The city forced the conversion. The anti-trolley impetus was so great that even Nortons Point, which could have been operated as a light line with the track connection to the rapid transit system for maintenanc kept at its elevated Stillwell Avenu terminal, was abandoned. A 100% PRW line with no street running whatsover. frequent service, and a feeder to four subway lines at the elevated Stillwell terminal.
Roy Chalk wanted to keep the remaining DC streetcar lines and said so. A Congressinal vote forced the change. Remember that Washington built a new conduit line to serve some government establishment in 1942 and built new conduit trackage for the DuPont Circle underpass, plus a pair of new underground stations, after WWII, I think even after the Benning LIne was abandoned.
I was told that Ballbaugh had gone to the railroads for funding but was turned down, and then went to GM. This is not direct information, however. There was a professor in the EE Department that tried to fight for a place for railroads in the curriculum, but didn't get anywhere. He also tried to preserve Old Colony New Haven commuter service and didn't get anywhere. He was active in the conversion of the Highland Branch to a branch of the Green Line light rail system however. His name was Professor Tucker, just occured to me.
I think everyone knows that if the USA had not gone overboard on the motorcar solving all personal ground transportation problems, the world would be a safer place today.
With respect to the "GM conspiracy", no less an authority than George Hilton himself testified before Congress that it was all hogwash. It's more a product of the hostility to GM in the 1973 oil crisis than anything that actually happened.
I could write a lot about this subject becuase I've looked into some of the original sources, not just what people with political agendas have written about it. I don't want to get into a lot of detail here, but let me make a few points:
(1) The factual basis of the "conspiracy theory" is that GM and several other companies provided capital to a transit holding company called National City Lines in the form of purchases of preferred stock. This is a financing device wihich in no way gives the preferred stockholders any "control" of the company -it simply gave them a right to be paid dividends before any dividends are paid to the common stockholers. As part of the deal, NCL agreed to buy all of its supplies from the companies that had bought its preferred stock (in other words, if NCL bought busses, it would buy them from GM, if it bought tires, it would buy them from Firestone, etc). At no time was NCL controlled by GM or any of the the suppliers involved in this arrangement. In fact, it was NCL which cooked up this arrangement and marketed it to its suppliers. I would point out that it is not at all unnusual for a supplier to provide financial support to its customers. That's exactly what Sam Insull did when he purchased and supplied capital to various interurban properties, including the North Shore and the South Shore. Insull was not a traction tycoon - he was an electric utilities man (the Henry Ford of the electric utilities industry). His primary interest in traction companies was because, at the time, they were some of the largest users of the electric power his utilities were producing, and he believed he could keep them viable with additional capital investment. I haven't seen any railfans claim that this was some kind of nefarious"conspiracy" by the Insull companies.
(2) NCL certainly had a strategy of converting most of its streetcar properties to busses. But the "conspiracy theory" isn't that NCL converted, but that the conversions would not have ocurred but for the nefarious conspiracy with GM et. al.. In other words, the conversions didn't make sense from a transportation standpoint, and were done only to sell busses and bus products, This, in turn, is said to be the reason why streetcars pretty much disappeared from the urban transportaion scheme across the country. Now I could get into a big discussion of why it would be stupid economics to convert a viable streetcar company into a less viable bus company just to sell busses and bus products, but there's a simpler answer. NCL didn't control anything close to the entire transit industry. If the "conspiracy theory" were true, the NCL properties would have converted, but the non-NCL properties would not have (because, according to the conspiracy theory, streetcars were superior). But that isn't what happened - the non-NCL companies converted too. Further, as you get into the 1950's, many of the conversions were made by public authorities. Foir example, the huge Chicago system was converted by the Chicago Transit Authority, a public agency having no NCL or GM affiliation, and they did so largely without buying GM products. Other big non-NCL cities in the midwest that converted included Milwaukee (which appears to have decided to start phasing out its streetcar system in the 1930's), Kansas City, Twin Cities and many others. While some U.S. cities kept a few streetcar lines (usually lines that operated in subways or private rights of way which gave them and advantage over street bound traffic), no city kept the comprehensive streetcar systems they had in the early 20th century.
(3) The universal pattern of streetcar conversions shows that something fundamental was sweeping the entire industry, and it's not difficult to see what it was. Streetcars require extensive infrastructure and investment, in the form of the trackage embedded in the streets which is expensive to construct, and expensive to maintain. That cames with it other requirements which were also expensive, like franchise requirements to pave the street in the track area, taxes based on the value of the investment represented by the track structure, etc. Some cities also required streetcars to operate with two person crews, but imposed no similar requiredment as to busses. And, by the 1930's, many cities simply wanted to get rid of the tracks in the street and refused to renew franchises unless the transit companies agreed to do so. At one time, it was necessary to have these facilities in order to provide public transportation on city streets because there wasn't any viable alternative. But, once busses proved practical, why should transit companies continue to bear these expenses for the privilege of running street vehicles on railroad tracks embedded in the street when they could avoid all of these expenses by converting to busses that simply drive on the pavement and have other street users pay most of the infrastructure cost? And there was a lot of pressure to cut costs, because most transit companies experienced very significant losses of passengers in the 1930's and the 1950's. The economic case for conversion was overwhelming, as shown by the fact that everyone converted. It's not fundmentally different than what happened when electric streetcars proved superior to cable cars in the late 19th century - a mass conversion. Transit companies weren't in the business of running streetcars. They were in the business of moving people, and they would embrace whatever technology they believed could do the best job at the lowest cost. By the 1930's, the bus was clearly superior in small and medium size cities (many of which had been running Birney streetcars, the best advertisement for busses there ever was). By the 1950's, the bus was superior in big cites as well. Result - mass conversion.
(4) Part of the conspiracy theory is that GM and the other conspirators were eventually convicted of their complicity in the streetcar conversion scheme, but by then the damage had been done, and they ended up paying only a small fine. Based on your note, I think you recognize that this is untrue, but let me elaborate. There was an antitrust case involving the relationship between NCL and its suppliers (including GM), but it had absolutely NOTHING to do with a supposed conspiracy to convert streetcar systems to busses. It had to do with "exclusive dealing", a practice covered by the Clayton Antitrust Act. Specifically, it involved the legality of the arrangement where NCL agreed to buy bus and bus related supplies only from the companies that had bought its preferred stock, which the court found to be illegal.
Finally, with respect to your suggestion that Professor Ballsbaugh's comment about the future of U.S. railroads had something to do with GM's funding of his department, I would simply say that his observation would have been appropriate at that time - the future didn't look so good for railroads in 1952. Futher, to the extent he saw no future for rail electrification in the U.S., he was correct, as shown by the fact that most of the then existing electrifications were subsequently discontinued. It's only in recent years that any significant electrifications have occurred.
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I had the Hilton interurban book and it is terrific. I hope to have it again some day, with the other two you mention.
It is wrong to it was not a GM issue at all. You are only partly right. GM did buy NY Railways in 1926 with the express intention of converting to bus as soon as a decent model could be developed, and it took them eight years. GM did threaten cajole, and use influence in some cases, including New Orleans with reference to the Canal Street abandonment only. The consipracy where they paid a meaningless small fine had more to do with their partly owned properties buying only GM buses and freezing Ford and White and Mack out of the business and not concerning streetcar conversion.
In 1952, MIT Professor Ballsbaugh, who taught transportation planning, said:
David, railroads have no future in the United States. If you want to be a railway electrification engineer, go to France and become a Frenchman. Exact quote. GM Funded the department at that time.
Unfortunately, I recently moved, and my copy of the Hilton cable car book has not yet emerged from the debris. Hopefully it will soon. Otherwise, I'll replace it, because it's really quite good. Aside from having maps, histories and pictures of all of the U.S. cable operations, it also has an extensive discussion of the technology and economics of these systems. A monumental work on an obscure topic. Hilton's book on narrow gauge railroads is of similar quality, and the book he did with John Due on interurban railroads is the seminal work on the subject.
Without the book, I can't give a complete answer to your question. However, I recall that one of the major routes was on Pennsylvania Avenue, and the power house for it was roughly on the site of the current Commerce Deparment building. The destruction of the power house by fire was an immediate cause for conversion to electric operations.
It was pretty common for cities to want to get streetcar tracks out of the street, particularly in the post WWII period. even if the streetcar company didn't want to convert. New York City, for example, was particularly hostile to streetcars once busses proved viable There were also plenty of examples in the 1930's. It''s not a "GM issue" at all. I could make some comments about the so-called "GM conspiracy" myth as well, which I've researched, but I'll control myself.
Sorry for the error. Where did they run? Capitol Transit was a merger of two systems. Did both have ex-cable lines or only one? And how did both systems adopt the exact same conduit configuration, so they could where necessary share tracks?
daveklepper Washington, DC, never operated cable cars. However, some similar conduit in NYC was converted from cable conduit, including 3rd Avenue's streetcar line.
Washington, DC, never operated cable cars. However, some similar conduit in NYC was converted from cable conduit, including 3rd Avenue's streetcar line.
Still, the record shows that Roy Chalk, whose Carribean Airlines then owned Capitol Tranist, did want to retain the streetcar lines that were still operating. The lines thought to have had conduit needing replacement were already agandoned, and nearly all the track and cars were in good shape. Congress required the covnersion to buses, and given the high quality of real service provided by the then all-PCC fleet, one must presume some heavy handed lobbying by outside interests, and not necesarily GM.
To answer Dave Klepper's question Wisconsin Avenue was the main drag between Georgetown and Friendship Heights on the DC line. Wisconsin Avenue continued on further into Montgomery County to Bethesda where it changed to Rockville Pike north of the Beltway.
As far as streetcar service on Wisconsin Avenue went the Route 30 Line ran from Barney Circle (17th and Pennsylvania Avenue SE) to Friendship Heights. The power collection was by center conduit from Barney Circle through downtown Washington to Wisconsin Avenue to just north of P street where it was changed to overhead wire for the rest of the trip to Friendship Heights. The Route 20 line (Union Station-Glen Echo-Cabin John) shared Wisconsin Avenue with the Route 30 to P street where it turned west to head for Cabin John. Up through the mid 1930's Capital Transit ran a line from up Wisconsin Avenue fromGeorgetown through Friendship Heights to Rockville. I am not sure where the line ran once it left Friendship Heights.
After WWII the Capital Transit Company's streetcar lines were mostly all PCC, but one of the things that did street cars in in Washington, DC was the requirement for the center slot third rail power collection system which was expensive to operate and maintain.
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