Dakguy201 wrote: I'd love for Buffet to invest in whatever stock I happened to be holding. When he made the public filing he had acquired 10% of BNSF the stock was around $85. It closed last night just under $92. Other railroads have also increased, it is just possible he has dragged the whole industry up.Also it would be nice to know that someone I regard as a whole lot smarter at investing than I am is investing where I am.
I'd love for Buffet to invest in whatever stock I happened to be holding. When he made the public filing he had acquired 10% of BNSF the stock was around $85. It closed last night just under $92. Other railroads have also increased, it is just possible he has dragged the whole industry up.
Also it would be nice to know that someone I regard as a whole lot smarter at investing than I am is investing where I am.
Warren Buffett is at the point where he can make money simply by announcing what he has invested in. Russell Sage used to do that with railroads ....
Berkshire Hathaway Cash and Cash Equivalents
[Millions]
2006 $37,9772005 $40,4712004 $40,0202003 $31,2622002 $10,2942001 $5,3132000 $5,2631999 $3,8351998 $13,5821997 $1,0021996 $1,3391995 $2,703
Limitedclear wrote: futuremodal wrote: Hey, isn't this the guy who gave a sizable charitable donation amounting to billions...........to Bill Friggin' Gates?!Maybe this buying of BNI on the high side is a sign of senility.A senile Warren Buffet is still 3x10,000,000 smarter and wiser than you FM so why not keep the personal attacks to a minimum...And BTW the charitable contribution was to the Gates Foundation, not Bill personally...But then again, precision was never your thing. As I recall Bill Gates is also a major shareholder in the strike ridden CN. Does that make him senile too??? A couple of senile Billionaires, darn...we should all be so challenged...FOFLMAO...LC
futuremodal wrote: Hey, isn't this the guy who gave a sizable charitable donation amounting to billions...........to Bill Friggin' Gates?!Maybe this buying of BNI on the high side is a sign of senility.
Hey, isn't this the guy who gave a sizable charitable donation amounting to billions...........to Bill Friggin' Gates?!
Maybe this buying of BNI on the high side is a sign of senility.
A senile Warren Buffet is still 3x10,000,000 smarter and wiser than you FM so why not keep the personal attacks to a minimum...
And BTW the charitable contribution was to the Gates Foundation, not Bill personally...
But then again, precision was never your thing. As I recall Bill Gates is also a major shareholder in the strike ridden CN. Does that make him senile too??? A couple of senile Billionaires, darn...we should all be so challenged...FOFLMAO...
LC
"We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo Possum "We have met the anemone... and he is Russ." Bucky Katt "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." Niels Bohr, Nobel laureate in physics
greyhounds wrote: MichaelSol wrote: The "railroader" who believed that deregulation would allow the railroad to raise rates? Then wondered why rates fell?Well, actually as a guy who did railroad pricing before and after dereg, we knew the problem was that we couldn't lower the rates to compete with the trucks and barges, not that we couldn't raise them. The asinie government regulators kept rail rates high and diverted freight off the railroads. See "In the Matter of Container Service" by your Federal Government in 1931Then we have... MichaelSol wrote: Naturally, there happened to be a good statistical reason why the PCE was very profitable at 9 trains per day compared to its busier peers. It happened to be operating at a strategic optimum.Oh sure, they ripped a profitable railroad out of the ground. They do that every day. Everybody is stupid.Look, there is fantasy baseball and there is fantasy football. Michael plays fantasy railroading. OK by me. Just don't take it seriously.
MichaelSol wrote: The "railroader" who believed that deregulation would allow the railroad to raise rates? Then wondered why rates fell?
The "railroader" who believed that deregulation would allow the railroad to raise rates? Then wondered why rates fell?
Well, actually as a guy who did railroad pricing before and after dereg, we knew the problem was that we couldn't lower the rates to compete with the trucks and barges, not that we couldn't raise them. The asinie government regulators kept rail rates high and diverted freight off the railroads. See "In the Matter of Container Service" by your Federal Government in 1931
Then we have...
MichaelSol wrote: Naturally, there happened to be a good statistical reason why the PCE was very profitable at 9 trains per day compared to its busier peers. It happened to be operating at a strategic optimum.
Naturally, there happened to be a good statistical reason why the PCE was very profitable at 9 trains per day compared to its busier peers. It happened to be operating at a strategic optimum.
Oh sure, they ripped a profitable railroad out of the ground. They do that every day. Everybody is stupid.
Look, there is fantasy baseball and there is fantasy football. Michael plays fantasy railroading. OK by me. Just don't take it seriously.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Michael:A reduction in capital expenditures will not seriously reduce the net income, as capex's are by nature capitalized and the depreciated over the life of the asset or the time allowed by the IRS.
However, it has a very large impact on free cash flow, which measures the actual cash generated by a business over the time period and the amount invested (which would include capex). A reduction in capex for a year will heavily impact FCF in that time, preserving cash or keeping a company from borrowing.
And as we all know...cash is king.
ed
The gentleman has no figures, no facts, but he has an ideology. He will stick with it.
Here are the studies that showed profitability:
Milwaukee Planning Staff, 1978. Fred Simpson.
Strategic Planning Studies, May, 1979. Booz Allen Hamiton.
Application to Abandon, August, 1979, Trustee, Stanley Hillman.
Lines West Study, Office of Rail Public Counsel, ICC, 1979, Henri Rush. (current General Counsel, STB).
Opinion, Interstate Commerce Commission, 1980. Darius Gaskins, Chmn.
He never has, and he can't, offer a single study, a single number, a single coherent argument in favor of his favorite troll hobby: railroad trashing.
Just don't take it seriously.
But, if you are remotely inclined to, ask him first; where's his data?
Just ask him.
Please ask him.
You won't get an answer.
He doesn't have one.
Trolls never do.
greyhounds wrote: MichaelSol wrote: The "railroader" who believed that deregulation would allow the railroad to raise rates? Then wondered why rates fell?Well, actually as a guy who did railroad pricing before and after dereg, we knew the problem was that we couldn't lower the rates to compete with the trucks and barges, not that we couldn't raise them. The asinie government regulators kept rail rates high and diverted freight off the railroads.
Well, actually as a guy who did railroad pricing before and after dereg, we knew the problem was that we couldn't lower the rates to compete with the trucks and barges, not that we couldn't raise them. The asinie government regulators kept rail rates high and diverted freight off the railroads.
False. Utterly. The argument was that deregulation would "finally" allow railroads to raise rates to where they should be. Former ICC Chairman Darius Gaskins, former BN President Darius Gaskins, comments on this huge miscalculation, "boy, did we get it wrong."
Naturally, of course, a railroad president wouldn't know what he was talking about, even he was previously an economist who advocated deregulation, and a government regulator who was accused of keeping rates too low ...
As opposed to this character who was, charitably, none of the above ...
MP173 wrote: BTW, a reduction in capex would not significantly affect the net income as most of those expenses would be depreciated over a long period of time. Correct?
BTW, a reduction in capex would not significantly affect the net income as most of those expenses would be depreciated over a long period of time. Correct?
Ed, I agree with you most of the time, but I just can't keep up with your changes between free cash flow, and then a net income argument based on depreciation. I mean, it is yes and it is no, but one is different than the other.
diningcar wrote: Being new to this site I am under the impression that we have theorists who may be educators, students or of some other discipline but have little 'real world experience' in the RR business who are weighing in on this issue of what is a good business plan for a RR over the long haul.
Being new to this site I am under the impression that we have theorists who may be educators, students or of some other discipline but have little 'real world experience' in the RR business who are weighing in on this issue of what is a good business plan for a RR over the long haul.
Depends. Who are you judging and how are you judging it?
From years of experience?
As a railroader? What kind? Surveyor? Engineer? Brakeman? VP Finance? Conductor?
As an economist?
As an investor?
Perhaps as a "Warren Buffett" who has no "real world experience" in railroading? Dumb as a box of rocks, right? Never turned a wheel, right? Doesn't know a d*** thing, right?
Perhaps as a "Kent Healy" who taught generations of "real railroaders" while being an academic?
Perhaps as an "Alfred Kahn" who literally defined "deregulation" and now insists, "this isn't it".
Perhaps as a Matt Rose, a trucker, who made it work, when a railroader, Rob Krebs, fell on his face?
Perhaps as a George Bush, who said that tax cuts and deregulation and globalization would spur growth for everyone? But, since he's not a "railroader", nothing that occured as a result of his economic polcies really happened?
Who do you think is a theorist, and why do you think the label outweighs looking at the facts?
RE: Fuel surcharges; BNSF is the one RR that is close to if not in agreement with what is being proposed by STB.
To the extent I am mistaken, perhaps completely, please advise. But it seems to me that BNSF has been getting it right and probably is not that concerned with peaks and vallys in the economy which happen, of course, but are not predicitable. They see the long view.
bakupolo:You are dead on correct. If capex returns to normal levels, the buybacks will continue at a higher pace and eps will increase with reduced number of shares.
BNSF is in a good place right now.
One thing that bothers me a bit...fuel surcharge revenue. STB has indicated no more tricks with those charges. Just wondering how much of the high revenues and earnings for the rails were due to fuel surcharge? Being in the transportation industry years ago, we certainly used it to pad the revenue.
MP173 wrote: Finally, I dont see how a decrease in volume will lead to an increase in earnings per share or more importantly in free cash flow, unless capex is curtailed in the cash flow picture.Where do you see the next wave of investment? If there is none of significance, just think of all of that extra cash. Can you spell "stock buyback program". ed
Finally, I dont see how a decrease in volume will lead to an increase in earnings per share or more importantly in free cash flow, unless capex is curtailed in the cash flow picture.
Where do you see the next wave of investment? If there is none of significance, just think of all of that extra cash. Can you spell "stock buyback program". ed
Hmmm, maybe you answered your own question. After a buyback the "decrease in volume" (of outstanding common shares) will increase earnings per share.
Just joking :-)
But...wouldnt that be the time to maintain capex...when the "machine isnt running full bore"? From an operations standpoint it would, financially perhaps not, but at least you would get ready for the next big business cycle.
MP173 wrote: Finally, I dont see how a decrease in volume will lead to an increase in earnings per share or more importantly in free cash flow, unless capex is curtailed in the cash flow picture.
Well, I think that is inherently part of the picture -- all the way across the board, equipment, physical plant, maintenance requirements -- everything climbs down substantially when the machine isn't being run full bore ....
This is a good discussion. I hope the fleeting mention of the PCE doesnt turn it into a free for all.
Regarding his holdings of considerable cash a few years ago, I cannot comment at this time without looking at the annuals and I will attempt to do that later. However, I do know he WILL not invest cash just to be fully loaded if companies do not meet his threshold.
Also, the statement was made on making $$ on capital appreciation of equites, not exactly correct. About the time we are discussing he made a large investment in so called junk bonds (which are rated below a certain level by the ratings services). It was classic Buffett as he identified outstanding value at low prices and made a killing.
I also seem to recall he purchased considerable amount of treasuries several years ago but might be wrong on that.
BTW...what will BNSF do once the Transcon line is up and running as a 2MT? Where do you see the next wave of investment? If there is none of significance, just think of all of that extra cash. Can you spell "stock buyback program". For 2006 BNSF purchased over $730 million in stock. That is in addition to the nearly $2.1billion in capex. I dont know what a "normal" capex would be but it seems that once the Transcon line is upgraded there will be a significant reduction in capex.
How interesting. If Buffet bought 39 mil shares, the BNSF is a cash cow, has the moat and a good business model. And regardless of current share price, it's undervalued! If Buffet doesn't like the management he can for sure get a couple of his own people on the board. As a matter of fact he could probably get all the institutional investors behind him and replace all the directors.
AT first I thought maybe a UP/BNSF merger but that couldn't possibly get past the Sherman act.
Alright I hope I'm not too unpopular for this, remember I'm a realist first and a railfan (a close) second:
Railroads currently are working on a system far more robust and logical than the one of 30 years ago. It used to be that when the economy boomed, railroads did too, and likewise the opposite, however after the 1950s several railroads were far less healthy than they let on, Pennsy and Rock Island come to mind here. The problem created by too many railroads that were too small shaped the entire sector until the turn of the century.
Remember Penn Central, when your profits are only paper and your opperating costs are skyrocketing, you are very very likely headed for a catastrophic failure.
The mega-mergers that resulted in our current UP, BNSF, KCSdeM, CP, CN, CSX & NS national railroad market saved the industry, and the United States. The system finally has reached the point where through strong leadership, prudent investment in the physical plant and thoughtful planning, every single Class 1 can be profitable, period. There really are not entire railroads whose entire existance is a mistake (such as Rock Island) anymore, at least not among the major players. The sector is strong, even in our economy with is becoming increasingly shakey due to the downturn in the real estate market.
Buffet is a smart man, no questions asked and I think he knows a good long term prospect for growth when he and his advisors see it. Also in owning a decient chunk of the BNSF, and with his name recognition influencing other shareholders, he's going to be a force whenever there are shareholder votes. It seems that since equilibrium has finally begun to become a reality within the railroad industry, the talks of more mega mergers is trailing off, but I wonder how long that is going to last. My bet is at least a good few years if not longer.
Cheers!
~METRO
Murphy Siding wrote: Michael-thank you for the clarification. Could you expand on the idea of why railroads should become more profitable with a downturn please?
The standard railroad marginal cost curve -- and it is a curve -- begins to rise on a single track mainline at about 16 trains per day. Train order, ABS, CTC, doesn't make much difference. Above that, friction in the form of increased meets begins to increase the marginal cost of handling each carload. Bob Fryml explains that very well above. Double track, triple track, the cost curve is in a different spot, but the nature of the curve doesn't change. The more congestion, the more it costs to handle a carload of freight. There is an optimal number of trains on a single track mainline, at which the combination of fixed costs, operating costs, financing costs, etc, yields the most profitable situation for a single track line, and it is a surprisingly low number of trains. The area of maximum profitability on the cost curve for a single track mainline is between 7 and 16 trains. Then costs start to go up and profitability declines.
As we discussed earlier on the thread, once past that optimum, profit still increases, but marginal costs increase still faster and that is why profitability declines.
Currently, in my view, the railroads are earning the least profit on their most competitive corridors -- where the marginal costs of operation are the highest; not to mention the intermodal freight there is expensive freight because it involves more handling, more need for the most expensive facilities in high cost waterfront areas. And it returns the lowest yields, while creating the circumstances for the highest possible marginal cost of operation for all freight that has to move on the same corridors.
Is Buffett betting on a downturn? Well, I think he has to be.
What might he expect happens in a downturn? Imports drop? That would have to be the single biggest effect on railroads. If import and export intermodal declines appreciably, that automatically takes low revenue stuff out of the financial picture, lowers the cost of operation for carrying remaining freight, and as traffic in general might decline, and congestion eases substantially, railroad profitability increases for all those reasons -- including eliminating the need for vast further expenditures to carry low profit freight.
If, and it is a big "if", he is looking at it that way, it may be because he sees railroads as being one of the few investments that might benefit from a downturn, his cash position clearly suggests that he thinks one must be coming, and given the average number of months that expansions have historically lasted over the past century, this particular expansion should be running out of steam pretty soon.
And I don't think Buffett would be making a big play right now if he thought railroads were going to be hurt in a downturn. And I am sure he is aware that railroads are generally hurt the worst in a downturn, but that something will make this one different.
MichaelSol wrote: ...... that I do believe he has a reason for this particular purchase, and I do think it is a strategy to buffer the effects of a downturn on his stock portfolio as railroads should become more profitable with a downturn. That would be an historical anomaly, but I happen to think it will happen, or at least it could happen, and it makes sense to me that he might see that as well.
...... that I do believe he has a reason for this particular purchase, and I do think it is a strategy to buffer the effects of a downturn on his stock portfolio as railroads should become more profitable with a downturn. That would be an historical anomaly, but I happen to think it will happen, or at least it could happen, and it makes sense to me that he might see that as well.
Limitedclear wrote: That was Berkshire Partners of Boston, not Berkshire Hathaway of Omaha (Buffett). Two completely different companies. LC
That was Berkshire Partners of Boston, not Berkshire Hathaway of Omaha (Buffett). Two completely different companies.
Ohhh
Thanks
Murphy Siding wrote:I'm confused. You make it sound as if you think Buffet is doing this because he doesn't know what he's doing?
I don't make it sound anything. It is a recitation of a series of events. If you believe, for instance, that Coca Cola was a good play over the period of time that Pepsico surpassed it, and Buffett finally resigned from the Coke Board, well, I don't know how that sounds, but that is what happened. That he went to a huge cash position over three years ago, just as the stock market began a historic run-up, well, doesn't he make his money from stock appreciation, not keeping money in the bank? That his current very large cash position signals a belief that the economy is headed for a downturn? I don't know what that sounds like either just because I happen to say that he did it.
I mean, he did it. How is it supposed to sound?
And I don't mean this to sound as sarcastic as it probably appears in print, but this just strikes me as an odd question.
What am I supposed to say about Buffett?
I did say, above, that I do believe he has a reason for this particular purchase, and I do think it is a strategy to buffer the effects of a downturn on his stock portfolio as railroads should become more profitable with a downturn. That would be an historical anomaly, but I happen to think it will happen, or at least it could happen, and it makes sense to me that he might see that as well.
But I also caution that there is a well-developed record of Buffett's investment strategies and they don't always work out quite to perfection; he is usually the first to say so. Indeed, the cash position over this past three years is contrary to his own textbook approach which only confirms to me that even the best, in the stock game, sometimes misjudge the market. The huge cash position over the past three years tells me he did because during a similar market run-up ten years ago, he was in up the hilt because that is where you want to be when the market runs.
What I did intend to suggest is that the reasons offered by some for his purchase don't make any particular sense because the identical conditions existed five years ago; all those trends were well into place. My point was that if those gentlemen are correct, then they would be suggesting that Buffett is well nigh clueless if those are the reasons he is getting in at this late date; because they would be suggesting that Buffett is the last guy on the block to figure out, for instance, that BNSF serves West Coast ports -- as an example.
And I don't agree that Buffett is slow, or that he just figured out that that BNSF serves the Powder River Basin.
MichaelSol wrote: Murphy Siding wrote: MichaelSol wrote: I don't think he got where he is by being the last guy on the block to notice the obvious. Something else is driving this. What would you think is driving this?Well, looking at BH's cash position over the last decade, there is an interesting pattern. They seem to have been pretty heavily invested at the time of the dotcom boom, and then began to convert to cash 3-4 years ago. Now, going into cash before the stock market really takes off is not exactly good timing. You miss the appreciation in stock that presumably was the reason you bought stock in the first place. Then, his vaunted position in Coca Cola occurred during a time when Coke began to crumble -- it's historic primacy over Pepsico disintegrated -- Pepsico is now the king of the hill, and Buffett resigned from the Coca Cola board -- one of the few he took an active role in. Good call, bad call?Then, to be sitting on piles and piles of cash for three years or more, while interest rates are at historic lows is also not exactly "textbook" portfolio management; all the while watching good companies throw off cash and stock appreciation right and left.Then to move on railroad stock at a historic high at a point in time when it actually makes sense to move into cash, according to Buffett's own past track record -- well, it all amounts to an interesting spectacle. We are coming to the end of a business cycle. But, we are not there yet. There would be plenty of time and opportunity to buy good railroad stock at lower prices. No need to get in a rush, at this particular point in time. And there was plenty of time to buy this stock earlier -- at far lower prices.That huge cash pile meant Buffett expected something much earlier, and it obviously didn't happen. Oh well, no one cries when they still have $40 billion in the bank. But, he's moving very little into stocks -- the railroad play is a drop in the bucket.
Murphy Siding wrote: MichaelSol wrote: I don't think he got where he is by being the last guy on the block to notice the obvious. Something else is driving this. What would you think is driving this?
MichaelSol wrote: I don't think he got where he is by being the last guy on the block to notice the obvious. Something else is driving this.
I don't think he got where he is by being the last guy on the block to notice the obvious. Something else is driving this.
Well, looking at BH's cash position over the last decade, there is an interesting pattern. They seem to have been pretty heavily invested at the time of the dotcom boom, and then began to convert to cash 3-4 years ago. Now, going into cash before the stock market really takes off is not exactly good timing. You miss the appreciation in stock that presumably was the reason you bought stock in the first place.
Then, his vaunted position in Coca Cola occurred during a time when Coke began to crumble -- it's historic primacy over Pepsico disintegrated -- Pepsico is now the king of the hill, and Buffett resigned from the Coca Cola board -- one of the few he took an active role in. Good call, bad call?
Then, to be sitting on piles and piles of cash for three years or more, while interest rates are at historic lows is also not exactly "textbook" portfolio management; all the while watching good companies throw off cash and stock appreciation right and left.
Then to move on railroad stock at a historic high at a point in time when it actually makes sense to move into cash, according to Buffett's own past track record -- well, it all amounts to an interesting spectacle. We are coming to the end of a business cycle. But, we are not there yet. There would be plenty of time and opportunity to buy good railroad stock at lower prices. No need to get in a rush, at this particular point in time. And there was plenty of time to buy this stock earlier -- at far lower prices.
That huge cash pile meant Buffett expected something much earlier, and it obviously didn't happen. Oh well, no one cries when they still have $40 billion in the bank. But, he's moving very little into stocks -- the railroad play is a drop in the bucket.
I believe that it was to the charitable foundation established by Gates, more than a slight shade of difference there. As mentioned earlier, Buffett has customarily been a long-term investor, and he sees things in that light.
Here is a bit of six degrees of separation trivia.
With the BH purchase, Marsico Capital Management becomes the second largest holder of BNI with 30+ million shares
Marsico was started by Tom Marsico in 1997.
Tom Marsico was previously the Investment Manager for the Janus Fund.
Janus Capital was previously own by Kansas City Southern Industries.
Just a couple of rail fans with money.
Bob-F,
Thank you for analysis that is other than scholastic. It sounds like you may be employable by a railroad.
Bob-Fryml wrote:...but with the opening of the last segments of Chicago - Los Angeles double track corridor, BNSF will begin to enjoy a noticable increase in velocity, with a concomitant increase in locomotive and freight car utilization, and a measurable drop in delayed train expenses due to congestion.....Yes with a business cycle downturn there probably will be some downward pressure on freight rates, but if the BNSF Chicago - L.A., TOFC/COFC-heavy corridor succeeds in producing a better product and their competition - chiefly truck lines - continues to feel the pinch of labor shortages and high fuel costs, I predict the overall lessening of freight rates, if any, will be far less than the historic norms.
....Yes with a business cycle downturn there probably will be some downward pressure on freight rates, but if the BNSF Chicago - L.A., TOFC/COFC-heavy corridor succeeds in producing a better product and their competition - chiefly truck lines - continues to feel the pinch of labor shortages and high fuel costs, I predict the overall lessening of freight rates, if any, will be far less than the historic norms.
And I agree. The point of my earlier post was to the effect that something will happen in the next downturn that hasn't happened before as the rail industry as a whole "decongests" and that will be a reduction in marginal costs, which is what you are saying above. The difference between that reduction occuring as the result of a downturn is that there is no additional investment necessary to make it happen; whereas if and when it happens as a result of new constuction, that adds a cost element.
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