Does anyone know where I can get info/pictures of a wreck that happened in Harvey Illinois around 1980/81 when an Amtrak train collided with a waiting IC freight train. I was on the scene as a Volunteer Fireman and my Father was an Engineer for the IC at the time. I was trying to find info/pictures of the wreck but my searches have come up empty.
Thanks,
tmjmred
tmjmred wrote: Does anyone know where I can get info/pictures of a wreck that happened in Harvey Illinois around 1980/81 when an Amtrak train collided with a waiting IC freight train. I was on the scene as a Volunteer Fireman and my Father was an Engineer for the IC at the time. I was trying to find info/pictures of the wreck but my searches have come up empty. Thanks,tmjmred
Well, if you use the Metra Electric regularly, you might come across a conductor old enough to remember the accident. Surely anything that serious would have messed up traffic on the (then) IC Electric service.
You should probably as well call the Chicago Tribune and/or the Sun-Times. I doubt that their archives have been digitalized back that far -- so if you're really curious you might have to come downtown and use a reading or research room at the paper. But call or email first. - a.s.
Most of the damage was to the third and fourth track. The second track which was one of the tracks for the electrics was messed up for a couple of days. The freight train was sitting on track 3 waiting for the amtrak to clear track 4. My Father explained to me how and why it happened, but it is hard to explain to people the damage that happened to the freight engines without pictures.
I would guess that you are referring to this accident:
Harvey, Illinois, is about 15 miles south of Chicago. In 1979 there were eight main tracks of the Illinois Central Gulf RR running through Harvey: two yard tracks, two suburban tracks, two fast-freight tracks, and two freight-only tracks. A “ladder” existed across all eight tracks.
On October 12, Amtrak 392 was approaching the ladder from the south on one of the fast-freight tracks. A south-bound ICG freight was stopped north of the ladder on the other fast-freight track, waiting to cross to a freight-only track, that is, across the track carrying the Amtrak train, which was running at maximum permissible speed, as given by the signals. It was night time.
The turnouts on the ladder which directed the Amtrak train into a head-on collision with the freight were thrown. With “train brakes applied in emergency and horn screaming.” the Amtrak train hit the freight head on. The Amtrak locomotive was a write off, but the crew survived. Two locomotives on the freight were written off, and two crew members killed.
That's it. Thanks for the date. It should help my search.
Southbound train #51, an overnight run to Memphis continuing on to Jackson and New Orleans.
What I remember is they had an 18 year old switchtender. Told him to line the switch after the passenger train went by. They meant Amtrak.
A suburban electric (it was a passenger train) on the seperated suburban line went by and he threw the switch just like he'd been told. This sent Amtrak head on into standing #51.
That is exactly how it was described to me by my Father who knew the Engineer. He could be heard on his radio yelling at the switchtender to throw the switch back. I thought at the time of the wreck that the Freight Engineer could have been my Father as he was working a lot of overtime during that time period. I had no idea where the freight was headed and my Father was based in Markham Yards so I thought he could have been heading in. Once I got on the scene and saw the Engineer, I realized it wasn't him.
For a complete report of the ICC's investigation of this accident including photos of the damaged locomotives go to the following site. Scroll down and click on ICC Historical Railroad Investigation Reports, click on the year 1979, then on the last of the two listings for AMTRAK accidents. It's very detailed and will give you all the info you are seeking.
http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?websearch&site=dot_railroads
Mark
KCSfan wrote:For a complete report of the ICC's investigation of this accident including photos of the damaged locomotives go to the following site. It's very detailed and will give you all the info you are seeking.http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?websearch&site=dot_railroadsMark
For a complete report of the ICC's investigation of this accident including photos of the damaged locomotives go to the following site. It's very detailed and will give you all the info you are seeking.
What a great site. Thanks for the link.
Thank You very much for the info.
Ironically, I read that report last weekend. There is a website that is devoted to Illinois Central and had about 100 accident reports. I read the entire report. What a shame. There were quite a few things that led up to the accident, but the underlying theme is that the switchtender had absolutely no training for that task.
ed
Very interesting thread and some really good research.
The accident report stated that this was not the first accident at that location and even experienced switchtenders made mistakes. Does anybody know what changes were made to the physical plant following the accident? What is the physical made-up of the plant today? Is it all remote?
CC
Reading that report brings back some sad memories, and some anger.
I didn't remember their names. But Richard Kingery, the 21 year old brakeman who was killed, was from an IC family. His father did the real estate transactions for the railroad.
His family knew he was working that night and that he was on "The Pigs". (Intermodal train #51.) When they heard of the wreck his father, mother and brother drove to the site. His brother ran up a hill to see if it was "The Pigs" that were wrecked. He had to come back to his parents and tell them it was his brother's train. Looking at that awful wreck and knowing your son/brother was in it had to be terrible.
The switchtender, 18 year old Gregory Harris, broke down into tears at the investigation hearing sobbing "I know I did wrong."
I couldn't believe that we had those switches unprotected. It still makes me mad that we did.
Sir,
I believe I may have an article from the Chicago Trib concerning this accident. I was on the train when we colided with this freight train. I was in tha Air Force on leave heading to Chicago from Rantool. Give me you email address and I will send you a copy w/pictures.
Paul Krieschen
This report is from the USG site.
RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT
HEAD-END COLLISION OFAMTRAK TRAIN NO. 392 ANDICG TRAIN NO. 51HARVEY, ILLINOISOCTOBER 12, 1979
NTSB-RAR-80-3
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TECHNICAL REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1. Report No.NTSB-RAR-80-3.
2. Government Accession No.
3. Recipient's Catalog No.
4. Title and Subtitle
Railroad Accident Report-Head-end Collision of Amtrak Train No. 392 and ICG Train No. 51, Harvey, Illinois, October 12, 1979
5. Report Date April 3, 1980
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Author(s)
8. Performing Organization Report No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
U.S. National Transportation Safety BoardBureau of Accident InvestigationWashington, D.C. 20594
10. Work Unit No. 2796B
11. Contract or Grant No
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARDWashington, D. C. 20594
13. Type of Report and Period CoveredRailroad Accident Report October 12, 1979
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplementary Notes
16. Abstract
At 9:05 p.m., c.s.t., on October 12, 1979, northbound Amtrak passenger train No. 392 was traveling at 58.5 mph on track No. 4. at Harvey, Illinois. Illinois Central Gulf Freight Train No. 51 was waiting on track No. 3 to crossover to track No. 4 after train No. 392 went north. The switchtender on duty at Harvey aligned the crossover switch on track No. 4 seconds before train No. 392 arrived. Train No. 302 entered the crossover and struck train No. 51. The engineer and head brakeman on board train No. 51 were killed, and all 6 crewmembers and 38 passengers on board train No. 392 were injured.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the switchtender's manual misalignment of a switch, immediately in advance of a train, which caused train No. 392 to be directed into a crossover and collide with a standing freight train on the adjacent track. The msialignment was made possible by the lack of an interlock or other positive means to prevent its movement. Contributing to the accident was the lack of training and limited experience of the employee assigned as switchtender. Also contributing to the accident was an inadequate communications system for giving directions to the switchtender.
17. Key WordsCollision, passenger train, freight train, radio, ABS, yard limits, hand thrown switches, switch targets, signal aspect, training
18. Distribution StatementThis document is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161
19. Security Classification (of this report)UNCLASSIFIED
20. Security Classification (of this page)UNCLASSIFIED
21. No. of Pages
31
22. Price
NTSB Form 1765.2 (Rev. 9/74)
CONTENTS
SYNOPSIS
1
INVESTIGATION
The Accident
Description of the Tracks
3
Injuries to Persons
5
Damage
Crewmember Information
9
Train Information
10
Method of Operation
13
Meteorological Information
15
Survival Aspects
Tests and Research
16
ANALYSIS
Training
18
Communications
19
Crashworthiness
20
CONCLUSIONS
21
Findings
Probable Cause
22
RECOMMENDATIONS
APPENDIXES
25
Appendix A - Investigation and Hearing
Appendix B - Crew Information
26
Appendix C - Excerpts from ICG Timetable, Special Instructions, and Operating Rules
28
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARDWASHINGTON, D.C. 20594
Adopted: April 3, 1980
HEAD-END COLLISION OF AMTRAK TRAIN NO. 392AND ICG TRAIN NO. 51HARVEY, ILLINOISOCTOBER 12, 1979
At 9:05 p.m., c.s.t., on October 12, 1979, northbound Amtrak passenger train No. 392 was traveling at 58.5 mph on track No. 4 at Harvey, Illinois. Illinois Central Gulf Freight train No. 51 was waiting on track No. 3 to crossover to track No. 4 after train No. 392 went north. The switchtender on duty at Harvey aligned the crossover switch on track No. 4 seconds before train No. 392 arrived. Train No. 392 entered the crossover and struck train No. 51. The engineer and head brakeman on board train No. 51 were killed, and all 6 crewmembers and 38 passengers on board train No. 392 were injured.
At 8:45 p.m., on October 12, 1979, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad (ICG) southbound freight train No. 51, consisting of 3 locomotive units, 40 cars, and a caboose, stopped on track No. 3 at Harvey, Illinois, because a train ahead of it was waiting for a crew change. Train No. 51 stopped 20 feet in advance of a crossover to track No. 4. The train director at Kensington Tower, had instructed the crew of train No. 51 to wait at this location until Amtrak passenger train No. 392 went north on track No. 4, and then was to cross over from track No. 3 to track No. 4 and continue its trip southward. The engineer on train No. 51 extinguished the locomotive headlight before train No. 392 arrived.
The crossover switches at Harvey are all hand-operated by a switchtender. The train director telephoned the yardmaster to relay the instructions for moving trains No. 392 and No. 51 to the switchtender. The yardmaster then radioed the switchtender, but the reception was not clear on the radio and the switchtender did not understand the instructions. After the switchtender advised the yardmaster that his radio was breaking up, the yardmaster called him on the telephone. The switchtender further stated that he understood that he was to align the crossover for train No. 51 to move from track No. 3 to track No. 4 after a passenger train had passed, but he was also instructed to line a train coming out of the yard to track No. 6. The yardmaster stated he did not remember whether he said passenger train or train No. 392 when he gave the instructions to the switchtender on the telephone; however, the yardmaster did not give the locomotive number or the track on which the train was to operate.
The switchtender had aligned the switches for a local transfer train to back out of the yard. However, he had made a mistake and had not aligned one of the switches properly. The conductor of the train called him back over channel 2, the yard channel, to correct the mistake. After properly aligning the switch for the transfer train, the switchtender began to walk toward the crossover switch on track No. 4.
At 8:52 p.m., after making a regular station stop at Homewood, Illinois, ICG northbound commuter train No. 160 departed on track No. 2. While the switchtender was walking to the mainline crossover switch on track No. 4, commuter train No. 160 passed Harvey at 9 p.m. The switchtender proceeded to the switch and began to unlock it, assuming that commuter train No. 160 was the passenger train referred to in his instructions.
Amtrak northbound passenger train No. 392, consisting of one locomotive unit and five superliner coaches, made a regular station stop at Homewood at 8:58 p.m. During this stop, the conductor heard the following transmission on his radio: "After 392 goes by, let 51 down cross him over onto 4," and "Your radio is breaking up, I can't understand it." At 9 p.m., train No. 392 left Homewood station on track No. 4 to continue its trip north to Chicago, Illinois.
The engineer of train No. 392 was operating the locomotive while seated on the right side of the cab, and the fireman was seated on the left side of the locomotive cab. After leaving Homewood station, the engineer accelerated the train to 65 mph. As he approached Harvey, he applied the trains brakes to slow the train to 58 mph. The train's brakes remained applied as he passed under signal 2056, which displayed a "proceed" aspect. While still holding the train brakes applied, he noted that the switch targets were green, indicating that track No. 4 was aligned for a straight movement through the crossover area. The fireman and engineer saw the green targets simultaneously, and the fireman called out "lined." When the engineer received this verification from the fireman that the switch targets displayed green aspects, he released the train brakes and operated his train with the understanding that the way was clear.
Before operating the switch, the switchtender looked to the south and saw a locomotive headlight and thought it was a slow moving freight train. He was unable to determine what track it was on. He then aligned the switch on track No. 4 to enter the crossover. Immediately after aligning the switch, the switchtender heard the locomotive horn blowing on train No. 392, looked to the south, and saw the train approaching very rapidly approximately 200 feet away. Realizing that a collision was inevitable, he ran west to clear himself of the tracks and equipment.
The engineer and fireman on train No. 392 did not see anyone on the ground around the area of the switches. The engineer stated he did not see the switch target turn red. The fireman stated that he saw the switch target turn red only a short distance in advance of the train, shouted a warning, and sat on the floor, bracing himself against the forward bulkhead. The engineer put the train brakes in emergency and sounded the horn in one continuous blast.
The conductor on board train No. 392 heard the following radio transmission repeated twice over channel 1 of his radio: "Don't line that switch you are going to line him in on top of us." Realizing that a switch may have been aligned improperly and that train No. 51 was to be cross over to track No. 4 after they had passed, he reached for his radio to instruct the engineer to stop. Before he could speak, with train brakes applied in emergency and the horn screaming, train No. 392, entered the crossover from track No. 4 at 58 mph. Before the train's speed could be reduced, the train struck train No. 51 at 9:05 p.m., c.s.t.
On impact, the locomotive of train No. 392 pushed the lead locomotive unit of train No. 51 34 ft under the second locomotive unit, struck and overrode the front end of the second locomotive unit, and struck and tore down the overhead catenary wires. The Amtrak locomotive and first coach of train No. 392 were overturned onto their sides. The locomotive traveled 134 feet before coming to rest on its left side adjacent to and west of the second locomotive unit of train No. 51. (See figure 1.)
After the accident, the switchtender stated that he had not heard the radio communication heard by the conductor of train No. 392.
Description of the Track
Eight tracks were located at the accident site and were numbered from west to east as follows:
Number
12 3 4 5 6 7 8
Direction and UseSouthward, Suburban - Commuter ServiceNorthward, Suburban - Commuter ServiceSouthward, Passenger and FreightNorthward, Passenger and FreightSouthward, FreightNorthward, FreightNorthward and Southward Transfer TrainsLead to Private Industrial Spurs
Figure 1.--Amtrak locomotive unit of train No. 392 and second locomotive unit of train No. 51.
Seven crossovers permitted trains to cross over from one track to another and to enter and leave Harvey yard. (See figure 2.)
The crossovers of tracks No. 3 and No. 4 had been equipped with electrically locked hand throw switches 1/ before 1971. The switches were replaced with low stand hand throw switches with mechanical locks. To operate the switch, the padlock is disengaged and the foot lever is depressed to release the latch. An unlighted four sided target, 7 x 12 inches, on a side, was mounted at the top of the spindle of the switch stand. Two opposite sides of the target were coated with reflectorized green scotchlite paint, and the alternate sides were coated with red. When the switch was lined for a straight movement, the green sides of the target were displayed to approaching trains, and when the switch was lined for the crossover, the red sides were displayed.
The tracks in the area of the collision were built on a fill 21 feet above the surrounding area. The grade for northbound trains is 0.26 percent ascending.
Injuries
Train No. 51 Crew
Train No. 392Crew
Train No. 392Passengers
Other RailroadEmployees
Fatal
2
0
Nonfatal
6
38
None
172
The first locomotive unit of train No. 51 was destroyed. The entire superstructure, including the cab, was sheared from the underframe. The second locomotive unit was damaged extensively. (See figure 3.) The third locomotive unit and cars were not derailed or damaged.
The locomotive unit on train No. 392 was destroyed. The engine mounts were broken, and the engine was separated from the unit. The fuel tanks were ruptured. The left sidewall of the cab was crushed inward against the fireman's seat which remained secured.
The first car of train No. 392 was overturned and damaged moderately. The shaft of a switch target penetrated the left side of the car about 12 inches below an upper level window and protruded 3 inches into the passenger carrying section. The second and third cars derailed, but remained upright, and were damaged slightly. The refreshment bar, located in the snackbar area on the lower level of the fourth car, was pulled loose from its two anchor bolts by the impact. No other damage occurred to this car. The fifth car did not derail and was not damaged significantly.
____________________1/ A hand-operated switch equipped with an electrically controlled device which prevents the movement of the switch during a predetermined time period.
Damage was estimated as follows:
Train equipmentTrack and signalOverhead wiresWrecking and cleanup
Total
$1,630,00025,00010,00020,000$1,685,000
The crew of train No. 51 consisted of an engineer, conductor, and two brakemen. All were qualified under ICG operating rules without restrictions. The engineer and head brakeman reported for duty at 4:25 p.m., on October 12, 1979, and had been on duty 4 hours 40 minutes when the accident occurred. The conductor and rear brakeman reported for duty at 4:45 p.m., on October 12, 1979, and had been on duty 4 hours 20 minutes when the accident occurred. The engineer had 10 years' experience as a fireman and 22 years' as an engineer. Before reporting for duty on October 12, 1979, the engineer had been off duty 27 hours. Prior to reporting for duty on October 12, 1979, the head brakeman had been off duty 15 hours; this trip was only his third assignment as a brakeman. (See appendix B.)
The crew of train No. 392 consisted of an engineer, conductor, fireman, baggageman, flagman, and a service representative. All of the operational crewmembers were qualified under ICG operating rules without restrictions. The crewmembers had reported for duty at 7:10 p.m., on October 12, 1979, and had been on duty 3 hours 55 minutes when the accident occurred. All the crewmembers had worked Amtrak train No. 391 south to Champaign, Illinois, earlier the same day and had been off duty 6 hours before beginning their return trip to Chicago, Illinois, on train No. 392. Except for the baggageman, who had been off duty for several days before reporting on October 12, 1979, each crewmember had worked the previous day but had been off duty 8 hours before reporting at 6:55 a.m. on October 12, 1979, for the trip south to Champaign. The engineer had 9 years' experience as a fireman and 30 years' as an engineer. The engineer was required to wear glasses while on duty.
The train director had 25 years' experience as an agent-operator and 5 years' as train director. The yardmaster at Harvey yard had worked for 15 years as a switchman and conductor and 12 years' as a yardmaster. He had reported for duty at 2 p.m., and had been on duty 7 hours 5 minutes when the accident occurred.
The Harvey switchtender had been employed 2 months by the ICG railroad. He had qualified as a switchman/brakeman by attending a 1-day orientation session; a 1-day session conducted by a trainmaster, which included verbal instructions on safety and on the operating rules; and by participating in eight student trips as a brakeman, following the classroom instruction. He was not assigned as a switchtender on any of the student trips but was assigned to various traincrews under the direction of the conductor of each crew. He was required to wear glasses while on duty.
At 9:05 p.m., c.s.t., on October 12, 1979, northbound Amtrak passenger train No. 392 was traveling at 58.5 mph on track No. 4. at Harvey, Illinois. Illinois Central Gulf Freight Train No. 51 was waiting on track No. 3 to crossover to track No. 4 after train No. 392 went north. The switchtender on duty at Harvey aligned the crossover switch on track No. 4 seconds before train No. 392 arrived. Train No. 302 entered the crossover and struck train No. 51. The engineer and head brakeman on board train No. 51 were killed, and all 6 crewmembers and 38 passengers on board train No. 392 were injured. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the switchtender's manual misalignment of a switch, immediately in advance of a train, which caused train No. 392 to be directed into a crossover and collide with a standing freight train on the adjacent track. The msialignment was made possible by the lack of an interlock or other positive means to prevent its movement. Contributing to the accident was the lack of training and limited experience of the employee assigned as switchtender. Also contributing to the accident was an inadequate communications system for giving directions to the switchtender.
At 9:05 p.m., c.s.t., on October 12, 1979, northbound Amtrak passenger train No. 392 was traveling at 58.5 mph on track No. 4 at Harvey, Illinois. Illinois Central Gulf Freight train No. 51 was waiting on track No. 3 to crossover to track No. 4 after train No. 392 went north. The switchtender on duty at Harvey aligned the crossover switch on track No. 4 seconds before train No. 392 arrived. Train No. 392 entered the crossover and struck train No. 51. The engineer and head brakeman on board train No. 51 were killed, and all 6 crewmembers and 38 passengers on board train No. 392 were injured. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the switchtender's manual misalignment of a switch, immediately in advance of a train, which caused train No. 392 to be directed into a crossover and collide with a standing freight train on the adjacent track. The msialignment was made possible by the lack of an interlock or other positive means to prevent its movement. Contributing to the accident was the lack of training and limited experience of the employee assigned as switchtender. Also contributing to the accident was an inadequate communications system for giving directions to the switchtender.
At 8:45 p.m., on October 12, 1979, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad (ICG) southbound freight train No. 51, consisting of 3 locomotive units, 40 cars, and a caboose, stopped on track No. 3 at Harvey, Illinois, because a train ahead of it was waiting for a crew change. Train No. 51 stopped 20 feet in advance of a crossover to track No. 4. The train director at Kensington Tower, had instructed the crew of train No. 51 to wait at this location until Amtrak passenger train No. 392 went north on track No. 4, and then was to cross over from track No. 3 to track No. 4 and continue its trip southward. The engineer on train No. 51 extinguished the locomotive headlight before train No. 392 arrived. The crossover switches at Harvey are all hand-operated by a switchtender. The train director telephoned the yardmaster to relay the instructions for moving trains No. 392 and No. 51 to the switchtender. The yardmaster then radioed the switchtender, but the reception was not clear on the radio and the switchtender did not understand the instructions. After the switchtender advised the yardmaster that his radio was breaking up, the yardmaster called him on the telephone. The switchtender further stated that he understood that he was to align the crossover for train No. 51 to move from track No. 3 to track No. 4 after a passenger train had passed, but he was also instructed to line a train coming out of the yard to track No. 6. The yardmaster stated he did not remember whether he said passenger train or train No. 392 when he gave the instructions to the switchtender on the telephone; however, the yardmaster did not give the locomotive number or the track on which the train was to operate. The switchtender had aligned the switches for a local transfer train to back out of the yard. However, he had made a mistake and had not aligned one of the switches properly. The conductor of the train called him back over channel 2, the yard channel, to correct the mistake. After properly aligning the switch for the transfer train, the switchtender began to walk toward the crossover switch on track No. 4. At 8:52 p.m., after making a regular station stop at Homewood, Illinois, ICG northbound commuter train No. 160 departed on track No. 2. While the switchtender was walking to the mainline crossover switch on track No. 4, commuter train No. 160 passed Harvey at 9 p.m. The switchtender proceeded to the switch and began to unlock it, assuming that commuter train No. 160 was the passenger train referred to in his instructions. Amtrak northbound passenger train No. 392, consisting of one locomotive unit and five superliner coaches, made a regular station stop at Homewood at 8:58 p.m. During this stop, the conductor heard the following transmission on his radio: "After 392 goes by, let 51 down cross him over onto 4," and "Your radio is breaking up, I can't understand it." At 9 p.m., train No. 392 left Homewood station on track No. 4 to continue its trip north to Chicago, Illinois. The engineer of train No. 392 was operating the locomotive while seated on the right side of the cab, and the fireman was seated on the left side of the locomotive cab. After leaving Homewood station, the engineer accelerated the train to 65 mph. As he approached Harvey, he applied the trains brakes to slow the train to 58 mph. The train's brakes remained applied as he passed under signal 2056, which displayed a "proceed" aspect. While still holding the train brakes applied, he noted that the switch targets were green, indicating that track No. 4 was aligned for a straight movement through the crossover area. The fireman and engineer saw the green targets simultaneously, and the fireman called out "lined." When the engineer received this verification from the fireman that the switch targets displayed green aspects, he released the train brakes and operated his train with the understanding that the way was clear. Before operating the switch, the switchtender looked to the south and saw a locomotive headlight and thought it was a slow moving freight train. He was unable to determine what track it was on. He then aligned the switch on track No. 4 to enter the crossover. Immediately after aligning the switch, the switchtender heard the locomotive horn blowing on train No. 392, looked to the south, and saw the train approaching very rapidly approximately 200 feet away. Realizing that a collision was inevitable, he ran west to clear himself of the tracks and equipment. The engineer and fireman on train No. 392 did not see anyone on the ground around the area of the switches. The engineer stated he did not see the switch target turn red. The fireman stated that he saw the switch target turn red only a short distance in advance of the train, shouted a warning, and sat on the floor, bracing himself against the forward bulkhead. The engineer put the train brakes in emergency and sounded the horn in one continuous blast. The conductor on board train No. 392 heard the following radio transmission repeated twice over channel 1 of his radio: "Don't line that switch you are going to line him in on top of us." Realizing that a switch may have been aligned improperly and that train No. 51 was to be cross over to track No. 4 after they had passed, he reached for his radio to instruct the engineer to stop. Before he could speak, with train brakes applied in emergency and the horn screaming, train No. 392, entered the crossover from track No. 4 at 58 mph. Before the train's speed could be reduced, the train struck train No. 51 at 9:05 p.m., c.s.t. On impact, the locomotive of train No. 392 pushed the lead locomotive unit of train No. 51 34 ft under the second locomotive unit, struck and overrode the front end of the second locomotive unit, and struck and tore down the overhead catenary wires. The Amtrak locomotive and first coach of train No. 392 were overturned onto their sides. The locomotive traveled 134 feet before coming to rest on its left side adjacent to and west of the second locomotive unit of train No. 51. (See figure 1.) After the accident, the switchtender stated that he had not heard the radio communication heard by the conductor of train No. 392.
Seven crossovers permitted trains to cross over from one track to another and to enter and leave Harvey yard. (See figure 2.) The crossovers of tracks No. 3 and No. 4 had been equipped with electrically locked hand throw switches 1/ before 1971. The switches were replaced with low stand hand throw switches with mechanical locks. To operate the switch, the padlock is disengaged and the foot lever is depressed to release the latch. An unlighted four sided target, 7 x 12 inches, on a side, was mounted at the top of the spindle of the switch stand. Two opposite sides of the target were coated with reflectorized green scotchlite paint, and the alternate sides were coated with red. When the switch was lined for a straight movement, the green sides of the target were displayed to approaching trains, and when the switch was lined for the crossover, the red sides were displayed. The tracks in the area of the collision were built on a fill 21 feet above the surrounding area. The grade for northbound trains is 0.26 percent ascending.
The first locomotive unit of train No. 51 was destroyed. The entire superstructure, including the cab, was sheared from the underframe. The second locomotive unit was damaged extensively. (See figure 3.) The third locomotive unit and cars were not derailed or damaged. The locomotive unit on train No. 392 was destroyed. The engine mounts were broken, and the engine was separated from the unit. The fuel tanks were ruptured. The left sidewall of the cab was crushed inward against the fireman's seat which remained secured. The first car of train No. 392 was overturned and damaged moderately. The shaft of a switch target penetrated the left side of the car about 12 inches below an upper level window and protruded 3 inches into the passenger carrying section. The second and third cars derailed, but remained upright, and were damaged slightly. The refreshment bar, located in the snackbar area on the lower level of the fourth car, was pulled loose from its two anchor bolts by the impact. No other damage occurred to this car. The fifth car did not derail and was not damaged significantly.
The crew of train No. 51 consisted of an engineer, conductor, and two brakemen. All were qualified under ICG operating rules without restrictions. The engineer and head brakeman reported for duty at 4:25 p.m., on October 12, 1979, and had been on duty 4 hours 40 minutes when the accident occurred. The conductor and rear brakeman reported for duty at 4:45 p.m., on October 12, 1979, and had been on duty 4 hours 20 minutes when the accident occurred. The engineer had 10 years' experience as a fireman and 22 years' as an engineer. Before reporting for duty on October 12, 1979, the engineer had been off duty 27 hours. Prior to reporting for duty on October 12, 1979, the head brakeman had been off duty 15 hours; this trip was only his third assignment as a brakeman. (See appendix B.) The crew of train No. 392 consisted of an engineer, conductor, fireman, baggageman, flagman, and a service representative. All of the operational crewmembers were qualified under ICG operating rules without restrictions. The crewmembers had reported for duty at 7:10 p.m., on October 12, 1979, and had been on duty 3 hours 55 minutes when the accident occurred. All the crewmembers had worked Amtrak train No. 391 south to Champaign, Illinois, earlier the same day and had been off duty 6 hours before beginning their return trip to Chicago, Illinois, on train No. 392. Except for the baggageman, who had been off duty for several days before reporting on October 12, 1979, each crewmember had worked the previous day but had been off duty 8 hours before reporting at 6:55 a.m. on October 12, 1979, for the trip south to Champaign. The engineer had 9 years' experience as a fireman and 30 years' as an engineer. The engineer was required to wear glasses while on duty. The train director had 25 years' experience as an agent-operator and 5 years' as train director. The yardmaster at Harvey yard had worked for 15 years as a switchman and conductor and 12 years' as a yardmaster. He had reported for duty at 2 p.m., and had been on duty 7 hours 5 minutes when the accident occurred. The Harvey switchtender had been employed 2 months by the ICG railroad. He had qualified as a switchman/brakeman by attending a 1-day orientation session; a 1-day session conducted by a trainmaster, which included verbal instructions on safety and on the operating rules; and by participating in eight student trips as a brakeman, following the classroom instruction. He was not assigned as a switchtender on any of the student trips but was assigned to various traincrews under the direction of the conductor of each crew. He was required to wear glasses while on duty.
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