Chicago and North Western, 70's style

[MP173]

One more thought/question.

With the GN/NP/CBQ alliance (early to mid 60's prior to BN), wouldnt it have made sense for there to have been discussions or exploration into a UP/MILW merger?  Think about it, it would have some sense.

ed

[MP173]

It is now oh so obvious as to why UP needed to get to Chicago in the worst way.

MILW to the north providing single line service and ATSF to the south.  In the middle you had SP/Cotton Belt crossing the Mississippi River.  UP was 300 miles short to St. Louis and 500 miles short to Chicago.  The Rock would have given them both, but a pretty bumpy ride to St. Louis.

ed

[MP173]

This is a good discussion Bob. 

I have learned quite a bit about the Midwestern operations and I appreciate both yours and Michaels input.  I have always been fascinated by the MILW, not so much the PCE but the Omaha line.  Why?  Possibly because of all of those City trains which ran on the line in the late 50's and 60's.  Did MILW handle that under contract with UP or was it a common carrier type operation.

I may not be making myself clear here, so I will attempt again.  I believe in the mid 50's UP changed routings on the trains from CNW to MILW.  Ok...that tells me they CONTROLLED the trains from Omaha to Chicago.  Were there ICC hearings to change the routing or did UP have control to do so?  I sort of compare it to contract carrier vs common carrier in trucking. 

Point well made regarding the PCE traffic.  UP competed with MILW.  Obviously they would not turn over the traffic at Omaha to a competitor.  So, in a way, getting back to the threads long ago about the necessity of the PCE...in the long run it had a negetive impact on the survival of the MILW, in a somewhat twisted offhand way.

Another fascination for MILW's Omaha line was based on standing at a couple of locations in Iowa and looking at the empty ROW, nature reclaiming the land.  It is a strange feeling that comes over me when I look at an abandoned ROW, tracks removed and think of all of the personal and business effort that went into that line which is now gone.  Such was the case at Muscatine, Iowa standing at the junction of the MILW line which ran to KC and the Rock's line.  Also a lessor degree in Central Iowa and realizing that years before all of those UP City trains once ran.

Anyway, I will attempt to keep my hyperventilating to a minimum and refrain from sipping the Fremont Connection Koolaid and simply try to understand what really happened.

ed

[MichaelSol]

...hyperventilating threads about "whose line was best" Chicago/Omaha with the developing conviction people don't know what they are talking about...

 

Why trash another good discussion?  This stuff has driven many people away. 

You complain selectively. When you see the name calling by your friends on other threads, you remain remarkably silent. Remarkably. Indeed, you take a very generalized comment directed at no one in particular, and take the effort to personalize it. I guess that's irony.

In this instance, the "best line" argument -- which seems to go on and on -- is demonstrably irrelevant. Larger and more compelling circumstances controlled these outcomes -- not somebody's line being 20 miles longer than somebody else's line, or a 1.2% grade vs a 1% grade. Yet people discuss these things like they are the final controlling decisive factors -- and they weren't.

 

 

[bobwilcox]

...hyperventilating threads about "whose line was best" Chicago/Omaha with the developing conviction people don't know what they are talking about...

 

Why trash another good discussion?  This stuff has driven many people away. 

[MichaelSol]

What happened to the MILW line to Omaha?  They were handling the passenger trains, I would have thought they would have handled more freight.

ed

One thing should jump out. MILW was a competitor with UP for its very longest haul traffic. At any point where Milwaukee and UP competed head-to-head in the Pacific Northwest, UP could not provide the service to Twin Cities and to Chicago that MILW could. In Washington State, of the market share shared by MILW and UP -- MILW had 61% of it.

When MILW entered Portland, UP lost 7,000 tons a day right off the bat to MILW -- all "Long East".

This is one reason I read these hyperventilating threads about "whose line was best" Chicago/Omaha with the developing conviction people don't know what they are talking about. In the MILW/CNW merger, the consolidated plan of operation was to operate the fast trains between the two points on MILW tracks. CNW thought it could gain an hour of schedule time with upgrades, but conceded that MILW would gain the same improvement -- it was simply a faster line.

But, vis-a-vis UP -- Union Pacific was not going to prefer the MILW for so long as MILW was a competitor for UP's best traffic. Period. Didn't matter -- better line, Fremont cutoff, Larry Provo, Cowboy line, price of tea -- Union Pacific was not going to assist in any way the survivability of its primary competitor for its most premium traffic.

Then Rock Island fell apart.

Who was left? North Western was the last girl left on the bench.

How much brains and guts did it take to be the last girl on the bench?

The specific course of events that can be shown conclusively that ultimately favored the North Western as the surviving connection for UP unfolded entirely outside of the control of the North Western.

That's luck.

 

 

[bobwilcox]

If anyone is interested in looking further H. Roger Grant wrote an excellant histroy entitiled North Western, A History of the Chicago & North Western Railway System, 1996. The ISBN number is 0-87580-214-1.

[bobwilcox]

Bob:

Any thoughts about the Cowboy line and whether or not it was up for abandonment?  When did the knowledge about the Wyoming coal hit?  What was the attitude at that time about the PRB coal and the opportunities presented?

It would be interesting to review that whole process.

ed

 

The Cowboy Line was always a puzzle.  It did not have enough local traffic to support itself but we needed a way to get profitable traffic out of the Rapid City area to its markets.  We could move the traffic via Pierre, SD or Chadron, NE.  When people got interested in coal very early on that put a hold on the line untill the Powder River got resolved.  It was not a problem because we had lots of other lines to spend our time on to upgrade for multi-loaders or dump.   

Acitve interest in the Powder River started in the early 1970s.  Everyone knew the coal was there it was just having a market for the stuff and a way to get it to market cheaply.  The desire for lower sulphur emmisions solved one problem and unit train economics solved the other problem 

When the Powder River resolved itself with the UP joint venture we had spun off lines in SD to the DME.  The Cowboy Line became just another drain on expenses so the machinery was put into gear to dump it. 

[MichaelSol]

Grand Island died with the BN merger.  When you say Omaha do you include Council Bluffs?  In the 1960s the CNW interchanged a lot of traffic with the UP in Council Bluffs and a small amount in Omaha. Does your data state the UP-Fremont-CNW traffic was all going to Chicago.  

In this breakdown, "Omaha" includes Council Bluffs & S. Omaha.

Through the Fremont/Freemont gateway, "of the 14,266 cars delivered by Union Pacific, 13,961 were overhead traffic"  - pre-blocked for through train operation to Chicago.

 

[bobwilcox]

I wish this article was a lot longer-

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,899667,00.html

Could someone post some thoughts on the working relationship between these great railroaders ?

 

I was told they had a good relationship but we kissed Ben, Cutty Sark Scotch and Fruit of the Loom underware goodbye with employee ownership. Ben was unable to solve the problems the CNW faced but Larry Provo was able to put the policies and people in place to get the job done.  Ben was to a great extent a victum of his times. A granger railroad president in those years was on the last leg of a succesful Kamakaze mission. 

[bobwilcox]

Well vis a vis the Milwuakee the "feather" was the Fremont cutoff that bypassed Omaha on the C&NW.  Getting between Chicago and Omaha, in and of itself, without the added benifits provided by the Rock Island route, meant nothing.

Saving an hour to Omaha was nothing compared to the benifits of the Fremont cutoff.

The Fremont cutoff must really have been something.

1960s averages.

Fremont Cutoff, UP to CNW 14,266 carloads annually. That's 39 carloads a day that CNW got to haul to Chicago.

Grand Island, UP to CBQ, 29,671 carloads.

At Omaha, UP to MILW, 43,998 carloads.

At Omaha, UP to Rock Island, 15,819 carloads.

Of all Union Pacific's Missouri River Gateways, Fremont accounted for, delivery and receipt,  5.6% of UP interchange traffic.

Schedules show MILW, Omaha to Chicago, 11'20"; CNW, "Freemont" to Chicago, 12'30".

 

 

 

Grand Island died with the BN merger.  When you say Omaha do you include Council Bluffs?  In the 1960s the CNW interchanged a lot of traffic with the UP in Council Bluffs and a small amount in Omaha. Does your data state the UP-Fremont-CNW traffic was all going to Chicago.  

[MichaelSol]

The Fremont cutoff might not have been much in the 60's, but we all know what happened later.

Michael, so the UP interchanged 700 cars per day on average at Missouri River Gateway with the following interchanges:

CNW 39 cars per day

CBQ 81 cars per day

MILW 121 cars per day

Rock 43 cars per day

That is a total of 284 per day.  Where did the rest go?  Gotta figure the IC got some and the Chicago Great Western got a few and no doubt Mopac got some along with Wabash (NW).

Are all of these numbers based on interchange from UP to the carriers or between the UP and the carriers? 

What happened to the MILW line to Omaha?  They were handling the passenger trains, I would have thought they would have handled more freight.

ed

These were just examples -- didn't feel like posting the whole chart -- but just to show a couple of relevant tonnages for comparison to the Freemont cutoff -- CNW's spelling for some reason. These are deliveries, UP to the named carriers. The numbers are much bigger for other examples, but just trying to get a handle on why 39 carloads a day eastbound, less than one train a day, on a demonstrably longer route, constitutes a "feather".

Haven't seen any numbers post 1970. Just superlatives. Don't actually know what those mean.

 

[bobwilcox]

Well vis a vis the Milwuakee the "feather" was the Fremont cutoff that bypassed Omaha on the C&NW.  Getting between Chicago and Omaha, in and of itself, without the added benifits provided by the Rock Island route, meant nothing.

Saving an hour to Omaha was nothing compared to the benifits of the Fremont cutoff.

The Fremont cutoff must really have been something.

1960s averages.

Fremont Cutoff, UP to CNW 14,266 carloads annually. That's 39 carloads a day that CNW got to haul to Chicago.

Grand Island, UP to CBQ, 29,671 carloads.

At Omaha, UP to MILW, 43,998 carloads.

At Omaha, UP to Rock Island, 15,819 carloads.

Of all Union Pacific's Missouri River Gateways, Fremont accounted for, delivery and receipt,  5.6% of UP interchange traffic.

 

That looks about right for the 1960s.  The gateway did not grow in importance untill the 1970s which is the period we have been talking about on this thread.  Things started to break loose in the very early 70s when UP+CRIP, CNW+MILW and Northwest Industries all came off the table.

[MP173]

The Fremont cutoff might not have been much in the 60's, but we all know what happened later.

Michael, so the UP interchanged 700 cars per day on average at Missouri River Gateway with the following interchanges:

CNW 39 cars per day

CBQ 81 cars per day

MILW 121 cars per day

Rock 43 cars per day

That is a total of 284 per day.  Where did the rest go?  Gotta figure the IC got some and the Chicago Great Western got a few and no doubt Mopac got some along with Wabash (NW).

Are all of these numbers based on interchange from UP to the carriers or between the UP and the carriers? 

What happened to the MILW line to Omaha?  They were handling the passenger trains, I would have thought they would have handled more freight.

ed

[MichaelSol]

Well vis a vis the Milwuakee the "feather" was the Fremont cutoff that bypassed Omaha on the C&NW.  Getting between Chicago and Omaha, in and of itself, without the added benifits provided by the Rock Island route, meant nothing.

Saving an hour to Omaha was nothing compared to the benifits of the Fremont cutoff.

The Fremont cutoff must really have been something.

1960s averages.

Fremont Cutoff, UP to CNW 14,266 carloads annually. That's 39 carloads a day that CNW got to haul to Chicago.

Grand Island, UP to CBQ, 29,671 carloads.

At Omaha, UP to MILW, 43,998 carloads.

At Omaha, UP to Rock Island, 15,819 carloads.

Of all Union Pacific's Missouri River Gateways, Fremont accounted for, delivery and receipt,  5.6% of UP interchange traffic.

Schedules show MILW, Omaha to Chicago, 11'20"; CNW, "Freemont" to Chicago, 12'30".

 

 

 

[nanaimo73]

I wish this article was a lot longer-

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,899667,00.html

Could someone post some thoughts on the working relationship between these great railroaders ?

[MP173]

Bob:

Any thoughts about the Cowboy line and whether or not it was up for abandonment?  When did the knowledge about the Wyoming coal hit?  What was the attitude at that time about the PRB coal and the opportunities presented?

It would be interesting to review that whole process.

ed

[gabe]

We cannot quantify luck into the equation.  It is there and we know it is, but to what degree? Regarding UAL, it has been well documented that they created a number of their problems.  It was a pretty militant group of "owners", particularly the pilots.  Bad luck?  Sure plenty.  But I am not here to compare UAL to LUV.

I agree with you...lets get back to the CNW.

Perhaps this has been previously stated, but here is my take on the CNW's 70's situation:

1. The ICC's handling of the Rock merger case gave CNW an opportunity.

2. Their Fremont/California Jct routing became the superior method of interchanging freight from UP to a Chicago connection.

3.  CNW got the employees on board in the 70's with the stock program.

4.  Their management had laser focus to concentrate on the Chicago - UP route.

5.  The Cowboy line, for whatever reason was not abandoned, which gave them an option for greatness.

6.  They understood the risks involved in doing what DME is trying today and took the sure bet, aligning with UP on the movement of the PRB coal.

I am sure there are things being left out or being minimized, but that is what I see.

Now, specifically, when did the Fremont routing gain importance?  Was UP interchange always done there?  Was that always a mainline or was there considerable upgrading done?

Did the CNW want to abandon the Cowboy line in the 70's or were they aware (and when did they become aware) of the coal in Wyoming?

Thanks,

ed

Ed,

I am sure you are someone's hero.  Post two or three more quality topics like this, and you will be mine.

How much do you think the decision to keep the Cowboy line was more dumb luck than skill?

Gabe

[bobwilcox]

In the 1970s the CNW had the largest PAC in the railroad industry. The money went to politicians in both parties at the Federal, state and local level.  We even gave some money to a radical elected mayor of Madion, Wis.  The money opened doors.  I remember two meetings with Hubert Humphry and George McGovern concerning branch line abandoments in MN and SD.  They wanted us to delay the abandoments but we had run out of money.

[jeffhergert]

I seem to recall reading in Trains Magazine, sometime during the mid-1970s, that the Federal Government passed a series of legislative acts - the so called "3R" (Railroad Rehabilitation) and "4R" (Railroad Rehabilitation and Revitalization) Acts - that made taxpayer financed, low interest loans available to financially strapped railroads for infrastructure maintenance and upgrades.  The Milwaukee Road and the Chicago & North Western were able to take advantage of this program, but for some reason the Rock Island wasn't.  The transfusion of federal money into the C.& N.W. plant coupled with the ongoing abandonments of little used branchlines was enough to keep this railroad going until they were able to tap into the coal-rich Powder River Basin cash cow. 

  I was once told that the CNW had some of the best lobbyists of any railroad at that time.  The Rock Island on the other hand had John Ingram, a former FRA administrator.  I think it was a Trains article that once said Ingram was hired because of his connections in Washington.  It turned out however, that he seemed to have more enemies there than friends.

  I don't know how true that is.  From the surface, it would appear to have some truth.  Of course, appearances can be misleading.  In any case, it never hurts to have friends in Washington.

 Jeff   

[MP173]

We cannot quantify luck into the equation.  It is there and we know it is, but to what degree? Regarding UAL, it has been well documented that they created a number of their problems.  It was a pretty militant group of "owners", particularly the pilots.  Bad luck?  Sure plenty.  But I am not here to compare UAL to LUV.

I agree with you...lets get back to the CNW.

Perhaps this has been previously stated, but here is my take on the CNW's 70's situation:

1. The ICC's handling of the Rock merger case gave CNW an opportunity.

2. Their Fremont/California Jct routing became the superior method of interchanging freight from UP to a Chicago connection.

3.  CNW got the employees on board in the 70's with the stock program.

4.  Their management had laser focus to concentrate on the Chicago - UP route.

5.  The Cowboy line, for whatever reason was not abandoned, which gave them an option for greatness.

6.  They understood the risks involved in doing what DME is trying today and took the sure bet, aligning with UP on the movement of the PRB coal.

I am sure there are things being left out or being minimized, but that is what I see.

Now, specifically, when did the Fremont routing gain importance?  Was UP interchange always done there?  Was that always a mainline or was there considerable upgrading done?

Did the CNW want to abandon the Cowboy line in the 70's or were they aware (and when did they become aware) of the coal in Wyoming?

Thanks,

ed

[bobwilcox]

Bob,

Did you know Jim Snodgrass, Wayne Borg or Sandy Dearden?

I didn't get to know Wayne untill my time at the UP when we worked together on some projects for Exxon.  I knew Sandra very well and took her on her first business trip.  She got unlucky with the UP+CNW merger but a lot of good CNW people had her experience. 

[CNW 6000]

So this failure you witnessed was what? 

[MichaelSol]

Bob:

I have a feeling the CNW people worked harder and smarter, particularly when given the incentives of stock ownership. 

ed

And, notwithstanding working harder and smarter, United Airlines plunged into bankruptcy and its employees lost everything.

But, in general, ESOP companies do perform better than non-esop companies; perhaps that made all the difference at CNW -- certainly ironic compared to the outcome at Northwest Industries. And that brings an interesting contrast to the hugely successful outcome at CMC.

 

[MichaelSol]

Personal heroism?  Never been a hero, probably never will be, but if you insist....well it must be true!  Never read Poor Richards, so cant quite comment on that statement.  But, since the post seems to have been a bit self serving, I will refrain from discussing my personal achievements and failures.

I think most successful people (BTW, exactly how do you define success, Michael?), have had a number of failures in their lives.  It is the nature of risk taking.  I personally believe most success stories involve a level of luck with a whole lot of hard work and persistance.

 ed

And sometimes "a whole lot of hard work and persistance" isn't enough either. If you disagree, and think it is enough, we disagree.

If you agree, then we agree and I don't see where you are trying to go with this.

Let's get back to C&NW.

 

 

[MP173]

Personal heroism?  Never been a hero, probably never will be, but if you insist....well it must be true!  Never read Poor Richards, so cant quite comment on that statement.  But, since the post seems to have been a bit self serving, I will refrain from discussing my personal achievements and failures.

I think most successful people (BTW, exactly how do you define success, Michael?), have had a number of failures in their lives.  It is the nature of risk taking.  I personally believe most success stories involve a level of luck with a whole lot of hard work and persistance.

 ed

[MichaelSol]

Perhaps I have been "lucky".  Lucky enough to make it in a career in which less than 5% who attempt it, succeed.

Lucky enough to have the alarm clock go off at 430am when I needed to drive 6 hours to see a customer.  Lucky enough to have made one more phone call.  Lucky enough to keep in contact with a prospect for 8 years and hear the word "no" yet be there when they said "yes" and watch them turn into a multi million dollar account. 

Lucky enough to have recognized a dead end career 17 years ago.  Lucky enough to have married quite well once.

I can go on and on, but wont.  My girlfriend once called me "Lucky" as a nickname.  After a few months she quit...dont know why, perhaps she saw something that changed her mind.

ed

OK, my comment was not intended to incite speeches of personal heroism. Some people work like hell and do everything right, and the cards just don't fall into place. Some people work like hell, everything works, and they make a buck. Some people have rich dads too. It's in the assertion that luck doesn't play a role that you should know better.

There are many reasons for "success."

There are many reasons for failure.

Luck and bad luck can be a component of either -- in business, science, and everyone's personal life as well.

My point is, good luck doesn 't necessarily mean the recipient should be elevated to genius; nor does bad luck imply bad management.

I am saying the world is a little more complex than these brains and guts stories and a thorough analysis sometimes is more appropriate to discovering the full story than relying on simplistic notions borrowed second hand from Poor Rchard's as an analytical tool.

 

[MichaelSol]

Then you haven't witnessed first hand the indvidual, the company, the railroad ... that had all the brains and hard work in the world, and still didn't make it.

 You've been lucky.

Ok I give up Sol. What railroad failure were you a first-hand "witness" to, that had so many brilliant and infallible executives and managers at the top.  I would like to know.

I'll bet you would! When you acquire some manners, I'll let you know ...

 

[MP173]

Perhaps I have been "lucky". 

You know, come to think of it...I am lucky.

ed

[Anonymous]

Then you haven't witnessed first hand the indvidual, the company, the railroad ... that had all the brains and hard work in the world, and still didn't make it.

 You've been lucky.

Ok I give up Sol. What railroad failure were you a first-hand "witness" to, that had so many brilliant and infallible executives and managers at the top.  I would like to know.