TheAntiGates wrote:Well,...re reading this entire thread, then pondering the original article in the context it was written, not as FM belabored to tangentialize, I would have to say that I'd feel a lot more at ease with the RRIF loaning money to BNSF and UP to expand powder river operations, than some marginal operator.
Then can we assume that you'd have no problem with one of the other Class I's (KCS, NS, CSX, CP, CN) getting into the PRB with the RRIF funding for that critical 3rd PRB player?
bobwilcox wrote:The CN, NS, CSXT and CPR do not want into the PRB. They do way to much business with the BNSF and the UP to sink lots of money into a project with poor returns after the rate war.
The question was posed to AG to see if he's just opposed to non-Class I's getting the same taxpayer subsidies as the Class I's, or if he is a slave to the status quo, but since you piped in.....
I would venture that of the remaining 5 Class I's, NS and CSX would follow your logic, but KCS, CN, and/or CP are also Western railroads, and as such may opt for PRB entry to sustain their own desires. CP and CN may also concievably enter the PRB as a silent partner for either UP or BNSF, much like some have hypothesized is the situation with DM&E acting as proxy for an eventual UP takeover.
futuremodal wrote:Then can we assume that you'd have no problem with one of the other Class I's (KCS, NS, CSX, CP, CN) getting into the PRB with the RRIF funding for that critical 3rd PRB player?
Without taking the time to make any detailed review of those railroad's financials, I'll give you a qualified yes answer.
My personal reservation to giving the loan to DME is that the net proceeds will be the lions share ot their net worth.
If they fail, they dust off their hands and say 'we tried boys' and that is that, they grab a parachute and jump, while the Taxpayer is handed a rail line that failed as their collateral.
I think that is not a wise bargain.
With one of the larger RR's, there is more at stake for them to loose, so simply going "belly up" is not a quick exit strategy for them.
I think that the treasury could achieve a $2 billion recovery by liquidating the lines you mention, but not DME
If DME defaults, the Taxpayer is left owning a RR that might be lucky to fetch half that, in a fire sale
TheAntiGates wrote: futuremodal wrote:Then can we assume that you'd have no problem with one of the other Class I's (KCS, NS, CSX, CP, CN) getting into the PRB with the RRIF funding for that critical 3rd PRB player?Without taking the time to make any detailed review of those railroad's financials, I'll give you a qualified yes answer.My personal reservation to giving the loan to DME is that the net proceeds will be the lions share ot their net worth.
I'm glad that you took the time to qualify your answer. For example, KCS's market capitalization is only $2 billion. And CP (USA) is only $8 billion.
well great then, I'll conceed that it was KCS that gave me apprehension against just throwing out an unqualified "yes"
Knowing FM, it was a trap he had planned that way, now he'll have curses for having been foiled again.
Greater risks (generally) justify greater interest rates, do they not?
Why shouldn't the tax payer make a cool 11% for absorbing all this risk?
Dan
Datafever wrote:Why aren't the PRB coal mines helping to fund the DM&E? It would seem to me that they have the most to gain by having the line extended into the PRB. Or the utility companies that receive the PRB coal?
Who says they're not?
TheAntiGates wrote: futuremodal wrote: Then can we assume that you'd have no problem with one of the other Class I's (KCS, NS, CSX, CP, CN) getting into the PRB with the RRIF funding for that critical 3rd PRB player?Without taking the time to make any detailed review of those railroad's financials, I'll give you a qualified yes answer.
futuremodal wrote: Then can we assume that you'd have no problem with one of the other Class I's (KCS, NS, CSX, CP, CN) getting into the PRB with the RRIF funding for that critical 3rd PRB player?
So it's size that matters to you?
(snicker, snicker....)
Then can we also assume that you'd have no problem with any non-railroad megacorporation partaking of the same deal? ExxonMobile? Duke Energy? Royal Dutch Shell?
Maybe even Microsoft?
futuremodal wrote: TheAntiGates wrote: futuremodal wrote: Then can we assume that you'd have no problem with one of the other Class I's (KCS, NS, CSX, CP, CN) getting into the PRB with the RRIF funding for that critical 3rd PRB player?Without taking the time to make any detailed review of those railroad's financials, I'll give you a qualified yes answer.So it's size that matters to you?(snicker, snicker....) Then can we also assume that you'd have no problem with any non-railroad megacorporation partaking of the same deal? ExxonMobile? Duke Energy? Royal Dutch Shell?Maybe even Microsoft?
I'm sure you enjoyed that...but lets not confuse the reality that what might constitute a disability for one entity does not automatically approve all parties not suffering from that problem..situational factors will apply.
I wouldn't say that the money should be loaned to...ENRON for instance, for reasons I'm sure you can appreciate.
TheAntiGates wrote: futuremodal wrote: TheAntiGates wrote: futuremodal wrote: Then can we assume that you'd have no problem with one of the other Class I's (KCS, NS, CSX, CP, CN) getting into the PRB with the RRIF funding for that critical 3rd PRB player?Without taking the time to make any detailed review of those railroad's financials, I'll give you a qualified yes answer.So it's size that matters to you?(snicker, snicker....) Then can we also assume that you'd have no problem with any non-railroad megacorporation partaking of the same deal? ExxonMobile? Duke Energy? Royal Dutch Shell?Maybe even Microsoft?I'm sure you enjoyed that...but lets not confuse the reality that what might constitute a disability for one entity does not automatically approve all parties not suffering from that problem..situational factors will apply.I wouldn't say that the money should be loaned to...ENRON for instance, for reasons I'm sure you can appreciate.
Well, let's assume RRIF money had gone to ENRON, and they had started building a line into the PRB before the implosion. Whatta ya think would happen to the line? Do you think it would have been scrapped by the creditors? Of course not. The creditors would have taken it and sold it off to an interested party, who would have used it for much the same purpose, aka hauling coal out of the PRB.
You see, although the stockholders of the "shaky" entity would suffer, the infrastructure itself is no worse for wear, and the creditors will get some value from the original loan.
The whole point is to get new competitive capacity into the PRB ASAP before it's too late. As long as someone somewhere is willing to take on the challenge, I say give 'em whatever they need to get it started.
Datafever wrote:Before it's too late???
Yes. When global warming hits it will be too late to build a railroad into the PRB to get the coal needed to run all the air conditioners. LOL
"We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo Possum "We have met the anemone... and he is Russ." Bucky Katt "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." Niels Bohr, Nobel laureate in physics
It would be greatly appreciated by me and possibly others if FM would cite his references (article or book, author, etc.) for the economic need for at least a "triopoly" to provide a competitive marketplace. The markets for road locomotives and large commercial airliners seem to be pretty competitive with only two entrants.
futuremodal wrote: You see, although the stockholders of the "shaky" entity would suffer, the infrastructure itself is no worse for wear, and the creditors will get some value from the original loan.
*Some value*??? You would make an investment into something with a pretty good chance of getting "some value from the original loan"? If that's the outlook from someone who is very *pro-DM&E* (or anti-BNSF, as the case may be), it's no wonder they have a hard time scraping up the money.
Wanna invest in a bridge in Brooklyn? You'll get some value from your original investment.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
CSSHEGEWISCH wrote: It would be greatly appreciated by me and possibly others if FM would cite his references (article or book, author, etc.) for the economic need for at least a "triopoly" to provide a competitive marketplace. The markets for road locomotives and large commercial airliners seem to be pretty competitive with only two entrants.
Do some research on this forum - I've referenced the triopoly theory many times.
Although I do question your statement regarding road locomotives and airliners. How much does a new six axle loco cost these days? How much does a large jet liner cost these days? And you call that a competitive market?!
The reason locomotives and airliners cost so much is that there are only two major players in each catagory, aka it's a duopoly.
Keep in mind one of those latter is a EU subsidized entity.
Murphy Siding wrote: futuremodal wrote: You see, although the stockholders of the "shaky" entity would suffer, the infrastructure itself is no worse for wear, and the creditors will get some value from the original loan. *Some value*??? You would make an investment into something with a pretty good chance of getting "some value from the original loan"? If that's the outlook from someone who is very *pro-DM&E* (or anti-BNSF, as the case may be), it's no wonder they have a hard time scraping up the money. Wanna invest in a bridge in Brooklyn? You'll get some value from your original investment.
Typically in a bankrupcty, the creditors will get a certain percentage of the value of the bankrupt entity, while the stockholders get nothing.
And if you invest in that bridge in Brooklyn, you'll get nothing whether you are a creditor or a stockholder.
The point is, it is still a better bargain for the taxpayers to subsidize a private entity that has a chance of failure (and thus a recoup of the investment back to government ownership), than it is for taxpayers to directly pay for the same project as a public works project. I've made that point many times regarding Amtrak - it would have cost us out here in taxpayer land a lot less if we had simply subsidized the Class I's to keep private passenger service, rather than creating this government run monstrosity we have today.
futuremodal wrote: Do some research on this forum - I've referenced the triopoly theory many times.
Who would be the experts on that theory ? Could you please post a link to some of their work ?
nanaimo73 wrote: futuremodal wrote: Do some research on this forum - I've referenced the triopoly theory many times. Who would be the experts on that theory ? Could you please post a link to some of their work ?
Okay, slight problem here.....
The main link I had to the theory of triopoly was a USDA study from 1998 that compared monopoly rates to duopoly rates to tripoly rates for a specific ag move. Unfortunately, the link to the study has been removed (probably by the evil Bush Administration )...
http://www.ams.usda.gov/stb.htm
....so the best you can get is the search engine blurb as follows:
"... monopoly to a duopoly in a corn market 75 miles from water reduces rates by 17.4 percent, and moving further to a triopoly reduces rates another 15.2 percent; ..."
Other search results are not as forthcoming as they were even last year when I searched. The only other link I can come up with is not even a study, but simply a news item on some new air carrier in Hawaii....
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-06-05-hawaii-fare-war_x.htm
Quote of note:
"There's the word 'monopoly.' There's the word 'duopoly.' But there's no word 'triopoly,'" said Jonathan Ornstein, Mesa's president and chief executive. "With a third carrier in the market now, it's sort of forcing this level of competition, which is clearly good for the consumer."
Okay, so Mr. Ornstein doesn't get out much if he thinks there is no word "triopoly", but from what we can glean from the gist of the article, the introduction of Mesa into the Hawaiian air market did cause a 50% reduction in introductory rates across the board from what the rates were with two carriers...
"Mesa introduced $39 promotional one-way rates in March. Aloha and Hawaiian quickly followed suit. That's nearly half of usual airfares in Hawaii. Mesa also recently announced a special $59 round-trip weekday rate, and that was also matched."
The points mentioned in this article do back up the theory as postulated, e.g. that introducing a third entity into a duopolistic market forces down rates to a level that nearly emulates perfect competition. And since dominant industries tend toward consolidation to eliminate competition, there is a need for government oversight of some kind to make sure the consumer maintains access to the lower pricing, which is ostensibly why we have anti-trust laws.
Wait! Here's one econ study that might show what I'm talking about, although I'll have to explain it to the non econ types....
http://www.iaee.org/documents/p03bunn1.pdf
"Evaluating the Effects of Crossholdings and Information on Wholesale Energy Prices" by Derek W. Bunn and Augusto Ruperez Micola; London School of Economics.
Go to page 14; "Theorectical Valuations" and "Nash Prices"
Monopoly = 100
Duopoly = 66
Triopoly = 50
So when P = 200, demand side valuation (e.g. value or worth of the transaction to the consumer) is 100 for monopoly, 134 for duopoly, and 150 for triopoly.
Thus, the consumer gets a 50% increase in the value of the market transaction when he is dealing with three supply side providers as opposed to one supply side provider, and a 16% increase in transaction valuation when dealing with the three over two providers. You'lll note that the 16% difference is remarkable close to the 17% difference in the USDA study.
This is a specialty field in economics -- not sure the Internet is the best source of scholarly work. Here's one scholarly perspective:
"Conventional economic theory argues that an increase in intrarailroad competition will result in a decrease in railroad price. There is substantial empirical support for this hypothesis. For example, Levin (1981b) found that hypothetical railroad price increases resulting from railroad deregulation are quite modest in the presence of a moderate degree of intrarailroad competition. Levin (1981a) discovered that for various assumptions regarding railroad demand elasticity and railroad revenue/variable cost ratios, the social benefit (net reduction in deadweight loss) of adding an equal-sized railroad competition to a monopoly railroad market ranges from 6.8% to 18.9% of revenues in that market. Adding a third railroad in a two-firm railroad market yields social benefits of 2.4%-6.8% of revenues in that market. MacDonald (1987) found that increased intrarailroad competition results in lower railroad grain prices. He found that movement from a railroad monopoly to a duopoly with equal-size firms leads to an 18% decrease in railroad corn prices."
Park, Babcock, Lemke and Weisman, "Simulating the Effects of Railroad Mergers," Southern Economic Journal, 2001, 67(4), 938-953, 941.
So, futuremodal, what I hear you saying is that there is really very little in the way of hard studies done on triopolies vs duopolies. What you have given us is a defunct (?) USDA study, an instance of a price war in the airline industry (which is known for its price wars leading to bankruptcies), and a theoretical paper that is looking at the effects of information sharing (and which makes some very broad assumptions).
Price wars may be great for the consumer, but I doubt that one could argue that the resulting bankruptcies are good for the economy.
Datafever wrote: So, futuremodal, what I hear you saying is that there is really very little in the way of hard studies done on triopolies vs duopolies. What you have given us is a defunct (?) USDA study, an instance of a price war in the airline industry (which is known for its price wars leading to bankruptcies), and a theoretical paper that is looking at the effects of information sharing (and which makes some very broad assumptions).Price wars may be great for the consumer, but I doubt that one could argue that the resulting bankruptcies are good for the economy.
What I would say is that hard studies do exist, they're just not available online like they used to be.
What I would postulate is something from my own perspective, that of the "two's company, three's a crowd" train of thought. It is easier for two entities to agree to a collusion than it is for three. The odd man out is what creates the undercutting of collusive agreements. Therefore, if you have at least three market participants you're more likely to get social pricing that is statisically close to all out competition than if you only have two.
futuremodal wrote: Datafever wrote: So, futuremodal, what I hear you saying is that there is really very little in the way of hard studies done on triopolies vs duopolies. What you have given us is a defunct (?) USDA study, an instance of a price war in the airline industry (which is known for its price wars leading to bankruptcies), and a theoretical paper that is looking at the effects of information sharing (and which makes some very broad assumptions).Price wars may be great for the consumer, but I doubt that one could argue that the resulting bankruptcies are good for the economy. What I would say is that hard studies do exist, they're just not available online like they used to be. What I would postulate is something from my own perspective, that of the "two's company, three's a crowd" train of thought. It is easier for two entities to agree to a collusion than it is for three. The odd man out is what creates the undercutting of collusive agreements. Therefore, if you have at least three market participants you're more likely to get social pricing that is statisically close to all out competition than if you only have two.
I agree with the basics of what you are saying. But my gut feeling (sorry, no studies to back it up), is that in certain cases (and the airline industry seems to be rife with this problem) the addition of an additional cut-throat competitor tends to create overall economic harm. I.e. if the price is already at a near-minimum (allowing for a "reasonable" profit), then an additional competitor that undermines that price (usually through cross-subsidization in order to get the foot in the door) is going to cause problems for the industry in the long run, even though consumers win out in the short run.
In the case of the PRB, I don't think that the addition of another player would affect the price to any great extent. Even if DM&E had rates that were 1/2 of what its competition charges, they only have so much capacity. And DM&E certainly could not remain viable at rates that low. In fact, they are going to have to set their rates at very close to the current rates (IMO) in order to recoup their investment eventually. In other words, they are in it to make money, not to start a price war just to get their foot in the door.
futuremodal wrote: "There's the word 'monopoly.' There's the word 'duopoly.' But there's no word 'triopoly,'" said Jonathan Ornstein, Mesa's president and chief executive. "With a third carrier in the market now, it's sort of forcing this level of competition, which is clearly good for the consumer." Okay, so Mr. Ornstein doesn't get out much if he thinks there is no word "triopoly", but from what we can glean from the gist of the article, the introduction of Mesa into the Hawaiian air market did cause a 50% reduction in introductory rates across the board from what the rates were with two carriers..."Mesa introduced $39 promotional one-way rates in March. Aloha and Hawaiian quickly followed suit. That's nearly half of usual airfares in Hawaii. Mesa also recently announced a special $59 round-trip weekday rate, and that was also matched."
Wow, FM you sure do know how to pick them Ornstien is a true scumbag who has almost singlehandedly killed any kind of quality in regional service for the airlines. Mesa is a well known in the airline industry for being a bottom feeder, under paying its employees, providing little to no customer service and not being the safest airline in the skys. Anyway I guess I am getting of my soapbox now.
Bert
An "expensive model collector"
n012944 wrote: futuremodal wrote: "There's the word 'monopoly.' There's the word 'duopoly.' But there's no word 'triopoly,'" said Jonathan Ornstein, Mesa's president and chief executive. "With a third carrier in the market now, it's sort of forcing this level of competition, which is clearly good for the consumer." Okay, so Mr. Ornstein doesn't get out much if he thinks there is no word "triopoly", but from what we can glean from the gist of the article, the introduction of Mesa into the Hawaiian air market did cause a 50% reduction in introductory rates across the board from what the rates were with two carriers..."Mesa introduced $39 promotional one-way rates in March. Aloha and Hawaiian quickly followed suit. That's nearly half of usual airfares in Hawaii. Mesa also recently announced a special $59 round-trip weekday rate, and that was also matched."Wow, FM you sure do know how to pick them Ornstien is a true scumbag who has almost singlehandedly killed any kind of quality in regional service for the airlines. Mesa is a well known in the airline industry for being a bottom feeder, under paying its employees, providing little to no customer service and not being the safest airline in the skys. Anyway I guess I am getting of my soapbox now.Bert
So Bert, are you suggesting a moral equivalence between Mesa and DM&E?
Datafever wrote: So, futuremodal, what I hear you saying is that there is really very little in the way of hard studies done on triopolies vs duopolies.
So, futuremodal, what I hear you saying is that there is really very little in the way of hard studies done on triopolies vs duopolies.
There are tons of studies. Here's a few:
Duopoly with Differentiated Products and Entry Barriers, Kofi O. Nti; Martin Shubik, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Jul., 1981), pp. 179-186
Product Assortment in a Triopoly, Steven M. Shugan Management Science, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Mar., 1989), pp. 304-320
The Elimination of the Canadian and Australian Wheat Boards: A Move from Triopoly to Perfect Competition in the World Wheat Market, Gregory William DeVos, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 79, No. 5, Proceedings Issue (Dec., 1997), pp. 1742-1748
Spatial Competition Revisited, B. Curtis Eaton, The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May, 1972), pp. 268-278
Horizontal Shareholding Interlocks, David Flath, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 75-77
Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition, Morton I. Kamien; Israel Zang, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Oct., 1993), pp. 205-229
Economies of Scale, Natural Monopoly, and Imperfect Competition in an Experimental Market, Charles R. Plott; Alexandre Borges Sugiyama; Gilad Elbaz, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Oct., 1994), pp. 261-287
Democracy and Duopoly: A Comparison of Analytical Models, James M. Buchanan,
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