At a time when the UP and SP experienced a lull or temporary breakdown in their merger talks, some in the RR business press were speculating that SP might simply become a "toll railroad". Since I have never heard of such a thing before, how exactly would that operate, and have there been other toll railroads in the past? If it were a viable option, why, for example, could any of the lines making up Conrail (NYC, PRR, etc.) not have used the same option rather than submit to the govt. merger?
Riprap
There is no such thing.
LC
Limitedclear wrote:There is no such thing. LC
Limitedclear wrote: There is no such thing. LC
Think Open Access. Similar concept.
Pathfinder wrote: Limitedclear wrote: There is no such thing. LCThere has been: Silverton and its Railroads In 1887, Silverton was ready for a more efficient and economical form of transportation. The mines in the area all had to bring their ore to Silverton, by wagon, for shipment on the Denver and Rio Grande. What Silverton needed was a new railroad to help bring cost of transporting ore to an affordable level. The natural person to spear head the effort was Otto Mears. Mears had built a network of toll railroads that stretched out more than 200 miles by 1887. This earned him the nick name of "The Path Finder of the San Juans." Mears was the logical choice to build the railroads the area required.From: http://www.narrowgauge.org/ncmap/excur2_silverton_railroad_silverton.html
In 1887, Silverton was ready for a more efficient and economical form of transportation. The mines in the area all had to bring their ore to Silverton, by wagon, for shipment on the Denver and Rio Grande. What Silverton needed was a new railroad to help bring cost of transporting ore to an affordable level. The natural person to spear head the effort was Otto Mears. Mears had built a network of toll railroads that stretched out more than 200 miles by 1887. This earned him the nick name of "The Path Finder of the San Juans." Mears was the logical choice to build the railroads the area required.From: http://www.narrowgauge.org/ncmap/excur2_silverton_railroad_silverton.html
An obvious typo if you read the paragraphs before and after it. According to the next paragraph, he built the first railroad in 1887.
arbfbe wrote: Limitedclear wrote: There is no such thing. LC Don't start that nonsense... LC Think Open Access. Similar concept.
Don't start that nonsense...
This is an error. Mears built toll roads, not toll railroads.
You're talking about "Open Access", a favorite of one or two members of this forum.
Open Access has not been shown to have any advantages over the more traditional integrated system where the same organization owns the trains and tracks.
Toll roads will work while toll railroads won't work principally because of the need to aggregate freight into trainload lots on a railroad. If you split the train operation between several entitites you wil make this aggreagation much more difficult and make rail transportation more costly.
With truckload shipments there is no need to aggregate at all. With less than truckload you do have to aggregate, but to a much less degeree than a train would require.
And that's why toll roads will work and toll railroads will not work
greyhounds wrote: Open Access has not been shown to have any advantages over the more traditional integrated system where the same organization owns the trains and tracks.
OA is a relatively new concept, still in the growing pains stage in Europe, perhaps more successfully entrenched in Australia. The closest North American examples in spirit would be those rail lines which host two or more Class I's, and certain shortlines/regionals that act as feeders for two or more Class I's (Ed Blysard's railroad being a prime example). The purpose of OA or toll railroads is to facilitate intramodal competition among Class I carriers. Most economists agree competition is a good thing for a free market economy, as it keeps prices down and services up for the consumers.
Greyhounds is absolutely correct in this statement......
.....if we are talking about rail lines that only host one or two trains per day. Then there wouldn't be enough traffic available to sustain two or more rail transporting companies with decent sized trains, e.g. economies of scale. (Or course, we are assuming that price competition of two or more railroads would not draw business off of over the road trucks, the long haul mode of last resort.)
However, most major rail terminals in the US and Canada host double digit numbers of trains per day, so it would be quite easy for even a single track CTC rail line to host sustainable consist sizes and train frequencies for each rail transporting company to optimize the economies of scale in terms of labor utilization, marketing reach, et al. As stated above, this is actually happening on a few rail lines in NA, where one Class I will host it's own trains and those of one or more other Class I's. In these situations, separation of infrastructure from the owning Class I could be done without disruption. But elsewhere across NA, separting infrastructure from the owning Class I would not occur without at least some semblence of the growing pains being experienced in Europe. Of course, Europe's railroads are dealing with the double whammy of privatizing previously nationalized railways in addition to adapting to separation. US railroads are already privatized, so the process of introducing OA in the US would probably go alot smoother than it has in Europe.
Since railroads in this country are already privately owned and enjoy the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, I'm not sure that FM really knows how involved the process would be in establishing OA in the United States.
Antitrust law would have to be amended to order the separation of railroads into operating and right-of-way companies. This would require an Act of Congress and there is no guarantee that this step will occur anytime in the foreseeable future given the current political climate. Said change in the law would also have to pass Constitutional muster.
Assuming that such a law is passed, the Justice Department would have to file suit against EVERY existing railroad company to enforce its provisions. These would be civil suits, which have a way of dragging on for a long time before reaching a conclusion. Since a multiplicity of lawsuits would be involved, it is quite possible that conflicting judicial decisions would be reached on various issues, which would need to be resolved by the various Circuit Courts of Appeals and possibly the Supreme Court. At no time is there a guarantee that the OA provisions would not be stricken as unconstitutional.
I will admit that this is a simplification and I welcome the attorneys to frequent this forum to fill in the details or shoot me down as appropriate.
greyhounds wrote: And that's why toll roads will work and toll railroads will not work
The reason this statement is unrealistic is that the toll railroad concept is already in place in certain areas. Montana Rail Link is for all intents and purposes a toll railroad for BNSF - BNSF pays a set fee for each of it's trains that crosses over MRL. Although BNSF has attempted to keep UP off MRL, there may be a time in the not so distant future where UP finally finds a way to utilize MRL as it's toll railroad.
futuremodal wrote: greyhounds wrote: And that's why toll roads will work and toll railroads will not work The reason this statement is unrealistic is that the toll railroad concept is already in place in certain areas. Montana Rail Link is for all intents and purposes a toll railroad for BNSF - BNSF pays a set fee for each of it's trains that crosses over MRL. Although BNSF has attempted to keep UP off MRL, there may be a time in the not so distant future where UP finally finds a way to utilize MRL as it's toll railroad.
No, MRL is more of a union busting railroad for the BN, than a toll railroad.
Bert
An "expensive model collector"
Ah, Bert, missed again. Every craft on the MRL is represented by one of the national labor organizations. That includes section men, signal maintainers, machinists, electricians, clerks and train crews. It has been that way on the MRL since day 1. This has been mentioned in every published article on the railroad in the railfan press. Try to get the facts straight before you push the send key.
MRL is hardly a toll road in the accepted sense of the word since the tracks are not open to all comers. MRL has offerred the mainlins to UP detours in the past but this happens on a case by case situation. Remember, the BNSF still OWNS the MRL mainlines and all the stipulations placed on MRL's use of these lines are only known to those at high levels in both organizations. Unless futuremodal has some information not in common knowledge, I would say it is very unlikely UP trains will be soon operating on the MRL.
If some other railroad wants to route over the MRL they would have to do the same at points east of Billings and west of Spokane with the BNSF. That sort of thing is generally handled in a rate making process. If such joint rate making meets the definition of a toll road then all common carrier railroads in the US are by your definition "toll roads".
TomDiehl wrote: Pathfinder wrote: Limitedclear wrote: There is no such thing. LC An obvious typo if you read the paragraphs before and after it. According to the next paragraph, he built the first railroad in 1887.
Pathfinder wrote: Limitedclear wrote: There is no such thing. LC
futuremodal wrote: greyhounds wrote: Open Access has not been shown to have any advantages over the more traditional integrated system where the same organization owns the trains and tracks. OA is a relatively new concept, still in the growing pains stage in Europe, perhaps more successfully entrenched in Australia. The closest North American examples in spirit would be those rail lines which host two or more Class I's, and certain shortlines/regionals that act as feeders for two or more Class I's (Ed Blysard's railroad being a prime example). The purpose of OA or toll railroads is to facilitate intramodal competition among Class I carriers. Most economists agree competition is a good thing for a free market economy, as it keeps prices down and services up for the consumers. Toll roads will work while toll railroads won't work principally because of the need to aggregate freight into trainload lots on a railroad. If you split the train operation between several entitites you wil make this aggreagation much more difficult and make rail transportation more costly. Greyhounds is absolutely correct in this statement...... .....if we are talking about rail lines that only host one or two trains per day. Then there wouldn't be enough traffic available to sustain two or more rail transporting companies with decent sized trains, e.g. economies of scale. (Or course, we are assuming that price competition of two or more railroads would not draw business off of over the road trucks, the long haul mode of last resort.) However, most major rail terminals in the US and Canada host double digit numbers of trains per day, so it would be quite easy for even a single track CTC rail line to host sustainable consist sizes and train frequencies for each rail transporting company to optimize the economies of scale in terms of labor utilization, marketing reach, et al. As stated above, this is actually happening on a few rail lines in NA, where one Class I will host it's own trains and those of one or more other Class I's. In these situations, separation of infrastructure from the owning Class I could be done without disruption. But elsewhere across NA, separting infrastructure from the owning Class I would not occur without at least some semblence of the growing pains being experienced in Europe. Of course, Europe's railroads are dealing with the double whammy of privatizing previously nationalized railways in addition to adapting to separation. US railroads are already privatized, so the process of introducing OA in the US would probably go alot smoother than it has in Europe.
Nope.
This misunderstanding of the freight market is, IMHO, the reason the RoadRailer concept has failed to fire. You've got a lot of trains originating at any given terminal and terminating at any other given terminal, but those trains are going to, and comming from, a lot of different terminals.
It's the traffic between any origin-destination pair that counts. There are OD pairs than can support daily trainloads. The Powder River to a major generation plant is an example. But when it comes to the movement of general frieght, your household appliances, your newsprint, your canned green beans, etc., there are almost no OD pairs that can support even one solid train per day.
So the railroads have to aggregate. A Chicago to Boston intermodal train doesn't really carry just Chicago to Boston loads. It aggrregates loads from all over at Chicago and takes them to Boston.
The rapid aggregation into blocks and trains that are of economical size to operate (a two car freight train ain't gonna' work) is a critical key to railroad efficiency. That's one of the reasons we've seen the railroad consolidation we have seen. Concentrating the traffic on fewer carriers allows the more rapid and efficient aggrregation of loads into blocks and trains.
Any open access system will make aggregation more difficult and reduce railroad efficiency. It will drive railroad costs up and divert freight to highway movement. The more rail carriers there are, the more difficult it will be for each one to do the aggregation. It's bad idea that has no proven benifits.
The RoadRailer people - and I worked there, and helped set up the 1st commercial RoadRailer operation, never understood this. They didn't understand the aggregation thing. And in 26 years of commercial operation they've gone basically nowhere beyone the initial Triple Crown network. They have never understood that a Chicago to Boston train is more than a Chicago to Boston train. It includes aggregated loads from multiple destinations. Their equipment was not to mix with the loads going to Boston from other origins. And that's a basic reason there is no RoadRailer service from Chicago to Boston, it can't be aggregated into an economical train size.
Open access proponents don't understand the need for aggregation either. And they have absolutely NO empirical evidence that OA will benifit anyone.
The quicker you can aggregate a block or a train, the more efficient you will be. Spliting the traffic between multiple train operators will make aggregation more difficult. It's not hard to understand.
arbfbe wrote:Ah, Bert, missed again. Every craft on the MRL is represented by one of the national labor organizations. That includes section men, signal maintainers, machinists, electricians, clerks and train crews. It has been that way on the MRL since day 1. This has been mentioned in every published article on the railroad in the railfan press. Try to get the facts straight before you push the send key. MRL is hardly a toll road in the accepted sense of the word since the tracks are not open to all comers. MRL has offerred the mainlins to UP detours in the past but this happens on a case by case situation. Remember, the BNSF still OWNS the MRL mainlines and all the stipulations placed on MRL's use of these lines are only known to those at high levels in both organizations. Unless futuremodal has some information not in common knowledge, I would say it is very unlikely UP trains will be soon operating on the MRL. If some other railroad wants to route over the MRL they would have to do the same at points east of Billings and west of Spokane with the BNSF. That sort of thing is generally handled in a rate making process. If such joint rate making meets the definition of a toll road then all common carrier railroads in the US are by your definition "toll roads".
No, I didn't suggest that MRL is a de facto toll road (okay, the "for all intents and purposes" description is probably off base!), but that the effect of the BNSF overhead traffic shows that the toll concept works for the stated purpose of generating revenue otherwise missed. Not sure if you'd agree with the following or not, but it seems to me that without the BNSF overhead traffic, MRL would have a hard time making it as a stand alone regional railroad.
As for other potential MRL clients, only UP is close enough connection-wise to be able to achieve overhead rights at two ends. And that would probably only be for Eastport-Pocatello traffic, not any east-west traffic. Again, on the MRL newsgroup there are always "rumormill"-type posts regarding the UP angle from time to time (aka, BNSF bought back the Montana Western to keep UP and MRL from having a direct connection, BNSF will never let MRL buy the Homestake Pass line to prevent the same, that kind of stuff). As for the details of the original lease contract, does that in and of itself prevent MRL from acting independently should UP by it's own volition make the necessary connections at Sandpoint and Silver Bow?
The only inside information I have is from a few years ago, when I was discussing a prospective Billings to Missoula 3rd party line haul with an MRL rep. There was no mention of such being forbidden by the original lease contract, and the reps willingness to discuss the proposal at length suggested to me that MRL could act independently if they so chose. Of course, he may have just been acting as a typical salesman, not wanting to throw water on any proposal until absolutely necessary. In the end, it was fear of BNSF seeing such as competition to it's own grain monopoly and subsequently pulling it's overhead traffic off MRL in response that squelched the idea, not any contractual misgivings.
Also, I remember MRL being interested in purchasing both the Palouse lines from BN (eventually sold to SCRAPCO.....er, I mean WATCO) and UP's Pocatello-Silver Bow line. If MRL was constricted from making such deals as per the lease contract, why would they go ahead and waste time making the pitches in the first place? Again, as in my case, BNSF's threats of pulling traffic off MRL was what was rumored to have squelched such plans.
greyhounds wrote: futuremodal wrote: greyhounds wrote: Open Access has not been shown to have any advantages over the more traditional integrated system where the same organization owns the trains and tracks. OA is a relatively new concept, still in the growing pains stage in Europe, perhaps more successfully entrenched in Australia. The closest North American examples in spirit would be those rail lines which host two or more Class I's, and certain shortlines/regionals that act as feeders for two or more Class I's (Ed Blysard's railroad being a prime example). The purpose of OA or toll railroads is to facilitate intramodal competition among Class I carriers. Most economists agree competition is a good thing for a free market economy, as it keeps prices down and services up for the consumers. Toll roads will work while toll railroads won't work principally because of the need to aggregate freight into trainload lots on a railroad. If you split the train operation between several entitites you wil make this aggreagation much more difficult and make rail transportation more costly. Greyhounds is absolutely correct in this statement...... .....if we are talking about rail lines that only host one or two trains per day. Then there wouldn't be enough traffic available to sustain two or more rail transporting companies with decent sized trains, e.g. economies of scale. (Or course, we are assuming that price competition of two or more railroads would not draw business off of over the road trucks, the long haul mode of last resort.) However, most major rail terminals in the US and Canada host double digit numbers of trains per day, so it would be quite easy for even a single track CTC rail line to host sustainable consist sizes and train frequencies for each rail transporting company to optimize the economies of scale in terms of labor utilization, marketing reach, et al. As stated above, this is actually happening on a few rail lines in NA, where one Class I will host it's own trains and those of one or more other Class I's. In these situations, separation of infrastructure from the owning Class I could be done without disruption. But elsewhere across NA, separting infrastructure from the owning Class I would not occur without at least some semblence of the growing pains being experienced in Europe. Of course, Europe's railroads are dealing with the double whammy of privatizing previously nationalized railways in addition to adapting to separation. US railroads are already privatized, so the process of introducing OA in the US would probably go alot smoother than it has in Europe. Nope. This misunderstanding of the freight market is, IMHO, the reason the RoadRailer concept has failed to fire. You've got a lot of trains originating at any given terminal and terminating at any other given terminal, but those trains are going to, and comming from, a lot of different terminals. It's the traffic between any origin-destination pair that counts. There are OD pairs than can support daily trainloads. The Powder River to a major generation plant is an example. But when it comes to the movement of general frieght, your household appliances, your newsprint, your canned green beans, etc., there are almost no OD pairs that can support even one solid train per day. So the railroads have to aggregate. A Chicago to Boston intermodal train doesn't really carry just Chicago to Boston loads. It aggrregates loads from all over at Chicago and takes them to Boston. The rapid aggregation into blocks and trains that are of economical size to operate (a two car freight train ain't gonna' work) is a critical key to railroad efficiency. That's one of the reasons we've seen the railroad consolidation we have seen. Concentrating the traffic on fewer carriers allows the more rapid and efficient aggrregation of loads into blocks and trains. Any open access system will make aggregation more difficult and reduce railroad efficiency. It will drive railroad costs up and divert freight to highway movement. The more rail carriers there are, the more difficult it will be for each one to do the aggregation. It's bad idea that has no proven benifits. The RoadRailer people - and I worked there, and helped set up the 1st commercial RoadRailer operation, never understood this. They didn't understand the aggregation thing. And in 26 years of commercial operation they've gone basically nowhere beyone the initial Triple Crown network. They have never understood that a Chicago to Boston train is more than a Chicago to Boston train. It includes aggregated loads from multiple destinations. Their equipment was not to mix with the loads going to Boston from other origins. And that's a basic reason there is no RoadRailer service from Chicago to Boston, it can't be aggregated into an economical train size. Open access proponents don't understand the need for aggregation either. And they have absolutely NO empirical evidence that OA will benifit anyone. The quicker you can aggregate a block or a train, the more efficient you will be. Spliting the traffic between multiple train operators will make aggregation more difficult. It's not hard to understand.
What's not hard to understand except by you is that aggregation and intramodal competition are not incompatible. You're falling into the "it's never been tried, ergo it won't work" trap of illogic.
As for bi-modal, the truth is aggregation itself is more compatible with bi-modal than for carload, because truckload lots are hardly ever one homogenous commodity, and bi-modal truckloads are easier to disperse to the various destinations than carloads. Most major corridors host enough over the road truckloads to make up profitable-sized rail consists. It is the disconnected reluctance of the railroads that has prevented greater acceptance of the bi-modal concept, not any percieved shortcomings you may envision.
The same can be said for the almost vitriolic reaction to the idea of open access and/or toll railroads. The idea that you can't split 30 daily trains among two or three separate entities and still have all three be profitable is ridiculous. What is your empirical evidence to support such nonsense?
futuremodal wrote: . It is the disconnected reluctance of the railroads that has prevented greater acceptance of the bi-modal concept, not any percieved shortcomings you may envision.
. It is the disconnected reluctance of the railroads that has prevented greater acceptance of the bi-modal concept, not any percieved shortcomings you may envision.
Aggregation - interesting piece of the puzzle.
So after the big boys cherry-pick all of the profitable unit train and other fixed-consist moves, who's left to do all of this aggregation? At what cost? Will it end up being more expensive to the "captive" shipper than the current arrangement?
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
The only line that seemed to get close would be the Colorado Joint line from Denver down to Colorado Springs (Pueblo?). D&RGW and Santa Fe owned it and Colorado & Southern / BN had trackage rights. Details anyone?
greetings,
Marc Immeker
bobwilcox wrote: futuremodal wrote: . It is the disconnected reluctance of the railroads that has prevented greater acceptance of the bi-modal concept, not any percieved shortcomings you may envision. Which railroads did this? When did they do it? Which o/d pairs were involved?
BNSF. Not the "evil BNSF" of TD's imagination, but the amoral, albeit illogical corporation. Swift was extremely please with the success of the I-5 RoadRailer operation over BNSF, and was actually exploring the idea of expanding the RoadRailer idea on other corridors. Then BNSF decided to jack the rate to an unrealistic amount, and the message to Swift was clear: BNSF was no longer interested in running RoadRailers at any price - "...oh, and we're so sorry you had invested all that money into RoadRailer vans and bogies without realizing the full depreciation, but hey, whatta ya gonna do? Take it up with consumer affairs."(?) As to the why's and whatfor's, you'll have to ask BNSF. They probably figured they'd get a bigger piece of the freight pie if they could force that traffic into boxcars - apparently they found out they had bought too many new boxcars - or maybe they were trying to strongarm Swift into investing in domestic containers like J.B. Hunt. Who knows? Thus the disconnected reluctance.
Whether the same scenario applies to the aborted ReeferRailer operation out of California, I don't know, but it's a safe bet that outfit lost their investment bucks as well, even though all parties were profiting at the time.
futuremodal wrote: bobwilcox wrote: futuremodal wrote: . It is the disconnected reluctance of the railroads that has prevented greater acceptance of the bi-modal concept, not any percieved shortcomings you may envision. Which railroads did this? When did they do it? Which o/d pairs were involved? BNSF. Not the "evil BNSF" of TD's imagination, but the amoral, albeit illogical corporation. Swift was extremely please with the success of the I-5 RoadRailer operation over BNSF, and was actually exploring the idea of expanding the RoadRailer idea on other corridors. Then BNSF decided to jack the rate to an unrealistic amount, and the message to Swift was clear: BNSF was no longer interested in running RoadRailers at any price - "...oh, and we're so sorry you had invested all that money into RoadRailer vans and bogies without realizing the full depreciation, but hey, whatta ya gonna do? Take it up with consumer affairs."(?) As to the why's and whatfor's, you'll have to ask BNSF. They probably figured they'd get a bigger piece of the freight pie if they could force that traffic into boxcars - apparently they found out they had bought too many new boxcars - or maybe they were trying to strongarm Swift into investing in domestic containers like J.B. Hunt. Who knows? Thus the disconnected reluctance. Whether the same scenario applies to the aborted ReeferRailer operation out of California, I don't know, but it's a safe bet that outfit lost their investment bucks as well, even though all parties were profiting at the time.
The "evil BNSF" of my imagination? You obviously can't read what you just wrote in the sentences following this lame attempt to turn the tables.
futuremodal wrote: BNSF. Not the "evil BNSF" of TD's imagination, but the amoral, albeit illogical corporation. Swift was extremely please with the success of the I-5 RoadRailer operation over BNSF, and was actually exploring the idea of expanding the RoadRailer idea on other corridors. Then BNSF decided to jack the rate to an unrealistic amount, and the message to Swift was clear: How do you know this occured. Was their a news story or press release? BNSF was no longer interested in running RoadRailers at any price - "...oh, and we're so sorry you had invested all that money into RoadRailer vans and bogies without realizing the full depreciation, but hey, whatta ya gonna do? Take it up with consumer affairs."(?) Is this a quote or just your an imaginary conversation in your head? As to the why's and whatfor's, you'll have to ask BNSF. They probably figured they'd get a bigger piece of the freight pie if they could force that traffic into boxcars - apparently they found out they had bought too many new boxcars - or maybe they were trying to strongarm Swift into investing in domestic containers like J.B. Hunt. Who knows? Thus the disconnected reluctance. Whether the same scenario applies to the aborted ReeferRailer operation out of California, I don't know, but it's a safe bet that outfit lost their investment bucks as well, even though all parties were profiting at the time. How do you know ReeferRailer lost "their investment bucks" and all parties were making a profit? Is this just pure speculation on your part?
BNSF. Not the "evil BNSF" of TD's imagination, but the amoral, albeit illogical corporation. Swift was extremely please with the success of the I-5 RoadRailer operation over BNSF, and was actually exploring the idea of expanding the RoadRailer idea on other corridors. Then BNSF decided to jack the rate to an unrealistic amount, and the message to Swift was clear:
How do you know this occured. Was their a news story or press release?
BNSF was no longer interested in running RoadRailers at any price - "...oh, and we're so sorry you had invested all that money into RoadRailer vans and bogies without realizing the full depreciation, but hey, whatta ya gonna do? Take it up with consumer affairs."(?)
Is this a quote or just your an imaginary conversation in your head?
As to the why's and whatfor's, you'll have to ask BNSF. They probably figured they'd get a bigger piece of the freight pie if they could force that traffic into boxcars - apparently they found out they had bought too many new boxcars - or maybe they were trying to strongarm Swift into investing in domestic containers like J.B. Hunt. Who knows? Thus the disconnected reluctance.
How do you know ReeferRailer lost "their investment bucks" and all parties were making a profit? Is this just pure speculation on your part?
futuremodal wrote: What's not hard to understand except by you is that aggregation and intramodal competition are not incompatible. You're falling into the "it's never been tried, ergo it won't work" trap of illogic.
No, I'm not. I pointing out a very real problem. A problem for which you have no solution.
futuremodal wrote: As for bi-modal, the truth is aggregation itself is more compatible with bi-modal than for carload, because truckload lots are hardly ever one homogenous commodity, and bi-modal truckloads are easier to disperse to the various destinations than carloads. Most major corridors host enough over the road truckloads to make up profitable-sized rail consists. It is the disconnected reluctance of the railroads that has prevented greater acceptance of the bi-modal concept, not any percieved shortcomings you may envision.
Why do you say these things?
"truckload lots are harldy ever one homeogeneous commodity" - that's not true. A driver hauling a load of frozen chickens out of Tyson won't stop to pick up something else. (unless it's more Tyson chicken)
"Most major corridors host enough over the road truckloads to make up profitable-sized rail consists." No, it's not the coridor, it's the origin destination pair that counts. That's why you have to aggregate into at least a block. There are almost no OD pairs that can support a train.
We bought research data from Reebie Associates. You'd be very suprised how few loads per day move from Chicago to New Orleans. So you've got to aggregate into blocks, then aggregate the blocks into trains. Spliting the operations between multiple carriers will make these aggregation steps more difficult and costly.
As to the bimodal concept, it's had more chances than it ever deserved. ICG tried it, it didn't work. BiModal Corporation tried their own train on Conrail - that didn't work. CSX tried it with auto parts between Detroit and Atlanta. That was also shut down. UP started a train between Chicago and Dallas, that one didn't work either. CN tried it between Montreal and Toronto - and shut the operation down.
Then there was "the big try", when BNSF put millions of dollars into buying RoadRailer equipment, and convinced two 3rd parties to buy some more (Alliance Shippers and Clipper Exxpress). CSX then gave RoadRailer a 2nd try and established connecting service between Chicago and the Northeast. CN followed suit with a connecting RoadRailer operation between Chicago and Toronto/Montreal.
A transcontinental RoadRailer system had been established and was up and operating. And then it was all shut down. Now these three railroads didn't make their investments and spend their money trying to fail - and they weren't looking for an excuse to not handle the freight. It just didn't work. Outside of Triple Crown, it's never worked, anywhere in the world.
For it to work, they'd have to solve the aggregation problem. And in 26 years, nobody has solved that problem with RoadRailer. TC works because they concentrate on auto parts - which move in sufficient quantity in their service area to support the network. But don't bet too much on TC's future.
futuremodal wrote: The same can be said for the almost vitriolic reaction to the idea of open access and/or toll railroads. The idea that you can't split 30 daily trains among two or three separate entities and still have all three be profitable is ridiculous. What is your empirical evidence to support such nonsense?
Again, it's not the number of trains, it's the origin destination pairs. Those trains aren't all alike. They're carrying different aggregations (blocks) from various origins to various destinations. How many times a day do you think a Twin Cities origin block forwards with Spokane as a final? I'll give you a clue, it's less than 15.
Open access is not going to break those 30 diverse trains down among several operators as you falsely claim, it's going to break that one Spokane block up between several operators. And it's going to do that with every block originating everywhere and going everyplace. What a freaking mess that would be.
You know, come to think of it, open access and RoadRailers seem to be a lot alike:
1) They create costly duplicate systems to serve the same market
2) They are pretty much assured of failure
TomDiehl wrote: futuremodal wrote: bobwilcox wrote: futuremodal wrote: . It is the disconnected reluctance of the railroads that has prevented greater acceptance of the bi-modal concept, not any percieved shortcomings you may envision. Which railroads did this? When did they do it? Which o/d pairs were involved? BNSF. Not the "evil BNSF" of TD's imagination, but the amoral, albeit illogical corporation. Swift was extremely please with the success of the I-5 RoadRailer operation over BNSF, and was actually exploring the idea of expanding the RoadRailer idea on other corridors. Then BNSF decided to jack the rate to an unrealistic amount, and the message to Swift was clear: BNSF was no longer interested in running RoadRailers at any price - "...oh, and we're so sorry you had invested all that money into RoadRailer vans and bogies without realizing the full depreciation, but hey, whatta ya gonna do? Take it up with consumer affairs."(?) As to the why's and whatfor's, you'll have to ask BNSF. They probably figured they'd get a bigger piece of the freight pie if they could force that traffic into boxcars - apparently they found out they had bought too many new boxcars - or maybe they were trying to strongarm Swift into investing in domestic containers like J.B. Hunt. Who knows? Thus the disconnected reluctance. Whether the same scenario applies to the aborted ReeferRailer operation out of California, I don't know, but it's a safe bet that outfit lost their investment bucks as well, even though all parties were profiting at the time. The "evil BNSF" of my imagination? You obviously can't read what you just wrote in the sentences following this lame attempt to turn the tables.
Show us all where I have said anything about BNSF being evil. On the contrary, I made the point of stating that BNSF, like all corporations, is amoral. What BNSF has *accomplished* in this vein is a sorry history of convincing certain 3rd parties to make heady investments in rail partnerships, only to pull the rug out from these 3rd parties permaturely. They did it to Swift. They did it to the ReeferRailer folks. They did it to Wabash. They've done it to 26-car and 52-car shuttle elevators. They did it to the Port of Montana in Butte. They've done it to the State of Washington. They've even done it to me. I'll bet others can add to this list.
futuremodal wrote:..They've even done it to me...
Now I understand some of your posts. Keep by the phone Dave, Matt may call at anytime.
futuremodal wrote: TomDiehl wrote: futuremodal wrote: bobwilcox wrote: futuremodal wrote: . It is the disconnected reluctance of the railroads that has prevented greater acceptance of the bi-modal concept, not any percieved shortcomings you may envision. Which railroads did this? When did they do it? Which o/d pairs were involved? BNSF. Not the "evil BNSF" of TD's imagination, but the amoral, albeit illogical corporation. Swift was extremely please with the success of the I-5 RoadRailer operation over BNSF, and was actually exploring the idea of expanding the RoadRailer idea on other corridors. Then BNSF decided to jack the rate to an unrealistic amount, and the message to Swift was clear: BNSF was no longer interested in running RoadRailers at any price - "...oh, and we're so sorry you had invested all that money into RoadRailer vans and bogies without realizing the full depreciation, but hey, whatta ya gonna do? Take it up with consumer affairs."(?) As to the why's and whatfor's, you'll have to ask BNSF. They probably figured they'd get a bigger piece of the freight pie if they could force that traffic into boxcars - apparently they found out they had bought too many new boxcars - or maybe they were trying to strongarm Swift into investing in domestic containers like J.B. Hunt. Who knows? Thus the disconnected reluctance. Whether the same scenario applies to the aborted ReeferRailer operation out of California, I don't know, but it's a safe bet that outfit lost their investment bucks as well, even though all parties were profiting at the time. The "evil BNSF" of my imagination? You obviously can't read what you just wrote in the sentences following this lame attempt to turn the tables. Show us all where I have said anything about BNSF being evil. On the contrary, I made the point of stating that BNSF, like all corporations, is amoral. What BNSF has *accomplished* in this vein is a sorry history of convincing certain 3rd parties to make heady investments in rail partnerships, only to pull the rug out from these 3rd parties permaturely. They did it to Swift. They did it to the ReeferRailer folks. They did it to Wabash. They've done it to 26-car and 52-car shuttle elevators. They did it to the Port of Montana in Butte. They've done it to the State of Washington. They've even done it to me. I'll bet others can add to this list.
Every mention of the BNSF in your posts vilifies the railroad for operating as any business would: to make a profit. Since when has ANY corporation been in the business to operate in the best public interest and/or morality? We can't even say the our government operates that way. Starting with your third sentence above you continue this tirade. This is the first post that you've added the qualifier, "like all corporations:" "I made the point of stating that BNSF, like all corporations,"
You're probably th only one of this forum that doesn't see this.
Or are in denial that you say these things making them sound "evil."
bobwilcox wrote: futuremodal wrote:..They've even done it to me... Now I understand some of your posts. Keep by the phone Dave, Matt may call at anytime.
Are you kidding Bob? This could be a good story. Even if it exists only in his mind.
FM the reason the Reefer Roadrailer train failed was simple no outbound trains. There was no outbound freight for the BNSF to haul out to the West coast to reload with produce to bring back to the midwest with. As for your comment about the Swift roadrailer train. Swift themselves PULLED THE PLUG there lack of the ability to send those trailers anywhere all over the US that plus the loss of 1000 lbs of cargo limits what you can haul in a way. Out here in the IL the local elevators are building 110 car loaders as fast as they can to get service by the EVIL BNSF as you call it.
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