Steam Locomotives versus Diesels

[Anonymous]

Maybe you said it and I can't find it, but why were the interest charges higher on the diesels than they would have been on new steam? Understandably they could have bought them slower, but in the end the cost would be the same, would it not?

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by up829
For example, at UP Otto Jabelman made that decision after the war. As chief Mechanical Engineer during the 30's he was closely involved with the Streamliners. He was also responsible for the Northerns, Challangers, Big Boys, and had plans drawn up for a Super 800. At the time the decision was made UP had almost 10 years experience with the Streamliners as well as yard switchers on the west coast. Jabelman was also well aware of the failure of the 2 GE steam turbines. The road didn't dieselize all at once, but rather west to east over the next 10 years. They also bought about equally from EMD and Alco.

You suggest that this was an Operating Department decision, and if so, then railroad management failed utterly, judging by the financial results. Paraphrasing Lou Menk: "If you put the Operating Department in charge of the railroad, you'd have a first class, bankrupt railroad."

UP was like most railroads. Do it, and worry about the results later. The 100-ton and 125-ton cars provide yet another illustration on this count at Union Pacific.

"Tracking heavy-car impact - effect of heavier cars on track
maintenance," Railway Age, March, 1989 by Gus Welty
...
Jerry R. Davis, executive vice president-operations of Union Pacific,
goes along with the popular assessment of the 125-ton well cars as not
having much impact. But Jerry Davis can be a bad man to get started
talking about 125-ton bulk-commodity cars operated in unit trains.
He's been with UP since the late 1950s, and he recalls unit-train
operations with 125-ton cars--with no enthusiasm whatsoever. Davis
thinks back to the railroad's experience with 125-ton covered hopper
cars hauling soda ash: "Worst experience we ever had. Those cars
literally ate the railroad up." And, it might be kept in mind, those
observations come from a railroad officer whose railroad always ranks
up-top in terms of maintenance.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd
If a RR buys 100 locomotives to handle their traffic and the locomotives perform exactly as advertised, but 90% of the traffic goes away, the nomalized measures will show that the locomotive's performance deteriorated, when, in fact, nothing of the sort happened.

I think you missed your own very good point.

If 90% of the traffic goes away, so do the fuel costs and maintenance costs as well. Employees can be furloughed. With Dieselization, one big cost thereafter remained that railroads could no longer control: the interest charges on the investment.

It may be that 90% of the traffic goes away, but 40% of the cost remains even when the shiny diesel-electric locomotives are just sitting there. Except that it becomes 80% or 90% of your cost and there's nothing you can do about it.

However, this does fit with your comment that railroad management at this point viewed railroading as a short term enterprise. Bankers, who benefitted the most from Dieselization, sat on most railroad boards at this point.

Walter Cummings, the chairman of Continental Illinois Bank, sat on the Milwaukee Road Board of Directors 1945-1966 ... it's most senior and influential board member during that era. When he retired, he was replaced by his son Tilden "Tillie" Cummings, by then, Chairman of Continental Illinois Bank.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by jockellis

G'day, Y'all,
While I grant that getting rid of steam was important, let's not forget that railroads were still in deep stinky until the government got rid of the ICC and all the old rules railroads had to live by thanks to excesses by the robber barons of the 19th century.

This raises a very important point. What metrics were the regulators using in setting rates during this period? Some utility boards today use a target ROI in setting rates. If inflation was increasing costs during the period, but the regulators felt a 4% ROI was sufficient, not much else matters.

I also disagree with the idea that the entire industry made a hasty decision based on little experience or over-zealous EMD salesmen.. For example, at UP Otto Jabelman made that decision after the war. As chief Mechanical Engineer during the 30's he was closely involved with the Streamliners. He was also responsible for the Northerns, Challangers, Big Boys, and had plans drawn up for a Super 800. At the time the decision was made UP had almost 10 years experience with the Streamliners as well as yard switchers on the west coast. Jabelman was also well aware of the failure of the 2 GE steam turbines. The road didn't dieselize all at once, but rather west to east over the next 10 years. They also bought about equally from EMD and Alco.

UP also had a large group of gas turbines and although they weren't a partner in the project by several east coast roads and the coal industry to develop a coal fired steam turbine, they went ahead and built one using the knowledge gained from that project. That effort which resulted in experimental designs for the N&W and C&O utilized some of the brightest minds in the country, was well funded, and lasted a number of years. It would seem that what those roads felt was no longer viable was the conventional reciprocating steam engine. It would also be very hard to believe that as part of that project they didn't study the comparative operating costs of conventional steam and diesels. In the end, both C&O and N&W bought diesels.

[Tharmeni]

Hey, Tom Diehl: Thanks for the info on the ACE 3000. I was actually in several of the meetings the BN had with the ACE folks and there WAS interest by BN in the idea, but it soon faded.

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding


nanaimo73: Was the FT diesel the Dreadnought of the railroads?[:)]

I don't know. I'm not good at that type of question.


Michael-
The theory you have put forward seems to fall completely apart when one looks at the PRR. It was THE railroad in the 1940s and 1950s. Their ROI fell quicker because they did not dieselize. Instead of buying 2 E7s in the fall of 1945 they should have bought at least 100 and not wasted all of that time and effort trying to replace their (worn out ?) steamers with T1s and the other experiments.

One of the things you need to understand to put this in perspective is the Pennsy's engineering culture (for lack of a better term). They had a reputation for testing the living daylights out of everything and documenting the tests and comparisons. For example, if a new appliance (same as accessory on a car) came out, they would buy a few, apply them to selected locomotives, and run tests comparing them to unmodified engines. After the numbers were "crunched" they would determine if the new item would actually save money, improve power or performance, etc enough to justify the added expense of buying and maintaining it.

There's an interesting display with artifacts and interpretive stations on this at the Railroaders Memorial Museum in Altoona, up on the 4th floor. It's in what used to be the Master Mechanic's Building of the Juniata Locomotive Works in downtown Altoona. On the web:

http://www.railroadcity.com/

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by cementmixr

This Brown is an outsider looking in. I am not particularly pursuaded by commentary from outsiders on the railroad industry. The woods are full of self-styled railroad experts. In my opinion, the place to start an analysis like this one is with primary source documents as found in a railroad company's archives. Surely every railroad made internal studies on the impact of dieselization. Where are the internal studies? I guess nobody here has read them.

Even if you completely ignore his background and/or qualifications, this does bring up another question: Why did Brown do this study? Was he hired by the railroads or organization like the AAR? Was he working for a Wall Street firm to give them a stock market rating for the railroads?

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by techguy57
I'm guessing that they saw dollar signs in the fact that diesels meant less crews and presumably easier maintenance (on paper it would seem easier to change out a mass produced traction motor or generator than custom rebuilding a boiler)
Mike

Therein lies one of the big differences between steam and diesel, standard (mass produced) parts. Even back in the days, you couldn't call up Baldwin and order a left piston for your 1928 Mikado and have it delivered from stock. Parts simply weren't standardized in any way. Even in cases where there were many copies of a single model, most major parts weren't interchangable to the point where you could take it out of the box and slap it on. Machining and fitting needed to be done to even the most common parts. In most cases, it was more economical to fabricate the part from scratch than try to make standard ones.

However, you could call EMD and order a new piston for your 567 type engine.

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Tharmeni

Whatever happened to the ACE3000, the computerized steam engine proposed by a group in Ohio in the 1980s? Did they ever build a prototype?

For more than you ever probably wanted to know about the ACE 3000:

http://www.trainweb.org/tusp/ult.html

[Tharmeni]

Jeez, when you guys are finished, I guess we can all argue about the virtues of my first wife. That's history, too!

[MJ4562]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
The statistical fact is that, had railroads achieved employment "efficiencies" in general that paralleled those associated with the Dieselization process, all American railroads would have been bankrupt .

That is, fortunately American railroads were able to achieve employment reductions in other areas far in excess of what they were able to achieve through Dieselization. It was that effort, not Dieselization, which saved American railroads from near certain bankruptcy as the result of the decline in carloadings.

So what are the employment reductions attributable to?

[Anonymous]

Michael Sol,

From your facts, what conclusions can be drawn about when the railroads should have dieselized?

[jockellis]

G'day, Y'all,
In some book of railroad facts, the number of employees per mile was compared using 1951 and, I thiunk, in the 1990s. The numbers dropped from about 8-9 per mile to 2-3 per mile for modern railroads. But it is really the intervening years between 1951 and 1960 when the last of the steamfitters, etc. were furloughed that would really tell how much diseasels aided the railroad books. Has anyone seen such figures? While I grant that getting rid of steam was important, let's not forget that railroads were still in deep stinky until the government got rid of the ICC and all the old rules railroads had to live by thanks to excesses by the robber barons of the 19th century.
Let's also not forget that Trains magazine's circulation dropped when steam was retired. I have a feeling that a lot of passengers decided at the same time, because of the same thing, that they could go by car if they couldn't be pulled by steam.
My first rail trip was from Atlanta to Fitzgerald, GA when I was about six in the year 1954. Hopping off the train early the next morning, I turned to the head end only to be disappointed to see a lashup of diseasels instead of a steamer. What was the big deal about taking the train if it didn't have siderods and smoke?
Jock Ellis
Cumming, GA US of A
Georgia Association of Railroad Passengers

[MichaelSol]

Well, my spreadsheet is about to collapse from too much data. I am going to have to go back and streamline the thing. A weekend project.

However, the data presented thus far is best looked at as relative. The problem that I noticed with the "diesel" costs is that they include the electrification, and that skews the data favorably in favor of the "diesel."

As you point out, Anthony, "how" it is presented makes more sense to some than to others, and there are myriad ways to measure things. Some prefer gross ton miles, other net ton miles. Some prefer a purely financial measure: % of revenue earned, etc. etc.

However, since the electrification skews Milwaukee Road figures -- it acts as a buffer to showing true changes due to Dieselization -- it is useful to separate out the electrification. The Electric fleet represented between 10.3% and 13% of the Milwaukee Road's available tractive effort during this period.

A quick way to look at 1962 numbers, using the 1944 constant dollar approach, is by creating index numbers to show improvement relative to earnings, or deterioration relative to earnings.

If the 1962 revenues represent an Index of 100, the following index numbers represents various categories:

Operating expenses exclusive of fuel, locomotive maintenance and financing charges: 108%. Now, this is the change in the relative relationships to revenue based on the relationship that existed in 1944.

Overall, operating expenses went up a bit relative to revenue. Not surprised.

Total expenses in 1962 associated with electric locomotives were 59% of the same costs relative to revenue in 1944. This was due almost entirely to the declining costs of electric power under the Montana Power/Puget Power & Light contracts.

Non-electric fleet operating costs in 1962 -- fuel, maintenance, financing -- all Diesel, were 136% of the same costs relative to revenue in 1944, when those costs represented mostly Steam.

Electrification was the big financial hero for Milwaukee Road during that era, enjoying the highest producitivty gains of anything on the railroad. Milwaukee pretty much held the line on all other operating expenses, fell behind a little, not much.

However, it is that increase relative to the revenue in the remaining motive power expense category that simply cannot be wished away as proof that Dieselization was good for Milwaukee Road. Had it not been for the ability to make substantial cuts/savings in other areas, the substantial increase in relative costs because of Dieselization would have been hugely problematic for the Milwaukee Road.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[oltmannd]

Anthony-

You are barking up the right tree with your questions, but I think all the normalized measures fall short.

If a RR buys 100 locomotives to handle their traffic and the locomotives perform exactly as advertised, but 90% of the traffic goes away, the nomalized measures will show that the locomotive's performance deteriorated, when, in fact, nothing of the sort happened.

If you had assumed you'd get so many ton-mile per unit per year and you get less, it can mean that locomotives were performing poorly, OR, it could mean less traffic (think same network of trains, but 10% fewer cars on each train. Not enough to drop one unit from the consist).

There might have been the assumption that utilization would be 70%, but only 60% is achieved. This might be related to locomotive reliability, but it can also be explained if less traffic means fewer trains. Same number of units chasing fewer trains = lower utilization.

Some of the ownership cost is fixed (purchase). Some is time variable (inpections). Some is mileage variable (trucks), and some is hp-hr variable (engine & fuel).

In order to do justice to this question, we really need the ROI calculation with all the supporting assumptions made that went to the RR board for approval in order to compare to the actuals. The only way dieselization could be proven to be a bad decision is if the original ROI calculation was in error (not likely) or there were bad assumptions (there usually are some, but not usually fatal).

Approaching the question this way one can find out if it was the performance of the locomotives themselves that were the problem or some other, perhaps external factor.

As many have pointed out, there were big changes afoot in post war US, many of them not favorable to the railroads. Until these are also considered as potential drivers of the drop in RR ROI, you can't say with any certainty that dieselization was the cause - it may be an effect, or artifact of the era.

I am inclined to think that the dieselization was entirely justified and overall performance not radically different from the assumptions made in the original ROI (don't be trotting out those traffic-normalized stats, though). I'm also inclined to think that RR mgt had only one thing in mind in the 1950s and that was to cut operating costs to the bone in order to continue to pay out dividends or invest in businesses with high ROIs. I don't believe that many on RR boards thought the RRs were a going concern and anything they could reasonably do to suck cash out, they'd do.

[AnthonyV]

I am just as skeptical about Michael's findings as anybody. However, if the economic advantages of Dieselization are such a slam dunk, it should easy to prove it in the numbers. No one has yet to refute Michael's results numerically, which is why I am focusing on understanding his analysis.

Michael,

I was questioned whether inflation adjustments could be applied in the manner that I did. (Read my original post.) So I do agree with the general premise of your earlier post.

I have had numerous questions on your results that I've been meaning to ask.

How are future costs of steam maintenance and fuel calculated?

You have presented much of the data on a per revenue ton basis. I believe that using the revenue ton mile as a basis of comparison is more appropriate since transportation involves moving weight over a distance. Do you have fuel, maintenance, and finance cost data in these terms?

You have referred to locomotive maintenance costs in terms of cost per horsepower and cost per tractive effort (if I remember correctly). Shouldn't maintenance costs always be represented in terms of cost per ton mile?

There is much discussion about locomotive service lives in terms of years. Wouldn't revenue ton miles be the only relevant measure of economic service life? How does steam and Diesel compare on this basis?

How did revenue ton miles change over time?

How did the average haul distance change over time? (I suspect this had to increase since the railroad lost unprofitable short-haul traffic due to the highway as you stated earlier.)

What assumptions are made regarding steam purchases over the 18 year period?

Is railroad employment dependent solely on carloadings?

Did train length and tonnage and frequency change as a result of Dieselization?

Were there any economic benefits made possible by Dieselization that could not be realized using steam?

How did revenue/ton and revenue/ton mile change over time?

I guess this is a good starting point. I'll keep asking as long as you're willing to answer.

Thanks,

Anthony V.

[rrandb]

Micheal I beleive the Tele-com, the dot-com and even Enron are excelent examples of industries that made poor and simularly bad economic decisions. [#ditto] Big ditto for an excellent analagy. How long did it take for there investors to scream bloody murder to both the directors and the government?? [?] The existing directors were either replaced and new stratagies implemented to turn them around or they were bankrupted/merger and ceased to exist. This what happened to many railroads because of freight leaving steel wheels for rubber tires. I find it interesting if steam could have been revived as an alternative to diesel in this day and age no one has been able to get past the talking stage. Not even a scale working model for a prototype. I think if you could contact UP's steam dept who still has big steam on the rails they could tell you which cost more to operate in 2006 dollars. It's not the GM/GE diesel behind there Challenger. The diesels only prolonged the agony for many railroads that were the victums of poor managment. If not for the follow the laeder style of this endustry we would probably see coast to coast mergers before now. Good, bad or indiferent in business the strong eat the weak. diesel ate steam and no one was sorrier than me to see them go. [:(] I'll step down now [soapbox] as always and most sincerly ENJOY

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal

QUOTE: Originally posted by Old Timer

TomDiehl sayeth:

"At first, I couldn't figure out why a Steam vs Diesel post would go 16 pages. This post is roll-on-the-floor-laughing hilarious.

"Blaming the railroad's downturn on the steam to diesel transition. So when does that Kalmbach book "Diesel Victory" come out?

"Michael, you should be writing comedy. Especially the way you're leading these people down the garden path.

"You're not getting a piece of the action for selling that book, are you Michael?"

At last. Somebody else who gets it.

By "getting it", you must mean the stuck-on-stupid virus that's going around..........[:D]

Wow, a lame attempt at an insult.

Color me surprised. [:D]

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Old Timer

TomDiehl sayeth:

"At first, I couldn't figure out why a Steam vs Diesel post would go 16 pages. This post is roll-on-the-floor-laughing hilarious.

"Blaming the railroad's downturn on the steam to diesel transition. So when does that Kalmbach book "Diesel Victory" come out?

"Michael, you should be writing comedy. Especially the way you're leading these people down the garden path.

"You're not getting a piece of the action for selling that book, are you Michael?"

At last. Somebody else who gets it.

By "getting it", you must mean the stuck-on-stupid virus that's going around..........[:D]

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by espeefoamer

Just look at how often steam engines had to stop for water.Also the extra facilities needed at each terminal.Facilities were needed at more locations,and steam engines had to be changed out more often. And many helper districts could be abandoned with diesels.All of these facilities required many more men to operate.On an economic basis alone,dieselization seems like a no brainer.

You've already posted this once.

Just what is "the economic basis" that you speak of, and how does that differ from the specific economic analysis we have been looking at on this thread?

Best regards, Michael Sol

[espeefoamer]

Just look at how often steam engines had to stop for water.Also the extra facilities needed at each terminal.Facilities were needed at more locations,and steam engines had to be changed out more often. And many helper districts could be abandoned with diesels.All of these facilities required many more men to operate.On an economic basis alone,dieselization seems like a no brainer.Even if a steam loco could be built to match a diesel's performance,(and the N&W came very close doing this) the steam engine still needed far more maintinance.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by daveklepper

I know from first-hand experience with the facts of the case that the B&M management made the right decision. And I trust the Norfolk and Western Management because of the other excellent decisions they made in keeping their railroad safe, profitable, and full of customer satisfaction. It is the N& case that is the proof for me about the other railroads. Of the majors, they kept steam the longest, had the very best steam engineering, operaiton, and maintenance, and yet they switched to diesel over a nine-year period.[

If, by this, you mean that neither railroad was harmed financially by their efforts, which I haven't seen, you will note that Milwaukee Road's ROI was not damaged during this period of dieselization ( by cutting some other things to offset the Dieselization losses, it appears), and during that time, its Operating Ratio improved. Can we say, based on the actual knowledge that we now have about Milwaukee's experience with Dieselization that it was the right decision at Milwaukee, just because its overall experience was something more positive than most railroads?

And if so, what does this say about the bulk of American railroads which suffered declining ROIs and deteriorating Operating Ratios during the period of Dieselization? Was that typical of B&M and N&W?

Or were the actual financial results of most American railroads different?

I do not understand these generous general conclusions, based on zero actual data. Particularly notwithstanding the actual fact that railroads, as an industry, went into a thoroughly documented economic decline during and after Dieselization from which many permit themselves to conclude is absolutely positive proof that Dieselization was a success!

Best regards, Michael Sol

[martin.knoepfel]

In another thread on steam engines - I could not find it, sorry - somebody mentioned that the PRR IIRC had solved the problem of m.u.ing steam engines in the thirties. It was not applied because the railroad was afraid of active resistance by train crews and because it would have meant there are unguarded boilers. Liability problem?

[daveklepper]

I know from first-hand experience with the facts of the case that the B&M management made the right decision. And I trust the Norfolk and Western Management because of the other excellent decisions they made in keeping their railroad safe, profitable, and full of customer satisfaction. It is the N& case that is the proof for me about the other railroads. Of the majors, they kept steam the longest, had the very best steam engineering, operaiton, and maintenance, and yet they switched to diesel over a nine-year period.

I do feel that the McGinnes inspired conversion of the New Haven from a change at New Haven electrication to the FL-9 concept was not a good decision. It might have been a good one if the Copnnecticut Turnpike had not been built at the same time with consequent erosion of passenger traffic (which has made a comeback). However, it did result in an interesting, long-living, and useful locomotive. But just think, the caternary between New Haven Passenger Station and the State Street Junction near Ceder Hill Yard was installed when the electrication was extended from Stamford to New Haven, then torn down when freight service was dieselized under Alpert, then restored after the Virginian electrics were purchased, then torn down when Conrail dieslized all freight service, and then put back as part of the Amtrak Boston electriciation. Same routes caternary installed three times! Must be a world's record.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by rrandb

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol[/i]
Notwithstanding romantic visions of crew savings by early dieselization advocates, perpetuated today by railfans, where are the economic results that support these contentions?

Best regards, Michael Sol

There is nothing romantic abuot the dramatic fact that only tourist lines still opperate steam today. The economic results are now writen in the history books and the facts can not be changed. It was no one single advantage but there overall cost reduction. While this no reflection on you Michael we are drowning in both acid rain and possible glodal warming. There are no clean burning coal power plants or would there be steam engines. At this point in time they are mandating even diesels reduce addmissions. Picture L.A. smog with steam instead of diesel today?? It will be up to the next EMD/diesel type advance in locomotives that may still yet keep railroads viable. I am quite sure debates such as this raged in railroad board rooms across America without the romantisim. Bottom line, Bottom dollar and diesels won.

There is this interesting premise that business organizations do the right things, all the time on big decisions. Statistically, half of all business decisions have negative results. That's why so much energy is spent these days examining why and how decisions go haywire.

For Dieselization, to support the premise that it was the right decision because so many boards of directors made the same decision, is purely teleological: that because it happened, it must have been right.

People manage to argue with a straight face that this decision, in particular, was a good one because everyone made the same decision. The same "everyone" that hasn't been able to earn their cost of capital in 80 years, even though they continually make these great decisions.

From a broader perspective, it just doesn't work that way. The Telecom industry, a far larger industry with arguably better executive talent, offers a remarkable rejection of the idea that many boards of directors inherently make correct decisions. More stockholders suffered greater losses, 1996-2003, in Telecoms than in any industry in history, barring of course the Dot-coms, likewise involving huge market capitalizations, many boards of directors, and executive talent all over the place. It is far more plausible that otherwise intelligent, experienced people invested because the "herd" was moving, than that people made fully independent judgments that would have saved themselves, and the national economy, billions of dollars.

As usual, analysis has to proceed on the basis of actual facts, not what we wi***he facts were because of the interesting theory that boards of directors inherently study these things and make correct decisions because that premise is simply not viable. There are too many concrete examples of the contrary.

I mentioned earlier that this is an industry that makes decisions more by default than by careful analysis, and there is nothing in the dieselization process that shows otherwise: to the contrary.

We mentioned earlier that Dieselization tracked the adoption of the 100-ton car. ""At the time of the 100-ton car's introduction a number of research and track engineers warned that it would be highly detrimental to the track structure.....Without fully analyzing the economic implications of the 100-ton car, the industry essentially adopted it by default."

That accurately describes the Dieselization process in the same industry where similar long-term operating and investment decisions were simply not made, but rather were avoided upon the premise that short term savings were the same thing as a long term strategy.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by daveklepper
How many years can a boiler on a steam locomotive be in service before being essentially rebuilt into a new boiler? Economically, isn't this equivalent to trading in on new power?

The boiler regs that were in effect from the 1930's until right after the Gettysburg incident required that the boiler be torn down every five years, the barrel and sheets inspected for flaws or thin spots, all flues replaced, and the locomotive hydrostatically tested. Probably the equivalent of the FRA inspection of a modern diesel, although I'm not familiar with the details of that inspection.

The flues were a normal wear item on the boiler. The barrel probably lasted the life of the locomotive, about 50 years on the 20th century built ones. The next most common to replace item was the crown sheet (roof of the firebox).

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Milwaukee had converted any number of steam engines to oil, no doubt much easier to convert to electronic controls than coal-fired machines.

Why would oil-fired steamers be easier to retrofit with a Diesel Synchronous Controller (DSC?) than coal fired locomotives? Are you refering to stoker-fired engines or hand fired engines, or is there no difference when comteplating DSC for coal-fired vs oil-fired steamers?

Well, that's a good question. My perception is that stoker-fired coal engines would be slower reacting than pressure-fired oil engines, but I've never seen them work. Don't know.

Best regards, Michael Sol

The answer to this question is that both the stoker on a coal fired loco and the oil jets on an oil fired loco are manually controlled by the fireman. They have to constantly vary the settings of the feed due to the varying need for steam, depending on how hard the loco is working. Maybe with today's technology, they could be remote controlled, as required by the MU system. The injector would also have to be automated to maintain water level in the boiler.

And to answer another question I saw earlier about MU'ing steam and diesel: they were run together in the transition period, but not in what we would call MU mode. The locos were run by their own engineer and required the skill and handling of an experienced engineer to coordinate the movement, more properly called helper service than MU.

[daveklepper]

Different operating conditions on the WP vs the B&M. Ernie Bloss was careful not to overstress his diesel power. He matched the number of units to the job at hand, and there were simply no cases in my memory of freights running through Hoosac Tunnel or up to White River Junction with one of the four or three units just along for the ride because of a failure. What I have read about most western railroad operations, not just the Western Pacific, is quite different, where failures in service were far more common. Even on the UP. The well-run Santa Fe might be the exception in my memory. Similarly, I don't remember failures in service on the New York Central and I do remember failures in service on the PRR. (With the Baldwins, particularly!) I can only speak about the B&M, because I did have first-hand knowledge about the replacement program where FT's were traded for GP-9's. Incidently, again, all GP-7's and RS-3's equipped with train boilers were used in freight service as well as passenger service on the B&M, and crews often ran a passenger in one direction and returned on a freight. Or visa versa. Often with the same locomotive. This was true of trainmen as well as locomotive engineers and firemen. Was the B&M unusual in this respect?

How many years can a boiler on a steam locomotive be in service before being essentially rebuilt into a new boiler? Economically, isn't this equivalent to trading in on new power?

Regarding the Clinchfield's using a diesel control stand in its heritage train 4-6-0 to control a helper F-7 B-unit, there was a good TRAINS article about this several years ago, with somewhat of a reprise this past year, and maybe some other reader can grab the copies quicker than I can. I think the operation ceased before the Clinchfield was merged into the CSX system.

[bobwilcox]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Old Timer

TomDiehl sayeth:

"At first, I couldn't figure out why a Steam vs Diesel post would go 16 pages. This post is roll-on-the-floor-laughing hilarious.

"Blaming the railroad's downturn on the steam to diesel transition. So when does that Kalmbach book "Diesel Victory" come out?

"Michael, you should be writing comedy. Especially the way you're leading these people down the garden path.

"You're not getting a piece of the action for selling that book, are you Michael?"

At last. Somebody else who gets it.

Thanks, Tom.

Old Timer

Pettifogger

1: a lawyer whose methods are petty, underhanded, or disreputable: SHYSTER
2: one given to quibbling over trifles
Websters Collegate Dictionary - 11th Edition

I thinks definition number 2 applies in this case.

[rrandb]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol[/i]


Notwithstanding romantic visions of crew savings by early dieselization advocates, perpetuated today by railfans, where are the economic results that support these contentions?

Best regards, Michael Sol

There is nothing romantic abuot the dramatic fact that only tourist lines still opperate steam today. The economic results are now writen in the history books and the facts can not be changed. It was no one single advantage but there overall cost reduction. While this no reflection on you Michael we are drowning in both acid rain and possible glodal warming. There are no clean burning coal power plants or would there be steam engines. At this point in time they are mandating even diesels reduce addmissions. Picture L.A. smog with steam instead of diesel today?? It will be up to the next EMD/diesel type advance in locomotives that may still yet keep railroads viable. I am quite sure debates such as this raged in railroad board rooms across America without the romantisim. Bottom line, Bottom dollar and diesels won.